WHAT USE INTELLIGENCE?
Take command of the dimensions of communication, goes today's wisdom, and you
(Reflection on Echelon and the USS Cole Incident)
by Peter B. Martin © 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
control your country's security. If Echelon, the code name for an automated
global surveillance operation, is all it is cracked up to be, then why didn't
that high-tech eavesdropping system receive and issue a warning about the
imminent attack on the USS Cole and if it did, why was it ignored?
ACQUISITION & COLLECTION
One can't discuss the extent or limits of Echelon without taking into account
its fountainhead, The National Security Agency (NSA), irreverently known as
the "Puzzle Palace" or "No Such Agency", based in Fort Meade, Maryland. NSA
and Echelon can almost be considered one and the same; each needs the other
to operate efficiently.
NSA/Echelon's global technological reach embodies:
1.Undercover embassy listening posts to pick up local message traffic.
2. Military intelligence assets.
3. Cars, trucks, vans and, often disguised as local utility vehicles, to
blend into surroundings when used as listening posts.
4. Covert miniature sensors near sources of communications, (used to assist
in difficulties with fiber-optic transmissions).
5. Various furtive devices that intercept Internet transmissions. 6. Overt
listening posts studded with antennas, outsize dish receivers and
space-based satellites that can listen in on international phone, fax,
microwave communications and other complex traffic.
While NSA's banks of supercomputers can probably break many codes in a matter
of seconds, by using what is called the "Brute force attack", they do have
difficulty with encryption programs with keys of 128 bits or more. In such
cases, there are several options, the most uncouth being to steal or bribe
the code key; a more elegant method is to covertly modify the foreign
encryption machine to one's advantage, or else code breakers can try and find
slight mathematical weaknesses in the key. NSA genuinely had problems with
certain voice communication, essentially because of pronunciation variables;
the computers have trouble recognizing cue words. Advanced computers, capable
of improved speech recognition, have done a lot to alleviate that problem.
Multisyllabic key words are easier for the computer to spot than monosyllabic
ones because they are less likely to be mixed up with another word. Today's
sophisticated word-recognition programs can digitally register keywords, but
they can't make reliable transcripts of a conversation because words in
conversations so often merge into one another and the computer can't untangle
the message.
To determine just how much intelligence collection by NSA is enough is a
pretty subjective matter. A great deal of material is simply taped and stored
in data bases. Some of it might prove useful in years to come, but most of it
will remain worthless and unusable. Despite exaggerated stories to the
contrary, Echelon does not intercept and monitor millions of communications
worldwide; there is no way they could deal with all that data. Echelon is a
much more selective and focused search engine than that, targeting especially
criminals, terrorists and other suspected enemy traffic. Most intercepts are
rejected before they are even seen or interpreted by humans. Echelon uses
"Dictionary" computers to scan input and discard what is superfluous and
valueless. They even have a portable model, brief case size, called
"Oratory", that can be taken around to foreign surveillance sites. NSA is now
perfecting a new technique called "topic analysis" which they hope will
further help to harvest information on precise subjects.
TERRORIST COUNTER MEASURES
Any terrorist worth his semtex knows the value and risks of modern
communications. The weakness of government authority, because of privacy
protection and confusions of jurisdiction within computer nets, works to the
terrorist's advantage. They know full well that an analogue portable phone
can be listened in by anyone, and that they are, in effect, miniature
transmitters that can double as covert listening devices and location
finders. Terrorist cells have access to the most sophisticated, up-to-date
digital communication equipment and they make use of it. A classic example
would be a product of Phonak Communications AG, a Swiss company making
state-of-the-art communication equipment. One of their more recent devices is
called "Phonito" a new generation of wireless, discreet, invisible two-way
communication apparatus that converts any received speech signals into an
inductive signal, which can be received by an inductor hidden in one's ear
and is said to be impossible to monitor. Such an example is characteristic of
the burgeoning problems facing NSA, whose operating costs amount to about $1
million per hour, totaling over $8 billion a year, and an illustration of its
difficulty to adapt to the constantly evolving technological environment.
Overcoming such measures inevitably adds to the cost of intelligence.
In this new environment of intelligence versus terrorist, it is increasingly
difficult to collect intelligence, and even more complex to process the raw
data into usable and timely information. The challenge of collection is more
formidable due to such things as encryption devices for communication systems
that are available on the open market.
Analysis is more complicated than ever before. This complexity produces the
inevitable ripple effect within the intelligence process, not only a demand
for sophisticated analytic skills, but for highly specialized subjects
working in the intelligence community; which adds up to forecasting trends in
terrorism well in advance. To keep any intelligence technological advantage,
new, more complex systems have to be introduced, but such new collection
systems require long lead times for development. Which means intelligence
officers have to anticipate their intelligence requirements, such as possible
encryption measures, frequency band of a transmission and then plan the
system far into the future. Just last month, the head of NSA, Lt. Gen.
Michael Hayden, disclosed they were reengineering signals intelligent
(Sigint) because of the rapidly changing communications technology.
Before discussing the USS Cole bombing, two last points should be emphasized.
No matter how much civil libertarians might carp, it is understandable that
NSA provides information about its operations very reluctantly, especially in
this age of media leaks and inside disclosures. They have good reason to fear
that their adversaries would be alerted, and consequently shield their
communications, thereby finding their source of intelligence vanish from
their clutches. And while NSA may sometimes miss vital information that could
forecast a terrorist act, it has been demonstrated time and again that they
still are an integral part of preventing terrorism.
EXPLOSIVE CONSPIRACY
On the 12 of October, in Aden harbor at 11:18 (local Yemen time), a white
motorized skiff slowly came along the port side of the USS Cole Arleigh Burke
Class Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG-67) unchallenged. The two men on the
skiff nonchalantly waved to sailors standing watch on the deck while the Cole
was moored and taking on fuel. As it reached about midway and a few feet from
the hull, a horrendous explosion ripped through the ship killing 17 US
sailors and injuring 39. The probably conical shaped charge under the hull of
the fiberglass craft turned the water into a major force concentrating all
its intensity against the hull and punching a 12 meter hole in the side just
at the waterline. The incredible underwater concussion smashed the hull plate
at hundreds of miles per hour through the interior of the ship, flattened the
mess deck against the overhead and pushed the entire galley to the starboard
side, as well as flooding number one engine room and the auxiliary one.
BUNGLED SECURITY
There were no patrol boats checking on the local harbor traffic. Although the
guards on the deck at the time of the attack were armed with guns, they were
not loaded because rules for their use were confusing and ambiguous due to
priorities related to non-combat missions. Even though the sailors on watch
may have visually tracked the unthreatening skiff, they were hardly in a
posture to seriously challenge the men on board and stop the aggression. This
lack of engagement preparedness was an unmistakable lapse in security, but
the inadequacy of port security measures was only part of the problem. The
Navy's Anti-Terrorist Alert Center had previously circulated a report warning
of just this sort of vulnerability, stating: "The current Antiterrorism/force
protection program leaves us exposed to attacks from waterside threats" and
went on to emphasize "policy disconnects" among various commanders
responsible for port security. In actuality, the crew of the Cole was under
orders to follow secret security procedures designed to deter just such an
attack. Some of the measures they should have used was first to establish an
exclusion zone 200 meters around of the ship, call out warnings in Arabic,
then, if necessary, fire flares, train water hoses on them, or discharge
.50-calaber machine gun fire if they persisted to threaten.
DATA OVERLOAD OR INCOMPETENCE?
The attack has all the hallmarks particular to elaborate, long-term planning
by well- trained professional terrorists. FBI forensic tests disclosed that
C-4 plastic explosive was used in the attack, an expensive and relatively
difficult explosive to obtain and implies an Afghan connection. One can
wonder why there was no previous warning of such an attack, and if there was,
why the Cole was not on a higher alert standing and better prepared for a
possible attack. Taking into consideration NSA's immense capabilities and,
more specifically, in association with the Navy's 6th Fleet Ocean
Surveillance Information Facility (FOSIF) out of Rota, Spain providing daily
security bulletins, based on data from sophisticated intercept systems and
intelligence agents on the ground in the Middle East, it might appear
incredible they missed this threat. In fact they apparently didn't, it was
the interpretation of the data, transmission or effectuation of it that might
have been amiss.
Last June, Kie Fallis, a counter-terrorism analyst for the Middle East at DIA
warned of a strong possibility of an imminent attack against US forces in the
region. His report was ignored and the analyst resigned after the attack.
Incidentally, several hours after the attack on the Cole, all but mystically,
NSA disseminated a top-secret intelligence report warning of a potential
threat against US targets in the Middle East. Additionally, there is a
reliable report that just a month before the attack, a member of the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad, (who is in US custody), had warned of an attack on a US
warship. And more specifically, a secret CIA warning went out in mid
September warning that terrorists were planning to attack a 6th Fleet warship
in the Mediterranean region using a small boat laden with explosives. What's
more, there are reports that on Jan. 03, terrorists tried the same attack
against another US warship in the Middle East, USS The Sullivans, but their
rubber boat sank, no doubt do to the considerable weight of the explosives
aboard.
The alert standing "Threatcon" in effect in the port that day was Bravo,
which is two levels above Normal (Charlie and Delta being higher). According
to directives, this level implies that there was information given that
indicates a potential regional or area specific threat against US interests,
whereas it is not target or time specific. Normally, this level necessitates
close screening and positive ID of any non-US Navy boat in the harbor. It is
evident the ship's captain was not following the Bravo security measures on
the day of the attack. If the facts substantiate this, the captain of the USS
Cole should be up for the Helen Keller Award for Dysfunctional Intelligence
Evaluation! What's more, it seems apparent the CENTCOM/CC (Central Command
Commander & Chief) made a dubious judgment in selecting Aden as a refueling
port in the first place, Djibouti, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Fujacyrah and Muscat
would have been a safer choices, refueling at sea would have been the safest.
Evidently, Yemen was chosen for political and diplomatic reasons - To fly the
US flag in Yemen, improve relations with America and with the prospect of
eventually building a military base there.
SHRINKING RESOURCES, INCREASING DEMANDS
It is said that terrorism is the poor man's war. It is also said that
technology does not win wars. So, it is doubtful technology will ever beat
terrorism. The value and consequence of intelligence information depends a
great deal on the affinity between the user and the collector.
By extension, appropriate, regular communication between collector, analyst
and operative is essential. The central point of the fault line in
intercommunication, as far as the Cole incident goes, is obvious. No matter
how good systems like Echelon can ever be, it is the translation of the
"take" and the appropriate action taken on it, which is fundamental to our
security. In other words, successful intelligence depends on capable people
producing it and capable people using it. Paradoxically, while Western
intelligence agencies and the DoD plan their moves by assessment of threat,
the terrorist community plans its moves by assessment of opportunity.
Fugitive terrorist mastermind, Osama bin Laden and his Qaida organization,
the instigator of the Cole attack, has proven to be very adept at such
tactics. Consequently, Echelon and NSA are necessary, even if, according to
some people, they are deemed an infringement to our right of privacy, since
they are our first line of defense in fighting international terrorism.
In the future, expanded intelligence collection will be crucial if we are to
keep ahead of our enemies, but all that intelligence is useless if the
disseminated end product is not correctly acted upon. The Cole incident was
not an intelligence failure but a failure to respond properly to an
intelligence assessment, coupled with political expediency, regrettably
contributing to the needless death of 17 United States sailors.
NMN Notes:
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