>On Tue, 18 Jul 2000 22:57:09 -0500 (CDT) webmaster <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > >Use of Sarin and Killing American in Laos > >Excerpt from General Moorer's July 17th (2000) deposition. > >MOORER: "Generally SOG's objectives > was to locate personnel such as defectors or > Laotian military or track NVA movements within > Laos. Tactics -- I did not get involved with > exactly how they did it. I knew what they were > trying to do. But I was too busy. I had the > Israeli problem to worry about. I didn't go into > detail on exactly how they would do it. It was > not the only such mission of its kind. > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > "Compartmentalization is key here. I > > didn't even tell General Abrams about when I was > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > going to mine Haifong Harbor because I was too > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > worried about leaks. That would have been > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > disastrous. Leaks were always a problem. > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > I can also remember talking about the Christmas bombing > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > with Nixon. He asked me if there was a leak or > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > not. And I promised him it wouldn't." > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > TAILWIND > >QUESTION: Now you had told us before the CIA was involved > in this operation. Was it the CIA's job to track > defectors?" >MOORER: "Yeah, trying to track defectors was one > of the jobs but it had several jobs. Again, I > knew the general overall task on this mission. > But I did not know about the tactics." > >QUESTION: But was the mission at hand here to try > and kill these defectors, that they were creating > a real military problem that had to be > eliminated? >MOORER: "I told you before that I would not > hesitate to use any tactic or weapon to save > American lives....One of the breaks we have had in > the last" -- "best few weeks is locating several > SOG recon teams who were sitting on the ridge line > surrounding the village base camp where the > defectors were. They report back to headquarters > that there are roundeyes or longshadows in that > village. At least one person we have talked to > observing the camp says they were walking about > unfettered, freely mixing with locals...." >QUESTION: So killing these defectors was the > mission? And it was done to protect American > lives? >MOORER: "Yes, I have no doubt about that." > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >QUESTION: Why not capture? >MOORER: "Well, you would have to examine that possibility. > You would have to see to it.....see if it was possible to > capture them and bring them out. If it was > ~~~~~~~~~~ > impossible, then you can't leave them out there. > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >QUESTION: You would have to eliminate them? > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >MOORER: "Yes. Elimination was successful in > this case? I say Yes. But again, I do > not remember the specifics of this action. I am > the aware of the fact that there was this > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > objective in Laos." > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >QUESTION: Our understanding when you mention a > large group, is that there were as many as 20 in > this village. Isn't 20 a large group, and isn't > that memorable? >MOORER: "That's a very large group. Probably > others had been picked up by the Russians. They > really liked electronic repairmen. The NVA really > liked getting their hands on them. They would > treat them nicely.....The problem at the outset of the > operation, now again I did not get an exact > rundown on the tactics of it, but there were > people mixed up with the locals. It is very > difficult to capture such people as a group, > especially if it's a big group. Now, I'm sure > that there would be an effort to capture them > alive. If they could capture them alive, they > would do it. Because we would want to interrogate > them about the other side. >QUESTION: Is communications, codes, signal > interpretation what was going on in this specific > village? >MOORER: "I think it could have been. > The enemy would interrogate them in detail. But > the enemy would get useful information out of them > and do anything to get them to turn. And if they > could get them to do something useful, they would > do anything to keep them cooperative, even serve > them ice cream." >QUESTION: You mean drugs, women and so forth?" >MOORER: "Drugs, yes. Women, I don't know about. Have you > ever seen the women over there?" >QUESTION: When the Tailwind hatchet force hit the > ground the defectors went scrambling into a > defensive perimeter around the base camp. Does > that make them enemy? >MOORER: "If they are participating > in a defense and you are on the offense, then of > course. No holds barred." >QUESTION: Wouldn't the White House have to > approve such an operation to go after defectors? >MOORER: "There's a lot of people in the White House." >QUESTION: Specifically did NSA Kissinger know and approve it? >MOORER: "He would be generally aware. That would > be......That would be a member of the National > Security Council staff that would know....There > would be a member of the National Security Council > staff that would know" what Kissinger knew and so on..... > The CIA gives the President a report every day on what they > do. They give him the key points in intelligence. > There could have been a CIA action officer on the > National Security Council that would have had that > conversation. I don't know." >QUESTION: Was it your > understanding that the SOG team achieved their > objective? >MOORER: "I don't know about achieve. I knew > about the problem. And I knew when the operation > Was finished. I didn't analyze the details. > There was no hooray, hooray, we've won." >QUESTION: Now, about the mission completed. It's > got to be a difficult choice. On the one hand, > those defectors are somebody's father or child. > On the other hand they are a huge military > headache and need to be taken care of. Is there a > moral choice here, any ambivalence? >MOORER: "When you go into a fight it is life or death. > You can't ease up on an operation. > You can't go in with sentiment. > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >QUESTION: How can you be sure that there were not > POWs there? The hatchet force team was told to go > in and shoot anything that moves. They wouldn't > be told that if they were POWs there, would they? >MOORER: "Now you're getting into the rules of > engagement. Every combat force gets information > on the rules of engagement. We had terrible rules > of engagement during the Vietnam War. The rules > of engagement tell you who to shoot and who not to > shoot. Sometimes it comes down that all right, > all targets are okay." >QUESTION: Is our number of about 15 defectors > killed about right?" >MOORER: "I do not know if there were 20 or 15. But there was > a group...... "Defectors are deserters. > And they were out there seeking the best way to > stay alive until they could escape and go home. > They were in my opinion probably deserters that, > after all, this war was unique. There was no > public support for it. Soldiers came back in > uniform, were booed.....These people apparently couldn't > take it anymore. They said, I'll escape. Going into > Laos is not the same as the Germans...they endeavored to > make their way back home through Laos. And they were > picked up by Laotian military people. And they > were biding their time until the war was over. > And they could make an escape back to the United > States..... "In order to surv they were cooperating with the > enemy, doing things, to get through this stage and achieve > their hope of getting home. They had set about > doing things that would not displease their > captors.....displease their captors. They were > collaborators. They did not wave the Laotian > flag, but they did not want to be eliminated. > They were taking the long range view.... > They all got together and somehow > decided how to survive until they could get out. > They knew it would not have been effective to have > attacked their captors. They did not have the > equipment and in that situation that could not > escape. If they had to in some way assist their > captors they would do it to survive....the enemy > would give them a job that they were fully > conservant with and also give them food. And they > would do anything to survive until the war was > over." >QUESTION: How many were there in general? > Singlaub has given us a figure of 23 and someone > else has said 300 and so on. >MOORER: "But there is no way that I can really give you accurate > figures on that. Even today, several bodies are disputed. I > tell you this, one figure is too low and the other > is too high. It's someplace in the middle....Many of the > missing on the missing list are truly missing. Not every > missing person is a defector. There is not a reliable source > of figures on this. It depends on who is computing > the information and how they handle the inferences." >QUESTION: We have been told, including > by Singlaub, that killing defectors, that > defectors were always a top priority target for SOG. >MOORER: "Yes, I think so. You can rely on > Singlaub. He was heavy into this from the start. > He would have no reason to misinform you... > ....But the conventional forces might be > more apt to take a defector prisoner....It's on a > case by case basis. You get into the game here." >QUESTION: The PR game? >MOORER: "PR game here. You can't have soldiers > writing home, dear mom, yesterday I saw a defector > and he was American but we had to shoot him. That > would hit the papers sooner or later and LBJ would be mad." >QUESTION: So a big PR problem? >MOORER: "Sure...... Many mothers and fathers do not believe > their sons would defect. If you kill a defector, you have a > big PR problem." >QUESTION: Because of the PR problem wit defectors, that is why the > operation was given to a black operation like SOG? >MOORER: "Yes." >QUESTION: Turning now to another subject matter, the gas. We discussed > CBU 15, which is GB, which is sarin when we last met. > I have been talking to lots and lots of Air Force > people. And specifically to 30 different A1 > pilots based at NKP. And they say that they had > this weapon and used it a lot on search and rescue, SARs. >MOORER: "That's right....." >QUESTION: The sun is going down. The pilot is > surrounded. In moments he will be captured and > killed. They drop the CBU 15. But what is > dramatic is that sometimes the pilot on the ground > might not have a gas mask. How would it be > decided to use such a weapon in that situation? >MOORER: "Well, the weapon had to be on the > airplane to begin with. The pilots would have had > sufficient information that this weapon was needed > to remove this threat. But the pilot would not > want to kill his objective -- the downed man. You > can't go dropping weapons like this willy-nilly." >QUESTION: How do you decide whether to drop the weapon? >MOORER: "It depends on good communication > between the man on the ground. Hopefully the > pilot can tell you, I'm just behind the big oak > tree, up the hill. The pilots would have to know > they have a good chance of attacking without > killing him. There is no point in killing him > while trying to save him....The key to that decision > depends on sufficient communications to pinpoint his > position. And if that is the case, and they are > confident, then the attack would take place and > the helicopter would make the pickup while the > results of the attack is debilitating the enemy. > You would not want to use the weapon unless you > know exactly where he was. If he gets killed it's > a lost cause." >QUESTION: Some describe a situation in which the gas would be dropped > enemy... "The sun is going down. The gas > could prevent the capture of another POW who would > then not give info to the enemy. And it would > kill a lot of enemy and keep them from gaining the > radios and other weapons on the aircraft. So the > pilots would drop the weapon in the hope of > preventing a capture, as a sort of prophylactic, > even if it killed the airman." >MOORER: "Well, one important factor here is the > wind. It's important to talk to the pilots to > make sure you drop the weapon downwind. You > obviously want to drop downwind from where he is. > You want to make sure the wind is not blowing over > him. But the decision to use the weapon or not is > an on-the-scene decision. There are three or four > vital pieces of information what to do. And if > the wind is right and communication is good, I > would be included to go ahead with the attack." >QUESTION: Now, turning to Tailwind for a > moment, one of the new pieces of information we > have is that A1s had prepped the camp where the > defectors were based the night before the SOG team > attacked. We've been told CBU 15 was used in > preparing the camp. Are you aware of that? Does > that fit with what you said earlier about any > weapon, any tactic, and so on, "in saving an > American life?" >MOORER: "I do not know this for sure. I know > they were trying to....what they were trying to > do there. I do not know exactly how they did it. > But the fact that this was an unconventional > operation, yes, I tried to use every capability > and facility to ensure success....." >QUESTION: And so prepping the camp with gas > was a part of the battle plan?" >MOORER: "Fundamentally what you described is aimed at saving American > lives. I have no problem with it...." >QUESTION: One pilot told me he flew the weapon 15 > different times. There are 60 or so pilots at NKP > who fly A1s. Could this weapon have been used > more than a hundred times?" >MOORER: "I don't have the figure....I can comfortably say that if a > pilot was involved in a SAR operation, then he probably > flew it. I think it could be useful in a lot of > those operations. I'm not aware of how many times it was > used." >QUESTION: We have heard the weapon was generally available from > '69 to '70." >MOORER: "I do not know the exact dates of > the weapon in the area. I am not aware > specifically. Let me say this. It was definitely > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > available in the Vietnam War, which is a much > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > bigger operation than you realize. >QUESTIN: Would the White House be aware? >MOORER: "Someone on NSA staff would be aware....I'm sure he had a > briefing. He was generally briefed on all weapons > in Southeast Asia. And I'm not sure he thought > about it seriously. It was just another weapon in > war. He was told what its characteristics are. > But in the broadest sense the U.S. was not to > initiate gas warfare." >QUESTION: But you told me before the NVA didn't use gas. >MOORER: "That's true. What I mean is that we > would not initiate in terms of regiment versus > regiment or division versus division. But when > you get into special operations, that's another > question. If the weapon could save American > lives, I would never hesitate to use it." >QUESTION: And did it save American lives in Laos?" >MOORER: "Yes." >QUESTION: How many Americans' lives were > saved by this weapon? >MOORER: "I don't want to speculate on that." > >########################################################## >SEE PNEWS ARCHIVES for previous articles about Tailwind --> > http://pnews.org/art/portart.shtml > Discuss Tailwind at: PNEWS Message Board --> >http://pnews.org/boards/pnews/ > Signup for PNEWS info list (on internet since 85) at: >http://pnews.org/signup.html > TheGolem > http://pnews.org/ *** NOTICE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. Feel free to distribute widely but PLEASE acknowledge the source. *** http://www.angelfire.com/mi/smilinks/thirdeye.html <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html">Archives of [EMAIL PROTECTED]</A> http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ <A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/">ctrl</A> ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
