WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a prelude to war! STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update 11 April 2000 Historical Korean Meeting Underscores Trouble in Pyongyang Summary The leaders of the two Koreas will meet in Pyongyang June 12-14, according to announcements by both North Korea and South Korea April 10. The meeting will be the first ever between the leaders of the divided peninsula. Coming just days before parliamentary elections in South Korea, the announcement demonstrates Pyongyang's desire to continue contact with the current government in Seoul and suggests an ongoing battle between isolationists and their opponents in the North Korean capital. Analysis South Korean President Kim Dae Jung will meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang June 12-14, according to an agreement released by the governments of North Korea and South Korea April 10. The announcement, coming less than a week before South Korea's parliamentary elections April 13, has caused some South Korean opposition members to question the timing as a mere political tactic. North Korean negotiators, however, apparently supplied the impetus behind the sudden announcement. While Pyongyang's decision to hold top-level talks with Seoul may seem like a fundamental shift in inter-Korean relations, the timing and haste in which the decision was made suggest a certain dependence between government factions in North Korea and Kim Dae Jung's party in the South. The announced visit of Kim Dae Jung to Pyongyang came after just three weeks of secret negotiations between South Korean Culture and Tourism Minister Park Jie Won and North Korean Asian-Pacific Peace Committee Vice Chairman Song Ho Gyong in China. During the final days of meetings, South Korea refused to concede to North Korea's preconditions to the visit and suggested resuming dialogue after the April 13 elections, according to Seoul government sources cited in the Korea Herald. North Korea promptly dropped the preconditions. The decision by Pyongyang to drop its demands allows the meeting to proceed months before South Korean officials had expected. North Korea's motives in accelerating the timetable for talks include a desire to influence South Korea's parliamentary elections. Both Park Jie Won and Song Ho Gyong have been key players in establishing economic links between the Koreas, particularly the Mount Kumkang tours sponsored by Hyundai. The secret negotiations, therefore, were carried out between Korean officials with a mutual interest in seeing economic ties continue to flourish. The secret meetings spawned a resumption of top-level inter-Korean contacts - originally slated for 1994. At that time, then South Korean President Kim Young Sam was slated to travel to North Korea to meet with North Korean President Kim Il Sung. Several officials in North Korea's government, including Kim Il Sung's son and heir apparent Kim Jong Il, opposed the meeting, which was brokered by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, acting in a private capacity. However, despite reservations within the government, Kim Il Sung personally oversaw many of the preparations for the meeting. The visit never took place, however. Kim Il Sung collapsed while looking into preparations at his summer villa in the Myohyang Mountains, where he planned to take Kim Young Sam. Due to the remoteness of the villa, doctors were unable to respond swiftly. Kim Il Sung died just 17 days before the talks were to commence. The reported cause of death was a heart attack, triggered by "heavy mental strains." Inter-Korean relations were set back as Pyongyang tackled the dynastic succession of its self-styled communist regime. Kim Jong Il's eventual rise to power following the death of his father was a slow process, fraught with rumors of coup attempts, internal executions and purges, and political opposition. With the election of Kim Dae Jung in the South and the launch of his Sunshine Policy for national reunification, inter-Korean relations began to shift heavily from security and political issues into the realm of economics. This increased focus on economics has led to a certain amount of North Korean dependence on South Korean business interests and projects. The dependence has also affected North Korea's foreign policy, particularly that dealing with Seoul. However, Pyongyang does not appear to be unified in its embrace of Kim Dae Jung and the Sunshine Policy. The divisiveness, exposed by Kim Young Sam's planned visit and deepened during Kim Jong Il's assumption of leadership, has yet to fully heal. The splits within the North Korean government can be seen in part in its diplomatic policies. In 1998, as Kim Jong Il firmly took the reins of power, Pyongyang began to reduce its diplomatic overseas staff by 30 percent, until "food and economic problems" in North Korea were solved. At the same time, there were several unconfirmed reports in foreign media that North Korea was under a near state of martial law following an attempted military coup. By the end of 1998 and into early 1999, North Korea had again reversed course, seeking to increase the number of diplomats stationed overseas, particularly in Europe. There were reports that North Korea was seeking entrance into the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and that it was softening its stance on U.S. forces stationed in South Korea. However, the apparent sorting out of policy in Pyongyang was again thrown into turmoil when South Korean navy vessels off the West Coast of the Korean Peninsula sank a North Korean patrol boat in June. North Korea's government was unprepared for the intensity of South Korea's response. The separate detentions and subsequent releases of a South Korean tourist and a U.S. citizen revealed an uncertainty in North Korean policy. Some factions in the government had come to rely on the ongoing economic cooperation with South Korea, and therefore wanted to restrain from responding strongly to the sinking of the vessel. Others, however, supported the maintenance of an isolated regime and advocated swift action, giving rise to reports of an imminent second long-range missile launch. In fall 1999, Kim Jong Il began grooming his son Kim Yong Nam as his successor, promoting him to a post in the Ministry of Public Security. The move coincided with reports of the North Korean military being sent in to suppress riots in the northern border region with China and Russia. Kim Yong Nam's promotion was an attempt by Kim Jong Il to reinforce North Korea's dynastic succession, thereby also reinforcing his legitimacy to power. Following this readjustment, North Korea again accelerated its international diplomatic campaign, establishing ties with Italy and engaging in talks with several countries including Australia, Canada, Japan, the United States and the European Union. North Korea and China also reinforced their relationship, which included an unusual visit by Kim Jong Il to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang. Chinese support not only reinforces Kim's hold on power, but also allows China to press its own agenda on the peninsula. China also reportedly promoted the high-level inter-Korean meetings North Korea has now accepted. North Korea's acceptance of a meeting between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung - a major change in the level of dialogue between the Koreas - appears to signal Pyongyang's decision to accelerate economic ties with South Korea. However, the timing of the announcement suggests an air of desperation and a tinge of mutual dependence. North Korean officials with deep links to the economic opening to the South wish to see the Kim Dae Jung government remain intact, or they may lose their power. Kim Dae Jung's own party is relying on the apparent softening of North Korea's regime to retain its mandate in the south. Pyongyang has repeatedly fought over its diplomatic policy, particularly whether to remain isolated - and thus insulated - from the rest of the world. This struggle may again be coming to a head, prompting the sudden announcement of the leader's meeting as a way to legitimize the role of those advocating economic ties in the face of the isolationists. While on the surface North Korea now looks to be unanimously pursuing South Korea's Sunshine Policy, the rushed decision to embrace direct dialogue between leaders, then, is likely to stir even more controversy in Pyongyang. (c) 2000, Stratfor, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/ **COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! 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