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MER WEEKEND READING:
FIELD OF THORNS
by Mouin Rabbani
[The Nation Magazine, 12 March 2001]: The Palestinian uprising in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, which in late September 2000 began as a wave of popular
protest against Ariel Sharon's belligerent incursion into Jerusalem's sacred
Haram al-Sharif, has developed into a full-fledged war of attrition against
the Israeli occupation, which rather ironically paved the aggressive right-wing
leader's path to power.
The gradual "Lebanonization" of the occupied territories during the Al-Aqsa
Intifada, in which the activities of increasingly effective armed cells have
been supplanting civil forms of resistance, poses a challenge to Israel, which,
in the context of its stated territorial ambitions and the external constraints
upon its conduct,
outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Barak was incapable of resolving. For all his
bluster about refusing to negotiate under fire, putting an end to Palestinian
"violence and terror" and achieving a "peace for generations," Sharon's dilemma
is equally intractable. Any government he forms will prove at least as unwilling
to withdraw to the
June 1967 boundaries as its predecessor, and thereby will insure the continuation
of the uprising. If Sharon opts instead to destroy the Palestinian Authority
(PA) in an updated version of the regional strategy attempted during the 1982
invasion of Lebanon, he will once again create the conditions for the ascendancy
of a more radical and uncompromising adversary--with the distinction that the
Palestinian variant will be based in Hebron, Jerusalem and the Palestinian
town of Umm al-Fahm within Israel rather than in Lebanon's Baalbek and Beirut.
And in contrast to 1982, open warfare with the Palestinian leadership in 2001
will for Israel entail significant regional (and perhaps international) costs.
The above notwithstanding, the prospects for a successful Palestinian guerrilla
campaign remain dim. Palestinian efforts are nowhere near as sophisticated
as those of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Israel is prepared to sustain much greater
losses in the occupied Palestinian territories than it was in Lebanon. At the
same time, the
militarization of the uprising is marginalizing the role of Palestinian society
and thus squandering the potential contribution of a mobilized population;
as the PA and Palestinian civil society are for different reasons gripped by
serious paralysis, Israel's punitive sanctions and the PA's haphazard response
have stretched Palestinians to the breaking point.
As the possibilities for either a permanent Israeli-Palestinian settlement
or a resumption of interim arrangements continue to recede, and those of a
wider regional conflagration remain on the rise, a prolonged low-intensity
conflict propelled by yet unable to rupture the political stalemate, punctuated
by occasional bouts of
intensified bloodletting, domestic chaos (whether Palestinian or Israeli) and
futile diplomacy, remains the most likely scenario. On an almost daily basis,
unarmed Palestinian youths trek to the boundaries separating areas under Palestinian
and Israeli security control to take on armed Israeli soldiers encased in protective
gear
and positioned behind barriers or in fortified locations. Unlike the 1987-93
intifada, during which the military was deployed within Palestinian towns and
such confrontations could occur almost anywhere at virtually any time, the
current clashes generally commence at around noon at fixed points on the outskirts
of Palestinian town!
s such as the City Inn junction in northern Al-Bira, or along other clear lines
of demarcation such as central Hebron or Martyrs' Junction (Netzarim) south
of Gaza City.
These are not the mass demonstrations of the uprising's early weeks, in which
hundreds and often thousands of Palestinian demonstrators launched frontal
attacks upon Israeli positions with the intention of overwhelming them and,
determined and disorganized in equal measure, suffered dozens of dead and thousands
of wounded in the process. Rather, and with increasingly few exceptions, these
have become ritualized confrontations. Separated by more or less permanent
barricades erected by the Palestinians and left in place by the Israelis, groups
of youths typically numbering in the dozens approach smaller concentrations
of soldiers to throw stones, bottles and the occasional firebomb. Their purpose
is to remind Israel, the world and also their own leaders that Palestinians
will continue to resist the occupation until it ends, and the soldiers confront
them in order to demonstrate just as clearly that they have no intention of
being involuntarily dislodged.
Shortly before or after the first stone is thrown, the soldiers begin firing
a barrage of tear-gas canisters (most of which are thrown right back) and fairly
quickly begin supplementing their toxic ordnance with volleys of rubber bullets
and spherical metal bullets (covered in a negligibly thin layer of plastic),
which can be lethal if fired--as often they are--directly at the head or upper
body from close range. Despite the gross imbalance of power, and with breathtaking
courage that numerous observers have termed suicidal, the youths continue advancing,
eventually and inevitably crossing a threshold at which point the soldiers
begin firing live, high-velocity
bullets, which fragment upon impact and are a surgeon's nightmare. On other
occasions, and particularly in the Gaza Strip, trigger-happy conscripts eagerly
dispense with this intifada protocol and almost immediately resort to live
ammunition, aiming to permanently maim and kill rather than temporarily disable.
It is doubtful a single Palestinian shot dead under such circumstances posed
a genuine threat to the life of an Israeli soldier. Nevertheless, the Israeli
military--which, in contrast to the previous intifada, has done away with the
pretense of investigating the conduct of its own soldiers--has in addition
to the above pattern responded to such demonstrations with snipers operating
at long range (and at times equipped with silencers), as well as rapid automatic
gunfire indiscriminate enough to wound journalists and kill ambulance personnel.
With increasing regularity, the ritual is brought to a conclusion by a barrage
of 500-millimeter or 800-millimeter bullets (the casing of the latter easily
accommodates a human thumb), or several tank shells directed at nearby buildings.
Sometimes these are fired without provocation; on other occasions they are
in response to Palestinian gunmen who feel or are compelled to intervene when
the situation gets particularly gruesome. In contrast to a number of incidents
during the uprising's early phases, the gunmen no longer fire from within the
crowd.
As night falls, and increasingly during the day as well, it is these armed
cadres who are defining the nature of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation.
Their cells include Palestinian security personnel, Fatah activists (who are
often one and the same) and almost certainly members of the Islamist and secular
opposition as well
(notably Islamic Jihad), and they operate under previously unknown names such
as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (kata'ib shuhada' al-aqsa) and Forces of Badr
(quwwat badr). Their weapon of choice is the sniper's bullet and roadside bomb,
and more recently the occasional mortar round and antitank missile. Their preferred
tactic is hit and run, and their proclaimed strategy of transforming Israel's
most sensitive assets in the occupied territories into its greatest liabilities
is as simple as it can be effective.
In this respect the network of settler roads, largely constructed since the
Oslo agreement to connect Jewish settlements to Israel (and each other) in
a manner that circumvents Palestinian towns and villages, is a case in point.
Built on the principle of apartheid (the infamous Dutch/Afrikaans word, meaning
"separateness," is
equivalent to the "separation" that Barak and other Israeli officials frequently
recommend as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), in order both
to consolidate the Israeli presence within the West Bank and Gaza Strip and
to provide the settlers who use them with a sense of security, these have to
the horror of their planners become the most dangerous roads in the Middle
East. Because they are the only ones settlers use, and are in many cases used
only by settlers and the military, any vehicle traversing them is a potential
target.
Isolated settlements--such as those in the Gaza Strip and colonies that, like
Gilo on the edge of Beit Jala and Psagot in al-Bira, abut the communities on
whose lands they were established--have on the basis of the above principle
been exposed as equally vulnerable. To the obvious satisfaction of the uprising's
armed activists, the
total settler population, which increased by approximately 50 percent in the
seven years after the Oslo agreement was signed, has as a result of their attacks
experienced (with the possible exception of 1988) its first net reduction since
1967. Additionally, numerous Israeli and foreign press reports have documented
the
pervasive fear and sense of imprisonment felt by those who remain, and many
appear eager to leave if their government will provide them alternative housing
and/or compensation. (The irony that the settlements were established by Israel
for the explicit purpose of encircling and suffocating the Palestinians, and
that the military provided the settlers with guns and green lights to terrorize
their neighbors, is entirely lost upon the majority of such correspondents.)
While the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade and most similar groups are known to the
PA and are believed to enjoy operational support from senior security officials
(which is unlikely to be provided clandestinely and through which the leadership
would seek to retain a measure of influence over their activities), these are
not PA units established to pursue an official policy under the cloak of plausible
deniability. Rather, they represent an autonomous and at times independent
force within the Palestinian national movement, with an agenda increasingly
divergent from that of the PA. Its backbone consists of the activist, militant
wing of the Fatah movement, which espouses its policies and positions both
independently and through the proclamations of the National and Islamic Forces
(NIF), a coalition of fourteen Palestinian political factions that constitutes
the operational command and organizational infrastructure of the uprising.
The NIF, which includes the gamut of PLO, secular opposition and Islamist factions
save the Fatah-Revolutionary Council of Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal), the
Fatah-Provisional
Command led by Sa'id Maragha (Abu Musa) and the Palestine Communist Party-Provisional
Command of Arabi Awad, is not a national political leadership and cannot (yet)
be compared to the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which
led the 1987-93 intifada until it was entirely subsumed by the exiled PLO leadership
in Tunis and Damascus. Rather, and by tacit agreement, its role is limited
to popular mobilization and the planning and organization of the uprising's
calendar (e.g., "Days of Rage"), as well as the conduct of activities such
as the consumer boycott of Israeli products, which --constrained by formal
commitments--the PA cannot itself undertake. According to the rules of the
game, the formulation and implementation of national policy is the exclusive
preserve of the PA.
In practice this is no longer the case. The NIF and its constituent organizations
have been increasingly critical of the PA, particularly with respect to its
domestic policies (or rather lack thereof) and its conduct of relations with
Israel and the United States. On February 10, for example, at a time when most
PA officials were
proclaiming the view that the election of Ariel Sharon was an internal Israeli
matter, with Yasir Arafat emphasizing the point by calling the victorious candidate
to congratulate him and express his desire to resume negotiations after the
formation of a new Israeli government, the NIF issued a statement openly vowing
to bring
about the downfall of the "terrorist criminal" Sharon, like Barak before him.
It said the "new phase of confrontation," which it predicted, "requires that
all Palestinian, Arab and international forces work to isolate this raging
bull by all means." Indeed, the NIF "stresses the need to reinforce the isolation
of Sharon," which "requires the escalation of the intifada and resistance in
order to make his aggressive policy a burden upon Israeli society." "Any Palestinian
or Arab attempt to market Sharon's spoiled goods," the NIF pointedly warned,
"will fall into the trap Sharon seeks to use to destroy Palestinian national
unity, eliminate the intifada, and paralyze the Palestinian National Authority."
Perhaps more than any other event, the election of Sharon has thrown the differences
between the PA and NIF into relief. To the PA, Sharon is above all a challenge
to the successful conclusion of the peace process. If it can utilize its regional
and international alliances to ensnare this uncompromising rejectionist in
permanent-status negotiations on the division of Jerusalem, return of refugees
and dismantling of settlements despite his having been elected to cut the Palestinians
down to size, it will have vindicated the PA's decision to enter into the Oslo
agreements and its performance prior to and since the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Under
no circumstances can it settle for less than was discussed during the final
round of permanent-settlement negotiations in the Egyptian resort of Taba,
and it must establish the understandings reached there as a baseline for further
negotiations with Sharon's government. The uprising is therefore an instrument
of diplomatic leverage, to help and remind the international community to prod
Sharon to resume negotiations at the point where they left off, and to shorten
his tenure if they don't or he refuses. Keeping alive the prospect of Oslo's
resumption and successful conclusion, without which neither Israel nor the
international community has much use for the PA, is the red line Arafat has
tacitly communicated to the NIF. The comparative absence of organized Palestinian
attacks across the Green Line, which cannot be solely attributed to previous
Palestinian and current Israeli campaigns against Hamas and Islamic Jihad,
suggests the message is generally being understood.
To the militants within Fatah and the majority of the NIF, the uprising is
an instrument of a very different sort, and Sharon is the opportunity to prove
its effectiveness. Through its consistent escalation, the Al-Aqsa Intifada
(and attendant Arab support) will, according to this view, force Israel to
surrender its vision of a
Palestinian protectorate under Israeli hegemony, retained even during Taba's
final moments, and thus allow the Palestinians to transcend the entire Oslo
framework.
In the confident words of Fatah West Bank secretary general Marwan Barghouti,
Sharon is Israel's "last bullet" before it surrenders to the realization that
it can have "either peace and security or occupation and settlement, but not
both." The uprising is thus a war of national liberation in which the only
negotiations to be conducted
are those that formalize the end of the occupation. If it is, however, exploited
as a negotiating tactic and made hostage to political pressures and the demands
of the moment, it will inevitably be prematurely aborted and end in failure.
Memories of the fate of the 1987-93 intifada are in this respect particularly
strong, and are
further reinforced by the stark contrast between Israel's consistent disregard
of signed agreements with its Palestinian "peace partner" and its generally
scrupulous respect for informal understandings with its bitter enemy Hezbollah.
The red line for the militants, which has until now been respected by Arafat,
is the continuation of the uprising until the end of the occupation.
Thus far, these ultimately contradictory trends have managed to compete in
coexistence, and even to complement one another. Barghouti and other Fatah
leaders can be bitterly critical of the PA, demand that Arafat root out the
corruption in its ranks and collaborators in their midst, and suggest the formation
of an "intifada
government" based upon the national unity and unity of purpose established
at the local level. There has not, however, been an open challenge to the current
leadership or its legitimacy, and Fatah has insured the formal loyalty of the
NIF to the PA. For its part the PA has not definitively severed security cooperation
with Israel, and in fact it reached various understandings with Barak and Clinton
to restore calm to the West Bank and Gaza Strip; but the PA has avoided measures
that would test Fatah's loyalty or rupture its relations with other NIF factions.
Arafat's method appears to be one of ongoing consultations with Fatah and the
opposition, combined with a consistent disregard of their positions when planning
his next move.
Until Sharon's election, both the PA and NIF were on the whole content to see
the uprising continue and in the process improve the PA's negotiating position,
even if the former felt the activities of the armed units were at times calculated
to derail the negotiations, and the latter viewed the PA's conduct in negotiations
as
endangering the further development of the uprising. The NIF's pride in Barak's
defeat notwithstanding, the relative calm in the weeks leading up to the Israeli
election were clearly enforced in deference to the PA. In the coming period
the PA and NIF will continue to cooperate, for example in seeking the deployment
of an
international protection force or in cutting short Sharon's tenure by making
a mockery of his promises of tranquillity, and they will continue to compete
over issues such as security cooperation. But if circumstances develop in which
the PA feels compelled to curtail the uprising to insure its own survival,
or the NIF considers it necessary to clean house within the PA to preserve
its uprising, an open confrontation between the PA and NIF cannot be ruled
out. Should such a showdown materialize, it will be the Fatah activists, and
particularly those with positions and connections in the security forces, who
will determine its outcome.
In the meantime, Israel's blockade and bombardment of Palestinian population
centers is exacting a terrible social, economic and physical toll. Throughout
the West Bank and particularly in the Gaza Strip, a systematic Israeli defoliation
campaign has transformed thousands of acres into a moonscape of uprooted olive,
palm and orange trees, and increasingly of summarily bulldozed homes as well.
The entrances to numerous towns and villages have been rendered impassable,
either through the erection of concrete or earthen barricades or by the digging
of trenches several feet deep across roads. Such measures, and particularly
the various forms of closure (including the repeated dissection of the minuscule
Gaza Strip into four separate enclaves), have had a devastating economic impact.
According to a recent UN report, the siege is costing the Palestinian economy
$8.6 million daily (excluding physical damage, loss of tax income and the cost
of caring for more than 10,000 casualties). Total losses between September
2000 and February 2001 have amounted to $1.5 billion, equal to a 20 percent
decline in GDP. Poverty has increased by 50 percent, to encompass 32 percent
of the total population, and unemployment has risen to 38 percent of the work
force (Palestinian sources claim significantly higher figures). While reports
that PA institutions face imminent collapse are in some cases accurate, security
personnel continue to receive their full salaries on time, and predictions
of the PA's impending disintegration have an air of politically motivated alarmism
about them.
Tanks are currently stationed throughout the occupied territories for the first
time since their conquest in 1967, and their barrels and those of the heavy
machine guns mounted upon them are routinely used against civilian neighborhoods.
By mid-February, a pattern appeared to be emerging in which more Palestinian
casualties are being inflicted by such shelling than by soldiers confronting
demonstrators. In Khan Yunis in Gaza, which along with Rafah and Hebron has
experienced some of the most intense bombardments, Israeli forces additionally
appear to have used a new form of toxic gas.
The systematic human rights violations, which according to a February 21 Human
Rights Watch press release include "indiscriminate and excessive [Israeli]
fire" into civilian neighborhoods and, as documented by Palestinian, Israeli
and international human rights organizations, have also involved the operation
of death squads, have reached a level of severity where they can no longer
be ignored even by Washington. On the same day that HRW released its condemnation,
the State Department announced it was launching an investigation to determine
if Israel has violated the US Arms Export Control Act, which regulates the
use of American weapons and ammunition. Meanwhile, the UN Human Rights Commission
recently completed a fact-finding mission to examine evidence of Israeli "war
crimes" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; it is expected to release its final
report in mid-March. At the same time, HRW and other organizations have also
condemned Palestinian gunmen for firing at Israeli positions from within Palestinian
towns, if pointedly noting that such acts cannot justify the disproportionate
Israeli response.
On February 14 Khalil Abu Ulba of Gaza's Shaikh Radwan refugee housing project,
one of only 16,000 Palestinians (out of some 3 million) with a record considered
clean and reliable enough by Israel's intelligence services to retain his permit
to enter and work in Israel, rammed the empty passenger bus he was driving
into a group of soldiers assembled at a junction south of Tel Aviv. Eight people,
including one civilian, were killed in the attack. It was by all accounts an
individual action that required neither careful planning nor organizational
support.
This time around Israel's intelligence community had not failed. Rather, its
policies have; Abu Ulba's interrogators have been attempting to determine whether
it was the siege and its economic devastation, the pervasive violence and killing,
the intense bombardment and gassing of Khan Yunis that same week or the latest
aerial assassination of a Palestinian activist (in nearby Jabalya the day before
the attack) that pushed one of the last Palestinians it certified as kosher
over the edge. As Fatah leader and Palestinian legislator Qadura Faris observed
several months ago, if Israel insists on starving the occupied territories
it is unlikely that the cost will be borne exclusively by Palestinians, particularly
if the PA is unable to meet the people's basic needs.
Attacks such as those by Abu Ulba, and eventually others by organizations affiliated
with the NIF, are not going to cease because of an intensified closure and
heightened repression--quite the contrary. If not the next attack, then the
one after that may prove to be the spark that brings Israel's confrontation
with the Palestinians, and the pressure that has been building within the Palestinian
body politic, to a new and more dangerous crossroads.
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