-Caveat Lector-

 http://208.138.42.193/forum/a3846aad804bf.htm


 Israel Builds China's First AWACS Aircraft

      Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology
      Published: November 29, 1999
      Author: David A. Fulghum

 The commander of China's air force, Lt. Gen. Liu Shunyao, and the
 nation's president, Jiang Zemin, have both said this month that the
 air service will change from a relatively immobile, short-range
 force, dedicated to defending the air space around its major bases,
 to a modern military arm capable of projecting power across borders
 and oceans.

 This kind of announcement has been made on a predictable basis
 since 1996, when Liu took command of the air force and the first
 U.S.-made F-16s were delivered to Taiwan. But in 1999, the
 well-worn rhetoric was assigned a more sinister meaning by some in
 the U.S. Just as the speeches were delivered, a new, Russian-built,
 A-50 airframe arrived at an airport near Tel Aviv. There the
 four-engine aircraft is being fitted with an Israeli-designed
 Phalcon early warning and airborne control system. The installation
 began on Oct. 25 and is slated to be completed by Elta, Israel
 Aircraft Industries' electronic subsidiary, in about a year. The
 contract reportedly has options for three additional aircraft. Each
 of the four aircraft, with radar installed, is to cost $250 million.

 A U.S. Air Force official said the Elta radar system will have
 three phased-array, L-band antennas set in a triangle inside a
 nonrotating dome to give 360-deg. coverage to a range "greater than
 190 naut. mi." The low frequency, combined with high-speed
 processing and specialized software to eliminate noise, could give
 the aircraft some potential for seeing stealth aircraft or cruise
 missiles. The antistealth capability is already going into allied
 E-3 AWACS with the latest radar improvement package. The system
 will have suites for electronic countermeasures (for protecting the
 aircraft from attack) and signals intelligence reconnaissance (for
 locating and identifying enemy electronic emissions such as
 radars). The system will also have the ability to adapt the radar's
 search and track priorities, he said.

 Israeli officials assured the Clinton Administration that no U.S.
 technology was involved, and that the State Dept. had been notified
 when the contract was signed in July 1996. The Administration has
 asked that the transaction be reconsidered. Israeli officials want
 to know why the proposed sale of airborne radars to China by
 British firm GEC-Marconi hasn't also been questioned. The British
 firm is offering its Argus 2000, a 1970s technology that is
 installed in Royal Air Force Nimrod patrol aircraft.

 There have been suggestions that there could be some sort of flyoff
 between the British and Israeli systems, especially if the Chinese
 aren't happy with the IAI system which may be only a "testbed for
 validation purposes," a U.S. analyst said. In support of this
 scenario, GEC-Marconi officials say they are still in active
 negotiations with China to sell their AWACS system and consider
 themselves still in the competition. However, U.S. Air Force
 officials dismiss the flyoff idea, saying China would not spend
 that much money on a demonstration system. They also note that Elta
 plans to market the Phalcon system to India, South Korea and Turkey.

 DESPITE A KNEE-JERK objection to the sale from conservative
 factions in Washington, virtually no one with a knowledge of the
 industrial, training, logistics or doctrinal straitjacket worn by
 the Chinese military see acquisition of the aircraft as a threat.
 While its role would resemble that of the E-3 AWACS flown by NATO,
 Britain and the U.S., it would likely be a far simpler aircraft,
 the product of a much smaller investment in modern technology. For
 example, Elta installed a version of the Phalcon AWACS system on a
 Boeing 707 for the Chilean air force several years ago. Because of
 the limited funding available when the Chilean system was designed,
 the radar is very accurate in determining the azimuth of other
 aircraft, but far less so in some other parameters. However, any
 AWACS system would give the Chinese aircrews, with practice, enough
 capability to operate more than four aircraft together in the same
 airspace, a current limitation that stems from the difficulty of
 positive air control.

 Certainly, China has bought two regiments of Su-27s from Russia and
 would like to build 200 indigenously. The government also has
 contracted to buy perhaps 40 two-seat Su-30 strike aircraft with
 delivery to begin in 2000. China's air force also has a limited
 inflight refueling capability with a half-dozen converted H-6 (a
 reverse engineered Tu-16) bombers equipped with wing-tip drogues.
 And prototypes of an indigenous fighter, the F-10, first flown in
 1998, are under construction.

 Moreover, after more than two years of negotiations with the
 Russians, the Israelis were finally allowed to buy an A-50 Mainstay
 AWACS airframe (modified from the Ilyushin II-76 by the Beriev
 design bureau to an A-50I configuration), which was flown to Israel
 in October. Now, Elta will install some version of its Phalcon
 phased-array radar. The completed system would provide early
 warning of approaching enemy aircraft and command and control for
 Chinese formations.

 The aircraft also would be equipped to intercept and monitor enemy
 radio conversations and plot the location of electronic emissions
 such as radar. Elta is to install the nonrotating, three-sided
 antenna it proposed for Australia's Wedgetail early warning and
 control aircraft competition and as a follow-on AWACS for the
 Chilean air force.

 Depending on antenna size and the availability of on-board power,
 the radar's range could be as much as 250 mi. at 30,000 ft. Modern
 high-speed computer processors and clever software algorithms will
 dictate the radar system's capability. For example, long range
 means little if mountainous terrain clutters the picture with
 spurious returns.

 Alarmists tout the AWACS aircraft as a tangible sign that China is
 preparing to flex its military muscle, with the goal of
 intimidating Taiwan and establishing itself as the major power in
 the South China Sea. But those few U.S. analysts who specialize in
 the Chinese army's air force and naval air arm paint a far
 different picture. They point out that all the new technology has
 been procured in piecemeal purchases. They also see an air force
 hamstrung by a small aviation industry, a limited defense budget,
 poor pilot training and strict military doctrine that prevents
 tactical or strategic agility.

 A SENIOR U.S. AIR Force official said that even if China buys four
 AWACS, the minimum considered necessary to keep a round-the-clock
 presence during a conflict, the difficulty of establishing
 procedures, building experience and adding communications needed to
 make the aircraft an effective combat tool will take the Chinese "a
 lot of years."

 Long-time Chinese aviation analyst Kenneth Allen (who has just
 published a book on China's foreign military relations for the
 Henry Stimson Center and wrote the standard work on the Chinese air
 force for the Defense Intelligence Agency) said evidence indicates
 the lone A-50I would likely be assigned to the 13th Air Div. in
 Hubei Province in south-central China where the rest of the small
 fleet of 14 similar II-76 transports are stationed along with two
 divisions of the 15th Airborne Army. The transports and the
 airborne force are part of Chinas fast-reaction force. Hubei is
 also the transport fleet's logistics and spare parts supply center,
 but it is far from the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea or border
 areas where an AWACS could play an offensive role.

 Moreover, the navy, air force and missile units that could be used
 offensively aren't exercised together and lack necessary
 communications. For example, the Air Force's standard F-7 and F-8
 fighters don't have the data links to work with AWACS.
 Communications would have to be voice, a slow and imprecise method.
 The Chinese navy's new F-8-II fighters, stationed on Hainan Island,
 are the only aircraft regularly practicing refueling. Not even the
 newest Su-27s have the capability.

 MOREOVER, THE LENGTH and quality of Chinese aircrew training is
 suspect. The average fighter pilot flies only about 100 hr. per
 year (as little as 60 hr. for Su-27 pilots), not enough to be
 proficient in either air-to-air refueling or AWACS operations.

 In addition, "most combat pilots, whether they're Israeli, Indian
 or Pakistani, try to find the edge of their aircraft's
 performance," a U.S. Air Force analyst said. "But Chinese pilots
 fly in the middle of the envelope because they are afraid to damage
 or lose an aircraft. Therefore, they don't really know what they
 can do in a dogfight. Even though they bought the Su-27 because of
 its maneuverability, I doubt if any Chinese pilot has ever tried
 the Cobra [a spectacular air show maneuver showcased by Russian
 test pilots]."

 Because of these technology, training and air-to-air missile
 limitations, "except for the Su-27, their aircraft can't conduct a
 head-on attack against other fighters," the analyst said. "It's
 hard to be offensive when you are limited to a rear-hemisphere,
 ground control intercept vectored [attack]." Most pilots fire one
 air-to-air missile in their career, and even that limited training
 is a relatively new phenomenon, he said.

 Moreover, training is unlikely to increase because Chinese
 officials want to avoid the very expensive overhauls that often
 must be done in Russia. Aircraft overhauled in China take six
 months or more to return to service. Those sent to Russia take 10
 months. Even with such precautions, at some point soon the Su-27
 fleet, which China began receiving in 1992, will have to start
 rotating to Russia for overhaul.

 LOGISTICS AND SPARE parts also put a damper on training or
 offensive operations. Doctrinally, Chinese units keep a year of
 spares on hand at their home base. Deploying takes a long time
 because spares and supplies must be moved by train. Such strains on
 the logistics system dictate short deployments. During the border
 conflict with Vietnam in 1979, it took the Chinese air force 45
 days to move 700 aircraft to the border. Once there, the
 operational tempo averaged one flight for each aircraft every four
 days. Not a single sortie was flown into Vietnamese airspace.

 Trying to put the A-50 purchase into perspective, analysts note
 that China's acquisition organization, the Central Military
 Commission, is becoming more and more reliant on outside sources
 for new technology and support. Purchases like the AWACS are only
 going to reinforce that dependency.

 Finally, some suggest, if you want a potential foe to have
 electronic, computer-based systems that can be penetrated
 surreptitiously with information warfare tools, it's a far easier
 task if those systems are provided by a U.S. ally. That kind of
 back-channel access worked for the U.S. when French contractors
 supplied details of Iraq's air defense network before the start of
 the air war in 1991. Baghdad's air defense computers were quickly
 disabled and the missile and radar sites shattered during the first
 few hours of the allied attack.


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 1 Posted on 12/02/1999 09:22:32 PST by Stand Watch Listen

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