-Caveat Lector- http://www.smh.com.au/news/0109/25/opinion/opinion2.html The Afghan rebel whose warnings the US ignored Washington has now realised that in quietly endorsing the Taliban seven years ago, it was backing the wrong camp, writes Amin Saikal. The crisis in the United States might have been avoided had Washington heeded the now-slain leader of the Afghan anti-Taliban forces, the legendary Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, who repeatedly warned that the triangular alliance between the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and Pakistan was turning Afghanistan into a major menace against world stability. Washington's failure to help Massoud cost both him and the US dearly. Massoud died in a suicide bombing attack by two Arabs on September 9. The assassination was apparently organised by bin Laden. Two days later the US fell victim to the worst terrorist attacks in history. Why did the US fail to act earlier over Afghanistan, and is it now able to act responsibly to address the root causes of the crisis? The bin Laden-Taliban-Pakistan (or more specifically Pakistan's military intelligence - ISI) alliance is not a new development. It dates to mid-1994 when Pakistan orchestrated the extremist Taliban militia as the most appropriate force to secure a compliant government in post-communist Afghanistan. At the time, the ISI and CIA were close allies, and the US quietly endorsed the Taliban's entry onto the Afghan scene with Pakistan's military and logistical support (and Saudi and United Arab Emirates financial backing because the latter states wanted an anti-Iranian leverage in Afghanistan). The US also showed no qualms when bin Laden threw the weight of his wealth and Arab connections behind the Taliban and moved into Afghanistan in 1996. Washington viewed the anti-Iranian character of the Taliban, and their purported ability to secure a direct corridor through Afghanistan into the newly independent but resource-rich former Soviet Central Asian Muslim republics, as beneficial. It paid no attention to the possible medium- to long-term consequences. Even after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in mid-1996, Washington ignored Massoud's bitter complaint that an ugly and dangerous alliance was developing between Arab and non-Arab groups, and refused to provide him with the necessary help to combat a complete Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. If it had not been for bin Laden's masterminding the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, Washington might have continued to overlook all of bin Laden's anti-US postures and the Taliban's human rights violations. Although it launched a retaliatory cruise missile attack on bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan, Washington continued to pursue a policy of "no support to any Afghan faction". It overlooked the fact that bin Laden's money and Arab and Pakistani recruits were rapidly changing the balance against the moderate Islamic government of Afghanistan, whom Massoud and his Northern Alliance represented and which still occupied Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations. It refrained from naming Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism, or putting maximum pressure on Pakistani governments to rein in the ISI and to close its territory as the only outlet through which bin Laden, his associates and their Taliban protectors could get in and out of Afghanistan. The Clinton Administration seemed deterred by the view that too much pressure on Pakistan, both bankrupt and nuclear-armed, might lead the country to implode, with serious consequences. Its attempts from last year to co-ordinate policies with Moscow and New Delhi to pressure the Taliban to curb narcotics production and hand over bin Laden proved to be half-baked and too late. By now the Taliban and their Arab and Pakistani allies had taken over most of Afghanistan, confining Massoud to the north-eastern quarter and a few areas north of Kabul. Massoud found it imperative, however, to continue the resistance as the only means to a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. He expanded the resistance and, with some financial assistance and arms from India, Iran and Russia, was able to frustrate his opponents. He had been the target of many Taliban-Pakistani assassination attempts, but finally when he was ready to go on offensives, his enemies succeeded in eliminating him. His death is a blow to his forces, but Massoud has left a number of excellent commanders and a solid structure to ensure the continuation of the resistance. Now that the US has finally come to share Massoud's cause in support of freedom and against terror, it must act prudently not to disappoint all those Afghans and other Muslims who applauded Massoud's stand either loudly or quietly. Massoud's forces, now under the command of his successor, General Qasim Fahim, are ready to help the Americans. The US must act in concert with these forces and assist them to achieve what is required. Its actions must have several important political objectives: to rebuild Afghanistan under a genuinely broad-based government; and to quell anti-US feeling by resolving the Palestinian problem and lifting sanctions against Iraq. ---------- Professor Amin Saikal is director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University. ================================================================ Kadosh, Kadosh, Kadosh, YHVH, TZEVAOT FROM THE DESK OF: *Michael Spitzer* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> The Best Way To Destroy Enemies Is To Change Them To Friends ================================================================ ----- Original Message ----- From: "Scott Jordan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "CAS" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, September 24, 2001 8:05 PM Subject: So it *is* a CAS: SMH: The Afghan rebel whose warnings the US ignored > http://www.smh.com.au/news/0109/25/opinion/opinion2.html > > The Afghan rebel whose warnings the US ignored > > Washington has now realised that in quietly endorsing the Taliban seven > years ago, it was backing the wrong camp, writes Amin Saikal. > > The crisis in the United States might have been avoided had Washington > heeded the now-slain leader of the Afghan anti-Taliban forces, the legendary > Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, who repeatedly warned that the triangular > alliance between the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and Pakistan was turning > Afghanistan into a major menace against world stability. > > Washington's failure to help Massoud cost both him and the US dearly. > Massoud died in a suicide bombing attack by two Arabs on September 9. The > assassination was apparently organised by bin Laden. Two days later the US > fell victim to the worst terrorist attacks in history. Why did the US fail > to act earlier over Afghanistan, and is it now able to act responsibly to > address the root causes of the crisis? > > The bin Laden-Taliban-Pakistan (or more specifically Pakistan's military > intelligence - ISI) alliance is not a new development. It dates to mid-1994 > when Pakistan orchestrated the extremist Taliban militia as the most > appropriate force to secure a compliant government in post-communist > Afghanistan. At the time, the ISI and CIA were close allies, and the US > quietly endorsed the Taliban's entry onto the Afghan scene with Pakistan's > military and logistical support (and Saudi and United Arab Emirates > financial backing because the latter states wanted an anti-Iranian leverage > in Afghanistan). > > The US also showed no qualms when bin Laden threw the weight of his wealth > and Arab connections behind the Taliban and moved into Afghanistan in 1996. > > Washington viewed the anti-Iranian character of the Taliban, and their > purported ability to secure a direct corridor through Afghanistan into the > newly independent but resource-rich former Soviet Central Asian Muslim > republics, as beneficial. It paid no attention to the possible medium- to > long-term consequences. > > Even after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in mid-1996, Washington ignored > Massoud's bitter complaint that an ugly and dangerous alliance was > developing between Arab and non-Arab groups, and refused to provide him with > the necessary help to combat a complete Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. > > If it had not been for bin Laden's masterminding the bombing of US embassies > in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, Washington might have continued to > overlook all of bin Laden's anti-US postures and the Taliban's human rights > violations. Although it launched a retaliatory cruise missile attack on bin > Laden's training camps in Afghanistan, Washington continued to pursue a > policy of "no support to any Afghan faction". It overlooked the fact that > bin Laden's money and Arab and Pakistani recruits were rapidly changing the > balance against the moderate Islamic government of Afghanistan, whom Massoud > and his Northern Alliance represented and which still occupied Afghanistan's > seat at the United Nations. > > It refrained from naming Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism, or > putting maximum pressure on Pakistani governments to rein in the ISI and to > close its territory as the only outlet through which bin Laden, his > associates and their Taliban protectors could get in and out of Afghanistan. > > The Clinton Administration seemed deterred by the view that too much > pressure on Pakistan, both bankrupt and nuclear-armed, might lead the > country to implode, with serious consequences. Its attempts from last year > to > co-ordinate policies with Moscow and New Delhi to pressure the Taliban to > curb narcotics production and hand over bin Laden proved to be half-baked > and too late. > > By now the Taliban and their Arab and Pakistani allies had taken over most > of Afghanistan, confining Massoud to the north-eastern quarter and a few > areas north of Kabul. Massoud found it imperative, however, to continue the > resistance as the only means to a political settlement of the Afghan > conflict. He expanded the resistance and, with some financial assistance and > arms from India, Iran and Russia, was able to frustrate his opponents. He > had been the target of many Taliban-Pakistani assassination attempts, but > finally when he was ready to go on offensives, his enemies succeeded in > eliminating him. > > His death is a blow to his forces, but Massoud has left a number of > excellent commanders and a solid structure to ensure the continuation of the > resistance. > > Now that the US has finally come to share Massoud's cause in support of > freedom and against terror, it must act prudently not to disappoint all > those Afghans and other Muslims who applauded Massoud's stand either loudly > or quietly. Massoud's forces, now under the command of his successor, > General Qasim Fahim, are ready to help the Americans. The US must act in > concert with these forces and assist them to achieve what is required. > > Its actions must have several important political objectives: to rebuild > Afghanistan under a genuinely broad-based government; and to quell anti-US > feeling by resolving the Palestinian problem and lifting sanctions against > Iraq. > > ---------- > > Professor Amin Saikal is director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies > (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University. > > > > > > > > > > > > _________________________________________________________ > Do You Yahoo!? > Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com > > > ========================================================================== > This mailing list is for discussion of Clinton Administration Scandals. If > you wish to unsubscribe from this mailing list, send electronic mail to > [EMAIL PROTECTED] In the message body put: unsubscribe cas <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/";>www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html";>Archives of [EMAIL PROTECTED]</A> http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ <A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/";>ctrl</A> ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
