-Caveat Lector-

European Parliament-  an ongoing study of "political CONTROL" - including
methods of surveillance, imprisonment, undetectable torture, and other
"technologies of political control."
excerpt below, full document at this link:
http://cryptome.org/stoa-atpc.htm
(email me if you do not have web access, I'll email it to you (it's VERY
LONG).


Dave Hartley
http://www.Asheville-Computer.com
http://www.ioa.com/~davehart

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
_________________________________________

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT
STOA

AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES
OF POLITICAL CONTROL

Working document
(Consultation version)

Luxembourg, 6 January 1998

PE 166 499

Directorate General for Research
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Cataloguing data:
Title: An appraisal of technologies for political control
Publisher: European Parliament
Directorate General for Research
Directorate B
The STOA Programme
Author: Mr. Steve Wright - Omega Foundation - Manchester
Editor: Mr. Dick Holdsworth
Head of STOA Unit
Date: 6 January 1998
PE Number: PE 166 499

This document is a working document. The current version is being circulated
for consultation. It is not an official publication of STOA or of the
European Parliament.
This document does not necessarily represent the views of the European
Parliament.




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AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL

ABSTRACT


The objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide Members of the
European Parliament with a guide to recent advances in the technology of
political control; (ii) to identify, analyse and describe the current state
of the art of the most salient developments; (iii) to present members with
an account of current trends, both in Europe and Worldwide; and (iv) to
develop policy recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their
management and future control.

The report contains seven substantive sections which cover respectively:

(i) The role and function of the technology of political control;

(ii) Recent trends and innovations (including the implications of
globalisation, militarisation of police equipment, convergence of control
systems deployed worldwide and the implications of increasing technology and
decision drift);

(iii) Developments in surveillance technology (including the emergence of
new forms of local, national and international communications interceptions
networks and the creation of human recognition and tracking devices);

(iv) Innovations in crowd control weapons (including the evolution of a 2nd.
generation of so called 'less-lethal weapons' from nuclear labs in the USA).

(v) The emergence of prisoner control as a privatised industry, whilst state
prisons face increasing pressure to substitute technology for staff in cost
cutting exercises and the social and political implications of replacing
policies of rehabilitation with strategies of human warehousing.

(v) The use of science and technology to devise new efficient mark-free
interrogation and torture technologies and their proliferation from the US &
Europe.

(vi) The implications of vertical and horizontal proliferation of this
technology and the need for an adequate political response by the EU, to
ensure it neither threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches the hands
of tyrants.

The report makes a series of policy recommendations including the need for
appropriate codes of practice. It ends by proposing specific areas where
further research is needed to make such regulatory controls effective. The
report includes a comprehensive bibliographical survey of some of the most
relevant literature.


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AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


The objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide Members of the
European Parliament with a guide to recent advances in the technology of
political control; (ii) to identify. analyze and describe the current state
of the art of the most salient developments; (iii) to present members with
an account of current trends, both in Europe and Worldwide; and (iv) to
develop policy recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their
management and future control. The report includes a large selection of
illustrations to provide Members of Parliament with a good idea of the scope
of current technology together with a representative flavour of what lies on
the horizon. The report contains seven substantive sections, which can be
summarised as follows:

THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES
This section takes into account the multi-functionality of much of this
technology and its role in yielding an extension of the scope, efficiency
and growth of policing power. It identifies the continuum of control which
stretches from modem law enforcement to advanced state suppression, the
difference being the level of democratic accountability in the manner in
which such technologies are applied.

RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS
Taking into account the problems of regulation and control and the potential
possessed by some of these technologies to undermine international human
rights legislation, the section examines recent trends and innovations. This
section covers the trend towards militarisation of the police technologies
and the paramilitarisation of military technologies with an overall
technological and decision drift towards worldwide convergence of nearly all
the technologies of political control. Specific advances in area denial,
identity recognition, surveillance systems based on neural networks,
discreet order vehicles, new arrest and restraint methods and the emergence
of so called 'less lethal weapons' are presented. The section also looks at
a darker side of technological development including the rise of more
powerful restraint, torture, killing and execution technologies and the role
of privatised enterprises in promoting it.

The EU is recommended to: (i) develop appropriate structures of
accountability to prevent undesirable innovations emerging via processes of
technological creep or decision drift; (ii) ensure that the process of
adopting new systems for use in internal social and political control is
transparent, open to appropriate political scrutiny and subject to
democratic change should unwanted or unanticipated consequences emerge;
(iii) prohibit, or subject to stringent and democratic controls, any class
of technology which has been shown in the past to be excessively injurious,
cruel, inhumane or indiscriminate in its effects.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
This section addresses the rapid and virtually unchecked proliferation of
surveillance devices and capacity amongst both the private and public
sectors. It discusses recent innovations which allow bugging, telephone
monitoring, visual surveillance during night or day over large distances and
the emergence of new forms of local, national and international
communications interceptions networks and the creation of human recognition
and tracking devices.

The EU is recommended to subject all surveillance technologies, operations
and practices to: (i) procedures ensuring democratic accountability; (ii)
proper codes of practice consistent with Data protection legislation to
prevent malpractice or abuse; (iii) agreed criteria on what constitutes
legitimate surveillance targets, and what does not, and how such
surveillance data is stored, processed and shared. These controls should be
more effectively targeted at malpractice or illegal tapping by private
companies and regulation further tightened to include additional safeguards
against abuse as well as appropriate financial redress.

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The report discusses a massive telecommunications interceptions network
operating within Europe and targeting the telephone, fax and email messages
of private citizens, politicians, trade unionists and companies alike. This
global surveillance machinery (which is partially controlled by foreign
intelligence agencies from outside of Europe) has never been subject to
proper parliamentary discussion on its role and function, or the need for
limits to be put on the scope and extent of its activities. This section
suggests that that time has now arrived and proposes a series of measures to
initiate this process of reclaiming democratic accountability over such
systems. It is suggested that all telephone interceptions by Member States
should be subject to consistent criteria and procedures of public
accountability and codes of practice. These should equally apply to devices
which automatically create profiles of telephone calls and pattern analysis
and require similar legal requirements to those applied for telephone or fax
interception.

It is suggested that the rapid proliferation of CCTV systems in many Member
States should be subject to a common and consistent set of codes of practice
to ensure that such systems are used for the purpose for which they were
authorised, that there is an effective assessment and audit of their use
annually and an adequate complaints system is in place to deal with any
grievances by ordinary people. The report recommends that such codes of
practice anticipate technical change including the digital revolution which
is currently in process, and ensure that each and every such advance is
subject to a formal assessment of both the expected as well as the possible
unforeseen implications.

INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS
This section addresses the evolution of new crowd control weapons, their
legitimation, biomedical and political effects. It examines the specific
introduction of new chemical, kinetic and electrical weapons, the level of
accountability in the decision making and the political use of such
technologies to disguise the level of violence being deployed by state
security forces. The research used to justify the introduction of such
technologies as safe is reanalysed and found to be wanting. Areas covered in
more depth include CS and OC gas sprays, rubber and plastic bullets,
multi-purpose riot tanks, and the facility of such technologies to exact
punishment, with the possibility that they may also bring about anti-state
retaliatory aggression which can further destabilise political conflict.

This section briefly analyses recent innovations in crowd control weapons
(including the evolution of a 2nd. generation of so called 'less-lethal
weapons' from nuclear labs in the USA) and concludes that they are dubious
weapons based on dubious and secret research. The Commission should be
requested to report to Parliament on the existence of formal liaison
arrangements between the EU and the USA to introduce such weapons for use in
streets and prisons here. The EU is also recommended to (i) establish
objective common criteria for assessing the biomedical effects of all so
called less lethal weapons and ensure any future authorization is based on
independent research; (ii) ensure that all research used to justify the
deployment of any new crowd control weapon in the EU is published in the
open scientific press and subject to independent scientific scrutiny, before
any authorization is given to deploy. In the meantime the Parliament is
asked to reaffirm its current ban on plastic bullets and that all deployment
of devices using peppergas (OC) be halted until such a time as independent
European research on its risks has been undertaken and published.

NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS
This section reports on the emergence of prisoner control as a privatised
industry, whilst state prisons face increasing pressure to substitute
technology for staff in cost cutting exercises. It expresses concern about
the social and political implications of replacing policies of
rehabilitation with strategies of human warehousing and recommends common
criteria for licensing all public and private prisons within the EU. At
minimum this should cover operators responsibilities and prisoners rights in
regard to rehabilitation requirements; UN Minimum Treatment of Prisoners
rules banning the use of leg irons; the regulation and use of psychotropic
drugs to control prisoners; the use of riot control, prisoner transport,
restraint and extraction technologies. The report recommends a ban on (i)
all automatic, mass. indiscriminate prisoner punishment technologies using
less lethal instruments such as chemical irritant or baton rounds; (ii) kill
fencing and lethal area denial systems; and (iii) all use of electro-shock,
stun and electric restraint technology until and unless independent medical
evidence can prove that it safe and will not contribute to either deaths in
custody or inhumane treatment, torture or other cruel and unusual
punishments.

INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES
This section discusses the use of science and technology to devise new
efficient mark-free interrogation and torture technologies and their
proliferation from the US & Europe. Of particular concern is the use and
abuse of electroshock devices and their proliferation. It is recommended
that the commercial sale of both training in counter terror operations and
any equipment which might be used in torture and execution, should be
controlled by the criteria and measures outlined in the next section.

REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION
The implications for civil liberties and human rights of both the vertical
and horizontal proliferation of this technology are literally awesome. There
is a pressing need for an adequate political response by the EU, to ensure
it neither threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches the hands of
tyrants. The European Council agreed in Luxembourg in 1991 and in Lisbon in
1992 a set of eight Common Criteria for Arms Exports which set out
conditions which should govern all decisions relating to the issue of
licences for the export of arms and ammunition, one condition of which was
"the respect of human rights in the country of final destination." Other
conditions also relate to the overall protection of human rights. However
these eight criteria are not binding on member states and there is no common
interpretation on how they should be most effectively implemented. However,
a code of conduct to achieve such an agreement was drawn up and endorsed by
over 1000 Non-Governmental Organizations based in the European Union.

Whilst it is recognised that it is not the role of existing EU institutions
to implement such measures as vetting and issuing of export licences, which
are undertaken by national agencies of the EU Member States, it has been
suggested by Amnesty International that the joint action procedure which was
used to establish EU regulations on Export of Dual use equipment could be
used to take such a code of practice further.

Amnesty suggest that the EU Member States should use the Joint Action
procedures to draw up common lists of (i) proscribed military, security and
police equipment and technology, the sole or primary use of which is to
contribute to human rights violations; (ii) sensitive types of military,
security or police equipment and technology which has been shown in practice
to be used for human rights violations; and (iii) military, security and
police units and forces which have been sufficiently responsible for human
rights violations and to whom sensitive goods and services should not be
provided. The report makes recommendations to help facilitate this objective
of denying repressive regimes access to advanced repression technologies
made or supplied from Europe.

FURTHER RESEARCH
The report concludes by proposing a series of areas where new research is
required including: (i) advanced area denial and less-lethal weapon systems;
(ii) human identity recognition and tracking technologies; (iii) the
deployment of 'dum-dum' ammunition within the EU; (iv) the constitutional
issues raised by the U.S. National Security Agency's access and facility to
intercept all European telecommunications; (v) the social and political
implications of further privatisation of the technologies of political
control and (vi) the extent to which European based companies have been
complicit in supplying equipment used for torture or other human rights
violations and what new independent measures might be instituted to track
such transfers.


SNIPPED ......  see:
http://cryptome.org/stoa-atpc.htm
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