Stratfor.com's Global Intelligence Update - 20 June 2000 __________________________________________ Tomorrow's news is today's intelligence. http://www.stratfor.com _________________________________________ On Stratfor.com: Ukraine after Chernobyl http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0006192300.htm Zimbabwe Risks South Africa's Ire http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/0006192034.htm _________________________________________ Manila's Mismanagement: A Reopening for Washington Summary The Philippine government has warned foreign governments not to give in to ransom demands of the Abu Sayyaf, which has held 21 international hostages in the southern Philippines since April. The comment came in response to reports that Malaysia, dissatisfied with Manila's handling of the situation, has suggested paying for the release of the hostages. Tensions between Manila and Kuala Lumpur are heightening as the Philippine government attempts to shift domestic and international attention from its inability to quickly resolve the hostage situation. In the long term, this diversionary tactic will do serious damage to the Philippines' relations with its neighbors. Analysis The Philippine government June 19 reiterated a warning to foreign governments not to give in to ransom demands of the Abu Sayyaf, a group that has been holding 21 hostages taken from a Malaysian island in April. The statement followed the Malaysian foreign minister's suggestion that paying a ransom may be a viable option. In addition, Manila threatens to further strain relations with Kuala Lumpur by again raising the Philippines' claim of sovereignty over the Malaysian state of Sabah. The government in Manila is increasingly isolating the Philippines from its Asian neighbors. It is cultivating a tough image to shift the blame and attention away from its inability to resolve domestic problems. In the short term, such tensions will further complicate negotiations for the release of the hostages. In the longer term, the isolation may allow the United States to be drawn back into the Philippines. ________________________________________________________________ Would you like to see full text? http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/062000.ASP ___________________________________________________________________ Since it began almost two months ago, Manila and Kuala Lumpur have been split as to how to resolve the hostage situation in the southern Philippines. Malaysia has expressed concern at the apparent lack of progress in bringing the crisis to an end. The Philippine government refuses even to consider ransom as an option. In contrast, while on a visit to the Philippines June 15 Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar said, "in exceptional circumstances like this there would have to be exceptional ways of dealing with such matters." The Philippine government faces mounting international criticism and reports that both Malaysia and Germany are considering payment for the hostages' release. In order to mitigate negative domestic press as well, Manila has begun shifting blame for its inability thus far to solve the difficult Abu Sayyaf problem. For example, Philippine Senator Rodolfo Biazon, chairman of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, suggested that a Malaysian-based crime group was responsible for the kidnapping in Sipadan, rather than the Abu Sayyaf, according to ABS-CBN News. Biazon implied that this might be a reason behind Kuala Lumpur's efforts to "meddle" in the hostage situation. In addition, Philippine Immigration Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez on June 13 called for the expulsion of the Malaysian ambassador to the Philippines for his interfering in the hostage negotiations by meeting with the Abu Sayyaf in May, according to the Straits Times. Rodriguez's recommendation echoed similar calls by Philippine senators in May. The heightened tensions between Manila and Kuala Lumpur are symptomatic of the Philippine government's reactionary tactics to rebuild popular support and cover for its inability to solve their problems. President Joseph Estrada's administration has suffered a loss of popular support amid continuing economic malaise, an escalation of fighting against separatists in the south and accusations of graft and corruption. _______________________________________________________________ For more on the Philippines, see: http://www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/philippines/default.htm?sect ion=2.3 __________________________________________________________________ The tensions have also spilled over to an older, more deep-seated issue. Calls for a review of the Philippine's position on the issue of the state of Sabah, claimed by both nations, have again arisen in the Philippine Senate. Raising the issue of Sabah further distracts from the domestic issues and potentially plays to nationalism. In addition, the Muslim separatist struggle in the Philippines traces its roots back to the dispute over Sabah, claiming Philippine military officers had several Muslim soldiers executed for refusing to invade Sabah in the 1960s. In response to the increasing crises, the government has cultivated Estrada's former tough guy movie image. In dealing with the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Estrada has established a June 30 deadline for peace talks, while refusing to let up on the military advance against the rebels. A similar stance has been taken toward the Abu Sayyaf, with the military launching attacks on members of the group holding Philippine hostages taken in a separate incident. The Philippines' problems are not isolated to Malaysia. Both Malaysia and Indonesia have been tagged as training and supporting bases for Philippine Muslim separatists - spreading responsibility away from the Philippine government. Manila is also engaged in several economic disputes. A confrontation over airline access between the Philippines and Taiwan, triggered by Manila's moves to protect Philippine Airlines, expanded recently with Taipei banning new Filipino workers from coming to Taiwan. Manila is also locked in a trade dispute with Canberra over fruits and cattle. These issues as well have nationalistic undertones. In the short term, the beleaguered Philippine government's attempts to bolster public support while struggling with its domestic problems will only increase stress with Malaysia and other neighbors. This could add further difficulties to the hostage situation, as impatient foreign governments begin independently entering negotiations for the hostages' release. It also becomes an exploitable issue for the Abu Sayyaf, who drew attention to the status of Sabah in calling for its return to the Philippines as part of a hostage settlement. In the long run, the Philippines threatens to isolate itself from its Asian neighbors. Trade and territorial disputes, fueled by nationalistic undertones, will further weaken regional ties. Already Manila's domestic problems are undermining its regional interactions. The Philippine head for the U.N. peacekeeping force in East Timor is likely to be replaced by a Thai, as several hundred Philippine soldiers withdrew from the operation to deal with the fighting in the southern Philippines; the Philippine commander is being promoted to tackle problems at home. The heightened isolation may lead to increased U.S. involvement in the Philippines. Unable to defend itself externally and internally, Manila may seek a return, albeit a slow and measured one, for U.S. military involvement. With U.S. relations waning with China, and the potential movement of the Indian navy into the South China Sea, the United States will find a rekindled relationship with the Philippines to be in their mutual strategic interest. _______________________________________________________________ For more on Asia, see: http://www.stratfor.com/asia/default.htm _______________________________________________________________ (c) 2000 WNI, Inc. _______________________________________________ SUBSCRIBE to the free, daily Global Intelligence Update. Click on http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp UNSUBSCRIBE by clicking on http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp _______________________________________________ Stratfor.com 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
