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[4th Generation Warfare.......]
Fourth Generation Warfare
[LINK]
If we look at the development of warfare in the modern era, we see
three distinct generations Third generation warfare was conceptually
developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918 Is it not
about time for the fourth generation to appear? Lind, Nightengale,
Wilson, et. al., Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989
Roughly speaking, "fourth generation warfare" includes all forms of
conflict where the other side refuses to stand up and fight fair. What
distinguishes 4GW from earlier generations is that typically at least
one side is something other than a military force organized and
operating under the control of a national government, and one that
often transcends national boundaries.
4GW Case Studies:
[INLINE] al-Qa'ida / Afghanistan
[INLINE] al-Aqsa Intifada
The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center are horrific
examples of operations as part of a campaign conducted according to
fourth generation principles. They dispelled forever the notion that
4GW is just "terrorism" or something that happens only in
poverty-stricken Third World countries. But it is a strange form of
warfare, one where, for example, military force plays a much smaller
(though still critical) role than in earlier generations, often
supporting initiatives that are more political, diplomatic, and
economic. As important as finding and destroying the actual
combatants, for example, is drying up the bases of popular support
that allow them to plan and then execute their attacks. Perhaps most
odd of all, being seen as "too successful" militarily may create a
backlash, making the opponent's other elements of 4GW more effective.
The authors of one of the first papers on the subject captured some of
this strangeness when they predicted:
The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the
vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of
having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between
'civilian' and 'military' may disappear.
Is 4GW Just Another Word for "Terrorism"?
"Terrorism" (defined as seemingly gratuitous violence against
civilians and non-combatants) can occur in all generations of war.
Until recently, in fact, most wars killed many more civilians than
military and not all of this was accidental - recall the Rape of
Nanking, the London Blitz, and the firebombing of Dresden. As 4GW
blurs any distinction between "military" and "civilian," we can expect
more activities that the general population will regard as terrorism.
Similarly, because practitioners of 4GW are often transnational groups
without territorially-based armies as such, much of their activity
will resemble "guerilla warfare" or "low intensity conflict." These
highly irregular practices have deep roots in the history of war. The
word "guerilla" itself, for example, dates back nearly 200 years to
Napoleon's campaigns in Spain. Until recently, however, such "special"
operations harassed but rarely decided—"sideshows" (as T. E.
Lawrence once termed them) in wars fought mainly along 1st, 2nd, or
3rd generation lines. Examples could include operations by colonial
militias and guerillas during the Revolutionary War, Nathan Bedford
Forrest's cavalry raids, Sherman's March, and the tactics practiced in
the early stages of most "national liberation" wars in the 20th
Century.
Is 4GW Simply Using Military Force in New Ways?
The premise of 4GW is that the world itself has changed, so that
terrorism and guerilla warfare—and other elusive techniques that
are still being invented—are now ready to move to center stage.
It would be a mistake, however, and perhaps a goal of our opponents
might be to encourage this mistake, if we were to focus on the
techniques and not the nature of 4GW itself. The place to begin is
with fundamental differences between 4GW and earlier generations.
As Col T. X. Hammes eloquently argues in "The Evolution of War: The
Fourth Generation," social and political changes are driving this
evolution. You can construct your own list of what is different about
today's world than that of, say, 1950. Here are some ideas to get you
started:
[INLINE] continued exponential increase in the world population
[INLINE] decline in standards of living in certain Third World
countries
[INLINE] continuing AIDS epidemic in parts of the Third World
[INLINE] growth of worldwide connectivity (CNN and the Internet, for
example)
[INLINE] ease of global transportation (24 hours between any two
points)
[INLINE] increasing scarcity of arable land and water
[INLINE] explosion in drug trafficking, with associated money flows &
corruption
[INLINE] disintegration of the Soviet Union and continued instability
in that region
[INLINE] end of the bipolar world order and of the interpretation of
events through a Cold War filter
[INLINE] ready availability of small arms and other weapons from the
end of the Cold War
[INLINE] resurgence of violent transnational ideological groups
[INLINE] continued growth in wealth and influence of transnational
corporations
[INLINE] emergence of US as the only conventional / economic
superpower
If these or similar factors are indeed driving the evolution of
conflict, then solutions must lie primarily in this arena, that is,
within the realms of economics, diplomacy, and
law-enforcement. Military force will play a smaller role, performing
specific tasks to solve problems that are intractable through other
means. A coherent "grand strategy" is needed to ensure that military
(destructive) actions harmonize with our overall objectives and do not
provoke a backlash that negates tactical success. Technology is not
unimportant, and may provide options, but the fact is that lack of
suitable technology cannot explain our less-than-stellar track record
in fourth generation warfare.
Note: Any discussion of 4GW, since it involves conflicts of culture
and religion, is likely to generate a high degree of emotion. In the
articles that follow, some may find the authors' views to be
simplistic or even offensive. For the record: Defense and the National
Interest does not endorse any political, cultural, or religious
viewpoint. These papers, however, raise many important questions
about the nature of future conflict, and we are publishing them to
stimulate thought and debate.
The Introduction to Spirit, Blood and Treasure, Ed. MAJ Don
Vandergriff. Why 4GW is the type of warfare we should be preparing
for, and what this means for doctrine, personnel policies, training,
and force structure. From the new book (Presidio Press, June 2001.)
"Fourth Generation Warfare is Here," By Harold A. Gould and Franklin
C. Spinney. Why the attacks of September 11 are not simply acts of
"terrorism" but represent the opening shots in true 4GW.
For those new to 4GW, this is probably the best place to start: "The
Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," by LtCol Thomas X. Hammes,
USMC. LtCol Hammes observes that "generations" of warfare are not
defined primarily by the technology employed since, to some degree,
each generation can use any available technology. Rather, generations
are better categorized by political, social, and economic factors.
After buttressing his case with examinations of China, Vietnam,
Nicaragua, and the West Bank (Intifada I), LtCol Hammes concludes this
important paper with the prediction that, "By using fourth generation
techniques, local antagonists can change the national policy of
Western democracies. Then once the Western forces have gone, they can
continue to pursue their local objectives using earlier generation
techniques." Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette,
September 1994.
"The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," by William S.
Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt
(USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I.
Wilson (USMCR). The classic article on why there really is something
that should be called "fourth generation warfare," and why we should
be paying very close attention to it, whatever it turns out to be.
Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.
"Is The U.S. Military Ready To Take On A Non-Conventional Terror
Threat?" Elaine M. Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, October 18, 2001.
Another in ITP's comprehensive look at the changing nature of warfare
and how the US military is - and is not - shaping the war against
terrorism in Afghanistan.
The Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld (Free Press, 1991). An
essential reference for fourth generation warfare. Required reading,
at some point, for every serious student of the subject. Study it
until you can say "non-trinitarian" with conviction.
"A New Kind of War," Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense,
September 27, 2001. Best evidence yet that when it comes to 4GW, our
top leaders do get it.
"Terrorism Battle Like Drug War All Over Again," Hal Kempfer. Once
money began flowing into the War on Drugs, it, and not
narcotrafficantes, became the focus of attention.
"Key Review Offers Scant Guidance On Handling '4th Generation'
Threats," Elaine M. Grossman,
Inside The Pentagon, October 4, 2001, Pg. 1. Well executed analysis
of the new (2001) Quadrennial Defense Review. Briefly, the parts
dealing with 4GW were pretty much bolted on after September 11, and it
shows.
Paradoxes of War, (500 KB PDF file) Grant T. Hammond, Professor of
International Relations and Director of the Center for Strategy and
Technology at the Air War College, originally published in the Spring
1994 Joint Force Quarterly; republished with permission of author. The
techniques and philosophy of 4GW applied to nation-vs.-nation
conflict. Strangeness persists: war and peace blur and intermingle,
decisive wars are fought with little or no armed conflict, and
operations on the moral and mental battlegrounds determine victor and
vanquished. When it must be used, military force adds to the confusion
and despair of the opponent, rather than simply bludgeoning him into
surrender. Dr. Hammond is the author of The Mind of War. a recent
biography of John R. Boyd.
"Letter From Egypt" Exclusive to DNI - how the attacks of September
11 played to a wide cross-section of Egyptians. A first-person report
from Cairo.
"Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001," Kenneth
Katzman, Congressional Research Serrvice, 10 September 2001. Latest
comprehensive survey from CRS. "Based on U.S. allegations of past
plotting by the bin Laden network, ... the network wants to strike
within the United States itself." (PDF file on the CRS site.)
Water Resources of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, United Nations,
1992. Nations and other groups often fight over scarce resources, from
hunting grounds to farm land to petroleum. In the Middle East, the
West Bank has an abundance of the scarcest resource, water, and this
is fueling an intractable conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians. This report concludes that "Israeli policies ensure
that most of the water of the West Bank percolates underground to
Israel, and settlers are provided with increasing access to the water
resources of the occupied Palestinian territory. As a consequence, a
'man-made' water crisis has been brought about which undermines the
living conditions and endangers the health situation of the
Palestinian people." (222KB MS Word) For an update, see Comment 425,
The Struggle for Israel's Soul, August 20, 2001,
"Chaos in the Littorals," Chapter 1 from MCDP 3, Expeditionary
Warfare, April 1998. Excellent overview of the nature of 4GW and the
problems facing US armed forces attempting to find and engage
"asymmetric" opponents.
Maoist Revolution in Nepal. "Rain of Shadows," first of a two-part
series in Outside Magazine, September 2001. Just when you thought
old-style communist revolution was gone forever. This "on-line
exclusive" article illustrates how changing conditions in Nepal are
creating a favorable environment for revolution—where guerillas
already control a large section of western Nepal and are continuing to
grow in strength. The second part, "Last Days of the Mountain
Kingdom," describes a visit to the guerilla stronghold in western
Nepal and includes interviews with its leaders.
The US and the Genocide in Rwanda, 1994, sixteen declassified US
Government documents detailing why the US refused to take actions to
stop the Rwandan genocide (800,000 dead in 3 months) and even
intervened in the UN to delay measures that might have ended the
slaughter. Unlike France, which seems to have had a stake in the
organizations that carried out the mass killings, the US was blinded
more by simple incompetence and the failure to recognize the changing
nature of warfare. On the National Security Archives site at George
Washington University, August 20, 2001.
Anticipating the Nature of the Next Conflict, by Col G. I. Wilson,
USMCR, Maj Frank Bunkers, USMCR, and Sgt John P. Sullivan, LA County
Sheriff's Dept., April 2001. The Soviet Union is gone, only to be
replaced by transnational crime, drug cartels with income greater than
most countries, and wars over water and religion. Technology is an
important player in this new 4th generation warfare, but it works both
ways. Considering the events of September 11, 2001, a remarkably
prescient paper (384 KB MS Word; reprinted with permission of authors
and the Emergency Response and Research Institution.) A newer version
of this paper is included in Comment 427, 20 September 2001.
The New Craft of Intelligence, by Robert David Steele. What type of
intelligence, and intelligence community, do we need when the threat
is primarily fourth generation?
An ongoing Case Study in 4GW: The Al-Aqsa Intifada. Charts and data
that show why this conflict is going to be so hard to resolve. Also
daily reporting from EmergencyNet: 28 Sep - 12 Oct 13 Oct - Present
Modern Conflict: The Reality, by Robert D. Steele, founder and CEO,
OSS, Inc. The data on fourth generation warfare as it is actually
practiced in the world today. Why the "revolution in military affairs"
is not the answer.
"Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare," by Col Vincent J.
Goulding, Jr., USMC. "Asymmetric warfare" is "as old as warfare
itself," as the author reminds us in the very first sentence of this
gripping paper. Drawing parallels and lessons from two widely
separated but eerily similar campaigns—Teutoburger Wald (9 and
14-15 A.D.) and Chechnya (1994-1995)—Col Goulding illustrates the
dangers in preparing only for the forms of warfare that suit us. In
the early 21st century, we seem to favor high-tech, mechanized combat
on gently undulating plains. Col Goulding concludes that we are
inviting future enemies to engage us in such places as teeming urban
slums, where a simple RPG fired from behind a fruit stand can destroy
a $4 million armored behemoth, live on CNN. From Parameters, Winter,
2000 - 2001. [DNI Editor's note: "Asymmetric" is not the same as
"4GW," since one of the aims of maneuver warfare - 3rd Generation - is
to "hurl strength against weakness." Undoubtedly, however, warfare in
the 4th generation will carry the asymmetric theme much farther than
its predecessors, to where the participants may not be recognizable as
"armies" in any usual sense.]
"Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and
Post-Modern Warfare," by Dr. Steven R. Metz of the Strategic Studies
institute at the Army War College. An alternative to the
"generations" classification scheme: formal war (including the
asymmetric aspects), informal war, and gray area war. In this
innovative and thorough critique of DoD planning (i.e., JV 2010), Dr.
Metz takes the official line to task for focusing on better ways to
re-fight the Gulf War. Given his radical interpretations of modern
strategy, though, readers may find his final recommendations somewhat
tame. ( 361K, 129 pp. .pdf file on the Institute's site.)
"Community War," by Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Ret.). As CAPT
Seaquist notes, the fundamental question facing defense planners is
"What is the purpose of the military in the modern world?" When this
question is considered at all, answers range from gunboat diplomacy
(see Comment 381 - esp. Gen Sullivan's article) to waiting around to
see if a peer competitor develops (e.g., China). In this
ground-breaking article, CAPT Seaquist suggests that these answers
betray a lingering Cold War mindset and that there are more urgent,
albeit unconventional, uses for military force today. Reprinted with
permission from the August 2000 Proceedings. See also Comment 384.
"Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look," by William S. Lind, Maj
John F. Schmitt, and Col Gary I. Wilson. Originally published in the
Marine Corps Gazette, December 1994. An update of the authors' 1989
paper, which makes the case that future conflict may revert to its
premodern past: Not just armies versus armies but "Families waged
war, as did clans, tribes, cities, monastic orders, religions, even
commercial enterprises."
"Sticks and Stones Can Break an Army" by Stan Crock in BusinessWeek
OnLine. When armies fight teenagers, the "better" the soldiers do, the
worse it looks on TV. Which is the whole idea. Readers with an
interest in the Middle East may also want to consult Hal Gould's
analysis in Comment 392.
"War Isn't a Rational Business," By Colonel T. X. Hammes, U.S. Marine
Corps. Colonel Hammes argues that the currently fashionable concepts
that go by the name "network centric warfare" will be unable to cope
with any real war, much less the mess that is 4GW. On the USNI
Proceedings web site, July 1998 issue.
Corruption undermines democracy, retards economic growth, and may be a
major contributing factor to 4GW. In the latest survey by Transparency
International, the most corrupt countries are Yugoslavia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Angola, and bringing up the rear, #90,
Nigeria. The U.S. ranks 14th (and first in perception that it uses
unethical practices to aid its own companies!) Read the complete 2000
findings on the TI web site.
"The Roots and Fruits Of Terrorism," by Prof. Harold A. Gould.
Concise introduction to the subject, tracing its history and outlining
the socio-political conditions that spawn it. Examines modern India
as a case study in how to (and how not to) alleviate the threat posed
by terrorist groups.
Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors 2000. Excellent
survey of the origins and current status of the major terrorist groups
in the Middle East. Ties the groups to their primary sponsors and
outlines US efforts to counter them. 2001 update now available.
"Emerging, Devolving Threat of Terrorism," by Fred Fuller, USAJFKSWCS,
Ft. Bragg, NC, and Colonel G. I. Wilson, OSD, USMC. As "stateless
actors" (e.g., international drug cartels and bin Laden-style
networks) employ increasingly sophisticated terrorist tactics, our
activities to counter (and deter) must change as well. EmergencyNet
News Service, November 30, 1996.
"Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The
Coming Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces," by Clark
L. Staten, Executive Director & Sr. Analyst, Emergency Response &
Research Institute, 04/27/98. The end of the Cold War is not turning
out to be the dawn of universal peace. If the U.S. is supreme in the
conventional military sense, those who oppose our interests will find
(or evolve) other ways.
"A Scourge of Small Arms," by Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare in
the June 2000 Scientific American. The ultimate asymmetrical threat
may be hoards of 6-12 year old kids. No, we don't mean throwing
rocks.
A Commander's Reflections, Address by Gen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC,
retiring CINCCENT, to the US Naval Institute. Entertaining,
thought-provoking, and at times disturbing observations by the senior
US commander responsible for perhaps the most likely venue for 4GW.
Excerpt: "In reality, though, the only reason Desert Storm worked was
because we managed to go up against the only jerk on the planet who
actually was stupid enough to confront us symmetricallywith less of
everything, including the moral right to do what he did to Kuwait."
"Culture Wars," MAJ Donald E. Vandergriff's thorough and often
provocative study of why the U.S. Army must radically change its
culture, and particularly its officer personnel management practices,
to be successful in 4GW.
"Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," by Timothy
L. Thomas, LTC, USA (ret.) Parameters, Spring 2000. Information
superiority is defined as "the capability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or
denying an adversary's ability to do the same." Col Thomas shows that
despite total information superiority dominance, Serbian forces were
consistently able to deceive allied commanders to the extent that we
still don't know exactly how many of Milosovic's armored vehicles we
destroyed. Thomas reinforces Adm Ellis's conclusion that "information
superiority overload can actually hurt mission performance."
Interested readers may want to contrast the mechanistic definition of
"information superiority" with Boyd's concept of organic design for
"command and control."
"Dramatic Increase in Piracy and Armed Robbery" from the International
Maritime Organization. High seas piracy increased by 52% over last
year, claiming the lives of 71 crewmembers. Piracy has become another
profitable activity for international crime syndicates, and perhaps
another indication of the emergence of "non-trinitarian" warfare (not
involving organized military forces of established states).
Links to 4GW Participants
Guerilla warfare—wars of "national liberation"—and similar
highly irregular conflicts certainly did not end with the Cold War and
will provide a component of any fourth generation of warfare. Like
these precursors, 4GW will show a very strong moral dimension. Boyd,
for example, observed that guerillas must:
Exhibit moral authority, offer competence, and provide desired
benefits in order to further erode government influence, gain more
recruits, multiply base areas, and increase political
infrastructure, hence expand guerilla influence/control over
population and countryside. ("Patterns of Conflict," p. 90)
To which one could add today: obtain funds from an affluent diaspora
and influence US public opinion.
In other words, the moral may be to the physical as three to one in
traditional conflict, but it is much more important to guerillas. As
always, such movements must "swim in the sea of the people" in order
to survive and grow. What better tool for moral warfare / grand
strategy in the 21st Century than the World Wide Web, which allows
participants to spread their message to tens of millions at very low
cost and practically no personal risk?
Defense and the National Interest presents a collection of web sites
from or about groups currently waging some form of 4th generation
warfare. On this list, you will likely find our opponents or allies in
future conflict. (Disclaimer—Defense and the National Interest is
publishing these links to demonstrate the nature of 4GW and the level
of sophistication of some of its participants. This most emphatically
should not be construed as endorsement of the causes they claim to
represent.) [DNI editor's note: You can witness 4GW in action as
these web sites are attacked and periodically shut down by opponents
in other camps.]
[INLINE] Afgha.com, site of the anti-Taliban United Front,
representing the recognized government of Afghanistan
[INLINE] Jihad and Mujahiddeen, Azzam Publications, pro-Taliban site
produced in London. Also supports Chechnyan rebels
[INLINE] Hamas, a very complete site from a movement that has,
unfortunately, put Boyd's advice into practice
[INLINE] Hizbollah, well-designed, content-rich site from the largely
Shiite, Iranian-backed Lebanese group. Illustrates how sophisticated
some of these organizations have become in using 4GW techniques.
<Note: Site has been down since early October 2000>
[INLINE] Intifada Online a "moral high ground" site presenting the
Intifada from the Palestinian prespective. Explicitly geared toward
Western public opinion.
[INLINE] SLA, "The Lebanese Foundation for Peace," Web site of the
South Lebanese Army. Group fighting Hizbollah in southern Lebanon.
[INLINE] ETA This is actually the link to "Basque Red Net," which has
some type of affiliation to ETA. We are looking for a better link.
[INLINE] FARC, the official web site of this Colombian guerilla
movement
[INLINE] Tamil Tigers, very professional, with an on-line store
[INLINE] Zapatistas, well done, but showing its age
[INLINE] Sinn Fein, which is, of course, a legitimate political party,
but has an historical association with the IRA. Again, we would most
appreciate a link to an "official" IRA page.
[INLINE] "Homelands" links to national liberation movements
[INLINE] Terrorism links on PRICENet
[INLINE] Federation of American Scientists' Guide to "Liberation
Movements, Terrorist Organizations, Substance Cartels, and Other
Para-State Entities" Like most FAS products, exceptionally
informative and complete.
[INLINE] Terrorists, Freedom Fighters, Crusaders, Propagandists, and
Military Professionals on the Net Very extensive collection, and not
just to terrorist organizations. The editor's annotations are an
education in themselves.
[INLINE] Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors 2000.
CRS survey provides a comprehensive overview. 2001 update now
available.
[INLINE] Counterror.net, over 100 links to resources: maps, articles,
photos on 11 September and its aftermath.
If you know of any similar links, please send them to us for
inclusion.
Comments:
429
Fourth Generation Warfare - Background Reading, October 4, 2001
427
Track Records Don't Count in a Town that Likes Pretty Faces, September 20,
2001
425
The Struggle for Israel's Soul, August 20, 2001
412
Iron Wall or Maginot Line? June 7, 2001
402
The MacKenzie Proposal: Peacekeeping Reform & Grand Strategy, January 18,
2001
392
The Palestinian Question - Is it a Colonialist War? October 21, 2000
278
The Real Revolution in Military Affairs … or … Can NATO Cope with
4th Generation War? May 29, 1999
255
German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944), April 6, 1999
194
Ready for What? Loose Nucs, Scud Missiles, and the Changing Nature of
Conflict, September 26, 1998
189
Ready for What? September 16, 1998
174
Food for Thought: Fourth Generation Warfare & the Relation of Strategy to
Grand Strategy (III) August 31, 1998
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