{{Well, maybe not THE mopst corrupt but pretty
close. AKE}}
19 May 2001. Thanks to National Security Archive. James Bamford writes in Body of Secrets (2001) that this “may be the most corrupt plan ever created by the U.S. government.”
UNCLASSIFIED THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
13 March 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations., Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. 3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1 Enclosure memo for Chief of Operations., Cuba Project SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED EXCLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
UNCLASSIFIED COPY NO. 1 TOP SECRET NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on NORTHWOODS (S) A report* on the above Subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. F. J. BLOUIN
* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat
EXCLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TOP SECRET 2165 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED COPY NO. 1 TOP SECRET JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DECISION ON JCS 1969/321 A Note by the Secretaries on NORTHWOODS (S) Note by the Secretaries
1. At their meeting on 13 March 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 8 of JCS 1969/321. 2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (6), applied and were followed. 3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet
of JCS 1969/321. F. J. BLOUIN
EXCLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC UNCLASSIFIED
[12 pages; classification stamps same on all pages, omitted
after first page.]
UNCLASSIFIED
COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES 9 March 1962 REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on CUBA PROJECT (TS) The Chief of Operations, Cuba ProJect, has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13 March 1962.
UNCLASSIFIED
JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS) THE PROBLEM 1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretextS which they consider would provide Justification for US military intervention In Cuba. ____________________ * Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action. 3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area. ____________________ ** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. 4. For additional facts see Enclosure B. DISCUSSION 5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States In the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere. 6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months. CONCLUSION The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba. RECOMMENDATIONS 8. It is recommended that: a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project. _____________________________________ DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. ____________________ * Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-ease basis. 3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. _____________________________________ APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) 1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. 2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. 3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere. 4. Time is and important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months. 5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. _______________________________ ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes: They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba). 1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies. 2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):(1) start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio. 3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms: a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. 4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government. 5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arm which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach. 6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months. 7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged. 8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight. a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone. 9. It Is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack. a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent Intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs. _____________________________________
ENCLOSURE B FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention. ____________________ * JCS 1969/303 2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an Internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows: " - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action." ____________________ ** JCS 1969/313 3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
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Title: Most Corrupt US Military Plan Ever