-Caveat Lector- WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a prelude to war! STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update Weekly Analysis November 8, 1999 Ten Years after the Fall: After the Celebration Summary: Last week saw a remarkable display of nuclear saber rattling by the Russians. Triggered by U.S. insistence on deploying an Anti- Ballistic Missile system despite a 1972 treaty and by Congress' rejection of a nuclear test ban treaty, the Russians put on a display of symbolic nuclear muscle-flexing unlike anything seen in 10 years. The real issue behind the display was that the United States is discounting Russia in its foreign policy decisions. U.S. meddling in Russia's sphere of influence, the former Soviet Union, is posing real problems for the Russians. Moscow is trying to remind the Americans of the risks it will run if it places Russia in an untenable position. This also makes for good domestic politics in Russia. Analysis: The Berlin Wall came down 10 years ago this week. This made the events of last week all the more startling. The Russians rattled their nuclear sabers louder than they have since Gorbachev's day, reminding the United States that whatever else has happened, Russia remains a great power. The United States appeared simultaneously confused and angry at Russia's behavior. This is what made the last week interesting. The United States still thinks it is operating in the post-Cold War era. The Russians have moved on to a very different place. It all began with discussion in the United States about amending the 1972 treaty banning the deployment of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems. The logic behind the treaty was that peace between the United States and the Soviet Union depended on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). As long as both sides were assured of the ability to destroy the other, neither would attempt a nuclear attack. Anti-ballistic missile systems had the potential of destabilizing the situation. With such a system, one side could gain the ability to block all or most of the other's attack. More important, was the uncertainty surrounding the system. As neither side could be sure the other side was able to block its attacks, each had to assume the worst: that its own nuclear arsenal was about to become impotent. This increased insecurity would obviously knock out the "assured" element of MAD, increasing the likelihood of war. Therefore, they formed a treaty banning all but a limited number of ABM sites in each country. What was particularly nice about the treaty was that the agreement banned a technology that didn't really exist yet. The United States toyed with the idea of an ABM shield during the 1980s. Called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and nicknamed Star Wars, it came to little, because of serious technical difficulties in implementation and attacks by those who felt MAD was a more secure foundation for preventing nuclear war. Nevertheless, research and development on some sort of missile defense went on in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), and in a system called Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). THAAD differed from Star Wars in several ways. It was not designed to shield the United States against a massive Soviet attack. Rather, it was intended to defend U.S. troops abroad against the threat of smaller powers like Iraq or North Korea. THAAD's function was to destroy a small handful of incoming missiles, not to serve as a shield against massive attack. Therefore, from the U.S. point of view, THAAD posed no challenge to the Russians. >From the American point of view, the 1972 treaty is now irrelevant. The foundation of the treaty was MAD. With the United States and Soviet Union training thousands of missiles on each other, an ABM system would have undermined MAD. In 1999, there is no Soviet Union, and the United States and Russia are not aiming thousands of warheads at each other. We are not on hair trigger alerts, ready to move to DEFCON 1 on a moment's notice. Therefore, U.S. reasoning holds that introducing interceptor missiles would not destabilize the balance of terror, because there is no longer a balance of terror. What remain are threats from minor powers that can be blocked by new ABM systems. Thus, not only is the 1972 treaty meaningless, but the Russians cannot reasonably object to the United States protecting its cities from destruction by dangerous, small enemies. The United States was wrong. The Russians did not think the treaty was irrelevant. In fact, they went ballistic last week. Earlier, Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton stating that the U.S. plan would have "extremely dangerous consequences for the entire disarmament process." Then things started happening: * On Nov. 3, with a massive publicity blitz, the Russians announced they had test-fired one of the anti-ballistic missiles they were permitted under the 1972 treaty. Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, head of Russia's rocket forces, was quoted by The Associated Press as saying the test must be viewed in the context of a "possible symmetrical and asymmetrical response" to U.S. actions. In defense jargon, this meant Russia already has an ABM system under the 1972 treaty, and may decide to respond to new U.S. deployments by either upgrading its ABM system or developing new, non-defensive systems. In other words, if the United States goes ahead, all bets are off. * The Russian publicity blitz continued to focus public attention on the deployment of Russia's new ICBM, the Topol-M, which Moscow made clear would be deployed and operational by the end of this year. Russia also made clear it was considering putting multiple warheads atop the Topol-M -- in defiance of START treaty restrictions -- to decrease the effectiveness of the U.S. ABM system. In short, the Russians were pointing out their willingness to wreck the entire arms control regime created in the 1970s and 1980s if the United States undermined the ABM treaty. * On Nov. 5, again amid massive publicity, Russia received the first of 11 strategic bombers from Ukraine in exchange for writing off its $285 million natural gas debt. Eight of the 11 bombers will be supersonic TU-160 Blackjack bombers. The other three will be refitted TU-95 Bear bombers. Both are able to fire nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Since Russia currently has only six TU-160s, the deal with Ukraine represents a substantial strategic boost. * Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had previously announced massive increases in defense spending. Last week, Col. Gen. Anatoly Sitnov, chief of armaments, announced that up to 28 percent of all money invested in weapons procurement would go toward modernizing strategic nuclear forces. * The Kremlin ordered U.S. Ambassador James Collins, who was supposed to visit a secured Russian military site known as Kraznoyarsk-26 for the inauguration of a U.S. financed business center, not to bring his top science advisor. It also told him he could not inspect any other U.S.-Russian projects at the site. The ambassador cancelled the meeting. Later, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, at a meeting in Denver attended by Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov, protested Russian restrictions in such strong terms that Adamov walked out of the room. This is interesting stuff to be happening on the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. To understand what is going on, it is useful to consider some things said by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in an interview with the Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail. Orban said Hungary needed nuclear weapons based on its territory, because of "uncertainties about the future of Russia." Francois Leblennec, a NATO spokesman, agreed that Hungary could, in principle, deploy nuclear missiles, but that the current strategic balance in Europe made the action unnecessary. The Russian Foreign Ministry blew up at Orban's comments, calling them a "direct violation of the Russia-NATO Founding Act, in which NATO countries confirmed they had no intentions, plans or causes to deploy weapons in the territories of new members." Lurking in Orban's statement is the real starting point for understanding what is going on here. Orban said Ukraine should never become part of Russia, since that would threaten Hungarian national security and therefore NATO. The Russians blew up not only at the thought of NATO nuclear weapons in Hungary, but also because Orban was intruding into what Russia regards as its sphere of influence, the former Soviet Union. Orban tried to downplay his statements later as a comment made in the context of a discussion of Canadian nuclear policy and having no practical significance. >From the Russian point of view, the statement seemed to be fraught with practical significance. Orban had linked the Ukranian question with the nuclear question. NATO seemed to be joining in this. Both said, given the current military and political situation, there was no need for nuclear weapons to be based in Hungary. Orban, however, made it clear that in Hungary's mind the need for nuclear weapons shifted if Ukraine changed its neutral stance. If Ukraine fell completely into the Russian sphere of influence, and Russian forces once again deployed in the Carpathians, Hungary would not be able to defend itself by conventional means. At that point Hungary would require nuclear weapons. Ukraine is critical to Russian national security. A hostile Ukraine threatens the southern flank of Belarus and Russia. On the other hand, Ukraine is economically dependent on Russia, particularly as a source of energy and as a market for Ukrainian manufactured goods that cannot compete on the European market. For its part, Russia needs Ukrainian agriculture. The two economies intertwine deeply. There is a deep economic fit between Ukraine and Russia that predates the Russian revolution. There is also real and deep anti- Russian sentiment in Ukraine. There is a deep tension between what Ukrainians want to see happen and what economic and geopolitical realities will make happen. The transfer of bombers to Russia in order to pay off energy debts symbolizes this interdependence. They are being pulled closer together on a number of levels. Hungary sees this and is worried, worried to the point of speaking of nuclear weaponry. Three levels exist to this process of Russian reassertion. First, there is public opinion in Russia. The Russians are tired of being treated as a banana republic by the United States. Standing toe to toe with America on nuclear issues is good politics in Russia. Upsetting the United States is even better politics. Therefore, Russia will not allow the United States to change a treaty that is in place, such as the ABM treaty, without its permission. Second, Russia has substantial strategic assets and the technological capability for producing more. It retains few levers in its relationship with the United States. This is a very real one. Last week's exercise was designed to remind the United States that the current status of the nuclear equation is neither fixed nor entirely dependent on the United States. Russia is as capable as America is of upping the temperature. Third, and most important, Russia is in the process of reclaiming its empire. This process will take a generation at least. Orban's statement symbolized what Russia sees as American meddling inside its sphere of influence. The Russians do not believe that Orban said what he did without U.S. permission. U.S. support for the Baltics as well as U.S. meddling in the Caucasus, Central Asia and, most important strategically, Ukraine has practical implications for Russian expansion. By using the ABM treaty as a basis for reopening the nuclear relationship between Russia and the United States, Russia will force the United States to think seriously about the consequences of pressing Russia too far, particularly in preventing it from reasserting its sphere of influence. Responding to the Russian statement on its ABM tests, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen said, "I'm not sure what point they were trying to make." The point is simple. Russia is a great power with a massive nuclear arsenal and serious regional interests. If the United States chooses to disregard its treaties with the Russians and to meddle inside of Russia's sphere of influence, the United States will find the Russians can still pose a threat on the strategic nuclear level. The risks of U.S. activities inside the former Soviet Union will rise prohibitively. In short, if the United States wants a new ABM treaty, it had better ask Moscow and be prepared to pay a high price. Included in that price will be abandoning any thought of deploying nuclear weapons in Hungary or Poland, or of further NATO expansion. Most important, Russia expects to exercise its influence in the former Soviet Union without American meddling. >From 1992-1995, there was a window of opportunity in which the United States could have moved directly into the Baltics, Ukraine or the Caucasus and created a framework for containing Russian power. For better or worse, it chose instead to focus on relations with Moscow, assuming that if Russia were pro-Western, everything else would follow. It was a decent assumption, save for the fact that the means for keeping Russia pro-Western -- namely, prosperity -- never happened; nor could it have happened. The United States is now in a position in which relations with Moscow are deteriorating daily, but relations with the rest of the former Soviet Union have not taken on forms that could help countries like Ukraine resist Russian pressure indefinitely. As Russia returns to a more traditional foreign policy, it reminds the United States that it has nuclear teeth. Therefore, the United States had better take those teeth into account in its dealings in areas such as Lithuania, Georgia or Kazakstan. Russia is back in the great power game. It may not be a superpower, able to project its forces globally, but it is the preeminent power in the former Soviet Union. It may not be economically healthy, but it has a massive nuclear force and a very respectable conventional force, more than enough for asserting power along its frontiers. The United States has a strategic decision to make. Will it challenge Russia's sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union or will it cede the region to Moscow? Russia's nuclear saber rattling was an attempt to remind the United States of the risks of intrusion. What is not clear is whether the United States is, at this point, capable of disengaging from the region. Russia cannot bear U.S. intrusion and the United States will find it difficult to disengage -- an interesting and dangerous problem for the millennium. (c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc. ___________________ **COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! 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