Hawks and Eagles: "Greater NATO' Flies to the Aid of 'Greater Albania' Diana Johnstone Excerpts: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was the group chosen to organize a Kosovo 'Verification' Mission (KVM). In Western Europe, objections to the expansion of NATO have tended to take refuge in proposals to strengthen the alternative OSCE which, unlike NATO, involves Russia and indeed all European countries except, since 1992, Yugoslavia. Early suspicions in some pro-OSCE circles, confirmed by later events, suggested that this assignment was used largely to DISCREDIT the OSCE as a viable "alternative" to NATO. Although the champions of OSCE had always seen it as less US-dominated, THE US PUT ONE OF ITS OWN "DIRTY WAR" SPECIALISTS, WILLIAM WALKER, IN CHARGE OF THE KVM. The "verifier" force never approached 2,000, and it was widely assumed that many of the "verifiers" were agents of various NATO intelligence services, especially US military and civilian intelligence. WALKER'S MAIN "DIPLOMATIC" EXPERIENCE WAS IN ASSISTING THE CONTRAS IN THEIR COVERT WAR AGAINST THE SANDINISTAS. This was good background for cooperation with the KLA -- the only "liberation" movement in the world which enthusiastically calls for NATO bombing of the territory it is out to conquer. In mid-January, Walker himself broke the fragile peace his force had been sent to solidify by endorsing the KLA version of events in the village of Racak. Walker's condemnation of a "Serbian massacre," which many believe (and on the basis of solid evidence) was a propaganda set-up -- arranging battlefield dead to give the APPEARANCE of an execution, discredited the KVM as a neutral observer. The war against Yugoslavia has been sold to the public as a humanitarian necessity when in reality it is a political project. For the Albanian leaders, the purpose was always clear: "Greater Albanian" rule over Kosovo ... Veton Surroi, publisher of the Kosovo Albanian newspaper Koha Ditore, FINANCIALLY SUPPORTED BY THE SOROS FOUNDATION, is favored as the West's choice for the President of "independent" Kosovo ... The leading role of the Albanian lobby in the Clinton campaign's "Ethnic Outreach" program is striking, as is the absence of any Serbian lobby. One can assume that this is not because there are no Americans of Serbian origin in the United States, but because Serbs identified totally with the victorious Allied side in both world wars; many considered themselves Yugoslavs first and foremost, and if they opposed Tito, the changes they hoped to see in Yugoslavia were political and democratic, not a reshaping of the Balkans with help from the U.S. Superpower. In contrast, Croatian exile groups in particular nursed dreams of restoring the fascist Ustashe "Independent Croatian State," which had existed only during World War II thanks to the occupation and dismantling of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy. In 1993, it was reported that "Croatia has built up the most effective lobbying and public relations network on Capitol Hill since the Israeli lobby." Croatian lobbying, congressional investigators reported, "could well exceed $50 million." Culturally, there is little in common between Croats and Albanians. But BOTH CROATIAN AND ALBANIAN EXILES NURSED THE HOPE OF RESTORING THE FASCIST STATE THAT HAD EXISTED ONLY THANKS TO THE AXIS POWERS DURING WORLD WAR II. Denouncing the anti-fascist Serbs as "Communist oppressors" was a sure-fire formula for winning support from American politicians. A key role in the joining of the anti-Serb forces was played by a young aide of Republican Senator Dole, Mira Radievolic Baratta. Within the "small circle of those who monitor U.S. policy toward the Balkans," The Weekly Standard reported in 1995, "her influence and her expertise are widely recognized." Richard Perle, [an ex-Reagan official] who advised Dole on behalf of Bosnian Muslims at the Dayton peace talks, says that "other than Richard Holbrooke, Baratta has been the most influential individual in shaping U.S. policy in Europe." Baratta began working for Dole in June 1989 and in May 1995 received the "Award for Excellence in Politics" from the "National Federation of Croatian Americans" -- [a front for those nostalgic for the days of the fascist Ustashe]. In a bastion of ignorance, Baratta easily became the congressional expert on the Balkans. Baratta has "as good an understanding of the Balkans as anyone on Capitol Hill," The Weekly Standard reported admiringly. Baratta's fans include the most hawkish veterans of the Reagan-Bush administration -- U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Perle, and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. Caspar Weinberger, whose name is synonymous with [ CIA-partner] Bechtel, is described as "the most hawkish on the Balkans." Bechtel has already been selected to build Croatia's new coastal highway. The ravaged Balkans supply plenty of other opportunities for Bechtel -- not least of which is the future oil pipeline to bring Caspian Sea oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, in keeping with the Clinton administration's committment to diverting that oil away from Russia or Iran. ==================== Hawks and Eagles: "Greater NATO' Flies to the Aid of 'Greater Albania' by Diana Johnstone (c) 1999 On March 24, NATO launched its first full-scale aggressive war against a sovereign state. It was certainly not meant to be the last. NATO, it was repeatedly stated, had to prove its "resolve." The action was meant to be exemplary, a model for future NATO actions elsewhere and a warning to the world. Yugoslavia had neither attacked nor threatened any other country. NATO acted illegally, without any mandate from the United Nations Security Council. By flouting the basic principles that underlie the fragile structure of international legality, the Clinton administration and NATO chose "might is right" as the law of the new millennium. This appalling adventure, presented by servile media and ignorant politicians as a "humanitarian" necessity, set off precisely the "humanitarian catastrophe" its apologists claimed it was meant to prevent. Countless thousands of frightened ethnic Albanian civilians fled over rough terrain into neighboring countries. They were fleeing from the NATO bombing and Serb reprisals, in proportions it was not possible to measure. Both NATO and its armed Albanian allies in the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK or KLA) needed to persuade the world that "Milosevic" (the semi-fictional personification of evil on the one hand, and Serbia on the other) was carrying out "genocide" in Kosovo. The "genocide" story was necessary to justify both the bombing and the next phase of the NATO-KLA scenario, the invasion of Serbia to "liberate" Kosovo. After a week of bombing, this much could be said with certainty: NATO leaders had lied so blatantly about things that could be checked, that there was no reason to believe anything they say about things that could not. Among the many lies in the current torrent, one lie played a key role in the justifying of the NATO bombing, the "no alternative" lie: Since Milosevic refused peace negotiations, we had no choice but to bomb. The "no alternative" lie incorporated several falsehoods in one. Milosevic had not refused peace negotiations. For months, the Serbian government had been offering to negotiate, while the ethnic Albanian leaders refused. The Serb side had presented quite comprehensive and reasonable proposals for extensive self-government in Kosovo. For years, but especially during recent months, both the Serbian government and non-governmental groups have made compromise proposals for Kosovo, all including autonomy, democracy and extensive cultural rights, while the nationalist leaders have insisted on only one demand: secession. The Rambouillet peace agreement was in reality an ultimatum to Yugoslavia to accept a NATO protectorate on its soil. It was designed by State Department official Christopher Hill to satisfy KLA leaders, and was "agreed" upon only by those two parties and the European Union representative, not by the entire Contact Group (including Russia) which was theoretically sponsoring it. No sovereign state in the world could accept such an ultimatum. Top U.S. officials openly coaxed reluctant Albanians into signing the agreement by telling them that their signatures were needed in order to justify NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia. The "peace agreement" was thus in reality a war agreement. The War Agreement of Rambouillet The conflict between ethnic Albanians and Serbs is a very old one, which can be traced back over three centuries. It is older than the Israeli-Palestinian or Northern Ireland conflicts, not to mention countless other ethnic conflicts in the world. The "peace process"; in such cases is expected to be long and delicate. Only in Kosovo, governments and media suddenly decided that the conflict had to be settled in two weeks, at Rambouillet, on terms laid down by the United States. Why the hurry? Because the United States was keen to lock in NATO's new mission as global intervention machine with a show of force prior to the 50th anniversary of NATO summit in April. NATO had carefully planned the operations six months in advance. Peace negotiations "broke down" just when NATO was all set to go. For many months, the Serbian government had offered to negotiate. High-level government teams went repeatedly to the provincial capital, Pristina, to hold talks with Ibrahim Rugova and other non-violent ethnic Albanian leaders. On one pretext or another, the Albanians refused to negotiate. It is probable that two factors weighed heavily in their refusal: fear of going against the rising armed rebel movement, the "Kosovo Liberation Army," (UCK/KLA), hostile to any compromise and ready to assassinate "traitors" who dealt with the Serbs; and expectations that strong U.S. pressure on Yugoslavia would bring them more than negotiations with Belgrade. At Rambouillet, the older generation of nationalist leaders such as Rugova never had the slightest opportunity to enter negotiations with the multi-ethnic official Serbian delegation, which included members of the various ethnic communities in Kosovo. They were flanked and overshadowed in the ethnic Albanian delegation by KLA outlaws, who by then were assured of United States support. Rambouillet was a charade staged by the United States in order to provide a pretext for a NATO demonstration of force on the eve of the Alliance's fiftieth anniversary. A genuine negotiation would have at least paid attention to the extensive 10-page proposal of the Serbian government side, calling for, notably: Equality of all citizens and guaranteed human rights. Facilitated return of all citizens to their homes. Safe unhindered access of all international and national or non-governmental humanitarian organizations to the population for purposes of aid. General amnesty for all political crimes related to conflict in Kosovo except for persons properly convicted of crimes against humanity and international law. Widest possible media freedoms. Preservation and promotion of the national, cultural, and linguistic identity of each national community. The commune (county) as basic unit of local self-government. An Assembly of 130 members, 95 elected directly by citizens through proportional representation and 35 elected by national communities of Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Romani (Gypsies), Egyptians, and Gorani (mountain Serbs of southwestern Kosovo, converted to Islam), five members each. Election by the Assembly of a President and 6 vice presidents, at least one from each national community, for a four-year term. Responsibility of the Assembly for: budget and taxes; educational arrangements, with respect for the authorities of national communities and communes; electing judges; establishing a framework for local self-government; protecting the environment where intercommunal issues are involved; adopting regulations governing medical institutions, urban planning, agriculture, elections, property ownership, as well as economic, scientific, technological and social development, among other things. The right of citizens to choose whether to be tried in a Kosovo court or in a court of the Republic of Serbia, and the right to request that members of the panel hearing their case be chosen from their own national community. Voluntary establishment of courts of national communities to settle disputes among members of a national community who accept separate national community rules. This last point is clearly designed for the Albanian community which, particularly in rural areas of Kosovo as in neighboring northern Albania, has never fully accepted any governmental law and prefers to be guided by the archaic traditional "Qanun" based on family honor and clan loyalty. Other measures, such as the provision for election to the Assembly, reflect fear of oppression by the Albanian majority of non-Albanians in Kosovo. No doubt this proposal is inadequate. But in any normal negotiation, it would have at least been acknowledged as a basis for discussion. This did not occur. As for the Albanian side, it was interested in only one thing: secession from Serbia and total independence, if not today, then certainly in three years' time. The stubbornness of the Albanian delegation surprised Madeleine Albright. Perhaps the U.S. sponsors of the KLA hadn't realized that the purpose of the armed rebellion was to seize power in any future “independent Kosovo,” and did not fully trust the United States to give it to them under the ambiguous terms of Rambouillet. For that purpose, war is a better method than any peace agreement, even one specially designed to detach Kosovo from Serbia. The KLA finally agreed to sign the Christopher Hill document once it was clear that Belgrade could not possibly agree to it, and that the KLA would thus get the war it wanted, complete with air cover. It was evident that Belgrade could not accept the U.S.-drafted two-part Rambouillet ultimatum, not only because it was a thinly veiled plan to detach Kosovo from Serbia, but also because it contained provisions even worse than loss of that historic province, provisions no country in the world could possibly accept. This has been clearly analyzed by Jan Oberg, director of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research in Lund, Sweden. The Rambouillet ultimatum came in two parts, civilian and military. In the civilian part, three aspects stand out as obviously unacceptable. Kosovo would in effect be independent of Serbia, but Serbia would not be independent of Kosovo. Kosovo would be able to influence Yugoslavia as a whole by sending its representatives to both Yugoslav and Serbian parliaments, governments, and courts, whereas Yugoslavia would be barred from influencing Kosovo's internal affairs. This is precisely the aspect of the 1974 version of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia that made major economic reforms impossible in Serbia in the 1980s and led to virtually unanimous Serbian demands for a return to pre-1974 terms of Kosovo's autonomy. The Albanian veto made Serbia ungovernable. "Self-governing" Kosovo would actually be run by a NATO imperial proconsul, with the title of Chief of the OSCE/EU Implementation Mission, or CIM. The CIM, who would effectively be chosen by the United States, would have the authority to issue binding directives on all important matters, hire and fire officials and security personnel, and overrule election results. During the three-week period between Rambouillet I and Rambouillet II, while the Clinton administration and ex-Senator Robert Dole were scrambling to cajole the Albanians into signing up for NATO bombing, the "High Representative" in Bosnia, model for the CIM, demonstrated his powers by dismissing the democratically elected President of the Serbian entity. Economically, the Rambouillet ultimatum would continue to drain economic resources from Serbia to Kosovo. In Tito's Yugoslavia, Kosovo was the main recipient of development aid from the Federation. Nevertheless, due in part to population growth (by far the highest birthrate in Europe, as well as clandestine immigration from lbania), per capita income in Kosovo remained the lowest in Yugoslavia. The Rambouillet ultimatum demanded that Yugoslavia give Kosovo an "equitable" share of benefits from international transactions, without indicating what might be Serbia's share of state or social property there. Since Kosovo would have its own "constitution," overruling the Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions, making it a "free market economy," it is to be expected that formerly Serbian resources would flow rapidly into the hands of the rich Albanian mafia as well as any interested buyers from the NATO countries. The agreement did not even mention suspending economic sanctions against Serbia, much less any economic aid or help to the 650,000 refugees in Serbia. But substantial economic aid was promised to Kosovo. The only operational remnant of the formal Yugoslav "sovereignty" supposedly retained by this proposal would be the obligation for Serbia to keep paying for Kosovo. Dr. Oberg points out that the civilian side of the "agreement" lacked any reference to confidence building, reconciliation, peace or human rights education -- measures vitally needed to enable the ethnic communities to live together. In short, there was nothing to suggest any serious effort to prevent "ethnic cleansing" of the Serb minority by the triumphant Albanian majority. Still, the Serbian negotiating team at Rambouillet was ready to consider seriously this extremely unjust arrangement. The real sticking point was the military side of the ultimatum. This amounted to nothing less than unconditional surrender of Kosovo to NATO. Kosovo would be occupied by a NATO force called "KFOR" headed by a Commander, COMKFOR, who would "have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all he judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect KFOR" or to order cessation of any activity he judges to be a "potential threat." Judging from experience in Bosnia, that could include forcibly shutting down media that differ with NATO doctrine. No ceiling is set on COMKFOR forces. The government had to disarm, but disarmament of the armed rebels, considered dangerous terrorists by the Serbs, was left up in the air. Yugoslav defenses within Kosovo would be withdrawn except for 1,500 border guards supported by up to 1,000 logistics personnel placed in predetermined barracks. On the other hand, the "Other Forces," apparently meaning the KLA (never mentioned by name), would be called on to "publicly commit themselves to demilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR." This meant that the Yugoslavs had no way of knowing to what extent or how the KLA might ever be disarmed. COMKFOR would have full control of airspace over Kosovo as well as 25 kilometers into Serbia and Montenegro along the borders with Kosovo. NATO would not be liable for any damages to local property, would be immune from all local jurisdiction or legal process, and would be ensured free and unrestricted access through all of Yugoslavia. This amounts to a license to invade other parts of Yugoslavia. "The military provisions," said Dr. Oberg, "have nothing to do with peacekeeping." Dr. Oberg observed that among all the leading media, commentators, scholars, and diplomats condemning the Yugoslav side for refusing to sign, none was examining what the accords contained. Having studied earlier versions of Christopher Hill's text and the final February 23 version, Dr. Oberg came to the conclusion that "this document has been adapted to be acceptable to the Albanian delegates to such an extent that the Yugoslav sid --ready to accept the political parts at an earlier stage-- now find the changed document unacceptable both in terms of political and military aspects." Why this change? "Because the worst case for the international community would be Yugoslavia saying yes and the Albanians saying no," concluded Oberg. So the Serbs were given an offer they had to refuse ... <cont'd>
