-Caveat Lector- WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War! Last Warning: China Ready to Take Taiwan in 2002 Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda Monday, April 16, 2001 China is fast developing its naval and war capabilities to engage in a major war in Asia with the purpose of taking Taiwan by the fall of 2002. Two respected analysts report that shipments of advanced Russian military equipment will be delivered and in place by late next year. The experts believe China's plans have already put it on a confrontation course with its neighbors, and a collision course with the U.S. What has happened during the last two weeks has surprised many experts, let alone persons having limited knowledge about China. The first question: How did it happen? The incident involving the U.S. EP-3 did not happen in a vacuum, but was instead one incident in a spate of aggressive moves by the Chinese military. During 2000 and the first months of 2001, China was steadily increasing its military presence in the airspace and waters between the mainland coast and the First Island Chain, formed by Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The goal of this activity is to push out all other countries' forces – significantly the U.S. Air Force and Navy – and to establish unlimited Chinese control in this strategically and economically important zone. This, by the way, would facilitate China's People's Liberation Army air force (PLAAF) and navy (PLAN) actions in a forthcoming conflict around Taiwan. The Japanese navy and Philippines navy, indeed, have physically felt the drastic rise of PLAN pressure in the East China Sea and South China Sea, respectively, over the last few months. So, direct collision of Chinese and U.S. forces at some moment was unavoidable. A U.S. Navy vessel managed to escape a collision with a PLAN frigate on March 24, but another collision – between a Chinese fighter and a U.S. reconnaissance plane – did occur. The second, probably more important question: Why have the Chinese been conducting such bold maneuvers against the U.S. and others? Indeed, the Chinese side behaved in a surprisingly bold manner during the months preceding the collision, during the collision itself, and in the showdown with the U.S. administration after the incident. There are two major reasons for China's increasing belligerence: 1) China has a mighty strategic rear, i.e., Russia, whose leaders firmly support any PLA action aimed at expansion and confrontation with the U.S. In July of this year, China and Russia intend to sign a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, and will formalize their strategic military alliance. In fact, this new military axis between Beijing and Moscow has been in de facto existence since about mid-1999. The new treaty prescribes, among other items, "joint resistance to the aggression against either of the two sides." This particularly means unconditional support of China by the Russian side – with all resources available – in the case of a Sino-U.S. military conflict. Such a position of the Russian side was confirmed in a telephone call between Jiang Zemin and Putin in mid-January this year. Talks between these two supreme leaders takes place on a regular basis after their summit in July 2000. The strongly negative attitude of the Kremlin to the U.S., especially toward the present U.S. administration, gives Chinese leaders "unshakable confidence" in Russian support. 2) PLA combat potential has increased very significantly during the last two years, and Russian military-technological assistance was the decisive factor here. Particularly: a) It is common knowledge among analysts that China's PLAAF and PLAN aviation received hundreds, not "several dozen," of Russia's modern fighters and bombers. By early April 2001, the PLA finished, or almost finished, staffing three fighter divisions with SU-series fighters. Each division includes up to 72 Chinese-made and Russian-made SU-27 SK, SU-27 UB, and/or SU-30 MKK fighters. This was achieved due to the work in the "prewar period regime" of key aircraft industry enterprises in China and Russia during the last 12-18 months. In addition, the PLA now has at least four divisions staffed with drastically upgraded – based on Russian technology – J-8 II M fighters. Though each fighter of this kind is still inferior to an F-16 fighter, two of them are capable of downing one F-16. Upgrading of several hundred J-7 fighters also adds to PLAAF potential. All the fighters are equipped with Russian-made or Russian-technology-based air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and air-to-ground missiles (AGMs). b) By April 2001, the PLA deployed in the coastal zone from Beijing to Hong Kong a theater missile defense (TMD) network, including the following Russian air-defense missile (ADM) systems: up to 30 systems (battalions) of S-300 ADMs (12 ADM launchers, capable of simultaneously launching 48 ADMs, in one battalion) with a range up to 150 km and altitude up to 35 km; at least 100 systems (companies) of Tor-M1 ADMs (4 ADM launchers, capable of simultaneously launching 8 ADMs, in one company) with range up to 40km and altitude up to 12 km; hundreds of Qianwei (QW)-2 missile-artillery air-defense systems, copied from Russia's Tunguska system technology. Together with thousands of Chinese-made ADM systems of various kinds and many thousand air-defense artillery units, this makes a strong-enough TMD network, capable of effectively opposing massive air strikes "of Kosovo war scale", including land-attack cruise missile (LACM) strikes. c) By early 2001, China, utilizing advanced Russian technology, began serial production of comparatively advanced ground-based LACMs: the Changfeng (CF)-1, CF-2, HongNiao (HN)-1, and HN-2 with a range between 400 km and 1,800 km, with conventional and nuclear warheads. By preliminary data, several brigades of the PLA 2nd Artillery (Strategic Nuclear Forces) are staffed with these LACMs. Simultaneously, China started production of the HN-3 3,000-km-range strategic LACM, capable of both ground-based deployment and of installation on old H-6 bombers and the new-generation HJ-7/FBC-1 bombers. The number of such bombers in the PLA inventory now exceeds 100. The offensive potential of these LACMs, aimed at Taiwan as well as U.S. Army facilities in Japan and South Korea, by April 2001, probably surpassed that of several hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) deployed around Taiwan. Also, in 1999-2000, the PLA received a significant quantity of DF-21 IRBMs with a range of 2,000 km to 2,900 km, a certain number of new-generation DF-31 ICBMs, and a greater number of MIRVed warheads for earlier installed DF-5 ICBMs. By April 2001, the PLA definitely had acquired a very substantial missile-strike potential, especially in regard to short- to mid-range missiles. d) PLAN modernization, though only half-completed, has realized great progress, mostly on the basis of Russian aid. This mainly includes the following: Obtaining several Sovremennyy-class destroyers and Kilo-class submarines. Re-equipping PLAN frigates and destroyers with very advanced Russian-made supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), probably of the Moskit (Sunburn) and/or Yakhont types. This work began in November 2000. Most importantly, Jiang Zemin received an assurance from Putin that – in case of a serious crisis around Taiwan, or any other crisis related to direct conflict between Chinese and U.S. forces – a significant part of the Russian Pacific Fleet will "block the way of the U.S. Navy." Only the most important directions of PLA modernization are listed above, but there is no doubt that PLA combat potential rose to a new level between mid-1999 and April 2000. And this gives "unlimited boldness" to China's top leaders. U.S. policymakers can no longer ignore China's emergence, with the help of Russia, as a major Asian military power capable of projecting power well beyong her borders. The Chinese and PLA almost certainly will not risk direct confrontation before about autumn 2002. China, based on Russian aid, will accomplish between April 2001 and Autumn 2002 an additional "great leap forward" in several key areas of PLA construction, such as staffing several new fighter divisions with SU-27/SU-30 and J-10 4th-generation fighters, at least doubling the number of advanced ADM systems in the East China TMD network, deploying several hundred more ballistic missiles and LACMs of all ranges, and upgrading PLAN to the maximum possible degree. According to available data, it is our opinion that in the second half of 2002 the PLA will undertake an action against Taiwan, which means unavoidable U.S. involvement. Several recent statements of Jiang Zemin at high-ranking military meetings in Beijing confirm this forecast. Chinese leaders are especially counting on large-scale direct Russian military assistance, which could include even the actions of Russian strategic aircraft. So, what has happened over the first days of April 2001 should not be viewed as an isolated incident, but one in a chain of incidents that are the "first sparks" of a future grand fire. To avoid this coming conflict with China, policymakers and the public must wake up to the great threat – namely, the new Chinese-Russian military axis and its direct implications for Western security. Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is a consultant for Science Applications International Corp., and a consultant to the American Foreign Policy Council. He is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics." Dr. Thomas J. Torda has been a Chinese linguist specializing in science and technology with FBIS, and a Chinese/Russian defense technology consultant with the Office of Naval Intelligence. *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? Write at [EMAIL PROTECTED] for a menu of our lists! <A HREF!ttp://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ÝÝÝCTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÚrchives Available at: http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html <A HREF!ttp://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html">Archives of [EMAIL PROTECTED]</A> http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ <A HREF!ttp:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/">ctrl</A> ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝo subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
