-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- an excerpt from: Treason's Peace Howard Watson Armbruster©1947 A Crossroads Press Book Beechurst Press New York 438 pps. -- First/Only Edition -- Out-of Print --[14]-- CHAPTER XIV Again, Espionage and Sabotage A" . . . STRUCTURE of espionage," which made "weekly and monthly reports to Germany . . . They were soldiers in the army of Germany." So said Francis P. Garvan, Alien Property Custodian, in 1919, when denouncing certain American agents of I.G. Dyes. An instrument so aptly devised for espionage pur-poses. Persons were carried on the payroll of the General Aniline and Film Corporation who were unknown in the company. There was a constant traffic in German agents who would be employed by General Aniline and Film Corporation for a few months and then moved on to other fields. So said Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, in 1942, when denouncing certain of the successors of I.G. Dyes (including some of the same individuals who had been involved in Mr. Garvan's charges). The part played by Bayer's Schweitzer and other I.G. Dyes agents as saboteurs in World War I need not be repeated. Over two decades later another Government official, who like Garvan, had spent months digging beneath the surface of the activities of the dye trust agents in this country before and during World War II made precisely the same charges which Garvan, in his attempts to induce senatorial action, had first made years previously. This later official indictment of Farben's espionage and saboteurs in a Treasury report of investigations made in 1941 and 1942, said in part: In the twenty-year period between 1919 and 1939 German interests succeeded in organizing within the United States another industrial and commercial network centered in the chemical field . . . It is unnecessary to point out that these business enterprises constituted a base of operations to carry out Axis plans to control production, to hold markets in this Hemisphere, to support fifth column movements, and to mold our postwar economy according to Axis plans . . . This problem with which we are now faced is more difficult than, although somewhat similar to, the problem faced by us in 1917. The background is vastly different from that which existed in 1917. The report went on to say that: Certain individuals who occupied a dominant place in business enterprises owed all of their success to their business contacts in the past with . . . I.G. Farben. Also that it was regarded as "nave in the fight of Axis practices" to believe that Farben relied only upon the services of those who were actually citizens of Axis countries. This Treasury report, in discussing the Farben practice of sending spies and agents to become citizens of this country (see Chapter v) stated that it had been found necessary to dismiss one hundred American citizens from General Aniline and Film Corp., including five key executives, three of whom received salaries in excess of $50,000 a year; also that it had been necessary to liquidate the General Aniline patent law firm, composed of W. H. Hutz, son of the only original Bayer's Rudolph Hutz (bobbing up again), and another attorney named H. M. Joslin. The Secretary of the Treasury, according to the report, had the power to define as a national of Germany any person determined to have acted directly or indirectly for the benefit of, or under the direction of, Germany. To the reader of this story it may appear that this power has not been utilized as fully as might be. The report described how the payroll of this American front for the German dye trust in World War II, as in World War I, was being utilized by Farben's spy bureaus. Under these conditions any past connection with Farben by a General Aniline employe appeared to be considered, by the Treasury, as cause for immediate dismissal. Among the pre-war activities of the Agfa-Ansco Division of General Aniline & Film are reported (by others, not this Treasury document) to have been demonstrations of its photographic and blueprint apparatus and materials, conducted ostensibly for the edification of our army and navy authorities. It is said that these tests included the taking of stills and moving pictures, and the reproduction of drawings and documents, of what may have been regarded as "top secrets" of the limited national defense preparations which were permitted by a stupid Congress prior to the outbreak of combat war in Europe. Complacent Government officials who permitted these generous tokens of Agfa-Ansco patriotism may have felt suitably compensated with copies of the films and photoprints thus supplied, gratis, for their use. And we may safely assume that Max llgner, in Berlin, was also gratified to see such movies and pictures of American defense plans as may have reached him through these channels. When it came to weeding out the undesirables in Sterling the Treasury firing squad was unable to apply its formula and the report states that the removal of some forty-two persons on the payroll (for relations with Farben) was merely suggested. The suggestion evidently went to the justice Department-and Mr. Corcoran. If it may appear difficult to understand why such discrimination would be tolerated it should be understood that the German dye trust had immeasurably improved its technic over that employed in World War I both in espionage and sabotage, and for the protection of the more important of its agents. This was especially true in the case of Sterling's Bayer. During the months following Pearl Harbor, when the attempted housecleaning of the Sterling-Bayer-Winthrop organization at Rensselaer, New York, got under way, considerable excitement prevailed in that town and at Albany, across the Hudson River, where many of the personnel of the Sterling companies resided. The head of a beauty parlor which was patronized by ladies of the Winthrop-Bayer families was reputedly put on the F.B.I. payroll, and feared for her life while thus serving her country in checking on subversive utterances of some of the lovely patrons whose husbands' loyalty to this country was under observation. One of the Winthrop scientific staff who was removed from his duties and locked up on Ellis Island was Wolfgang Schnellbach, mentioned in Chapter V, who, it developed, had charge of "testing" the 400,000 adulterated Sulfathiazole tablets shipped out in 1940 which caused so much death and injury before the Winthrop management warned the public of this danger. At Ellis Island, Mr. Schnellbach protested vehemently that the catastrophe was not his fault-that his superiors refused to permit him to make proper tests on the tablets. Months before the United States entered the war in December 1941, there was available to the Congress testimony direct from the Gestapo relating to Farben's espionage and sabotage activities in this country and Latin America. This information was publicly presented to the Dies Committee on un-American Activities in May 1941 by the celebrated Richard Krebs, who wrote "Out of the Night," under the pen name of Jan Valtin. Mr. Krebs, as a former Gestapo agent, testified at length from personal knowledge regarding the part played by the German dye trust in the organization of Nazi propaganda, espionage and sabotage in this hemisphere. Naming Hamburg-American Line offices, and the Zapp Transocean News Service as mere appendages of the Gestapo, Krebs told how business houses in the United States employed Gestapo agents themselves and also placed these agents in other concerns which were not pro-German. The Gestapo, said Krebs, had its "In dustrial Reports Department" with special schools for training Germans, or Americans of German origin, to go to America as mechanics, engineers, and draftsmen, also as newspaper men and teachers—for work in vital industrial and cultural establishments of North and South America. According to the witness, the Gestapo regarded any country where it operated as a "hostile country" with which "war" began the moment one of its agents crossed the border. (The country would learn in good time that "war" was going on.) In addition to inducing propaganda which might retain a semblance of legality, the purpose of the Gestapo, and especially of its Farben spies, was revealed by Mr. Krebs to be: . . . to obtain information about our security (defense) program, and to produce choke points, or to sabotage our war efforts." (We may recall that Francis Garvan had said the same thing in 1919, and that Henry Morgenthau repeated it in 1942.) Mr. Krebs was specific when he stated: The I.G. Farbenindustrie, I know from personal experience, was already in 1934 completely in the bands of the 'Gestapo. They went so far as to have their own Gestapo prison on the factory grounds of their large works at Leuna, and . . . began, particularly after Hitler's ascent to power, to branch out in the foreign field through subsidiary factories . . . It is the greatest poison gas industry in the world, concentrated under the title of I.G. Farbenindustrie . . . During World War II there may have been fewer instances than in World War I of destruction of ships and munition plants by explosive bombs but the new technic did largely delay, and in some instances may have prevented, building the ships and the plants. Possibly readers may perceive little difference in results between the "sabotage" that destroys, with bombs, a munition Plant, after it is built; and the "sabotage" that prevents, by what Harry Truman called treason, the utilization of an improved process or the building of a new munition plant. In August 1942 during the closing days of the Bone Committee hearings the word "sabotage" rang out in the Committee room while Standard Oil's Frank Howard was attempting to explain why a Farben-Standard patent restricting tie-up forbade Standard from using an advantageous process for making synthetic nitrogen and ammonia. Irritated at cross-examination of the committee counsel, which brought out an admission that Standard did not appeal to the United States Government to do something about the matter until August 1941, Mr. Howard exclaimed: The sabotage you speak of, Mr. Fath, was simply a blanket refusal on the part of the German Government to do any business at all in America . . . You are arguing that we should have disregarded the limitations that . . . existed on our rights. I might tell you that if we felt it was necessary, and important in the national defense, we certainly would have done it; but at the moment we apparently did not think it was necessary to do anything different from what we had. As indicative of the significance of the use of the word "sabotage" in that connection it may be pointed out that when Mr. Howard gave this testimony the "limitations" on Standard's rights had already been adjudicated as criminal violations of our laws; and the "moments" when Standard did not find it necessary to act extended until August 1941, within a few short months of our entrance in combat war, the importance to our national defense being that synthetic nitrogen was vital in our production of military explosives. Just as this kind of "sabotage" went on before and during the war, it may also occur to readers of this chapter that 'in some of the law enforcement problems to be mentioned later another type of "sabotage" —of government—may be observed. Another incident of the Standard-Farben partnership which should properly be classified as "sabotage" had to do with that other vital military need, toluol. Back in 1920 appeal was made by the United States Navy authorities to the Senate that we should not again be caught short of toluol for TNT as we had been in World War I. But the Senate, and every one else in authority, apparently forgot that warning; so we were again short of this all-important military requirement because, among other reasons, of restriction imposed by Farben upon the use of a new process for producing synthetic toluol which was developed by Standard from the germ of one of the Farben patents on the hydrogenation of oil. Although the process was developed long before the war, Standard's Frank Howard appeared to believe that even after the war began Farben still controlled its use because it did not relate directly to the oil industry. So Standard, in May 1940, turned down requests for the synthetic toluol which the Trojan Powder Co., required for a War Department contract. Large scale production of this product was delayed by Standard out of deference to Farben until 1941, long after the need for immense quantities of synthetic toluol had become pressing. In World War I toluol was needed mainly for TNT. In World War Il its use for TNT was tremendously increased because of the larger use of military explosives, and also because of further enormous requirements of toluol for production of butadiene, an essential infredient[sic] for synthetic rubber, and for high-test aviation gasoline. But Standard feared that Farben might object to the use of this process—and sue for damages after Farben had won the war. In 1944 the United States was still short of high-test aviation gasoline and Buna rubber. Instances of this later variety of sabotage have been indicated and it may be that here is the place to include an excerpt from the "Act (of April 20, 1918) to punish the wilful injury or destruction of war material . . . and for other purposes," which was amended on Nov. 30,1940 and includes this addition to the original law: Sec. 5. That whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of the United States, shall wilfully injure or destroy, or shall attempt to so injure or destroy, any national defense material . . . shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000.00 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. However it was not the above statute but the antitrust laws which were invoked—oh, how gently—in such cases of Farben's industrial espionage and sabotage, as were taken to court after Thurman Arnold finally got his Irish up and went gunning for the dye trust American fronts. General Aniline and Film is amply discussed elsewhere in this story. This Treasury report of 1942 also described the seizure of Farben-owned Chemnyco, Inc., which was incorporated in 1931 as successor of the United States and Transatlantic Service Corp., Inc., a high sounding title that had succeeded a group called the Committee on Political Economics in 1930. Max Ilgner was its organizer. Wilfrid Greif, a Farben director and also one of the top men in American I.G. Chemical Corp., originally held stock control of Chemnyco and he was succeeded in 1935 by our old acquaintance D. A. Schmitz. William vom Rath, another of the sons of Farben was a parttime bolder of Chemnyco stock and his pal Walter Duisberg included this organization among his multitudinous duties as Farben's chief trouble shooter in its American hideouts. Among the notables who served as directors of Chemnyco were Dr. Karl Hochswender, who was also active in Farben's magnesium set-up; Carl B. Peters, vice-president of Synthetic Nitrogen, and its one-time president (of whom more later); and the late William Paul Pickhardt, son of one of the Kuttroff & Pickhardt founders who started as an office boy in that Badische-Farben hideout, became its president and, before he died in 1941 had also served as an American-born figurehead for Farben in many of its hideouts. Mr. Pickhardt was also president of Chemnyco but its real head was Rudolph Ilgner. Each of these four Cbemnyco directors, as told elsewhere, was indicted one or more times-and never punished save for the picayune $1,000 fine paid by Ilgner for burning Chemnyco secret files. Nominally a wholly American-organized and owned corporation, Chemnyco started out with a yearly subsidy from Farben of $84,000 which annual retainer by 1938 bad increased to $240,000. However it was not restricted to this generous budget outlay, the Chemnyco management being authorized to incur any additional or "special" expenses which were considered "necessary or expedient." This blank check arrangement indicated that Uncle Hermann and brother Max had great confidence in Rudolph Ilgner—or else they thought that this might be a convenient method of denying responsibility for expenditures which later could be embarrassing to the Farben high command at Frankfurt. In addition to its stated income and special expenses, Chemnyco also handled enormous sums while acting as a receiving or collection agency for funds due Farben from various partnership and patent license agreements in America. Among the services which Chemnyco was obligated to perform was to "facilitate" the activities of such individuals that Farben chose to send to this country-including their introduction to our top level notables, when such contacts were deemed essential to the "accomplishment of the purpose of their visit." The details of these services as outlined in the agreement may appear sinister in view of some of the activities which have been uncovered. The Chemnyco staff undertook to make reports and act for Farben on governmental matters, including the recovery of property which had been seized by the Alien Property Custodian during the first World War, or to induce compensation (from the United States Treasury) for same. They also conducted negotiations and liaison relations with American corporations; acted as blind holders of American securities, prying into the affairs of such concerns, and reporting on scientific developments. Chemnyco was forbidden to do one thing-it was specifically provided that it had no authority to do anything which American courts could construe as the "doing of business" by Farben inside of the United States. Thus its status as a false front was established in pseudo-legal language. However, Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., head of the raiding squad of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., disregarded this camouflage and on December 11, 1941, the day on which Germany declared war, seized Cbemnyco as a Farben property. A great mass of Chemnyco's secret records were burned by order of Rudolph Ilgner after the F.B.I. came to examine them in July 1939, as told elsewhere, but those which have been uncovered reveal in part the comprehensive character of Chemnyco espionage on industrial developments, especially as they related to war-making potentials. The Chemnyco pre-war reports to Farben dealt with such things as progress of the research in atomic fission, synthetic rubber tires, duPont's Nylon invention, manganese and magnesium resources and the annual production of the coke ovens of America. While the war in Europe was in progress there were compiled, under dates in June, 1941, long lists of reports on research and developments in Standard Oil (N. J.) laboratories and producing plants. Ostensibly occupied wholly with the handling of patent application licenses and matters of this sort, Chemnyco practised espionage on the secrets of American industry, with results which were of tremendous value to Farben's preparations for war in Germany and for crippling and obstructing preparations for war in America. By its great number of industrial contacts permitting correspondence. reports, and inspection visits which produced up-to-the-minute information of scientific and industrial progress here, Chemnyco was enabled to transmit secret intelligence to Max Ilgner's spy bureau at Berlin. This included confidential data which could not possibly be obtained by the conventional methods of secret agents. As a friendly patent ho lding company Chemnyco readily obtained the desired data at little cost and no risk, through exploitation of its industrial and commercial contacts. Tons of this material; process secrets, blueprints and national defense plans, were thus transmitted to Farben. An example of this pre-war espionage of a vicious type in spying upon American synthetic rubber research was revealed before the Bone Patents Committee of the Senate on May 20, 1943. This espionage was directed at development work on rubber substitutes which had been conducted for some years by Dow and Goodyear; both companies had expended large sums and made good progress in this field; Dow already was marketing a rubber substitute which was acceptable for some purposes. According to testimony given before the Bone Committee by Professor R. M. Hunter, of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, a request was made by Dow and Goodyear for licenses to utilize the Buna synthetic patents, about which it will be recalled (from Chapter IV) Farben kept Standard guessing for many years as a bait for the lopsided exchange of processes between them, and finally refused point blank, for military reasons, to supply the know how. Dow and Goodyear got a runaround instead of a license to make Buna. An act was staged by Standard and I.G. Farben for the rubber companies, while they were kidded into believing that licenses might be forthcoming. And documentary evidence was also presented to the Committee showing that Chemnyco, as Farben's patent agent, reported to headquarters on June 3, 1937, that: We thought it expedient to conduct the negotiations in such a way that we would continue to observe and become acquainted with Dow's and Goodyear's experiments. Posing as patent license negotiators on this vital munitions product, Rudolph Ilgner's Chemnyco spies were pillaging results of this invaluable research work done by Americans for secret transmittal to Max Ilgner's espionage bureau in Berlin. During the summer of 1945, after Germany was occupied and some of Farben's staff were in custody, Dr. Oscar Loehr of the Farben staff at Frankfurt recalled that particular report from Chemnyco on synthetic rubber snooping, and admitted frankly that this Farben front in the United States did "conduct industrial espionage for I.G." A general conclusion recorded by Dr. Loehr during one of his examinations is to the point: Question: So I.G. was able to suppress completely the synthetic rubber production in the United States, was able to use an American company, Standard Oil, to protect I.G.'s patents in case of war between the United States and Germany, and in that way I.G. itself undermined the military potential of the United States, and I.G. itself was able to carry on industrial espionage in the United States using its representatives, its participations and its agreements with American firms, to carry on economic warfare against the United States. Is that true? Answer: These are the conclusions which seem to disclose that I.G. impaired the military strength of the United States Yes. Likewise informative are excerpts from interoffice reports between Farben's offices and government officials in 1940, when the Germans thought that the war was already won, and that the United States would stay out of it. One report, dated August 8, 1940, praises Chemnyco's services: Extensive information which we receive continuously from the Chemnyco . . . is indispensable for our observations of the American conditions especially with a view to the tech-nical development . . . Moreover this material is, since the beginning of the war, an important source of information for governmental, economical and military offices. Also in view of the later revival of trade with America, these informations are of importance to us. Another communication indicates prewar knowledge by officials of the United States Government of precisely what Cbemnyco was up to. This report, dated July 20, 1940, states: We would not fail to mention that the Chemnyco was several times examined by the Authorities in the U. S. A. on its work and its connections with the I.G. and we would like to point out the confidential character of the above mentioned fact. Some day, it may be hoped, these pre-war "examinations of Chemnyco" by officials of our own government will also be brought to light, and the identity revealed of those so complacent "authorities" who did not act when the character of Chemnyco's espionage was uncovered, especially after destruction of its secret files in 1939. Perhaps those prewar investigators of ours are among the men who expressed such shocked surprise when, after we entered the war, some of the truth about Farben's allegedly secret activities inside the United States came out in Congressional hearings (before these were choked off). Chemnyco had its headquarters at 551 5th Avenue in New York; and during the prewar period there was also located at that address the Chemical Marketing Company, another hideout of a Farben affiliate, the Deutsche Gold-und-Silberscbeide Anstalt.a.g. This American front was incorporated in 1935 as the Frank von Kroop Company, changed its name to Chemical Marketing in 1937, and was headed by a German chemist, Dr. Ferdinand A. Kertess. That individual came to the United States in 1923 and commuted regularly back to Germany without becoming an American citizen until 1938, by which time he had prospered in many varieties of activities and was established in a sumptuous suburban estate in Westchester County, New York. Dr. Kertess won what appears to have been the exclusive honor of being the only one of Farben's ersatz citizens to be lodged in jail in the United States. The crime for which he and his company were indicted in four different actions on November 6, 1942, was violation of the Trading with The Enemy Act, for which the defendants were convicted in July, 1943. The court fined them $14,000 and also awarded Dr. Kertess six years in jail, where, supposedly, he now languishes. Farben's connection does not appear in the record of these cases but its war plants undoubtedly were in dire 'need of the rare metals shipped by Kertess, such as palladium, rhodium and iridium, all invaluable in the production of war munitions and implements. Dr. Kertess made use of a woman courier to smuggle the precious metals out of this country to Germany via a circuitous route first to the Canal Zone, then to Colombia and Chile in South America, and overseas to Italy by plane. This criminal agent appears to have been deeply involved in many varieties of subversive activities. He was known as the power behind the scenes in the Board of Trade for GermanAmerican Commerce, Farben's hideout for Nazi propaganda agencies, which is discussed in the next chapter. According to statements which be made to the Dies Committee in 1940, his Chemical Marketing Company had acquired the Maywood Chemical Company of Maywood, New Jersey, to manufacture a "specialty," which he did not identify. The Maywood company was the long established narcotic producer of cocain from coca leaves and kola nuts. Also the maker of the syrup known as "Merchandise No. 5," which is used in well-known beverages, and around which revolved one of the most bitterly contested court cases in the early years of Harvey Wiley's Pure Food and Drug Law. Why Dr. Kertess should have acquired a large plant for the production of narcotics has not been revealed. He was also on close terms with the American I.G. Chemical people and was active after the war broke out in shipping chemicals to Farben's South American agents, whose supplies had been cut off by the British blockade. His company likewise served as an alleged American assignee of German patents, in a vain attempt to prevent their seizure after the war started Among his other public-spirited activities, Dr. Kertess took a leading part in promoting an organization called the American Foreign Trade Association which, according to a letter written in August, 1939, to Germany about it, was promoting a friendly attitude towards Germany among members of Congress by the employment of lobbyists at $50 per day, plus expenses for ,.secretaries." This reference to the use of money by the phony Kertess organization to influence members of Congress as World War 11 was beginning, may be a reminder of the statement made on the floor of the House of Representatives on September 31, 1917, by Tom' Heflin of Alabama, then a Congressman, when it was revealed that German Ambassador von Bernstorff, prior to our entry into the first world war, had cabled the Kaiser's government at Berlin for: . . . authority to pay out . . . $50.000 in order, as on former occasions, to influence Congress, thru the organiza-tion you know of, which can perhaps prevent war. Tom Heflin, later to become famous as a firebrand in the Senate, asked for investigation of those members of the House and Senate who had acted in a suspicious manner by their pro-German speeches, resolutions or bills, and demanded their expulsion if found guilty of being influenced by the mysterious organization referred to by von Bernstorff. Having placed this challenge to his colleagues on the record Mr. Heflin followed up with some even more crude remarks in the press about "lady spies" and a gambling room in Washington where "peace-at-any-price" members of Congress were extraordinarily lucky at cards. The only result of these 1917 charges was a rebuke to Congressman Heflin. Demands for investigation of similar legislative misconduct before and during World War II were likewise ignored. On May 4, 1939, four months before the German army crossed the Polish border, Dr. Kertess cabled one of his friends in Frankfurt that he was "together with friends, ready for war." Shortly after this he engaged a New York newspaperman, James E. Edmunds, for espionage work, which he termed "research," and for which Mr. Edmunds was paid some $1,500 by Chemical Marketing. In justice to Mr. Edmunds, it should be stated that his activities in reality constituted counter-espionage of a very clever character, and were conducted under the directions of the F.B.I. and British and French Intelligence officials, to whom he reported as soon as he realized the character of the "research" he was to do. Originally engaged by a representative of the Japanese News Agency Domei, who paid him handsomely, Edmunds became suspicious and reported. to the authorities. These suspicions became a certainty when the Jap, Mr. T. Sato, sent him to Dr. Kertess, and the latter in turn asked him to contact one Dr. Herbert Gross, described as a German agent, who was operating a news agency in New York as a front. Gross wanted information about American war plants, British and French ships sailing from the United States and Canada, and other espionage matters. Mr. Edmunds accordingly traveled to Halifax, Nova Scotia, on his pretended spying, hoping to contact the Kertess-Gross agent across the border, and supplied his treacherous paymasters with much false data which was gotten up for him by the American and British authorities. He had some difficulty in securing from Dr. Gross the additional funds which the latter promised him, but appeal to Dr. Kertess always caused such financial troubles to be adjusted. The latter assured Edmunds that he was personally delivering the data thus secured to the German Naval Attache at Washington. Gross also asked Edmunds to bribe employees of Pan American Airways to supply information about British defenses at Bermuda, and the establishment of a convoy base there, with report s on its shipping. Finally, according to Edmunds' sworn statements, Dr. Kertess solicited his aid in getting shipments of chemicals through the British blockade. On the record, Dr. Kertess appears to have been a most important cog in Farben's domestic espionage machine. But Mr. Edmunds made a monkey out of this Farben agent with his counter-espionage fairy stories. Our old acquaintance, Dr. Eugene R. Pickrell, the Metz handyman and Farben lobbyist, reappears in the picture as receiving an annual stipend of $6,000 from Chemnyco on an arrangement that was made in 1931, by which Dr. Pickrell represented Farben's interests in a legal capacity. Unhappily for Dr. Pickrell, the freezing order issued by President Roosevelt in June, 1941, appears to have interfered with the delivery of the Pickrell meal ticket in the customary manner, and Farben accordingly cabled its good friends Rohm & Haas, of Philadelphia, to please arrange a special license from the Treasury so that Chemnyco could pay Pickrell out of funds which the Philadelphia firm owed to Farben, for which Chemnyco acted as collector. Mr. Morgenthau unkindly said "nothing doing," so Mr. Pickrell, who is not easily discouraged, made another try after the Alien Property Custodian had taken possession of funds due Farben from Rohm & Haas. In 1943 Dr. Pickrell put in a claim to the Custodian for the $4,500 still unpaid on his 1941 salary for serving Farben in his native land. Again Dr. Pickrell lost out. The Custodian's Vested Property Committee decided that the Pickrell "evidential burden has not been sustained." Dr. Pickrell, like Dr. Kertess, appears again in the next chapter as an important figure in Farben's propaganda hideout. Among other duties Chemnyco and its predecessors also agreed to prepare, publish and circulate in America any advertising or other publicity which Farben might request. Chemnyco had no publication of its own. Here obviously was where the joint direction by Rudolph Ilgner of both Chemnyco and the GermanAmerican Board of Trade became so useful. The latter's monthly Bulletin circulated among the cream of American industry, commerce and finance, as the organ of a group of top ranking public spirited companies and individuals. Farben thus possessed an agency to wield influence in business circles and on high Governmental policies which far exceeded that of all the rest of the blatant pro-Nazi publications representing the Bund and other groups of the less respectable levels of American society. So Rudolph Ilgner's powers as Chairman of the Board of Trade executive committee fitted in splendidly with those which he exercised as head of Chemnyco. Which activities his brother Max, head of Farben's world-wide spy bureau in Berlin, was to admit (after his capture in 1944) "might" have violated the United States security statutes. They did. But Rudolph, by then raising chickens in Connecticut, should worry. pps. 269-285 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. 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