STRATFOR.COM's Global Intelligence Update - December 29, 1999 By The Internet's Most Intelligent Source of International News & Analysis http://www.stratfor.com/ _________________________________________ Stratfor.com welcomes any comments or suggestions that you may have regarding our website and services. Look for our reader survey at http://www.stratfor.com/survey.htm _________________________________________ WHAT'S GOING ON IN YOUR WORLD? * All week, see our forecasts on the future of the world. * Also see the Year of the Crackdown, our in-depth analysis of China. FIND OUT AT http://www.stratfor.com/ __________________________________________ STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update December 29, 1999 The Middle East: A Peaceful Backwater Summary The end of the Cold War has caused a rare set of circumstances to occur in the Middle East. Viewed from a global standpoint, it is, for now, non-strategic. Arab regimes, based upon Gamel Abdel Nasser's model for a secular and nationalistic government, are in a state of decline. The real question for the next decade, as a result, no longer turns on the Arab-Israeli relationship - but rather Arab identity. Three forces will converge - the decline of Arab leadership, the unstable succession periods that will follow and the Iranian variable - indicating a real possibility of a resurgent and powerful fundamentalist movement sweeping the Islamic world. Yet, current relationships between Arab countries and Israel point to a future with fairly manageable, somewhat unhealthy, peace in the region. Analysis For 50 years, any analysis of the Middle East turned on Arab- Israeli relations. As we have discussed in detail [ http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/GIU/112299.asp ], the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict were intimately connected. The Western strategy of containment depended heavily on maintaining a cordon around the Soviet Bloc on the line of Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Iran. Unable to break this line, the Soviet Union countered by attempting to encircle the encirclement and brought Syria and Iraq under its influence. The Western countermove was to increase dependence on Israel, Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula. The end of the Cold War has brought an extraordinary moment to the Middle East. Now, at a rare instance in history, this crossroads of three continents is not in anyone's line of march nor critical to any empire's defense. Viewed from a global standpoint, the Middle East is, for now, non-strategic. Russia is struggling merely to hold on to its own periphery. Even oil -though higher in price than a year ago - is not in such short supply as to arouse concerns. Indeed, it is important to remember that the pivot of the entire region - the area from Cairo to Damascus - doesn't have much oil. The decline of great power rivalry has opened the door to what passes for peace in the region. Egypt and Israel have had a peace treaty for a generation. Jordan and Israel formalized their ongoing entente more recently. Syria and Israel are now seeing if they can formalize what has been in place for well over a decade. If the attempt fails, it is of little importance. Syria and Israel have too many common interests in Lebanon to allow too much friction to develop, especially when there is no great power audience to play for. Therefore, for the moment, the fate of the region is of far greater interest to inhabitants than to outsiders. This is a startling feeling to Israelis, Egyptians and Syrians, all of whom expect the world to care much more about what goes on there than is the case. The real question for the next decade, as a result, no longer turns on the Arab-Israeli relationship - but rather the Arab-Arab relationship, or to be more precise, the future dynamic of the Arab world. And if the most important issue for the region is the future of Arab self-conception, then the most important issue is what is called, inappropriately, Islamic fundamentalism. It is a misnomer simply because the real question in the region is the extent to which Islam in general, rather than in any fundamentalist sense, will dominate. This is a critical question because we are on the verge of a generational shift in Arab leadership. Jordan's King Hussein is dead. Syria's Hafez Assad is clearly ill. Egypt's Hosni Mubarak has been in office for a generation. Moammar Gadhafi has been in office for more than 30 years. Most of those now governing Arab states will not be around in 10 years. Therefore, the question of Islam intersects with this impending generational change. The Rise and Fall of Nasserism To understand the next 10 years, we must take a detour into history, and particularly into the history of the most dynamic movement in post-war Arab history: Nasserism. Today, the regimes of major Arab states that are not monarchies are descendants of the model pioneered in Egypt by Gamel Abdel Nasser. While Nasser and his brand of pan-Arab nationalism have long since passed from the scene, the regimes that emulated him continue. But everywhere they exist - from Iraq to Libya - these governments are in a state of decay and decline that is irreversible. In overthrowing the Egyptian monarchy in July, 1952 Nasser put into power a popular military government, more secular than Islamic. The model on which Nasser built his regime actually derived from the Turkish military revolutionary, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk overthrew the Ottoman Empire after its defeat in World War I. His goal was to create a modern state, by which he meant a secular, technologically developed regime ultimately modeled on the West and built around Turkish nationalism. Ataturk used the military, as the most modern, cohesive and technologically advanced element in Turkish society, to serve as the engine of revolution. The Ataturkian model of a secular, republican, anti-clerical regime based on a purely national sense of identity, did not confine itself to Turkey, though. It became the model on which the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran was founded. It also became the model that Nasser adopted, consciously or unconsciously. In overthrowing King Farouk, Nasser created a secular republic; while it was not as overtly anti-clerical as the Ataturk or Pahlavi models, Nasser's regime was still far from orthodox Islam. And like Ataturk and Pahlavi, Nasser was obsessed with national development. He saw himself and the army as revolutionary forces driving development and overthrowing outmoded traditions. Nasser adopted republicanism, rather than more traditional Arab monarchic traditions, as the basis for his rule. Indeed, Nasser was as socialist as he was Islamic. Nasser also understood that his regime needed to legitimize itself by offering more than just modernization. He seized on a trans- national concept: The idea of Pan-Arabism became the foundation of his political theory. The Arab nation, not Islam, was at the core of his plan was to create a united Arab state, incidentally Islamic, but more fundamentally committed to a national renaissance for the Arab people. Nasserism swept the Arab world. Military regimes, dedicated to modernization, overthrew monarchies in Syria, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere. The dream of turning the army into a modernizing engine swept the Arab world as military coups tried to trigger not only national revolutions but to build a United Arab Republic that encompassed the entire Arab world. Nasserism not only spawned national variations on his theme. It also spawned secular, revolutionary, anti-Israeli movements grouped around the Palestine Liberation Organization. Essentially secular, socialist and revolutionary organizations, these movements threatened Israel far less than they threatened the surviving Arab monarchies of the Saudi Peninsula. A profound struggle began between the conservative, Islamic monarchies and the radical, Nasserite regimes, with the Palestinian movement serving as a key weapon for destabilizing the conservative regime. For a while it appeared that secular Nasserism and its outriders would sweep the Arab world. The oil crisis of 1973 and the boom in oil prices that followed changed the balance of power dramatically, as financial power allowed the monarchies to stabilize their regimes and subvert their enemies. The decision by Anwar Sadat, Nasser's heir, to abandon the struggle against Israel further undermined the secular revolutionaries. They faded in the 1980s into old age, corruption and compromise. Arafat's Palestinian National Authority is what is left of them. Instead, the Iranian revolution created an idea that drew adherents in the Arab world as well: the Islamic Republic, combining Islamic law with the European republican tradition. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini combined the revolutionary republican form that Nasser had created and linked it to very traditional Islamic law. This was an extraordinary development that redefined the dynamics of the Islamic world. Nasser had posed a choice between a secular republican government and traditional Islamic monarchies. Khomeini fused the two: republican government and traditional Islam. In retrospect, the Nasserite tradition both succeeded and failed. Outside of the Saudi Peninsula, Nasserite regimes and variants rule most Arab countries. Military regimes linked to republican administrative forms dominate Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt. But rather than serving as the springboard for Arab unity, these regimes have become vehicles for personalized rule. Men like Saddam Hussein, Gadhafi and Assad claim Arab republican and socialist traditions, but govern regimes that have failed either to modernize or satisfy the psychological needs of their people. The most profound failure has been the inability to destroy Israel. The core promise of socialist modernization was the idea that with modernization, Israel would be destroyed and the Palestinians returned to their rightful place. Instead, the radical Nasserites - and now Assad - have made peace with Israel. Making peace is not merely limited to formal treaties. Rather, Israel has been absorbed into the informal deal making that constitutes the region's diplomacy and business. The key event was not the Camp David accords. The key event was the informal, businesslike understanding over Lebanon achieved by Syria and Israel in the 1980s. The Camp David accords were public, American- style events, full of symbolism and formalism. The Israeli-Syrian accords were Middle-Eastern style: full of winks, nods, secret conversations and plausible deniability. They were as - or more - enduring than Camp David. All of this left the Arab revolutionary movement bereft of support as first Egypt and then Syria slowly withdrew assistance. Arafat was left with no one but the Iraqis, whom he supported in the 1991 war - a massive miscalculation. Syria and Egypt, as a result, distrusted Arafat even more. The collapse of the secular, socialist, revolutionary movement created a massive vacuum in the Arab world. No one spoke for either the revolutionary republican tradition or for the assertive Islamic tradition. There were only exhausted Nasserite regimes and conservative monarchies, increasingly down on their luck as oil prices sagged. The Islamic Republican Alternative Throughout the Arab world the result has been the same: an Islamic Republican movement drawing its inspiration from Iran and from its own, indigenous religious traditions. This movement must not be confused with the radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s. They are different ideologically and socially. They combine revolutionary republicanism with Islamic tradition. But for all the differences, they are similar in that they threaten the stability of all varieties of existing Arab societies. They are also stronger than the old radicals, because they draw on the anti-establishment energies of the universities and the young, the traditionalist sensibilities of the merchant and peasant classes, and the sense of powerlessness of broad sectors of society. The Nasserite regimes have been quite successful at suppressing Islamic fundamentalists. From the Syrian massacre at Homs to the Egyptian crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, there has been general success in crushing the immediate threat. But now is not the moment of greatest threat. Three events are coming in the next decade that will tend to magnify Islamic power. First, the leaders of key Arab countries are old and will pass from the scene. Second, in many of these countries, the succession process is not only unclear; it is unknown. There has been no succession in decades. No one understands how to conduct it. The danger of instability as the result of palace coups and countercoups is substantial. We expect to see many of these. The Arab monarchies will also see succession, the most important of which will be in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, for example, is conservative in terms of Islamic doctrine, but has managed to suppress the more aggressive politics that could follow from conservative interpretations of the law. Saudi Wahabi Islam has as one of its followers Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden is not the largest object in the picture. Instead, it is Wahabi conservatism and a move toward greater activism that can take place in a succession crisis. Finally, there is the inability of moderates in Iran to gain complete control of the regime. While the regime of President Mohammad Khatami is not weak, it has also not been strong enough to protect key allies from judicial prosecution by conservatives. The struggle in Iran is far from settled. Significantly, Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has abandoned his moderating role and is now campaigning on the moderates' platform. The demonstrations of the summer terrified the clerics but had to have been encouraging to Khatami. A stalemate is emerging, in which Khatami has popular support but Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's supporters can regularly single out and imprison prominent moderates. Hanging in the balance is Iran's relationship to the rest of the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have clearly, although tentatively, explored some sort of regional security cooperation with the goal of limiting U.S. influence. The relationship is creeping forward at a glacial pace, but it is creeping forward. A moderate Iran may succeed in poking holes in U.S. influence in the region. A revival of a full-blown conservative clerical regime will alarm Arab regimes. The convergence of these three forces - the decline of the current leadership of Arab nations, the clearly unstable succession periods that will follow and the Iranian variable - indicates a real possibility of a resurgent and powerful fundamentalist movement sweeping the Islamic world during the next decade. With the death of the great leaders of the secular republic Arab movement and potential shifts in the Saudi monarchy, the forces that contain Islamic fundamentalism are likely to weaken and lose their grip on the situation. With Iran remaining very much an Islamic Republic, a non-Arab emblem of the viability of Islamic Republicanism, the possibilities are substantial. Men like Assad are moving to try to protect the future of their regimes after their deaths. That is why Assad is prepared to deal with Israel and why he is more than happy to see Israel attacking Hezbollah forces while negotiating with Syria. In an odd way, just as Israel has become the guarantor of the Hashemite throne in Jordan, Israel could become a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism. Nevertheless, there are severe limits on Israeli power. Even Israel and Turkey together, both sworn enemies of Islamic Republicanism, would be unable to contain general instability in the Arab world. Besides, we expect Turkey's vision to be riveted northward, watching what the Russians are doing, with little time left to meddle in Arab affairs. In our view, the institutions bequeathed by Nasserism are so bankrupt that it is difficult to imagine how they will survive their charismatic leaders. It is difficult to see what other powers are present to prevent at least some nations from succumbing to Islamic Republicanism. That will pose an interesting geopolitical problem. According at least to doctrine, Israel is even more anathema to the Islamic forces than it was to the Nasserites. However, when the Nasserites faced Israel, it was during the Cold War, and the confrontation had global significance, and superpowers to underwrite all sides. Today, as we have argued, the global action has shifted north of Turkey. Russia will not be a serious player in the Middle East until it reabsorbs the Caucasus and Central Asia. And that will take a generation. Therefore, this time, both sides in the Middle East will be on their own. This reduces the global danger substantially. It also reduces the threat to Israel. Unlike the Nasserites at the peak of their power, Islamic republicans have shown themselves able to work, Middle Eastern style, with winks and nods. It is no secret that Iran continues to work with Israel against Iraq and on other issues of mutual strategic interest. Islam is an ancient religion and its traditional practitioners, like those of other ancient religions, understand the complexity of politics, the virtue of patience and the intimate connection between good and evil. They know how and when to do business, and how and when to do it in public. As in Lebanon, all is not as it seems when Israelis confront the Islamic movement. Wheels whir within wheels. So long as outside powers don't covet the region - and we forecast that for the next decade at least, the region will be a backwater - the ability of Arabs and Israelis to maintain working relationships, albeit with healthy mistrust and a dollop of violence, will remain intact. Thus, we think that Arab history will take another turn in the next decade. The last vestiges of the Nasserite movement will be overthrown, and new, interesting Arab experiments with Islamic fundamentalism will take place. In countries like Egypt, with the deep-rooted cosmopolitanism of the Cairene to block it, the situation will be difficult and complex. In other countries, where most institutions have been discredited, the traditions will be stronger It is important to note that this problem is not peculiar to the Arabs or to Islam. Israel is also going through an identity crisis, even more intense than the Arab world in some ways. Israel, after half a century, cannot fully define itself. Is Israel a secular republic that happens to be ethnically Jewish or is it a Jewish state under Jewish law? This question is as likely to destabilize Israel as Islam is likely to destabilize Nasserite and monarchist Arab countries. The central problem here is peace. During the constant national emergencies of the Cold War, danger precluded a full investigation of the foundation of either Arab or Jewish states. The internal arguments were always cut short but the external threat. But it is our view that international relations in the region are now going through a period of relative stability. This is not permanent but it will be the dominant landscape of the next decade. Thus, the threats that cut short fundamental arguments about philosophy and theology have eased. This means that while external stability will increase, internal stability is likely to decline. We are entering a period of introspection and domestic instability in a region that has been obsessed with the external threat. It will be a period of strange alliances and issues, disconnected from global geopolitics, at least for a time. One of the oddities of all of this is that the United States, as the leading global power, is operating in a foreign policy mode that is fairly disconnected from the region's issues. The war against Iraq no longer has much meaning and it will undoubtedly be dismantled by the next administration. U.S. policy toward Iran will also be redefined. But the reason that there is no urgency about this is that the U.S. does not, for now at least, have any strategic interests in the region. So long as the United States has Venezuela, the status of Persian Gulf oil is a European and Japanese concern. As the world's superpower and the other great powers remain temporarily disconnected from the region, forces indigenous to the region will dominate its history. That will lower the stakes from a global standpoint. But it will raise the stakes within the region: in the next decade, the very soul of the Arab and Israeli nation will be in play. 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