Taken from: http://people.cs.und.edu/~nordlie/papers/index.html
(http://people.cs.und.edu/~nordlie/papers/asat.html)
THE RISE, FALL, AND REBIRTH OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS
by John Nordlie
For Military Applications of Space course
HISTORY
The concept of anti-satellite weapons (or "ASAT"s in the jargon of government
contractors) is nothing new. The concept was given low priority by the armed
services until the launch of Sputnik I in 1957. In this era of cold-war
hysteria, Sputnik represented the idea of Russian superiority in space
technology, and the ability of the Soviets to bomb anywhere on earth without
risking their planes. To the American people, Sputnik could be an atomic
weapon just as easily as the scientific satellite it really was. The
satellites' launch galvanized the U.S. military machine into action. The
military knew that an orbiting spacecraft need not necessarily be a weapon to
be offensive in nature. Studies by the Advanced Research Planning Agency
(ARPA) had shown that space would be an ideal place to conduct optical
reconnaissance and collect electronic intelligence. At the time, proposals to
design a system to destroy such orbiting spacecraft were met with a relative
lack of enthusiasm ("Why design a weapon to destroy what doesn't even
exist?"). The launch of Sputnik made the development of an ASAT device not
only plausible, but much more desireable. After the launch of Sputnik, the
armed services started conducting their own ASAT research programs independent
of the ones sanctioned by the government. The thinking was that when and if
the official policy of the peaceful use of space in scientific research, a
particular service might be in a better position in comparison to the others.
Although ARPA was given the formal responsibility to coordinate this research,
the services soon found ways to circumvent the regulations1/41. Since projects
costing less than $500,000 didn't need to be itemized, the services chopped up
their individual ASAT research programs into $499,000 pieces to avoid
scrutiny. The official ARPA project was named Project Defender, and covered
defense from both satellites and ballistic missiles. ARPA requested the Air
Force's Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) contract for the "study of
weapon systems to combat hostile satellites" in 1958. ARPA also later got NASA
into the act of researching ASAT and ballistic missile defense (BMD)
technology. Most of these studies were only conducted on paper, but a few did
go farther than that:
The High Altitude Nuclear Test Program was a study to determine the effect of
a nuclear detonation in space on satellites and space itself. In project
Argus, three rockets carrying nuclear weapons were detonated in 1958 to study
the behavior of free electrons in the earth's magnetic field. The military was
also interested in the effect these explosions would have on the Explorer IV
satellite, which would be used to monitor the tests. Argus showed that "A
nuclear explosion in space produces three kinds of effects of military
importance. The high energy radiation including particles from the explosion
produces effects on space; the whirling high energy electrons generate radio
noise; and the delayed radiation from the fission products can affect radio
transmission."1 It was observed later that the electrons striking the metal
surfaces of satellites produce bursts of X-rays, which can damage electronics.
A later project (Fishbowl) which detonated a 1.4 megaton yield warhead at an
altitude of 248 miles caused considerable havoc with Pacific communications,
power systems in Hawaii, and damaged three satellites in orbit. The military
decided that this adverse effect on friendly hardware would be an inevitable
result of the use of high-yield nuclear warheads in space.
Project Bold Orion was designed to research the feasibility of an air-launched
ballistic missile, but was also used to test a possible ASAT system. In it's
final test version, the two-stage rocket came within four miles of the
Explorer VI satellite, providing proof of concept.
The Navy was not to be left out on all this ASAT research. During the Air
Force tests, the Navy announced it's "Early Spring" ASAT concept. Based on a
missile that would climb to orbital height and hover there, waiting for the
satellite to come into range, and then destroy it, Early Spring covered a
variety of proposals between 1960 and 1964. One concept was of mounting a
modified Sparrow air to air missile on a Polaris sub-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM). This concept was abandoned because the department of defense
didn't want the current stock of SLBM's used for anything other than nuclear
weapon delivery. Project Skipper proposed to use a modified Scout rocket
launched from a ship or sub, and would kill a satellite with a cloud of metal
pellets or rods. This differed from most ASAT designs in that it used a
kinetic energy weapon rather than a nuclear warhead to destroy the satellite.
Skipper never went beyond the drawing board. A few other Navy projects
followed, but generated little enthusiasm.
The early 1960's saw the beginning of research to use laser and maser
technology in an ASAT role. Rather than blast the satellite to little bits,
lasers or masers would be used to render the satellite inoperable by attacking
it's sensors or electronics. In 1965 Arthur Kantrowitz suggested using
particle beam weapons for ASAT systems. Funding for this project was rather
low priority, however. In 1962 General Curtis LeMay warned that the Soviets
knew the importance of laser and particle beam ASAT capability, and that
whatever we did, they would go ahead with the development of ASAT systems
based on these technologies. Emphasis remained on rocket powered interceptors,
however.
The first full-scale ASAT system research was project SAINT. SAINT was short
for Satellite Inspector, which was supposed to be a system which would
establish an orbit similar to the target satellite, and observe it with an
imaging sensor. The plan was to integrate a destructive capability into the
co-orbiter, which could destroy a satellite if it was of an offensive nature.
The "kill" capability was later deleted from the design, but never from the
minds of the researchers. SAINT got a boost during December of 1959, when a
"mystery satellite" was picked up on radar. Fears as to the purpose of this
new Soviet satellite ran rampant, until it was determined that the target was
not, in fact, a Soviet satellite, but instead the second stage booster for the
Discovery V satellite, causing more than a bit of embarrassment to the folks
at DoD. The lessons of the unknown "satellite" sunk in, though, and project
SAINT was given the go-ahead. The project suffered from funding problems and
political set backs, and was even attacked by certain religious groups
protesting the irreverent use of the term "saint". The program was renamed
"Hawkeye", but later changed to Program 720. Suffering from technical,
conceptual, and financial problems, the project was canceled in 1962. The Army
also had it's ideas about ASAT systems. Project MUDFLAP proposed using a Nike
Zeus missile modified for ASAT use in 1960. This was the first program that
blurred the distinction between anti-satellite (ASAT) research and
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) research. The similar design goals of the two
missions made this inevitable. The Nike Zeus system consisted of a solid fuel,
three stage rocket carrying a 1 megaton range nuclear warhead. The system's
maximum altitude was about 150 nautical miles. The project was eventually
canceled, and in 1972 the Army's involvement in ASAT research ceased.
One program that actually became operational was Program 437. 437 used a Thor
booster to carry a 1.5 megaton yield nuclear warhead to a target up to 200
nautical miles high. The system was deployed on Johnston Atoll. In the launch
scenario, two missiles were counted down simultaneously in case there was a
last minute problem with one of them. One variant of program 437 was program
437 X (later changed to 437 AP). This used the same launch hardware to boost a
camera/film return capsule of Discovery design to the orbit of a Soviet
satellite and take pictures of it (SAINT's mission). Test data of this program
are still classified, so it's effectiveness are unknown. With the signing of
the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, the treat of orbital bombardment was lessened,
and program 437's funding began to dry up. 437 finally died in 1975. After the
cancellation of 437, a number of follow-on programs using a non-nuclear
warhead on the 437 hardware enjoyed temporary success, then they too were
canceled.
Project Dynasoar proposed the development of a hypersonic manned glide vehicle
that would skip off the upper atmosphere, then re-enter and land on a
conventional runway. One of the many proposed missions of Dynasoar was ASAT
use, as well as reconnaissance and intercontinental bombardment. The project,
later known as the X-20, was canceled in December 1963, due to cost and
development difficulties.
In 1971, with the demise of program 437 looming in the future, the Air Force
proposed project SPIKE. SPIKE would use a non-nuclear missile launched from an
F-106 fighter plane to destroy enemy satellites. The project had it's funding
completely cut off in FY 1973.
During the Ford administration, a Space Defense Initiative was begun, which
basically revamped earlier ideas of developing non-nuclear weapons to destroy
satellites, as well as working on technology to harden U.S. satellites to make
them less vulnerable to attack. In March 1975, the magazine "Aviation Week &
Space Technology printed an article that referred to the Miniature Homing
Vehicle (MHV), the first real public reference to an Air Force ASAT program or
component3.
The MHV was a small kinetic energy weapon, launched from an F-15 and guided to
it's target by a long wave infrared sensor in it's nose. FY 1977 included
money to continue development of the MHV, as well as several satellite
survivability technologies. Detection of tracking and laser attack were two
these.
The Carter administration continued development of the MHV, it being the most
promising of the ASAT proposals then under research. Choice of launch platform
(F(c)15, with a Boeing short range attack missile and a Vought Altair III
booster chosen for the first and second stage) was finalized. A program to
provide a "low tech" backup system to the MHV was also begun. This backup
program was based on a vehicle that used explosive pellets to disable a
satellite, and was considered possible to build from "off the shelf"
technology. The MHV was finally tested against an aging Army communications
satellite in 1985, successfully destroying the target.2 The Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) also compiled a prioritized list of Soviet space vehicles to
destroy in the event of war.
One area of research that had taken off during the Ford administration, and
was being hotly debated during Carter's, was the use of lasers in space. The
suspected blinding of an American satellite in November of 1975 add fuel to
the flames. Proponents of laser and directed energy weapons pointed out that,
even with the formidable technical difficulties of developing and lifting such
a system to orbit, space was an ideal environment for such weapons. Opponents
argued that "conventional" weapons systems could accomplish the same
objectives, while costing many times less than the new technologies. Research
on particle beam weapons was carried out from 1978 to the present by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) at Lawrence Livermore and
Los Alamos labs. This research suggested that a beam of accelerated neutral
charge particles would be useful in both ASAT and ABM roles (charged particles
are easier to accelerate, but are affected by the earth's magnetic field,
which makes pointing difficult). Funding for the project was kept at a
"technology development" (low) in 1980, and research continues to this day.
In contrast to the particle beam programs, research on high energy laser
systems was considered much more practical. Three main areas of research was
supported by congress: high energy hydrogen fluoride lasers, the optics
necessary to direct them, and a tracking and pointing system to accurately
point them at something. Funding for the Air Force and Navy's individual high
energy laser research projects was cut to free up money for these "big three".
The Regan administration continued the development of ASAT systems, but gave
the policy of ASAT deterrence much more credit than the previous
administrations had. Just how much president Reagan believed in ASAT and ABM
systems came as a shock to many people. Research was sped up on the "big
three" laser projects, and the MHV development was continued. In the so-called
"star wars" speech, Reagan shocked everyone in announcing the Strategic
Defense Initiative program; a program to develop a "leak-proof" ABM system.
The SDI program created controversy the day it was announced. Many thought
that such a system could not be built then or in the foreseeable future.
Others said that the problem only needed to be tackled one step at a time.
With the possibility of big-money research contracts in the air, aerospace
companies charged full-steam into the project.
The use of space based directed energy weapons was never mentioned in the
speech, but their use in the system has become almost a given assumption,
hence the popular term "star wars" was attached to the project by the public.
Controversy over this system continues to this day, especially with the
breakup of the Soviet Union. Many people see this as losing the only opponent
the system was designed to combat, while others point to the possibility of
third world countries obtaining nuclear weapons which might be used against
the U.S. The debate rages on. PRESENT
It is important to mention SDI in this paper because the weapons systems
designed for the SDI program could very easily be converted into an ASAT
system on short notice. The mission of destroying ICBM's or ballistic warheads
closely matches the mission of destroying orbital spacecraft, the main
differences being the height of the orbit (or trajectory), the number of
targets, and the response time needed by the system (very fast for SDI
(minutes), and longer for ASAT (hours, days, weeks, etc.)). Undoubtedly, the
large amounts of research being done for the SDI program will be invaluable to
ASAT system designers in years to come.
Another role that ASAT systems provide is that of a bargaining chip. In the
past, the Soviets have expressed interest in limiting the deployment of
orbiting weapons systems, such as ASAT and ABM systems. The Reagan
administration rejected these proposals as being "hypocritical and insincere",
which annoyed some members of the public1/41. This suggests that Reagan's
position was one of "these programs are very important, and will continue".
Reagan did not put faith in the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) policy,
which said that no one would start a war knowing that their country would be
destroyed along with their enemy. Reagan believed with great faith in the
policy of SDI, which was presented as a "peace shield" over the U.S., and
could not be used as a first strike weapon. The possible ASAT uses of the SDI
system were a continued worry to the Soviets, however.
FUTURE
The future of ASAT systems technology seems assured. Unless a major policy
effort is made to ban all research on ASAT and ABM systems, the importance of
space-borne reconnaissance and military communications demands the ability to
strike at space vehicles. The current policy of "let's be open about what
we're up to" is an effective tension reducer, but may not always be the case
in the future. I think that ASAT systems are an important part of our national
defense, and their funding should be continued, but that spin-offs from SDI
technology will make ASAT development a much easier proposition, so such
funding need not be our most important goal.
REFERENCES
[1] Stares, Paul B. The militarization of space, Cornell University Press.
Ithaca, New York. 1982.
[2] Vedda, Dr. James. Professor Space Studies. Class lectures.
[3] Aviation Week & Space Technology. March, 1975.
OTHER REFERENCES
Space News, various authors, 1975 - 1991
Johnson-Freese, Joan. "Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in
Space". Orbit book company, Malabar, Florida. 1990
McDougall, Walter A. "...The Heavens and the Earth". Basic Books, Inc. New
York. 1985
Linenthal, Edward Trabor. "Symbolic Defense". University of Illinois press.
Urbana & Chicago. 1989
"War and Peace in the Nuclear Age". Public television. November, 1991
"The Eagle and the Bear". Mind extension university television. November,
1991
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