Hawks and Eagles:
     "Greater NATO' Flies to the Aid of 'Greater Albania'
     by Diana Johnstone

     <cont'd>

     Although KLA leaders were not enthusiastic about this
agreement either, the United States apparently obtained their
consent by promising a privileged role for the rebel gunmen as
military partners of the United States.

Eliminating the Alternative

     It is preposterous to suggest that there was no alternative
to unconditional surrender of Yugoslavia to CIM and COMKFOR. It
would have taken time to work them out, and bringing the
intransigent KLA into the negotiations made matters vastly more
difficult. But that intransigence was largely the result of their
certitude that they ultimately commanded full United States and
NATO support.
     During the time needed for a peace process, the presence of
truly neutral peacemakers could have played a constructive and
indispensable role.
     Last October 12, Richard Holbrooke got Belgrade to allow
2,000 "verifiers" to enter Kosovo to monitor compliance of the
Yugoslav side only with a cease-fire the KLA had never been
obliged to keep. This was already an extreme oddity: a one-sided
cease-fire, in which the legal police of a country agrees not to
pursue armed groups which, whether called "liberation army" or
"terrorists," had been murdering citizens for well over a year
and showed no inclination to stop.
     The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) was chosen to organize this Kosovo Verification Mission
(KVM). In Western Europe, since the demise of the 1980s peace
movement, objections to the qualitative and geographical
expansion of NATO have tended to take refuge in proposals to
strengthen the OSCE which, unlike NATO, involves Russia and
indeed all European countries except, since 1992, Yugoslavia.
     Early suspicions in some pro-OSCE circles, confirmed by
later events, suggested that this assignment was used largely to
discredit the OSCE as a viable "alternative" to NATO.  Although
the champions of OSCE had seen it as less U.S.-dominated, the
U.S. put one of its own "dirty war" specialists, William Walker,
in charge of the KVM.
     The "verifier" force never approached 2,000, and it was
widely assumed that many of the verifiers were agents of various
NATO intelligence services, in particular U.S. military or
civilian intelligence.
     Walker's "diplomatic" experience in assisting the Contra
guerrillas to mount a spoiling war against Sandinista Nicaragua
was good background for cooperation with the KLA, the only
"liberation" movement in the world (so far) which
enthusiastically calls for NATO bombing of the territory it is
out to conquer.
     In mid-January, Walker himself broke the fragile peace his
force had been sent to solidify by endorsing the KLA version of
the extremely controversial events in the village of Racak.
Walker's hasty and unquestioning condemnation of a "Serbian
massacre," which many believe (and on the basis of solid
evidence) was a propaganda set-up, arranging battlefield dead to
give the appearance of an execution, discredited the KVM as a
neutral observer.
     Some of the resulting dissension within the OSCE has come
into public view. In particular, the German vice-president of the
OSCE, Christian Democratic Bundestag member Willy Wimmer, called
the KVM a "fairly hopeless mission" because some people
"apparently did not at all want it to succeed." Who?
     "For instance, those who are behind the UCK and pull the
strings." Wimmer said that the international OSCE observers had
unambiguously agreed that the Yugoslav side had kept to the
October cease-fire agreement, while the UCK had "systematically
evaded it" and engaged in provocations.
     Asked by Deutschlandradio Berlin whether he considered the
NATO military assault a mistake, Wimmer answered: "I personally
consider it a very big mistake. And I am in agreement with the
OSCE parliamentary assembly, which with a majority of nearly 90%
has repeatedly stated that military engagements can be undertaken
only with a mandate from the United Nations Security Council.
     "However, the interests of the United States and Britain
were diametrically opposed to us."

"Greater Albania" to "Greater NATO"

     The war against Yugoslavia has been sold to the public as a
humanitarian necessity, when in reality it is a political
project.  For the Albanian leaders, the purpose was  always
clear: Albanian rule over Kosovo, not "human rights" and
certainly not "peace."
     Veton Surroi, publisher of the leading Kosovo Albanian
newspaper Koha Ditore, financially supported by the Soros
Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy, is
often mentioned as the West's dark horse to be President of
"independent" ethnic Albanian Kosovo. He was a member of the
Albanian delegation that signed the Rambouillet war agreement
with the U.S. and the EU. He told the New York Times a week
later that when he signed, he "also accepted that there would be
consequences for the people of Kosovo, that if the Serbian side
did not agree to the pact, it would have to be imposed by force,"
"even at risk to the civilian population."
     He said "These kinds of political arrangements require war,
both as the driving force and as the action that seals them."
     Surroi also recognized the political interest of NATO: "The
inhabitants of southeastern Europe will have to face the fact
that NATO has created a security umbrella over them."
     In reality, the whole thrust of U.S. policy has been toward
a violent conflict in Yugoslavia that would shatter Serbia, the
last bastion of old-fashioned independence in the Balkans, and
bring NATO in as occupier and arbiter. The United States did not
want to bring Yugoslavia into NATO, but NATO into Yugoslavia.
     To most people, it seems incredible that the apparently
blundering Clinton administration could have hatched and carried
out such a Machiavellian plot. And no doubt it didn't.
     The monstrous policy seems, from what one can discern, to
have grown more or less by chance out of a strange encounter
between two very different interest groups: Balkan revanchist
lobbies, both Croatian and Albanian, on the one hand, and a
circle of strategic policy planners looking for the means to
transform NATO from a West European defense alliance focused on
containing the Soviet Union into the military arm of U.S.
global hegemony, able to act anywhere in the world without regard
to national sovereignty, the United Nations or international law.

The Albanian Lobby

     First came the lobbies. Already in the 1980s, when Albanians
were actually running Kosovo, and the mainstream press was
reporting that Albanians were harassing Serbs in order to
establish "an ethnically clean Albanian republic" before merging
with Albania to form "a greater Albania," the Albanian lobby in
the United States was working to reverse the image.
     The center of this lobby was New York Republican Congressman
Joseph DioGuardi, of Italian-Albanian background.
     On June 18, 1986, Representative DioGuardi and Senator Bob
Dole introduced Concurrent Resolution 150, "Expressing Concern
over the Condition of Ethnic Albanians Living in Yugoslavia."
This was an early significant victory for the Albanian lobby. Of
course, neither Dole nor, probably, any other congressman had the
slightest idea of conditions in Kosovo, if they could tell where
it was, but it's a rare politician who isn't ready to "express
concern" over the condition of an ethnic minority that has an
active lobby operating in Washington. This sort of resolution can
then be used as documentary proof of whatever it alleges.
     The reward was not long in coming. In May 1987, Dole and
DioGuardi attended an Albanian-American fund-raiser in New York
City that raised $1.2 million for Dole's campaign and $50,000 for
DioGuardi's.  Even so, DioGuardi lost his seat, whereupon he
formed the Albanian-American Civic League to pursue lobbying for
the Albanian cause.
     Cuba has long been the most striking illustration of how a
relatively small ethnic lobby --that of the counter-revolutionary
Cuban exiles in Florida-- could have a long-term negative
influence on U.S. foreign policy. The Balkans provide a second,
even more surprising, example.
     Ethnic lobbies offer mediocre politicians two precious
assets. The most obvious is money in the form of campaign
contributions. The other is the semblance of an idealistic cause:
Championing some obscure "oppressed people" seeking American
support for its "righteous cause" can provide a glow of
international vision to mediocre provincial politicians with not
a glimmer of understanding of the outside world.
     The ethnic lobbies are not partisan. Republicans and
Democrats are eligible to support their causes. For the 1996
elections, the Democrats "established nine steering committees to
concentrate on Albanians, Arabs, Croatians, Greeks, Irish,
Hungarians, Italians, Lithuanians and Poles.... An energetic
31-year-old Albanian American, Ilir Zherka, was put in charge of
the drive, which was called Ethnic Outreach," The European
reported.
     Once upon a time ethnic lobbies were concerned with the
social welfare and advancement of their constituents. To some
extent, that may still be the case, but since America became top
superpower, the focus has shifted to bringing that power in on
the side of exile groups with an agenda. The Clinton
administration, Zherka told The European, "has concentrated on
trying to solve age-old problems in Ireland, Bosnia, and the
Middle East. In addition, Clinton has worked on expanding NATO,
and the Poles, Hungarian, and Baltic citizens appreciate his
efforts. He has also supported Ukrainian independence."
     Here is where the agendas of exile groups and the post-Cold
War problem of finding a new "mission" for NATO have dovetailed
dangerously. With the collapse of the communist "enemy," a small
number of very special interests have rushed in to fill the
foreign policy void.
     "Minority groups have leverage because their support can
mean the difference between a candidate winning or losing an
entire state," according to William Kimberling of the Federal
Election Commission.
     "Smaller ethnic groups can be more effective than big ones
because they are more compact.  One of the problems of American
politics is that the two biggest groups, Blacks and Hispanics,
are the least organized and don't vote." The lesson he drew is
that "if you vote together, candidates will pay attention."
     The leading role of the Albanian lobby in the Clinton
campaign's "Ethnic Outreach" program is striking, as is the
absence of any Serbian lobby.
     One can assume that this is not because there are no
Americans of Serbian origin in the United States, but because
Serbian-Americans have not, in recent decades, been united by an
activist revanchist agenda. Serbs identified totally with the
victorious Allied side in both world wars; many considered
themselves Yugoslavs first and foremost, and if they opposed
Tito, the changes they hoped to see in Yugoslavia were political
and democratic, not a reshaping of the Balkans with help from the
U.S. Superpower.
     In contrast, right-wing Croatian exile groups in particular
nursed dreams of restoring the fascist Ustashe "Independent
Croatian State," which had existed only during World War II
thanks to the occupation and dismantling of Yugoslavia by Germany
and Italy.
    In 1993, it was reported that "Croatia has built up the most
effective lobbying and public relations network on Capitol Hill
since the days when the Israeli and Greek lobbies were at their
peak."  Croatian lobbying efforts, congressional investigators
were quoted as saying, "could well exceed $50 million."
     Culturally, there is little in common between Croats and
Albanians.  But extreme Croatian and Albanian exiles nursing the
hope of restoring the Greater Croatia and the Greater Albania
that had existed only thanks to the Axis Powers during World War
II shared something very important: a common enemy.  That common
enemy was multi-national Yugoslavia, which deprived them of their
ethnically defined independent states. Politically, it was more
effective to define that enemy as the Serbs, the people who had
played the leading historic role in creating multi-cultural
Yugoslavia. Denouncing the Serbs as communist oppressors was the
formula for winning support from American politicians.
    Serbian-Americans were without a well-funded revanchist
agenda, and politically divided: no clout.
     A key role in the joining of the anti-Serb forces was
reportedly played by a young aide of Senator Dole, Mira
Radievolic Baratta.  Within the "small circle of those who
monitor U.S. policy toward the Balkans," The Weekly Standard
reported in 1995, "her influence and her expertise are widely
recognized."  Richard Perle, an informal Dole adviser who worked
on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims at the Dayton peace talks, says
that "other than Richard Holbrooke, Baratta has been the most
influential individual in shaping U.S. policy."
     Baratta began working for Dole in June 1989 and in May 1995
received the "Award for Excellence in Politics" from the National
Federation of Croatian Americans.  In a bastion of ignorance,
Baratta easily became the congressional expert on the Balkans.
Baratta has "as good an understanding of the Balkans as anyone on
Capitol Hill," The Weekly Standard reported admiringly, adding
that "she is probably the only congressional staffer monitoring
ex-Yugoslavia who speaks and reads both Croatian and Serbian," a
statement which itself indicates the prevailing ignorance, since
Croatian and Serbian are the same language.
     Baratta clearly understood the importance of concentrating
on the villain --the Serbs-- as a better way to influence policy
than to try to sell Congress on the Croats.
     She also advocated the Albanian cause and was publicly
credited with getting the Senate to adopt a resolution calling
for lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.
     Even after leaving politics, Dole continues his support of
the Albanian cause.  "In articles and TV appearances, Dole has
glorified the KLA and vilified the Serbs," Investor's Business
Daily reported.
     Matthew Rees predicted that Baratta would succeed in
"climbing the foreign-policy establishmen's greasy pole. Dole
advisers such as Perle, Wolfowitz, and Jeane Kirkpatrick are
among Baratta's biggest boosters."
     By a not so strange coincidence, Baratta's fans include the
most hawkish veterans of the Reagan administration.  "Many former
Reagan officials --U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Perle, and Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger-- have publicly endorsed sending NATO ground troops to
Kosovo."
     Caspar Weinberger, whose name is synonymous with the big
California-based transnational infrastructure-construction
company, Bechtel, is described as "the most hawkish on the
Balkans."  Bechtel, incidentally, has already been selected to
build Croatia's new coastal highway. The ravaged Balkans should
supply plenty of infrastructure construction opportunities -- not
least the future oil pipeline to bring Caspian Sea oil from the
Black Sea to the Mediterranean, in line with the Clinton
administration's great concern to divert the oil away from Russia
or Iran."

The Eagles and the Hawks

     "Albania," in the Albanian language "the land of the
eagles," is by far the poorest, least developed country in
Europe. After the fall of its uniquely repressive communist
regime, Albanians came into world view trying desperately to flee
their poor country toward Italy. During Enver Hoxha's
dictatorship, that exit had been closed tight from within. The
easiest exit route for Albanians in that period had been across
the mountains of northern Albania into Kosovo, where local
authorities --often ethnic Albanian kinfolk-- let them settle.
Compared to Albania, Kosovo was the land of milk and honey, even
if it was the poorest part of Yugoslavia. With a Yugoslav
passport, travel was easy. From Kosovo, enterprising Albanians
went out to make their fortunes in Germany or Switzerland.
     Thanks in part to their very tight clan structure, Kosovo
Albanians have notoriously taken control of the heroin smuggling
routes through the Balkans from Turkey to Switzerland and
Germany. After the fall of communism, rich Kosovo Albanians have
tended to treat Albania itself as a colony for exploitation and
a base for various illegal operations.  Considering the potential
dominance by Kosovo Albanians in a "Greater Albania," the
prospect does not delight all people in Albania itself, in
particular in the south, where the Tosk dialect is spoken, in
contrast to northern Albania and Kosovo where the Gheg dialect
prevails.
     If, as has been widely reported, the KLA is the armed branch
of the ethnic Albanian mafia, it would not be the first time that
the CIA has ended up working hand in hand with drug dealers.
     The alliance of the Hawks and the Eagles solidified around
the dangerous project of "Greater Albania," sold by lobbies and
public relations campaigns to American politicians and public
opinion as a "human rights" rather than a nationalist cause. This
project filled a foreign policy vacuum. Veterans of the Cold War
policy elite were groping around for new "threats" and a new
mission for NATO and the U.S. military-industrial complex.  As
for the American left, or what remained of it after the end of
the Cold War, it largely stopped thinking seriously about
international problems of war and peace. The "single issue"
approach made paradoxical connections invisible.  Reduced to
sentimental humanitarianism, the liberal left has become easily
manipulated by public relations campaigns framed in terms of
human rights and victims.  A contemporary version of the old
"white man's burden" or "mission civilisatrice" has emerged to be
exploited by the designers of NATO's new global mission.
     Thus by championing a supposedly "oppressed people," NATO
could prove in the Balkans its ability to act as a "humanitarian"
police force anywhere in the world. Bombing Iraq and Serbia
simultaneously, it could prove its "two wars at once" capacity
(and clean out its stockpile of aging Cruise missiles).
     If it worked, NATO would have a formula that could be put
into operation in other trouble spots, notably what Zbigniew
Brzezinski calls the "Eurasian Balkans," a vast area of mixed
ethnic composition interestingly located around the Caspian Sea
and all those oil reserves.
     The idea is to find an "oppressed minority," promise support
to its fiercest warriors --preferably drug dealers who can afford
to buy their own weapons-- and when all hell breaks loose, one
moves in to "avoid humanitarian catastrophe."
     Yugoslavia is a test case.
     Supposing U.S. mastery of airspace and television time, this
mixed propaganda-missile mechanism should meet the needs of those
who perceive that eternal U.S. economic supremacy needs a
military arm.
     "The hidden hand of the market will never work without a
hidden fist -- McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell
Douglas, the designer of the F-15," is how Thomas L. Friedman
summed it up.
     This is the imperative behind the rush to assert NATO's
"right to intervene" all over the world.
     Thus, observed columnist Jim Hoagland, "the Kosovo war is
about the global future, not the European past."
     The American people not being considered mature enough for
such Realpolitik, it has been necessary to feed them children's
fairy tales about the Big Bad Milosevic eating babies for
breakfast, with Slick Willy and Slick Tony reincarnating FDR and
Churchill to stop "the new Hitler."
     The future of the Albanians and the Serbs is only one of the
stakes in the Kosovo war of 1999.
     Another is the capacity of the American people to tell
reality from fiction.


<footnotes omitted>


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