> U.S. MILITARY CIVIL DISTURBANCE PLANNING: THE WAR AT HOME
> ____________________________________________________________________
>
> By Frank Morales, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> AFIB Editor's Note: An edited version of this article currently
> appears in CovertAction Quarterly, Number 69, Spring/Summer 2000;
> it appears in Antifa Info-Bulletin with the author's permission.
> For CAQ subscription information see below.
>
> Under the heading of "civil disturbance planning", the U.S. military
> is training troops and police to suppress democratic opposition in
> America.
>
> The master plan, Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2,
> is code-named, "Operation Garden Plot". Originated in 1968, the
> "operational plan" has been updated over the last three decades,
> most recently in 1991, and was activated during the Los Angeles
> "riots" of 1992, and more than likely during the recent anti-WTO
> "Battle in Seattle." Current U.S. military preparations for
> suppressing domestic civil disturbance, including the training of
> National Guard troops and police, are actually part of a long
> history of American "internal security" measures dating back to
> the first American Revolution. Generally, these measures have sought
> to thwart the aims of social justice movements, embodying the
> concept that within the civilian body politic lurks an enemy that
> one day the military might have to fight, or at least be ordered
> to fight. Equipped with flexible "military operations in urban
> terrain" and "operations other than war" doctrine, lethal and
> "less-than-lethal" high-tech weaponry, US "armed forces" and "elite"
> militarized police units are being trained to eradicate "disorder",
> "disturbance" and "civil disobedience" in America. Further, it may
> very well be that police/military "civil disturbance" planning is
> the animating force and the overarching logic behind the incredible
> nationwide growth of police paramilitary units, a growth which
> coincidentally mirrors rising levels of police violence directed
> at the American people, particularly "non-white" poor and working
> people.
>
> Military spokespeople, "judge advocates" (lawyers) and their
> congressional supporters aggressively take the position that legal
> obstacles to military involvement in domestic law enforcement civil
> disturbance operations, such as the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, have
> been nullified. Legislated "exceptions" and private commercialization
> of various aspects of U.S. military-law enforcement efforts have
> supposedly removed their activities from the legal reach of the
> "public domain". Possibly illegal, ostensible "training" scenarios
> like the recent "Operation Urban Warrior" no-notice "urban terrain"
> war games, which took place in dozens of American cities, are thinly
> disguised "civil disturbance suppression" exercises. In addition,
> President Clinton recently appointed a "domestic military czar",
> a sort of national chief of police. You can bet that he is well
> versed in Garden Plot requirements involved in "homeland defense".
> Ominously, many assume that the training of military and police
> forces to suppress "outlawed" behavior of citizens, along with the
> creation of extensive and sophisticated "emergency" social response
> networks set to spring into action in the event of "civil unrest",
> is prudent and acceptable in a democracy. And yet, does not this
> assumption beg the question as to what civil unrest is? One could
> argue for example, that civil disturbance is nothing less than
> democracy in action, a message to the powers-that-be that the people
> want change. In this instance "disturbing behavior" may actually
> be the exercising of ones' right to resist oppression. Unfortunately,
> the American corporate/military directorship, which has the power
> to enforce its' definition of "disorder", sees democracy as a threat
> and permanent counter-revolution as a "national security" requirement.
> The elite military/corporate sponsors of Garden Plot have their
> reasons for civil disturbance contingency planning. Lets' call it
> the paranoia of the thief.
>
> Their rationale is simple: self-preservation. Fostering severe and
> targeted "austerity", massive inequality and unbridled greed, while
> shifting more and more billions to the generals and the rich, the
> de-regulated "entities of force" and their interlocking corporate
> directors know quite well what their policies are engendering,
> namely, a growing resistance. Consequently, they are systematically
> organizing to protect their interests, their profits, and their
> criminal conspiracies. To this end, they are rapidly consolidating
> an infrastructure of repression designed to "suppress rebellion"
> against their "authority". Or more conveniently put, to suppress
> "rebellion against the authority of the United States." And so, as
> the Pentagon Incorporated increases its' imperialist violence around
> the world, the chickens have indeed come home to roost here in
> America in the form of a national security doctrine obsessed with
> domestic "insurgency" and the need to pre-emptively neutralize it.
> Its' code-name: "Garden Plot".
>
> Recently, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth H. Bacon "acknowledged that
> the Air Force wrongfully started and financed a highly classified,
> still-secret project, known as a black program without informing
> Congress last year."
>
> The costs and nature of these projects "are the most classified
> secrets in the Pentagon."(1) Could it be that the current United
> States Air Force Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2 Garden Plot is one
> such program financed from this secret budget? We have a right to
> know. And following Seattle, we have the need to know.
>
> As this and numerous other documents reveal, U.S. military training
> in civil disturbance "suppression", which targets the American
> public, is in full operation today. The formulation of legitimizing
> doctrine, the training in the "tactics and techniques" of "civil
> disturbance suppression", and the use of "abusable", "non-lethal"
> weaponry, are ongoing, financed by tax dollars. According to the
> Pentagon, "US forces deployed to assist federal and local authorities
> during times if civil disturbance...will follow use-of-force policy
> found in Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan-Garden Plot."
> (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of Engagement, Appendix A,
> 1 October 1994.)
>
> Origins of Operation Garden Plot: The Kerner Commission
>
> "Knowledge makes a man unfit to be a slave." -- Frederick Douglass,
>
> Rochester, New York is the former home of Frederick Douglass's,
> North Star newspaper. In 1964, it erupted in one of the first
> large-scale urban outbursts of the decade. Precipitated by white
> police violence against the black community, the July uprising
> lasted several days, subsiding only after the arrival of 1500
> National Guardsmen. In "the fall of 1964, the FBI, at the direction
> of President Johnson, began to make riot control training available
> to local police departments, and by mid-1967 such training assistance
> had been extended to more than 70,000 officials and civilians."
> (2)
>
> On July 29, 1967, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11365,
> establishing the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.
> It is more commonly known as the Kerner Commission, named for it's
> chair, former Major General, and then Governor of Illinois, Otto
> Kerner. The creation of the commission came hot on the heels of
> the violence in Detroit, a conflict which left 43 dead, several
> hundred wounded and over 5,000 people homeless.
>
> Johnson sent troubleshooter Cyrus Vance, later Secretary of Defense,
> as his personal observer to Detroit. The commission issued its'
> final report, completed in less than a year, on March 1, 1968.
>
> Although the Kerner Commission has over the years become associated
> with a somewhat benign, if not benevolent character, codifying the
> obvious, "we live in two increasingly separate America's" etc.,
> the fact is that the commission itself was but one manifestation
> of a massive military/police counter-insurgency effort directed
> against US citizens, hatched in an era of emergent post-Vietnam
> "syndrome" coupled with elite fears of domestic insurrection.While
> the movement chanted for peace and revolution, rebellious, angry
> and destructive urban uprisings were occurring with alarming
> frequency, usually the result of the usual spark, police brutality,
> white on black crime. The so-called urban riots of 1967-1968 were
> the zenith, during this period, of social and class conflict. "More
> than 160 disorders occurred in some 128 American cities in the
> first nine months of 1967."(3)
>
> The executive order establishing the commission called for an
> investigation of "the origins of the recent major civil disorders
> and the influence, if any, of organizations or individuals dedicated
> to the incitement or encouragement of violence."(4) The work of
> the commission was funded from President Johnson's "Emergency Fund."
> The executive order sought recommendations in three general areas:
> "short term measures to prevent riots, better measures to contain
> riots once they begin, and long term measures to eliminate riots
> in the future."(5) Their two immediate aims were "to control and
> repress black rioters using almost any available means", (6) and
> to assure white America that everything was in hand.
>
> Commission members included Charles B. Thorton, Chairman and CEO,
> Litton Industries, member of the Defense Industry Advisory Council
> to the DoD and the National Security Industrial Association, John
> L. Atwood, President and CEO, North American Rockwell Corporation
> ("Commission Advisor on Private Enterprise"), and Herbert Jenkins,
> Atlanta Chief of Police and President of the International Association
> of Chiefs of Police.
>
> During the early stages of staff recruitment, commission Deputy
> Executive Director Victor H. Palmieri "described the process as a
> war strategy"(7) and so he might given the overwhelming presence
> within the commission and its' consultants of military and police
> officials. One quarter of over 200 consultants listed were big-city
> police chiefs, like Daryl F. Gates, former chief LAPD. Numerous
> police organizations, including the heavily funded Law Enforcement
> Assistance Administration (financiers of SWAT), guided the commission's
> deliberations. No less than 30 police departments were represented
> on or before the commission by their chiefs or deputy chiefs. A
> key player within the commission, "consultant" Anthony Downs, stated
> at the time that, "it would be far cheaper to repress future
> large-scale urban violence through police and military action than
> to pay for effective programs against remaining poverty." (8) As
> for the military, twelve generals, representing various branches
> of the armed services appeared before the commission or served as
> contractors. The commission's "Director of Investigations", Milan
> C. Miskovsky, was "on leave as assistant general counsel of the
> treasury, and formerly connected to the Central Intelligence
> Agency."(9)
>
> The Kerner Commission's "study" of "civil disorder" lead directly
> to (civilian) recommendations regarding the role of the military
> in domestic affairs. The report dutifully "commends the Army for
> the advanced status of its training." Further, it states that "the
> Department of the Army should participate fully in efforts to
> develop nonlethal weapons and personal protective equipment
> appropriate for use in civil disorders." In addition, "the Army
> should investigate the possibility of utilizing psychological
> techniques to ventilate hostility and lessen tension in riot control,
> and incorporate feasible techniques in training the Army and National
> Guard units."
>
> The Army and Civil Disorder
>
> Under the heading, "Army Response To Civil Disorders", the commission
> report states that "the commitment of federal troops to aid state
> and local forces in controlling a disorder is an extraordinary
> act...An Army staff task group has recently examined and reviewed
> a wide range of topics relating to military operations to control
> urban disorders: command and control, logistics, training, planning,
> doctrine, personnel, public information, intelligence, and legal
> aspects." The results of the Army brass's study was subsequently,
> "made known to the National Guard and to top state and local civil
> and law enforcement officers in order to stimulate review at the
> state and local level."(10)
>
> The Army Task Force which assisted the Kerner Commission issued
> its' own report in early 1968. In it, the Pentagon took a multi-pronged
> approach to solving the civil disturbance problem. "Expanding the
> suggestion of Cyrus Vance, Military Intelligence - working with
> the FBI, local, county and state police forces - undertook a massive
> domestic intelligence gathering operation...the Senior Officers
> Civil Disturbance Course was instituted at the Military Police
> Academy in Georgia...Security forces ranging from Army troops to
> local police were trained to implement their contingency
> plans...Contingency plans, called planning packets, were prepared
> for every city in the country that had a potential for student,
> minority or labor unrest."(11)
>
> In addition, "the Army Task Force that had designed this program
> took on a new name, the Directorate of Civil Disturbance Planning
> and Operations. The Army Task Force transformation into the
> Directorate occurred during the massive rioting that broke out in
> black ghettos of 19 cities after the assassination of Martin Luther
> King in April 1968."(12) At that time "seven army infantry brigades,
> totaling 21,000 troops were available for riot duty. And a hugh,
> sophisticated computer center kept track of all public outbursts
> of political dissent, thereby furnishing the first of the Army Task
> Forces prescribed remedies: intelligence."(13)
>
> By June of 1968, the Directorate had become the Directorate of
> Military Support, setting up shop in the basement of the Pentagon.
> "Better known as the domestic war room, the Directorate had 150
> officials to carry out around-the-clock monitoring of civil disorders,
> as well as to oversee federal troop deployments when necessary. At
> the cost of $2.7 million, this massive directorate also developed
> policy advice for the secretary of the Army on all disturbances
> and maintained intelligence packets on all major U.S. cities."(14)
>
> Even though the full extent of US military intelligence activities
> during this period is far from generally known, "by 1968, many
> Justice Department personnel knew that the military was preparing
> to move in massively if needed to quash urban riots, and some
> officials feared the development of a large national military riot
> force. It was well known among top officials that the Department
> of Defense was spending far more funds than the Justice Department
> on civil disorder preparations...indicative of the growing trend
> at the federal level toward repression and control of the urban
> black rioters."(15)
>
> By 1971, Senator Sam Ervin, later of Watergate reknown, had convened
> his Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights which "revealed that
> Military Intelligence had established an intricate surveillance
> system covering hundreds of thousands of American citizens. Committee
> staff members had seen a master plan - Garden Plot - that gave an
> eagle eye view of the Army-National Guard-police strategy."(16)
> "At first, the Garden Plot exercises focused primarily on racial
> conflict. But beginning in 1970, the scenarios took a different
> twist. The joint teams, made up of cops, soldiers and spies, began
> practicing battle with large groups of protesters. California,
> under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, was among the most enthusiastic
> participants in Garden Plot war games."(17) As time went on, "Garden
> Plot evolved into a series of annual training exercises based on
> contingency plans to undercut riots and demonstrations, ultimately
> developed for every major city in the United States. Participants
> in the exercises included key officials from all law enforcement
> agencies in the nation, as well as the National Guard, the military,
> and representatives of the intelligence community...According to
> the plan, joint teams would react to a variety of scenarios based
> on information gathered through political espionage and informants.
> The object was to quell urban unrest..."(18) Unrest of a different
> sort took place on the evening of February 27th 1973.
>
> At that time, a group of Native Americans occupied a trading post
> in the village of Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation in
> South Dakota. By the 2nd of March the takeover had "triggered the
> army contingency plan for domestic disturbances. Emergency Plans
> White - now coded as Garden Plot - brought the Army into South
> Dakota...Three army colonels, disguised as civilians, and reconnaissance
> planes assisted", while "the Justice Department used the army to
> conduct intelligence for civilian law enforcement around Wounded
> Knee."(19) Information on other instances in which Garden Plot was
> "triggered" over the intervening years is presently locked in
> Pentagon vaults.
>
> In essence, the contemporary roots of militarized efforts to suppress
> domestic rebellion lie in the US Army's master plan, Department of
> Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden Plot. Since at least
> 1968, the military has expended billions of dollars in this effort.
> The plan is operative right now, most recently during and after
> the Los Angeles uprising of 1992.
>
> A view into details of this plan is possible by way of an examination
> of United States Air Force Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden Plot
> which is the "implementing" and "supporting plan for the Department
> of the Army (DA) Civil Disturbance Plan - GARDEN PLOT - dated 1
> March 1984 (which) provides for the employment of USAF forces in
> civil disturbances." It is specifically drawn up "to support the
> Secretary of the Army, as DOD Executive Agent for civil disturbance
> control operations (nicknamed GARDEN PLOT), with airlift and
> logistical support, in assisting civil authorities in the restoration
> of law and order through appropriate military commanders in the 50
> States, District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
> US possessions and territories, or any political subdivision
> thereof." The plan "is effective for planning on receipt and for
> execution on order."(20)
>
> U.S. Air Force 55-2 - Garden Plot
>
> "The long title of the plan is United States Air Force Civil
> Disturbance Plan 55-2, Employment of USAF Forces in Civil Disturbances.
> The short title of this document is USAF Civil Disturbance Plan
> 55-2. The nickname assigned by Department of the Army is GARDEN
> PLOT." It's dated July 11, 1984.
>
> The plan opens with some basic "assumptions", namely that "civil
> disturbances requiring intervention with military forces may occur
> simultaneously in any of the 50 States, District of Columbia,
> Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories." And
> like the current situation in Vieques, Puerto Rico, "civil disturbances
> will normally develop over a period of time." In the event it
> evolves into a confrontational situation, under Garden Plot, it is
> a "presidential executive order" that "will authorize and direct
> the Secretary of Defense to use the Armed Forces of the United
> States to restore law and order."
>
> According to the Air Force plan, the military will attempt "to
> suppress rebellion whenever the President considers that unlawful
> obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against
> the authority of the United States, make it impractical to enforce
> the laws of the United States in any state or territory by the
> ordinary course of judicial proceedings...(10 USC 332)". Applying
> its' own version of equal protection under the law, the military
> can intervene "when insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
> combinations, or conspiracies in a state so hinder or obstruct the
> execution of the laws as to deprive individuals of their Constitutional
> rights, privileges, and immunities or when the insurrection impedes
> the due course of justice, and only when the constituted authorities
> of the state are unable, fail or refuse to protect that right,
> privilege, immunity, or to give that protection (10 USC 333)." In
> other words, the Army makes an offer of "protection" that the
> citizenry can't refuse. T. Alden Williams, in a sympathetic 1969
> treatment of the Army in civil disturbances, put it this way: "Where
> officials have not shown determination, or have invited violence
> by predicting it, violence has developed. Hence, it follows that
> with few exceptions, serious riots are evidence of police failure
> and that, implicitly, it is at the point of police failure that
> states and their cities redeem their national constitutional
> guarantees and the Regular Army may be asked to intervene."
>
> (21) Some redemption.
>
> According to the Air Force plan's "Classification Guidance", the
> roughly 200 page document "is UNCLASSIFIED and does not come within
> the scope of direction governing the protection of information
> affecting national security. Although it is UNCLASSIFIED, it is
> FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY as directed by AFR 12-30. This plan contains
> information that is of internal use to DOD and, through disclosure,
> would tend to allow persons to violate the law or hinder enforcement
> of the law." Consequently, the plan's "operations orders and
> operating procedures must be designed to provide the highest degree
> of security possible." Therefore "the entire staff should identify
> known or suspected opposition awareness of previous operations and
> operations plans", while "procedures should be designed to eliminate
> the suspect sources to the degree possible." And "in the event of
> organized opposition...some sort of advisory intelligence gathering
> capability should be assumed."
>
> The Air Force document warns, under the heading of "Open Literature
> Threat", presaging current military discourse on "info-war", that
> "any information/document, though seemingly unclassified, which
> reveals information concerning this Plan is a threat to OPSEC
> (operational security)." This is especially true given the nature
> of the "Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Threat." Recognizing that,
> "prior to and during sustained military operations in Support of
> the Plan, the potential HUMINT threat could be considerable", the
> plan recommends that "every effort should be made to reduce
> vulnerability to this threat by adhering to OPSEC procedures and
> safeguarding Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)."
>
> Under "Operations to be Conducted: Deployment", the Air Force plan
> states that "a civil disturbance condition (CIDCON) system which
> has been established to provide an orderly and timely increase in
> preparedness for designated forces to deploy for civil disturbances
> control operations, will be on an as required basis for USAF
> resources for such operations as aerial resupply, aerial reconnaisance,
> airborn psychological operations, command and control communications
> systems, aeromedical evacuation, helicopter and weather support."
> The Air Force does have some experience in this area. "In response
> to the US invasion of Cambodia, student unrest broke out. Under
> Operation Garden Plot, from 30 April through May 4, 1970, 9th Air
> Force airlift units transported civil disturbance control forces
> from Ft. Bragg to various locations throughout the eastern US."(22)
> In fact, two years earlier, "Air Force Reserve C-119 and C-124
> units participated in Garden Plot operations set up to quell domestic
> strife that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King."(23)
> Although the section on "Counterintelligence Targets and Requirements"
> is "omitted", the plan does specify its' targets, namely, those
> "disruptive elements, extremists or dissidents perpetrating civil
> disorder." A "civil disturbance" is defined as a "riot, acts of
> violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or
> other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil
> disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring the use of
> federal armed forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15,
> Title 10, United States Code." Conditions precipitating Garden Plot
> activation are "those that threaten to reach or have reached such
> proportions that civil authorities cannot or will not maintain
> public order." As for legal authority, "the Constitution of the
> United States and numerous statutes provide the President with the
> authority to commit Federal military forces within the United
> States...DOD Directive 3025.12 provides guidance in committing
> Federal armed forces."
>
> Force Structure
>
> The "application of forces should be in the following order: local
> and state police, Army and (in support role) Air National Guard
> under State control, Federal civil law enforcement officials,
> federal military forces to include Army and (in support role) Air
> National Guard." According to the plan, "State Adjutants General
> prepare civil disturbance plans for the employment of National
> Guard units under state control." Specifically, "as a general rule
> for planning purposes, the minimum forces to be supported in any
> single objective area is 5,000. The maximum to be supported is
> 12,000 for any objective area other than Washington, DC and 18,000
> for Washington, DC." The "objective areas" are "those specified by
> the Presidential Proclamation and Executive Order in which the
> Secretary of Defense has been directed to restore law and order",
> and as "further defined by the Letter of Instruction issued to Task
> Force Commanders by the Chief of Staff, US Army." In order to avoid
> the unseemly implications of "martial law", "requirements for the
> commitment of Federal military forces will not result in the
> declaration of a National Emergency". In this regard, the "Public
> Affairs Objectives" include the development of "procedures for the
> public release of appropriate information regarding...civil
> disturbance control operations." Media and other queries "concerning
> employment of control forces...may be locally answered by an interim
> statement that the:
>
> Department of Defense policy is not to comment on plans concerning
> the possible employment of military units and resources to carry
> out assigned missions." Concerning "Force Requirements", the plan
> states that, "US Army and Marine Corps units designated for civil
> disturbance operations will be trained, equipped and maintained in
> readiness for rapid deployment, (with) ten brigades, prepared for
> rapid deployment anywhere in CONUS. A Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
> will be considered to be on a 24-hour alert status and capable of
> attaining a CIDCON 4 status in 12 hours..." Upon receipt of orders,
> "the Task Force Commander assumes operational control of the military
> ground forces assigned for employment in the objective area",
> including "specials operations assets." In case the soldiers are
> unfamiliar with "urban terrain", the "Defense Mapping Agency
> Topographic Center provides map services in support of civil
> disturbance planning and operations."
>
> The "Summary of the Counterintelligence and Security Situation"
> states that "spontaneous civil disturbances which involve large
> numbers of persons and/or which continue for a considerable period
> of time, may exceed the capacity of local civil law enforcement
> agencies to suppress. Although this type of activity can arise
> without warning as a result of sudden, unanticipated popular unrest
> (past riots in such cities as Miami, Detroit and Los Angeles serve
> as examples) it may also result from more prolonged dissidence."
> USAF Garden Plot advises that "if military forces are called upon
> to restore order, they must expect to have only limited information
> available regarding the perpetrators, their motives, capabilities,
> and intentions. On the other hand, such events which occur as part
> of a prolonged series of dissident acts will usually permit the
> advance collection of that type of information..." The United States
> Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), "provides training
> programs and doctrine for civil disturbance operations to military
> services." The US Army Force Command (FORSCOM), "organizes, trains,
> and maintains in readiness Army forces for civil disturbance
> operations", while the Director of Military Support (DOMS), "conducts,
> on a no-notice basis, exercises which direct headquarters of
> uniformed services, appropriate CONUS command, and other DOD
> components, having GARDEN PLOT responsibilities to assume a simulated
> increased preparedness for specified forces." In addition, the
> DOMS, "maintains an around-the-clock civil disturbance command
> center to monitor incipient and on-going disturbances." The document,
> the United States Air Force's "implementing plan" for the US Army's
> Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden Plot, goes on to detail every
> aspect of military "suppression" of "rebellion against the authority
> of the United States", including who pays, who bills and how to
> secure "loans" to cover the costs "attributable to GARDEN PLOT."
> Ominously, under "Resources Employed Without Presidential Directive",
> the document states that when the "immediate employment of military
> resources is required in cases of sudden and unexpected civil
> disturbances or other emergencies endangering life or federal
> property, or disrupting the normal processes of Government, expenses
> incurred will be financed as a mission responsibility of the DOD
> component employing the military resources."
>
> Pentagon Directives
>
> Department of Defense Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for
> Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) became effective on February 4, 1994
> when signed by then Defense Secretary William Perry. It states
> that, "the President is authorized by the Constitution and laws of
> the United States to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic
> violence under various conditions and circumstances. Planning and
> preparedness by the Federal Government and the Department of Defense
> for civil disturbances are important, do to the potential severity
> of the consequences of such events for the Nation and the population."
> Further, "the Secretary of the Army, as DoD Executive Agent, shall
> provide guidance to the other DoD Components, through DoD 3025.12-R,
> the DoD Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT), or both, in accordance
> with this Directive".
>
> DoDD 3025.12 makes it clear that "MACDIS operations are unprogrammed
> emergency requirements for the Department of Defense", and that in
> order to "ensure essential control and sound management of all
> military forces employed in MACDIS operations, centralized direction
> from the DoD Executive Agent (the Army) shall guide planning by
> the DoD component." Thus, "MACDIS missions shall be decentralized
> through the DoD Planning Agents or other Joint Task Force Commanders
> only when specifically directed by the DoD Executive Agent."
>
> According to the directive, the "Army and Air National Guard forces
> have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to
> state and local governments in civil disturbances." Accordingly,
> "the Army National Guard State Area Commands (STARCs) shall plan
> for contingency use of non-Federalized National Guard forces for
> civil disturbance operations."
>
> The directive further outlines policy, guidelines, and legal
> justification for "military assistance for civil disturbances",
> including policy regarding domestic law enforcement, designating
> the Army as "the principle point of contact between the Department
> of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) for planning
> and executing MACDIS." (24) The militarization of domestic "law
> enforcement" is founded, in part, upon Department of Defense
> Directive 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement
> Officials, dated January 15, 1986, five years after Congressional
> "drug warriors" passed the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law
> Enforcement Agencies Act. Referencing the 1971 version of DODD
> 3025.12 (above), the directive states that, "it is DoD policy to
> cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials to the extent
> practical...consistent with the needs of national security and
> military preparedness." In addition, "the Military Departments and
> Defense Agencies may provide training to Federal, State, and local
> civilian law enforcement officials." Apparently, military Judge
> Advocates (lawyers) have no problem with the 1878 Posse Comitatus
> Act, (18 U.S.C.1385) which states that: "Whoever, except in cases
> and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution
> or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
> Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall
> be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two
> years or both." Nor is there much concern shown for "the historic
> tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian law
> enforcement activities." For even though the Act is cited within
> the directive as "the primary restriction on military participation
> in civilian law enforcement activities", it is rendered null and
> void in deference to "actions that are taken for the primary purpose
> of furthering a military or foreign affairs function." In fact,
> "under guidance established by the Secretaries of the Military
> Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies concerned,
> the planning and execution of compatible military training and
> operations may take into account the needs of civilian law enforcement
> officials for information when the collection of the information
> is an incidental aspect of training performed for a military
> purpose."(25)
>
> Army Field Manual
>
> United States Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances, dated
> November 1985, is designed to provide hands-on "guidance for the
> commander and his staff in preparing for and providing assistance
> to civil authorities in civil disturbance control operations." The
> Army manual opens by noting that, "the DA Civil Disturbance Plan,
> known as Garden Plot, provides guidance to all DOD components in
> planning civil disturbance missions."
>
> Its' thirteen chapters cover, in depth, every aspect of military
> "tasks and techniques employed to control civil disturbances and
> neutralize special threats." Subjects include the nature of civil
> disturbances, participants ("the crowd"), federal intervention,
> information planning ("intelligence"), control force operations,
> crowd control operations, threat analysis ("criminal activists"),
> about which "law enforcement sources can provide useful information",
> riot control agents, extreme force options, apprehension, detention,
> and training.
>
> According to the Army manual, "civil disturbances in any form are
> prejudicial to public law and order." They "arise from acts of
> civil disobedience", and "occur most often when participants in
> mass acts of civil disobedience become antagonistic toward authority,
> and authorities must struggle to wrest the initiative from an unruly
> crowd." They are caused by "political grievances" and "urban economic
> conflicts", or maybe even by "agents of foreign nations", but
> mostly, "urban conflicts and community unrest arise from highly
> emotional social and economic issues."
>
> And in a statement that resonates with the "benign neglect" of some
> years ago, the manual points out that disturbances may arise because
> "economically deprived inner-city residents may perceive themselves
> treated unjustly or ignored by the people in power."
>
> Utilizing Garden Plot language, the manual states that "the president
> can employ armed federal troops to suppress insurrection, domestic
> violence, unlawful assemblies, and conspiracy if such acts deprive
> the people of their constitutional rights and a state's civil
> authorities cannot or will not provide adequate protection." Never
> mind the Congress or Constitution, "federal intervention in civil
> disturbances begins with the issuance of a presidential proclamation
> to the citizens engaged in the disturbance." In other words, the
> President reads "the riot act" and "a control force" is sent in to
> "isolate the disturbance area." The goal is to "isolate the people
> creating the disturbance from those who have not yet become actively
> involved."
>
> According to FM 19-15, the Army can gather intelligence on civilians
> if their "activities can be linked directly to a distinct threat
> of a civil disturbance that may involve federal forces." This is
> especially important, given that "during civil disturbances many
> people engage in unlawful behavior." Therefore, "when at all
> possible, civil law enforcement agents are integrated with the
> military control force team making apprehensions", and "if police
> are not available, military personnel may search people incident
> to an apprehension." Useful measures for "isolating an area include
> barriers, patrols, pass and ID systems, and control of public
> utilities." Also, "imposing a curfew is a highly effective control
> measure in many civil disturbances." Army "saturation patrols",
> "integrated with civil police patrols", blanket the area, creating
> "the psychological impression of the control force being everywhere
> at once." The Army field manual points out that when "control
> forces" resort to "forceful measures" they can turn to a host of
> weaponry, including "the M234, which is a nondeadly force measure,
> to the machine gun, which is the most deadly force measure." The
> manual states that "machine guns, 7.62 millimeter and below, may
> accompany units on civil disturbance missions." In addition, the
> "control forces" can utilize the M234 launcher, which is "a riot
> control weapon" mounted on an M16 rifle which "fires a projectile
> that causes pain on impact." In addition, "the riot shotgun is an
> extremely versatile weapon. Its appearance and capability have a
> strong psychological effect on rioters."
>
> Martial Rule
>
> The concept of martial rule, as distinct from martial law, is not
> written, and therefore is an eminently more workable arrangement
> for "law enforcement forces". That's because, as FM 19-15 points
> out, "martial rule is based on public necessity. Public necessity
> in this sense means public safety." According to the manual, U.S.
> state authorities "may take such action within their own jurisdictions."
> And yet, "whether or not martial rule has been proclaimed, commanders
> must weigh each proposed action against the threat to public order
> and safety. If the need for martial rule arises, the military
> commander at the scene must so inform the Army Chief of Staff and
> await instructions. If martial rule is imposed, the civilian
> population must be informed of the restrictions and rules of conduct
> that the military can enforce." Realizing the power of free speech,
> the manual suggests that "during a civil disturbance, it may be
> advisable to prevent people from assembling. Civil law can make it
> unlawful for people to meet to plan an act of violence, rioting,
> or civil disturbance. Prohibitions on assembly may forbid gatherings
> at any place and time." And don't forget, "making hostile or
> inflammatory speeches advocating the overthrow of the lawful
> government and threats against public officials, if it endangered
> public safety, could violate such law."
>
> During civil disturbance operations, "authorities must be prepared
> to detain large numbers of people", forcing them into existing,
> though expanded "detention facilities." Cautioning that "if there
> are more detainees than civil detention facilities can handle,
> civil authorities may ask the control forces to set up and operate
> temporary facilities." Pending the approval of the Army Chief of
> Staff, the military can detain and jail citizens en masse. "The
> temporary facilities are set up on the nearest military installation
> or on suitable property under federal control." These "temporary
> facilities" are "supervised and controlled by MP officers and NCOs
> trained and experienced in Army correctional operations. Guards
> and support personnel under direct supervision and control of MP
> officers and NCOs need not be trained or experienced in Army
> correctional operations.
>
> But they must be specifically instructed and closely supervised in
> the proper use of force..." According to the Army, the detention
> facilities are situated near to the "disturbance area", but far
> enough away "not to be endangered by riotous acts." Given the large
> numbers of potential detainees, the logistics (holding, searching,
> processing areas) of such an undertaking, new construction of such
> facilities "may be needed to provide the segregation for ensuring
> effective control and administration." It must be designed and
> "organized for a smooth flow of traffic", while a medical "treatment
> area" would be utilized as a "separate holding area for injured
> detainees." After a "detainee is logged in and searched", "a file
> is initiated", and a "case number" identifies the prisoner. In
> addition, "facility personnel also may use hospital ID tags. Using
> indelible ink, they write the case number and attach the tag to
> the detainees' wrist.
>
> Different colors may be used to identify different offender
> classifications..." Finally, if and when it should occur, "release
> procedures must be coordinated with civil authorities and appropriate
> legal counsel." If the "detainee" should produce a writ of habeas
> corpus issued by a state court, thereby demanding ones' day in
> court, the Army will "respectfully reply that the prisoner is being
> held by authority of the United States."
>
> Training under FM 19-15/Garden Plot must be "continuous" and must
> "develop personnel who are able to perform distasteful and dangerous
> duties with discipline and objectivity." Dangerous to the local
> citizenry given that "every member of the control force must be
> trained to use his weapon and special equipment (including) riot
> batons, riot control agent dispersers and CS grenades, grenade
> launchers, shotguns, sniper rifles, cameras, portable videotape
> recorders, portable public address systems, night illumination
> devices, firefighting apparatus, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes,
> bulldozers, Army aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and roadblock
> and barricade materials." Sounding a lot like recent Urban Warrior
> war-games, the manual makes note that although unit training must
> address "the sensitivity and high visibility of civil disturbance
> operations", the "unit training must be realistic." In this regard,
> "the unit commander should try to include local government officials
> in field training exercises. The officials can be either witnesses
> or participants. But care must be taken to prevent adverse
> psychological effects on the local populace, especially if tension
> is high."(26)
>
> Sources:
>
> 1. New York Times, "Pentagon Misused Millions in Funds, House Panel
> Says", July 22,1999, pg. A-1. See also, on the subject of
> "unacknowledged Special Access Programs" wherein "the USAF's $7.4
> billion budget for classified procurement is more than a third of
> the service's total budget", Bill Sweetman, "In search of the
> Pentagon's billion dollar hidden budgets - how the US keeps its
> R&D spending under wraps", International Defense Review, Jane's
> Defense Weekly, January 2000,
>
<http://www.janes.com/defence/editors/pentagon.html>http://www.janes.com/d
> efence/editors/pentagon.html
>
> 2. James W. Button, Black Violence, The Political Impact of the
> 1960's Riots, Princeton University Press, 1978, pg. 116.
>
> 3. Button, pg.121. Also, see, Cyrus R.Vance, Final Report of Cyrus
> R.Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Concerning
> the Detroit Riots, July 23 Through August 2, 1967.
>
> 4. Michael Lipsky and David J. Olson, Commission Politics: The
> Processing of Racial Crisis in America, Transaction Books, 1971,
> pg. 161. The Executive Order is reprinted in US Riot Commission
> Report, Bantam Books, 1968, pgs. 534-535.
>
> 5. Lipsky and Olson, pg.163, citing pg.198 of a transcription of
> Lyndon B. Johnson, "Statement by the President", July 29, 1967.
>
> 6. Button, pg. 107.
>
> 7. Lipsky and Olson, pg.165.
>
> 8. Anthony Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for
> America, Yale University Press, 1973, pg.176. Downs, a leading
> "housing expert", believed that the key to effective urban based
> counter-insurgency was the notion of "spatial deconcentration", or
> the "adequate outmigration of the poor" from the cities. Downs
> wrote Chapters 16 and 17 of the Kerner Report which deal with
> "housing". He is the leading exponent of "deliberate dispersal
> policies" designed to "disperse the urban poor more effectively".
> The origins of "homelessness" (state repression) lie here.
>
> 9. Lipsky and Olson, pg.168.
>
> 10. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,
> Washington, DC, March 1, 1968, pgs.279-281.
>
> 11. Ron Ridenhour and Arthur Lubow, "Bringing the War Home", New
> Times Magazine, 1975, pg. 20.
>
> 12. Ridenhour and Lubow, pg. 20.
>
> 13. Ridenhour and Lubow, pg. 20.
>
> 14. Button, pg. 133.
>
> 15. Button, pg. 133.
>
> 16. Ridenhour and Lubow, pg.18.
>
> 17. Donald Goldberg and Indy Badhwar, "Blueprint for Tyranny",
> Penthouse Magazine, August 1985, pg. 72.
>
> 18. Goldberg and Badhwar, pg. 72.
>
> 19. Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980, Yale
> University Press, 1991, pgs. 257-258. This excellent historical
> account actually does what it says, tracing American "internal
> security measures" right back to the "founders".
>
> 20. United States Air Force Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden
> Plot, Headquarters, United States Air Force, June 1, 1984. (roughly
> 200 pages, not paginated)
>
> 21. T. Alden Williams, "The Army in Civil Disturbance: A Profound
> Dilemma?", pg. 161, in ed. Robin Higham, Bayonets in the Streets,
> University of Kansas Press, 1969.
>
> 22. Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis Network,
> "Garden Plot", Nov. 1998.
>
> 23. US Air Force News Service, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, "Air
> Force 50th Anniversary: April History", March 25, 1997, pg. 2. In
> fact, Garden Plot may have been operative prior and during the
> assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. William F. Pepper, attorney
> for the late James Earl Ray, as well as the King family in their
> current attempts to get to the bottom of the murder, claims (Orders
> To Kill, Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1995, pg. 424) that the orders
> to kill King, which were delivered to special forces operatives in
> Memphis were tied to Garden Plot. Pepper states that the orders to
> kill King "appeared to come from the office of the Joint Chiefs of
> Staff and were issued under the umbrella of the anti-black terrorist
> operation Garden Plot which was a part of the overall U.S. Command
> antiriot operation CINCSTRIKE which was activated with the outbreak
> of any major riot."
>
> 24. Department of Defense Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance
> for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), February 4,1994.
>
>
(<http://web7.whs.osd.mil/text/d302512p.txt>http://web7.whs.osd.mil/text/d
> 302512p.txt) Note: DoDD 3025.12 is
> one quarter of 4 correlated directives that deal with civil
> disturbance. The others include DoDD 3025.1, Military Support to
> Civil Authorities (Jan.
>
> 93), DoDD 3025.15, Military Assistance for Civil Authorities
> (Feb.97), and DoDD 3025.1-M, Manual for Civil Emergencies (June
> 94).
>
> 25. Department of Defense Directive 5525.5, DoD Cooperation With
> Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, January 15, 1986.
>
>
<http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/referenc/briefngs/wmd/DODD5525>http://www.ngb.dti
> c.mil/referenc/briefngs/wmd/DODD5525.
> 5DoDCooperationwithCivilianLawEnforcementOfficials.htm
>
> 26. United States Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances,
> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, November 25,
> 1985.
>
> Copyright 2000 Frank Morales. All rights reserved.
>
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