-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- from: http://www.frw.uva.nl/cedro/library/complex.html Click Here: <A HREF="http://www.frw.uva.nl/cedro/library/complex.html">The international drug complex</A> ----- The Political-Economy of Drug Law Enforcement The growth of the drug industry and concomitant real or perceived threats to states' authority gave an important impulse to the development of law and the organization of crime control. Since the beginning of this century, starting with the Shanghai Conference in 1909, step by step a global prohibition regime was created, sanctioning the production, dealing, and trafficking of psychotropic substances.8 Almost every country in the world, by ratifying international treaties, obliged itself to adapt its national laws in accordance with these treaties, and thereby to suppress the now illegal drug business. The responsibility for control and furthering the design of the regime came to fall on the United Nations in 1946.9 This regime is still under construction, targeting new drugs and expanding its organizational structure. It encompasses multinational organizations, state bureaucracies, banks, medical institutions and morality. Thereby an unprecedented regulatory framework is established, comparable to the non-proliferation regime for nuclear weaponry. In the evolution of this international regime, individual states attained a high degree of world-wide uniformity and mutual tuning in the regulation of one category of intoxicating, mind bending, substances (Gerritsen 1993:75). There exists a formal global prohibition regime, but to date there is no global criminal justice system to meet the challenge of drug trafficking and globalized crime. Although formal regime control and design are with the United Nations, execution and dedication of control efforts are in the hand of governments and state agencies of individual nation-states. In spite of formal compliance to the predispositions of the prohibition regime, in practice, the strategies and tactics for its enforcement are broadly disputed. Historically the conception of the 'drug problem' has been subject to dramatic transformations. Fiscal, balance of payments, civic security, public health, social welfare and moral considerations can be found as determining the main diagnosis of the problem. Within and between societies the conception of the problem and the discourses guiding government intervention in the drug industry vary widely, over time and in geographic space. The multi-dimensionality of the drug problem makes it a very complex policy field. With prohibition in place, repression still is no panacea. It was only after their dependencies gained independence that the major european powers dissolved their colonial monopolies on the opium trade. Prohibition also met with fierce resistance from the pharmaceutical industries in Germany, Japan and Switzerland. These were often shielded by state interests in the preparation for war, in which the secured supply of anaesthetics plays an important role. Coaxing governments into compliance with prohibition has been, and still is, an arduous process. >From the beginning it has been the United States to take the lead in building the prohibition regime. Especially since the 1980s, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral forms of pressure, intervention and collaboration are proliferating to force governments to comply with prohibition and to stifle the growth of the drug economy. Conditional development aid, extradition treaties (so called International Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties), new types of financial policing to 'chase the money' around the international banking system, financing and advising foreign military and police, political pressure and even outright military intervention count among the plethora of instruments applied in the relations between states in this war on drugs. In the process, institutional structures (e.g. Interpol, Europol, UNDCP) are strengthened to intensify international cooperation. Besides that, many informal structures have developed between police, military and intelligence agencies (see Anderson et al 1995, Anderson and den Boer 1994, Benyon et al 1994, Fijnout 1993, Marshall 1991). Many of these are not new. Before the end of the Cold War, countries like France and the United States had extensive programmes for the assistance of foreign military and police forces (Fijnout 1993, Marshall 1991). Nowadays, however, such programmes are legitimized by the supposed need to strengthen other state's capabilities to fight the drug industry. Since the mid 1980s, through the process of European integration, also the European Union is asserting itself as a major player in the field. The internationalizing powers to enforce the prohibition regime are largely legitimized and rationalized by interdependencies that derive from the global division of labour in the illegal drug industry and the concomitant problems this presents to individual states to control the drug industry. But forthcoming interdependency does not necessarily mean greater integration (collaboration and harmonization). Interdependency can possibly also mean 'dependency', 'exploitation', 'free riding' and 'conflict' (Bühl 1995:123). International law enforcement instruments, are unevenly distributed, and include the exchange of information between law enforcers, international pressures on countries to shape their legislative body (for example, the closure of coffee shops and the lifting of bank secrecy), the provision of military aid and advisors (an important element of the American efforts in Latin America), or the extension of 'intelligence' gathering by foreign stationed liaison officers. The control over these instruments ultimately touches on the control that countries have over their economies and political system, and on the control people have over their privacy and sovereignty. The strategies and tactic applied by governments in their drug policies do not only touch upon very different conceptions of 'the drug problem', they also affect the distribution of income within and between societies, and the level of protection that citizens can attain . Interventions in drug markets influence the direction, composition and volume of drug streams over the world, and of the flows of money that are generated in this international business. They thereby touch upon the distribution of wealth that can be accumulated in the drug business, and on the relative power of actors within and between societies. Drug interests are strong enough to create powers that can play a major role in political life and in economic activities. Where many people depend on the drug industry for their income, and where the overall economy is dependent on the influx of foreign currencies from the drug trade, such drug interests, and concrete efforts of drug entrepreneurs to protect their trade, severely limit the margins for governments to deal with the drug industry. Moreover, enhanced drug repression also strengthens coercive and other powers within state apparatuses relative to each other and the society at large. Drug policies therefore also have an impact on the distribution of power and security in and between countries. On the one hand, they can limit the destabilizing effect of the drug industry on society. On the other hand, enhancing the resources and legal powers of a state's security forces possibly also limits the sovereignty of individuals, peoples and countries, and therewith the level of freedom, democracy and human rights they can enjoy. Drug repression therewith also attains an important political dimension. From the perspective of the ruling elites, it is of concern to prevent power contending ethnic, political or clan associations to use the drug proceeds for building their own power structure. In such a situation, they may have little choice but to gain control over the business themselves, or at least find a way of incorporating such new dynamic sectors into the existing power structure. Drug repression would, in many cases, only strengthen the opposition, as it would leave a good share of the population without means of support. Domestic and foreign drug policies thus touch upon the distribution of power, wealth and security, both within a country and between societies. These interests are informing if not imposing a specific logic on many a state's policies and practices, and lead to systemic interactions between the upper and the underworld, that play a (decisive) role in deepening their perverse impact on the relations among states and between states and their societies. The phenomenon of 'protected trafficking' here enters the picture (Scott and Marshall 1991:vii), where selective suppression and protection of the drug industry becomes a more likely outcome of drug policies. Criminal groups and criminally obtained resources often are a deviant element in national and international dynamics of politics. Illegal violence and authorized force used illegitimately to serve the purpose of one class, clan, ethnic group region or country against the other is no new phenomenon. It is however strongly related to the dynamics and consequences of the growth of drugs markets and state policies to control them. In many countries it is exactly the association of criminal groups with power elites that produces and prolongs such perverse consequences (Hess 1986:128). In recent history of both industrialized (e.g. France, the United States and Italy) and developing countries (e.g. Turkey, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico) many examples can be found of cooperation between secret services, political parties and other elite power groups with -drug trafficking- criminal groups in the repression of domestic opposition, the destabilization of foreign governments, and the support against (geo)-political foes (see for example Block, Hess 1986, Krüger 1980, McCoy 1972, Scott and Marshall 1991). Equally, many opposition groups have discovered how important drug income can be to withstand (foreign) control over their territories (e.g. PKK in Turkey, Shining Path in Peru, and the Afghan mudjaheddin). Such symbiotic relations between drug entrepreneurs and local, national or foreign power elites are often amended by forms of corruption of a more or less institutional nature. The price increase effect of prohibition works effectively as a tax, that however does not flow straight into the coffins of the state treasury, but is collected by the producers, traffickers and other services in the trade. In many countries, a prohibition tax is however equally levied by 'corrupt' enforcement officers and other protectors of the trade within the politico-administrative system. Such state induced extortion, or bribing, of the trade is however not only an activity for private gain (supplementing salaries). In fact, various systems exists that provide for the distribution of such rents within hierarchical networks, through which such money flows. In return they facilitate exchange in prohibited markets. Bribery can be a primary method of public finance, alongside taxation, borrowing and inflation (Thornton 1991:137). From that perspective, it should be less of a surprise to find police officials actively involved in the management and maintenance of the black-market monopolies. Through their relations with drug entrepreneurs, police officers (and other state protectors) become responsive to the monopolist. This may lead them to act against new entrants or third parties in the pursuit of maintaining the monopoly and its profits. Such symbiotic relations are often an outcome of law enforcement tactics, where drug enforcement agencies infiltrate trafficking rings, and set up front stores to provide services to the drug industry. The 'War on Drugs' is in many countries literally running out of control. A severe crisis upset the Dutch police and juridical system, as it turned out that the methods used by police agencies in their criminal investigations on drug traffickers had to a large extent devolved beyond the juridical boundaries and parliamentary control. The Dutch parliamentary commission that investigated these methods in 1996 found for example that 285 tons of drugs had been imported by the Dutch police, of which 100 tons had disappeared on the market (Zwaap 1996).10 The opportunities for bribery and outright extortion, facilitated by the outlaw position of drug entrepreneurs, constitute an important incentive for the escalation of the drug war. In a more formalized way, asset seizure laws have had the same result (Benson, Rasmussen, Solars 1995, Benson and Rasmussen 1996). In fact, the self-financing of police forces is now also actively propagated by Pino Arlacci, director of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (AFP 31/03/99). The narcotics industry has, to a greater or lesser extent, become economically and socially entrenched in almost every country in the world. Drug related interests have permeated many sectors of society, sectors that often function in the formal economy, but derive part of their income from activities connected to the drug trade. Few sectors remain untouched by the drug industry, as drug proceeds are consumed and invested in other enterprises, or as for example banks and transport companies provide services to the drug industry, and so become part of the drug industry themselves. The drug industry is to varying degrees also socially embedded in many countries. Drug consumption is culturally rooted in certainly not only the most marginalized sectors of the population. Furthermore, drug entrepreneurs increasingly establish themselves as a social force that seeks integration in the formal institutions of the societies in which they live and operate. They thereby often gain if not the respectability than at least some leverage to protect their interests. The income and employment the industry generates, for a multiplicity of actors and societies at large, also does not fail to provide political clout to drug related interests, especially when threatened by foreign or domestic repression efforts. Prohibition, however, severely hampers the formal incorporation of the drug industry through taxation, interest mediation and forms of market, labor and product regulation. From consequential partial, informal, or denied integration, it is my contention, derive many of the most harmful consequences of the industries operations, much more so since police and military institutions are ill equipped to perform these regulatory roles.11 As both the drug industry and drug law enforcement are internationalizing, they put severe strains on the possibilities of the state to incorporate the drug industry in local and domestic arrangements, that could limit their destabilizing effects on society. Such a strategy, if applied, and many countries can not escape such a choice, either by informal arrangements or through 'corruption', is however becoming less feasible where the power of organized crime and pressures for intensified law enforcement upset such symbiotic relations. The drug industry and drug repression, certainly where they cross the border of other states, can therefore have very disruptive effects on domestic political-economic institutions and arrangements. This can come about merely as an unintended consequence of conscientious cross border supply reduction efforts. However, in many instances, drug policies are merely part of other foreign policy goals, and are to a large extent shaped by the institutional logic of agencies called in to implement them. Recent history has shown that, rightly, much more calculation tends to play a role in supply side policies than zealous supply reduction. Such policies also take into account the interests involved in drug trafficking, and the capabilities of governments to offset the pressure put on these interest by efforts to stifle the drug economy (for example crop substitution projects carried out by the United Nations that aim to provide drug farmers with an alternative source of income, or the provision of arms to the Colombian military). As soon as drug policies become part of broader policy goals towards other countries they are however likely to be subordinated to other priorities that states pursue to protect their national interests. Just as war is the continuation of politics by other means, so the 'War on Drugs' has become an extension of foreign policy by other means (Marshall 1991:ii). International drug policies almost inescapably become enmeshed with geo-political and economic considerations (LaBrousse and Koutouzis 1996). So also, enhancing powers of specific law enforcers, like, in an extreme case, the military in Peru or Colombia, is likely to serve interest quite different from convincing coca growers to limit their output. In the most brutal form, international drug law enforcement can legitimize outright military intervention, as the Panamanians experienced in the late 1980s. In the foregoing paragraphs I have built an analytical framework to study the underlying dynamics, outcomes and consequences of the War on Drugs. Thereby I tried to show how the growth of global networks of crime and the internationalization of law enforcement are shaped by some fundamental changes in the global political and economic system. I also focused on how the 'War on Drugs' is likely to be subverted by interests of both drug entrepreneurs and of the powers that are called in to control the drug industry. Through their symbiotic and systemic interactions they are the most likely beneficiaries of this wa r. As their interactions take place in a competitive world, with unevenly distributed resources, the outcomes of their interactions are also likely to impinge unevenly on different societies and groups within them. The criminal system permeates the political and economic system, undermining the functioning of legal industries and the role and functioning of the state. The extension of states' coercive powers to 'control' the drug industry also impinges heavily on the distribution of power, wealth and security within and between societies, often through practices that escape democratic control. The destructive force of the intertwined dynamics of the drug industry and state repression is thereby likely to demolish the existing relations between states, markets, and societies. Therewith, the underlying dynamics and outcomes of the drug war are not only shaped by, but also reshaping the fundamental structures of the worlds' political-economy. In the next section I argue that interests in the drug industry and in drug law enforcement collide, in both the domestic and the international domain, to form the International Drug Complex. The International Drug Complex In analogy with the theory of the Military Industrial Complex, developed since the 1960's to explain the longevity of the Cold War, arms racing, the persistence of anti-communist ideology and political interventions in peoples lives and societies, I have tried in this paper to assemble and understand the mechanisms and dynamics that might explaining for the flourishing of both drug economies and new regulatory frameworks for 'state' control. Therewith I hope to elaborate a theory of the International Drug Complex. This theory tries to explain for both the prolongation of the 'War on Drugs' and the flourishing of the drug economy, by focusing on political and economic interests that shape relations between drug markets and state interventions in these markets. The basic hypotheses I try to further are that: the dynamics within and between the social forces at both sides of the law do not tend to keep each other in check, but rather reinforce each other, either by acting in concert or through more systemic interactions. Through this a 'community of interest' -a coalition of groups with vested psychological, moral, and material interests- develops between drug entrepreneurs and coercive state agencies or the power elites that control them. This mutual support takes many shapes and has many levels, changing over time and location. However, the consequence of this collusion is that the interests of both groups are advanced, to the detriment of third parties and great parts of the societies they flourish in. The drug industry and drug law enforcement, in this approach, are not necessarily opposite to each other, but develop a more or less intertwined and interdependent dynamic, a sort of countervailing but also mutually reinforcing 'coalition', that serves the interests of both, independent of democratic control by citizens and sometimes even the government. Globalization, neo-liberal reforms and the end of the Cold War have strongly affected the regulation of relations among states and the relation between states and societies. The Cold War system imposed relative stability in the international state system, as well as order and discipline within both camps and a more general foundation for stability in the world economy. The Cold war did not lead to a major conflict between the superpowers and diminished the possibilities for war between states. But, it also charged a heavy toll on peoples squeezed between the antagonistic claims to maintain political and ideological unity within the superpowers', self-proclaimed, spheres of influence. With globalization and the end of the Cold War system, state's legitimation and capacities to maintain internal order and protection against external threats have quickly diminished. Neo-liberal reforms and regional integration, there above, have accelerated the incapacitation of individual states to manage the interface between their society and the rest of the world, and to intervene in the distribution of opportunities within society. In the protection of the state, internal and external security are closely related. For half a century, military-industrial elites have nearly always prevailed over domestic rivals without much difficulty. Fear of the foreign foe persuaded political managers and the population at large to acquiesce in new efforts to match and overtake the other side's armament. The escalating arms race, in turn, helped to maintain conformity and obedience at home, since an evident outside threat was, as always, the most powerful social cement to human kind (McNeil 1982:382). The vast armed establishments that protected the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers against one another, their ideological strife and the legitimation for domestic control and foreign interventions are nowadays being supplanted by an extension of the strong arm of the law in private, domestic and foreign domains. Today, a qualitative and quantitative shift has been brought about in the constitution and dedication of the coercive apparatuses of states. In public discourse, governments' budgets and in the daily lives of many of us we are witnessing important transformations. Transformations, in the dominance of acclaimed threats (from communism to drugs, crime and foreigners), in the priority given to the financing for the preservation of internal order instead of external security arrangements (from the military to policing institutions), and in the demand of states on citizens to acquiesce to restrictions on spending power, consumer freedom, personal privacy, sovereignty and liberty, in order to comply with international demands to 'harmonize' efforts in countering the scourge of drug trafficking and other forms of criminalized activities. The discourse and state activities supporting this transformation are to a large extent based on new foes, basically the drug industry and its alleged connections with organized crime, terrorism and migration. The 'red scare' is so substituted by the fear of drugs and organized crime. The fight against this 'white scare', however, poses societies and states for many the same opportunities, dilemma's and systemic contradictions as they were facing during the Cold War era. Different from the Cold War era, which was dominated by external security concerns, coercive powers are nowadays basically set up for the safeguarding of internal security. However, such divisions are progressively blurred by the internationalization of non-military treats to internal security. Thereby the traditional divisions of labour between police, military, secret services and other coercive state powers tend to loose their significance. Such developments can be seen in the militarization of the 'War on Drugs', in the policing of external frontiers and in cooperative or interventionist activities of law enforcement agencies across boarders. The 'War on Drugs' is so in many respects taking over the functions of the Cold War, in legitimizing the coercive use of state powers to foster internal order and discipline, but also in setting up control mechanisms to defend the state and society against external threats, at home and abroad. The internationalization of police cooperation and the concomitant proliferation of tools to intervene in the sovereignty of individuals, peoples and foreign countries is, however, highly liable to decrease the prospect of a world order in which peace, justice and freedom could develop. This is mainly due to the uneven distribution of the powers unleashed by the International Drug Complex. One the one hand, the globalizing forces of for instance crime, monetary volatility, and migration decrease the possibilities to protect the state and the social arrangements that support it. The increasing overlap this brings about between internal and external security concerns, are likely to lead the formal goals of the drug war to be overruled by geo-political and economic concerns. The coercive powers of states that are called in to maintain internal order and external security, to a large extent, tend to escape democratic control, as their 'operational information' needs to be shielded from the outside world. Diminishing accountability goes hand in hand with the increased powers assigned to coercive state agencies. More than this threat of free floating state power, it is however the subversive impact of international criminal organizations that undermines the very basis of the state and the societies they preside over. If indeed also law enforcement directed against the drug industry is counterproductive, and there above serves quite different political goals, this leaves us with a less than gloomy perspective for the future development and democratization of our societies. Conclusion Since the end of the Cold War, the 'New World Order', established under conditions of increased globalization and underwritten by neo-liberal reforms, is to a large extent shaped by two forces: the visible hand of criminal forms of market control and the extension of the strong arm of the law in the national and international domain. These two forces of repression and subversion increasingly show the tendency to squeeze the populations of entire societies into a spiralling anarchy, endangering the constitutional state, and the living conditions of its citizens. Both sides of the law, although formally opposed to each other, in fact enhance each others growth and therewith their impact on the rest of society. In their mutual (systemic) interactions they permeate societies with a logic reminiscent of the way in which, during the Cold War, the two antagonistic superpowers and their military-industrial complexes on the one hand fostered the control over their spheres of influence, and on the other hand incapacitated their populations to counter the pressures of vested interests in a spiralling arms race that enhanced the income, prestige and power of military establishments and the profits of weapons industries that fed the threat of war. The two worlds of criminal entrepreneurs and of the coercive agencies of states are however not separated by geographical boundaries, nor are they separated from the societies in which they function. As both increasingly attain transnational dimensions they become more disposed to prevent themselves from being incorporated into society and, thereby, from being subordinated to democratic control. At the same time they increase their powers to penetrate in the sovereignty of individuals and that of entire societies over the globe. Endnotes 1. My greatest thanks are due to Yasemin Soysal, Marnix Croes, Gianfranco Poggi and Anne Wegner for reading and criticizing an earlier draft of this article. In a more morphological sense I may be indebted to Peter Andreas whom I find sharing similar approaches and concerns towards the underlying dynamics and consequences of the 'War on Drugs'. 2. Between 1980 and 1996, the number of inmates in the United States more than tripled from 501,886 to 1,700,661 (Belenko 1998:53). 1:50 American men are in prison; 1:20 are on parole or probation. In 1993 one in three black Americans, who did not finish highschool, were in prison (ESB 26/6/96). The number given by Mauer (1997) for drug offenders in American State and Federal prisons is substantially lower than that provided by Akida. However, he also notes a considerable shift in law enforcement priorities towards drug law enforcement. According to his data from 1985 to 1994 drug offenders accounted for more than a third (36%) of the increase in the number of offenders in state prisons and more than two thirds (71%) of the increase in federal prisoners. One of the largest increases in arrests has been for violation of laws prohibiting drug sales, distribution and possession - up 154 percent during this time period, from 580,900 to 1,476,100 (Belenko 1998:55). 3. Naylor (1987) describes extensively how governments and financial institutions compete with one another to attract international flows of hot and/or dirty money to shore up bank liquidity or foreign exchange reserves. 4. The literature embarking on such assessments is extensive, especially for producing countries. See for example the Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug Trade, 6 Volumes, undertaken by UNRISD and the United Nations University. 5. For a discussion of 'models' of the criminal firm see e.g. Peter Reuter (1983), and Joseph Albini in Thomas Mieczkowski (ed.) (1992). Thomas Naylor (1995) points at the important distinction to be made between forms of organization to participate in the market and organization to control the market. 6. An example of one of the few studies that analyze cocaine as a transnational commodity chain can be found in Wilson and Zambrano (1994). They assess that most profits (87 percent) remain in drug consuming countries. They also note the selective nature of US drug policy, that distributes the risk of participation in the trade unequally throughout the cocaine commodity chain, as it overlooks or underfunds investigation into the formal sectors (provision of key components like chemicals, airplanes, arms and communication equipment) and core countries' roles in the drug trade (money laundering, distribution net-works). 7. For example, the US Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that in 1993 the Colombian drug cartels spent 23% of their profits on laundering the hard earned drug money, up from 6% in the late 1980s (Foust and DeGeorge 1993). 8. The substances covered by this regime are expanding with technological developments in pharmacology, new 'designer' drugs are rapidly proliferating and incorporated in the prohibition regime. The principal target for control are opiates, followed by coca and cannabis derivatives. Other substances with prohibitive marking are denominated by their active substances. 9. For an oversight and analysis of the development of this global prohibition regime see for instance Stein (1985), Gerritsen (1993) and Silvis (1993). 10. In June 1999 a new Dutch Parliamentary Commission (Kalsbeek-commission) concluded that double-informants, with the help of drug officers had managed to import and market an additional 15.000 kilos of cocaine (NRC June 10 1999). 11. 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'Cocaine, Commodity Chains, and Drug Politics: A Transnational Approach.' Pp.297-315 in Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz eds. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. Zwaap, René. 1996. 'Hassans gecontroleerde doorvoer.' De Groene Amsterdammer, 14 February. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ http://www.frw.uva.nl/cedro/library/complex.html Last update: Tue Oct 19 11:16:58 1999 Editor: Arjan Sas This document is provided for personal use only. It may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, published on a website, or transmitted or published in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilm or otherwise without the prior written permission of CEDRO. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. 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