-Caveat Lector- Amnesty International, BASIC, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld UNITED NATIONS 2001 CONFERENCE ON THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS - THIRD PREPARATORY CONFERENCE, NEW YORK, U.S.A HOW GUNS GET TO WAR ZONES - TECHNIQUES OF CLANDESTINE ARMS DELIVERY A BRIEFING PACK INTRODUCTION The transport of weapons and ammunition by air always is an operation carried out with discretion, even when the transfer is a legal one from one sovereign Government to another and no international embargoes are being breached; in the case of illicit arms transfers the degree of deceit which may be involved is great - but so, of course, are the rewards. Interviewed last year, Captain Brian 'Sport' Martin told Brian Johnson-Thomas that UNITA rebels in Angola were willing to pay him and his two colleagues 100,000 U.S dollars per trip to fly to UNITA's secret air base, Alpha One. He described his meeting with a UNITA Colonel: "That was in Kigali, in a little shack. There were tiny lights on. They put the charts on the table and I had a look at it, and it's not a easy place to get into at night, and they insisted on doing it at night..... and you have to come in, into a valley and up onto the runway so (makes titling movement with hands) ... come down into the valley and up and land so you lose some of the runway because of the angle you are at ..... they have got low cloud there and so on and the early hours of the morning and fog..... you're doing it all on GPS .... Doing an approach on the GPS and nothing else". This laconic account indicates clearly that aircrew who become involved in this clandestine world are, whatever else one may think of them, consumate aviators who are able to fly in conditions on, or beyond, normal aviation limits. Captain Martin again: " With the (Boeing) seven-oh (7) you would get in just about anywhere... we landed on 1800 yards ... to me, It's proper flying, you don't talk to anybody ... there is nobody to talk to. We do a lot of map reading as well you know ... we follow the rivers and things like that. It's nice flying, it really is..." EXAMPLES 1. Concealment - Transfer of ammunition from Bratislava in the Slovak Republic, to Khartoum in Sudan, diversion from flight plan. (Documents A and B) The simplest method used to conceal the true destination of an arms shipment is for the aircraft to divert from it's approved flight plan. Documents A and B show how this works in practice. Aircraft 9G-ROX (with Alan Maskell as Loadmaster) is apparently flying, says document ammunition from Bratislava in the Slovak Republic to N'Djamena in Chad. It's only when Document B is scrutinised that we see that the aircraft actually landed at Khartoum at a time when Sudan was under a European Union arms embargo. Loadmaster 'Jim' and Flight Engineer 'John' had a similar experience with nearly 5 tonnes of weapons and ammunition that was diverted from Israel to Turkmenistan, and ultimately Afghanistan, some seven years ago. Jim starts the conversation: " The first sheet here is basically the weight control and the acceptance of the 165 boxes weighing 4474 kilos into the security compound at Schipol airport .... Following that one there's the actual shippers declaration for dangerous goods, which is from a shipper called Distraco S.A 1060 Brussels to Israel Military Industries, Ashkamat Hasharon in Israel, P.O Box 1044 .... That is supposedly where it was going... to Tel Aviv and the listing is cartridges, small arms, 143 boxes - that's the dangerous part of the shipment although there was a further 22 boxes weighing just over a tonne which were in fact weapons themselves .... Automatic rifles, pistols, hand grenades. Certainly we did take off (from Schipol) and go down towards the Mediterranean but at some point we did turn left up towards the Black Sea and turned right to somewhere". John remembers that 'somewhere." "It was a military airfield in Turkmenistan and we used to offload ammunition there for Afghanistan." 2. Bluff - Transfer of arms from Bratislava to Guayaquil in Ecuador, cargo deceit. (Documents C, D, E and F) Another favourite technique is simply to declare an arms cargo as an innocuous one. On 8th March 1995 overflying and landing permits were sought for a giant Antonov 124 cargo aircraft ostensibly flying a 'hospital truck and special equipments' from Bratislava to Guayaquil in Ecuador. This was at the time of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador when arms supplies to both countries were notionally embargoed by the OAS. During a routine refuelling stop in the Azores, a passing pilot was attracted by what was, to him, a new type of aircraft and he went aboard. It was then discovered that the cargo was military and not medical, thus prompting the Portuguese authorities to impound the aircraft. Document C shows the original flight plan, documents D and E show the internal Telex messages between shipping agents and suppliers and document F shows the amended flight plan for '104 tonnes military trucks and its equipment'. What makes this particular example interesting, of course, is that this particular shipment was detected. An even more common deception is for an unauthorised aircraft to use the flight number of an authorised flight across the State. Since most aircraft movements are scheduled, i.e. planned well in advance, it is possible to know that, say, Flight XYZ 123 is due to transit the airspace of Country Blank between 1310 and 1430 on Day X. The 'rogue' aircraft presents itself to the air traffic controllers at the right height and on the correct Airway and uses the approved call sign, but is half an hour early, controllers will readily accept that the aircraft has the right to be on that route. By the time that the properly shows up the 'rogue' aircraft (travelling, remember, at around 800 kph) has already become somebody else's problem. SOLUTIONS These examples highlight the need for concrete action at the UN Conference to ensure that the illicit delivery of arms is dealt with at international and national levels. Enforcement of arms embargoes Transfers of small arms should be conducted in strict accordance with states' existing obligations under international law. All UN member states are required to adhere to UN resolutions by refraining from transferring arms to an embargoed country, they are also required to take steps to enforce the embargo against individuals within their jurisdiction. The international community, in the form of the UN Conference, must now address embargo enforcement, as a crucial element in the fight against the illicit trade. States should treat any arms transfer in breach of a UN arms embargo as a serious criminal offence and adapt their domestic laws accordingly. To be effective such legislation must be matched with adequate resources for police and customs officials to ensure compliance, for example by follow up checks to track the end-use of exports. In addition, where appropriate the international community should offer technical assistance and resources, particularly in the region surrounding an embargoed county, through which are likely transit routes, in order to enhance their national controls and ensure stringent enforcement regimes. Targeted sanctions should be applied against states that transfer arms in contravention of embargoes. Controlling legal transfers and enforcing the responsibilities of states Many illicit arms transfers originate as Government licensed deals that then get diverted. Therefore in order to tackle illicit trade of arms it is crucial to look at controls on the "legal" trade. It is essential that global criteria governing the transfer of small arms and light weapons are developed at the UN Conference, based on existing commitments under international law, as well as other areas of growing concern, for example the need to avoid the destabilising accumulation of weapons in a region, and the need to avoid undermining sustainable development. Effective control over the end-use of small arms and light weapons when exported All states need to strengthen their mechanisms for assuring and monitoring the end-use of small-arms and light weapons post-export to prevent diversion from legal markets and end users. Many governments currently rely on paper forms of end-use certificates that are easily forged and circumvented by unscrupulous end users. The UN Conference is an opportunity to develop international norms and standards governing end-use. This could include states adopting a system whereby end-use undertakings take the form of legally binding contract that, if broken, would result in targeting sanctions against those responsible. Such sanctions could include the refusal of further exports whether under existing or new contracts, or the withholding of spare parts and servicing. Regulating arms brokers and shipping agents Unlike arms manufacturers and exporters, brokers and shipping agents are entirely unregulated. Such lack of regulation makes it very difficult to distinguish between legitimate operators and criminal dealers. An international convention on arms brokering and shipping agents is under discussion at the UN Conference. It is essential that this international convention includes shipping agents as well. The UN conference should play a central role in establishing agreed international definitions and standards for addressing all aspects for the problem of arms brokers and shipping agents. The UN agreement should commit states to establish national laws, regulations and procedures to regulate arms brokering activities that may take place within their area of jurisdiction, criminalise breaches of such regulations and monitor and enforce their implementation. Cargo checks Currently, air freight documents such as air waybills and cargo manifests, do not require detailed descriptions or cross referencing of the goods described in arms export and import licences. Arms have been described as agricultural equipment, mining equipment, tents and second hand clothing. Air freight documents should contain more detailed descriptions or cross references of the goods described in arms export and import licences. In addition, if the airport authorities at certain key transit points - such as Cairo and Nairobi - where many freighter aircraft call for fuel, were more assiduous at checking actual cargoes carried against manifests, then many more such anomalies would be discovered. Documentation checks of flight path Rigorous checks are needed in an aircraft's flight plans. Where an aircraft has diverted to another destination to offload cargo a close perusal of the aircraft's own documentation would disclose discrepancies. Aircraft registration checks Under current systems, an aircraft registration number and the name of the airline leasing or operating the plane can readily be switched to conceal an operation. A cargo aircraft might typically be registered in one country, then leased and chartered by companies registered an other. For example Equatorial Guinea has acted as a "flag of convenience" by registering planes that other countries operate. A national authority that registers an aircraft to fly under its flag, may also fail to ensure the air-worthiness and safety of that plane. A legal requirement for aircraft to be registered in countries that are operating them should be established. -------------- For a more detailed appreciation see: "Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms" (edited by Lora Lumpe. London: Zed Books and New York: St Martins Press 2000) Brian Johnson-Thomas <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. 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