-Caveat Lector- ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 30 Dec 1999 10:19:35 -0500 From: Alexandra H. Mulkern <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ( This is an email alert that my husband's company just got from NIPC and the FBI. It may or may not be of use to anyone.) National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC ADVISORY 99-031) > >Introduction > >Large-scale U.S. infrastructure disruptions are not expected from "Y2K >failures" during the Y2K transition period. However we are prepared for a >possible increase in real or reported criminal cyber activity (such as >hacking and spreading computer viruses), considering the heightened >awareness of and media focus on malicious activity during the Y2K period. > >Any increased criminal activity during the Y2K period could raise the level >of problems in infrastructure systems, adding to genuine Y2K-generated >issues and the normal level of infrastructure concerns. We anticipate >encountering both known and new viruses and hacking exploits. We could see >the dissemination of several new and possibly destructive viruses, and the >successful exploitation of both corporate and government information >systems. But even these possibilities reflect only a larger assembly of the >same kinds of malicious activity seen and addressed every day. > >Finally, known and possible extremist or apocalyptic terrorist activity in >the United States by individuals or groups suggests the possibility of >threats to domestic infrastructures. For example, the media have reported >arrests of certain individuals allegedly planning violent actions against >electric power and oil and gas facilities. These indications of possible >threats to our infrastructures warrant an increased vigilance to protect >against both cyber and physical threats to our nation's critical >infrastructures. > >Summary > >The Y2K Transition might be seen by potential malefactors as an >unprecedented opportunity for malicious code release and associated >publicity, where a new and significant exploit can achieve a widespread >notoriety in the information security and hacker world. Viruses and >exploits like Melissa and its variants, ExploreZip, Back Orifice, mobile >code, etc. reflect increasing sophistication in the use of email and >attachments, increasing variation on prior exploits, and remote access and >control of malicious code. Additional virus activity can be expected during >the Y2K period, following the recent examples of W32.mypics, ICQ Greeting >and Babylonia. > > Distributed denial of service tools have recently been discovered on >various computer systems, creating large networks of hosts capable of >launching significant coordinated packet flooding denial of service attacks. >These tools target high bandwidth sites and connections, use readily >accessible technical vulnerabilities for installation, and reflect >suspicious installation and tool development activity. Possible motives for >this deployment could include exploit demonstration, network systems >reconnaissance, or even preparation for major denial of service attacks. >Such attacks could take place during the Y2K period. > > Back Orifice 2000 remains a significant open-source tool easily customized >for malicious purpose; we expect that its malicious use and adaptation will >continue to increase in the future, and could be applied during the Y2K >period. > >The installation of malicious code under cover of Y2K-remediation remains a >possibility, considering the numbers and scale of systems remediated for >Y2K, the significant access granted throughout computer systems and networks >for this work, and the clear, predictable window of opportunity to conduct >this action. Such code could be activated during the transition period or >long thereafter, to allow future access to the network or to deny service. > > A number of long-known computer viruses continue to impact systems because >of inconsistent and incomplete security implementation and oversight. The >rising attention to computer virus activity during the Y2K transition period >will likely include "discovery" and publicity of old virus problems like >Marker and Melissa. > > Harassing and malicious actions against Internet sites (such as those seen >by U.S. Government and military web sites, the WTO, commercial sites like >E-Bay and E-Toys, etc.) continues as an element of network systems activity; >these actions are increasingly common and could well be a part of the Y2K >transition and associated press coverage. > > Finally, security measures taken in preparation for Y2K or as a result of >initial Y2K problems may cause unintended consequences. Systems may be shut >down to avert problems, only to cause a more serious operational impact than >remaining connected. For example, the closure of network connections could >generate a significant email backlog that might generate more problems when >re-connected than if connectivity were maintained throughout. Information >systems owners and operators must remain deliberate and logical in their >situational assessment, actions and management recommendations. Y2K is >primarily a higher volume, higher attention version of the types of problems >seen in normal network operations. > >Virus Summary > >At this point there are four viruses that are of particular concern during >the Y2K transition. The first three of the viruses are Microsoft Word macro >viruses. These three viruses, in their current variants are not very >destructive; however, because macro viruses are so easily modified, there >may possibly be new variants with "trigger" dates during the Y2K transition >that may have destructive payloads. The last virus, PC CIH, is an older, >more common virus, but still very prevalent and has a very destructive >payload and could cause very severe damage to infected machines. > >W97M/Marker is a macro virus that is spreading very rapidly and has a >disruptive payload. All variants of Marker steal some type of information >from infected machines and then covertly FTP the information to a specified >IP address. > >W97M/Class is a macro virus that infects documents and templates created in >Microsoft Word. Class is polymorphic, which means it is capable of mutating >its signature, thus making detection and removal more difficult. Class also >exhibits stealth characteristics, which further complicates detection and >removal. The Class virus has several "trigger" dates for execution of the >payload, the 31st or 14th of the month, depending on the variant. In >current versions the payload is not destructive. > >W97M/Melissa is a relatively old virus, but is still a threat due to the >number of variants and the potential to cause a denial of service on mail >servers. Melissa spreads as an email message with an infected Microsoft >Word document as an attachment. Despite the age of the original Melissa >virus, the numerous variants of Melissa and their ability to spread >constitute a continued threat. > >PC CIH was first seen in the summer of 1998, but is still spreading very >rapidly. PC CIH has a very destructive payload which will delete the first >megabyte of data on all hard drives available to the infected machine and >overwrite flash BIOS memory. The payload is triggered on different dates >depending on the variant which infected the machine. Typical trigger dates >are the 26th of any month. > >Other viruses in the high-medium threat range, based on an NIPC evaluation, >are: > >PE PADANIA (Padania) Variants: joke, ne 230, 3932, a, b Type: Macro >Risk: High >W97M PRILISSA.A (Prilissa) Type: Macro Risk: High - Medium > >Viruses in the medium to low threat range: > >W32.MyPics (MyPics) Type: Worm Risk: Medium >Count2K (Y2Kcount) Type: Trojan Risk: Medium >W97M TRISTATE (TRISTATE) Variant: O97M, P97M, W97M Type: Macro Risk: >Medium - Low >W97.MELISSA.AD (Melissa AD) Type: Macro Risk: Medium - Low >Troj ICQGreeting (ICQ Greeting) Type: Trojan Risk: Medium - Low >W97M/MMKV.A (MMKV) Type: Macro Risk: Medium - Low >W32/Fix (FIX) or (Trojan Fix2001) Type: Win32 Risk: Medium - Low > >Viruses in the low to medium threat range: > >Millenium v2.0 (Millenium2) Type: Trojan Risk: Low to Medium >W97M/ETHAN (Ethan) Variants: a, at, b, c, q, frome, mod, mrx Type: Macro >Risk: Low >PE Babylonia (Babylonia) Type: Trojan Risk: Low to Medium >W32/ska (Happy New Year) Type: Win 32 Risk: Low >W97M/Chantal (Chantal) Type: Macro Risk: Low >W97M/CLSTNT.B (CLSTNT.B)) Type: Macro Risk: Low >X97M/PIXLY (Pixly)) Type: Macro Risk: Low >ATOMIC-1A (ATOMIC-1A) Type:Virus Risk: Low >ATOMIC-1B (ATOMIC-1B) Type:Virus Risk: Low >ARCV-718 (ARCV) Type: Virus Risk: Low >CPW.1527 (CPW) Type: Virus Risk: Low >DIOGENES (DIOGENES) Type: Virus Risk: Low >MINOSSE (MINOSSE) Type: Virus Risk: Low >NULL (Null) Type: Virus Risk: Low >PE KRIZ (PE Kris) Type: Virus Status: Old Risk: Low >PRIME (Prime) Type: Virus Status: Old Risk: Low >TOPO (TOPO) Type: Virus Status: Old Risk: Low >VBS Chrystal.C (Chrystal) Type: Virus Status: Old Risk: Low >W97M A OPEY (OPEY) Type: Virus Status: Old Risk: Low >W97M CALIGULA (CALIGULA) Type: Virus Status: Old Risk: Low > >Disclaimer: The above lists are not comprehensive due to the sheer number >of known viruses. The virus evaluations are based on all information >available to the NIPC at the time of advisory preparation and are subject to >change as new information becomes available concerning new viruses and >variants. In particular, judgments made concerning risk are subjective and >supersede previously disseminated NIPC virus listings. > >Recommendations > >1. Get and stay informed about potential threats and possible solutions; >keep up to date by regularly reviewing Y2K breaking news from various >sources. Expect a certain degree of initial confusion and conflicting >reports. >2. Get yourself a good anti-virus package, easy to use and update, and able >to screen incoming messages for the fast-multiplying email viruses. >3. After installation, keep the signature files and scanning engine updated. >Hundreds of new viruses emerge each month, and the January 1st transition >may see a boom in new activity. Virus writers are constantly inventing new >ways of designing and distributing viruses, so your only secure source of >protection is to make sure that you update your signature files regularly. >In times of high threat, you may want to set your anti-virus programs to >automatically download new pattern files every day. >4. Getting and maintaining a good anti-virus package solves only some of >your security issues; viruses may still enter through your browser or macro >files. Configure your browser security to a higher level by disabling >ActiveX and Java controls in Internet Explorer and Netscape, and enable >macro protection in Excel and Word. If you find something suspected as a >virus and it has not been stopped by anti-virus software, report it and get >it checked immediately. >5. During the holiday season, you may also find your system clogged by spam >and electronic holiday cards. The added overhead in delivering and >filtering these messages may also strain your email servers and system RAM >and storage resources. >6. Make sure that the rest of your systems, servers and firewalls are >secure. Download the latest security patches and install them correctly. >As with the anti-virus protection, regularly check to make sure you have the >latest protection. >7. Understand your system's normal baseline operating parameters, so >differences are quickly spotted and investigated. >8. Prepare and implement (if necessary) realistic contingency plans. >9. Recipients are asked to report significant or suspected criminal activity >to their local FBI field office ANSIR or NIPC Coordinator, computer >emergency response support and other law enforcement agencies, as >appropriate. > >This Awareness of National Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) >communication is intended for corporate security professionals and others >who have requested to receive unclassified national security advisories. >This communication is not a press release and should not be furnished to >those who are not direct recipients of ANSIR Program disseminations or >republished in any public format without authorization from the National >ANSIR Program at FBIHQ. Media requests should be directed to the local FBI >field office media representative. > >The NIPC is a Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of >Investigation (FBI) initiative to deter, detect and respond to unlawful acts >involving computer intrusions and to other cyber and physical threats that >could adversely impact the critical infrastructures of the United States. >With interagency and private sector participation, the NIPC joins, leverages >and supports the jurisdictions, expertise and resources of the FBI, DOJ and >the United States Attorney offices throughout the nation and the >capabilities and resources provided by other federal government agencies, >state and local governments, and the private sector, in order to fulfill its >mission. The NIPC web site is http://www.nipc.gov. > http://xfacts.com/y2k.htm DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. 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