-Caveat Lector-
Despite Secret '95 Pact by Gore, Russian Arms Sales to Iran Go On
By JOHN M. BRODER
WASHINGTON, Oct. 12 � In June 1995, Vice President Al Gore
signed a secret agreement with Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, then the
Russian prime minister, calling for an end to all Russian sales
of conventional weapons to Iran by the end of 1999.
But the deadline passed with no sign of a halt to such sales,
despite repeated complaints late last year and this year to
senior Russian officials by Mr. Gore, Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott. Moscow continues to be a significant supplier of
conventional arms to Tehran despite the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal,
the Central Intelligence Agency reported in August.
The 1995 agreement allowed Moscow to fulfill existing sales
contracts for specified weaponry, including a diesel submarine,
torpedoes, anti- ship mines and hundreds of tanks and armored
personnel carriers. But no other weapons were to be sold to
Iran, and all shipments were to have been completed by last Dec.
31.
In exchange for the Russian promises, the United States pledged
not to seek penalties against Russia under a 1992 law that
requires sanctions against countries that sell advanced weaponry
to countries the State Department classifies as state sponsors of
terrorism. Iran is on that list.
Though Mr. Gore and Mr. Chernomyrdin mentioned an arms agreement
in general terms at a news conference the day it was signed, the
details have never been disclosed to Congress or to the public.
The Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement appeared to undercut a 1992 law,
the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, known as Gore-McCain
after its principal sponsors, Mr. Gore, then a senator from
Tennessee, and Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican. The
law was rooted in concerns about Russian sales to Iran of some of
the same weapons that the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement expressly
allowed.
Senator McCain said this month that he was unaware of the deal
that Mr. Gore struck with Mr. Chernomyrdin, which was codified
in a document stamped "Secret" and signed in Moscow on June 30,
1995. Mr. McCain said a "strong case can be made" that the
Russian delivery of arms, especially the submarine, should have
triggered sanctions against Moscow under the provisions of the
Gore-McCain law.
"If the administration has acquiesced in the sale, then I believe
they have violated both the intent and the letter of the law," he
said.
Mr. Gore's chief foreign policy adviser, Leon Fuerth, said the
deliveries were not subject to sanctions because they did not
meet the 1992 act's definition of "advanced conventional weapons"
and did not significantly change the balance of power in the
Persian Gulf. But, he said, Mr. Gore brandished the threat as
leverage to induce the Russians to sign the agreement, in part to
learn more about what arms Moscow was sending to Tehran.
"We deliberately used the Gore- McCain law as a fulcrum to
negotiate an understanding with Russia to put constraints on
their exports to Iran," Mr. Fuerth said, by setting a cut-off
date of Dec. 31, 1999.
Strengthening the lever was the submarine being supplied, the
third of three Kilo-class subs that Russia sold to Iran. The sub
was of particular concern to American policymakers because it can
be hard to detect and could pose a threat to oil tankers or
American warships in the gulf.
Mr. Gore and Mr. McCain specifically cited the submarine and
its deadly long-range torpedoes as one reason the 1992
nonproliferation act was needed, according to the Congressional
Research Service.
Mr. Fuerth acknowledged that Russia had failed to meet its
promise to end deliveries by Dec. 31. "We have indicated we are
not satisfied with a unilateral decision by the Russians to
modify the terms of this understanding," he said.
Critics in Congress who have become aware of the 1995 deal,
conceived in secrecy and at best only partly successful in
achieving its goals, said it is symptomatic of flaws in Mr.
Gore's approach to handling relations with Russia.
President Clinton entrusted his vice president with an
extraordinary degree of authority to manage one of the most
important accounts in American diplomacy. Mr. Gore used that
authority to pursue a broad agenda on issues from arms control to
the environment to cooperation in space.
Much of that work was carried out in a channel known as the Gore-
Chernomyrdin Commission, which was established in 1993 and which
met twice a year until Boris N. Yeltsin, the former president,
dismissed Mr. Chernomyrdin in March 1998. Mr. Gore has cited
the work of the commission as among his signal achievements as
vice president and an important part of his r�sum� for the
presidency.
Some critics in Congress, as well as Governor George W. Bush's
foreign policy advisers, say that Mr. Gore placed too much faith
in his close personal relationship with Mr. Chernomyrdin, and
that this led Mr. Gore to turn a blind eye to strong evidence of
corruption by Mr. Chernomyrdin and associates, who appear to have
profited handsomely from the rapid privatization of Soviet state
enterprises.
Mr. Bush himself touched on this criticism during his debate
Wednesday night with Mr. Gore when he said in a discussion of
Washington's world role:
"Take Russia, for example. We went into Russia, we said here's
some I.M.F. money. It ended up in Viktor Chernomyrdin's pocket,
and others'. And yet we played like there was reform." (Mr.
Chernomyrdin had been out of office several months when the funds
from the International Monetary Fund reached Moscow, and an
I.M.F. investigation found no conclusive evidence that he
personally profited from the loans.)
The vice president and his advisers respond that the
Gore-Chernomyrdin channel produced scores of agreements on a wide
range of topics in part because of the strong bond between the
men. Mr. Gore was fully aware of the allegations of corruption
against Mr. Chernomyrdin, Mr. Fuerth said, but he also believed
that the prime minister was dedicated to reform and had the clout
to cut through the bureaucracy.
"How else do you talk to leaders about difficult issues unless
you have developed a relationship with them?" Mr. Fuerth asked.
"The bureaucratic approach can take you only so far."
The vice president's office has produced a catalog of Mr.
Gore's achievements in Russia policy: the removal of nuclear
weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, trade deals on
steel and poultry, diversion of Russian weapons scientists to
peaceful pursuits, increased cooperation on corruption and
money-laundering, joint efforts on the international space
station.
But critics respond that Mr. Gore's eagerness to pile up
agreements led, in some cases, to bad deals.
For example, E. Wayne Merry, former director of the political
section of the American Embassy in Moscow, said in Congressional
hearings earlier this year that the Gore- Chernomyrdin Commission
had required hundreds of hours of busywork to pad its list of
achievements, racking up piles of "taxpayer-supplied evidence of
American good will regardless of Russian performance, honesty or
even desires."
And the 1995 accord, which essentially exempted Russia from
American sanctions on arms deliveries to Iran, emboldened Moscow
to ignore other agreements, particularly on sales of missile and
nuclear technology to Iran, according to Gordon C. Oehler, who
directed the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence
Agency until he retired in 1998.
"It was one more of these strange deals that Gore and
Chernomyrdin had that were kept from people," said Mr. Oehler,
now a vice president with the Science Applications International
Corporation in La Jolla, Calif. "If this had been disclosed to
Congress, the committees would have gone berserk, absolutely.
But the larger problem is, if you have these under-the-table
deals that give the Russians permission to do these things, it
gives the signal that it's O.K. to do other things."
The 1995 arms agreement between Mr. Gore and Mr. Chernomyrdin
was just one of more than a dozen during a three-day meeting in
Moscow, the fifth session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission,
but it was not included in a list of accords released by the
White House.
Still, the men mentioned it in passing at a news conference at
the end of their meeting. Mr. Chernomyrdin said the Iran accord
was the product of "difficult and lengthy talks." Mr. Gore
indicated that deliveries of conventional arms to Iran would end
within a few years.
"This is significant, very significant," Mr. Gore said at the
news conference. "I would say that this has been resolved in a
specific, mutually agreed fashion that does not leave any
uncertainty or open ends that would create problems."
But no specific reference was made to a 12-paragraph document the
men had signed, where the final paragraph reads, "This
aide-m�moire, as well as the attached annexes, will remain
strictly confidential."
Such undertakings between executive branch officials do not carry
the force of law or treaty, which require legislative
ratification; either party can unilaterally withdraw from
executive agreements without notice or penalty, an aide to Mr.
Gore said.
A copy of the aide-m�moire and related classified documents were
provided to The Times by a government official concerned about
the proliferation of Russian arms to Iran.
Administration officials briefed Congress on the outlines of the
aide- m�moire in closed hearings in July 1995 but did not
disclose its details, specifically the American promise not to
seek sanctions as a result of the arms deliveries.
The Gore-McCain law provides for waivers of its penalties, but
the administration did not seek a waiver from Congress because,
in its view, the types and numbers of military hardware Russia
planned to send did not cross the threshold of sanctionable
items.
The older contracts for conventional weapons that Russia was
allowed to fulfill dated to 1989 and were intended to help Iran
rearm after the devastating Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88.
A classified annex specifies the weapons Russia was committed to
supply to Iran: one Kilo-class diesel- powered submarine, 160
T-72 tanks, 600 armored personnel carriers, numerous anti-ship
mines, cluster bombs and a variety of long-range guided torpedoes
and other munitions for the submarine and the tanks. Russia had
already provided Iran with fighter aircraft, surface-to- air
missiles and other armored vehicles.
The weapons are not the top of the Russian lines, but they are
among the best in the region and bolstered a military force in
Iran that continues to grow in quality and quantity.
Russia was to sign no new arms contracts with Iran and was to
deliver no weapons other than those specified.
The United States, for its part, would "take appropriate steps to
avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise under
domestic law with respect to the completion of the transfers,"
the document states.
The United States also said it would help Russia join
international arms-trading organizations and would take steps to
remove Russia from the list of countries ineligible to receive
American arms or technical assistance.
The United States would also help Russia's weapons industry find
customers. And the United States would ensure that its own
customers in the Middle East would not transfer American-made
weapons to countries on the borders of Russia. Moscow was
concerned that Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern buyers of
American arms were sending some on to Islamic fundamentalists in
the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.
Members of Congress have repeatedly complained about Russian arms
shipments to Iran and demanded that the administration seek
sanctions against Moscow.
In June 1993 Senator McCain, alarmed at reports that Russia was
delivering Kilo-class submarines to Iran without a forceful
response from the administration, introduced amendments to
Gore-McCain to stiffen sanctions against Russia for such sales.
The amendments failed.
Because of frustration with the administration's apparent
unwillingness to penalize Russia, Congress amended Gore-McCain in
1996. The new law required sanctions for any supplier of arms to
nations that sponsor terrorism, not just weapons sales that upset
regional stability, as specified in the 1992 law. But the new
law has not been invoked, administration officials said, because
sanctions laws cannot be applied retroactively.
>From 1997 on, members of the House Armed Services Committee on
several occasions questioned Pentagon and State Department
officials about the submarine and why the administration was not
taking stronger measures to stop delivery.
And just last week, Senator Sam Brownback, Republican of Kansas
and chairman of the Near East and South Asia subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said at a hearing that the
administration had failed to inform Congress of confidential
deals with Russia and had looked the other way as Russia sent
significant quantities of arms to Iran and elsewhere.
He said Russia has blatantly violated the Gore-Chernomyrdin
agreement and other pacts and continues to be a major sponsor of
Iran's arms buildup.
"You've seemed to conclude your own sidebar agreements and the
development continues to take place with alarming speed and
progress," Senator Brownback lectured Robert J. Einhorn, the
State Department's top nonproliferation official. "The problem
has grown decidedly worse, and the world is a far more dangerous
place because of that."
Mr. Einhorn acknowledged that the United States has expressed
its "frustration and disappointment" to Moscow over the continued
sales to Tehran. But he said the extent of the sales was
classified and could not be discussed in an open hearing.
In January Secretary Albright sent a classified message to Igor
S. Ivanov, Russia's foreign minister, complaining that Moscow was
not abiding by terms of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement. Russia
has not provided a required accounting of the arms shipped to
Iran and those still in the pipeline, she complained, and she
referred to a statement by Mr. Ivanov that it would take a
decade for Russia to complete its weapons contracts with Iran.
She said the administration had lived up to its end of the
bargain, and she warned, "Continued transfers to Iran could be
subject to sanctions under relevant U.S. laws."
"Russia's unilateral decision to continue delivering arms to Iran
beyond the Dec. 31 deadline will unnecessarily complicate our
relationship," Dr. Albright wrote.
The same week that Dr. Albright's message was sent to Mr.
Ivanov, Russia delivered the first of five heavy military
helicopters to Tehran, according to Itar-Tass, the official
Russian news agency. The helicopters are not on the list of
permitted military deliveries contained in the annex to the
Gore-Chernomyrdin deal.
The day after Dr. Albright's message, Marshal Igor D.
Sergeyev, the Russian defense minister, met with a top Iranian
security official and pledged to maintain Russia's military ties
to Tehran, according to the Russian Interfax news service.
"Russia intends to maintain the dynamics of its bilateral ties
with Iran," Marshal Sergeyev said, "in the military,
military-technical, scientific-technical and energy fields."
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