From: Catherine Austin Fitts <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wednesday, October 31, 2001 12:34 AM
Subject: FW: pop cycle indexGreat description of where we are.....the mortage and credit card securities are also filling up our pension funds...while the banks make fees on the packaging...and the pension funds or the taxpayers get all the risk...-----Original Message-----Catherine,
Sent: Wednesday, October 31, 2001 1:51 AM
To: Catherine Austin Fitts
Subject: pop cycle indexYesterday I found in my own web searching part of
what you have told me before about the government
mortgage securitizing agencies taking over from
private mortgage resale. Without mentioning that
it would be a perfect way to legitimize drug income,
several websites described how those government
agency mortgage-based securities are also taking over,
at the same time, from short term treasury bonds,
which aren't being issued anymore, so that foreign
investors including foreign drug lords and aliased
US drug industry protectors are forced to switch
from t-bonds to mortgage-based securities.The web sources I found mention that real risk
assessments get lost as mortgages are securitized,
at least the way the game is being played now.
They note the dramatic increase in bank assets
which are some form of mortgage-based security
or their derivatives, pointing to the hidden and
forgotten risk which should cause an immediate
write down of those assets now, but will not, and
so there is a bubble of false confidence which will
burst some day and bank assets and ability to
loan will collapse along with everybody else's
valuations.What is missing from the web picture is that the
foreign investors who have switched from buying
t-bonds to buying securitized US mortgages are
in fact often foreign and aliased US drug lords,
and corruption has been covered offshore by doing
the bribes and kickbacks outside the US. Also
the extent to which true risk assessment is not
priced into mortgage securities is magnitudes
greater than the websites say because of the
HUD deliberate default fraud cycle.Another tip of an iceberg is the ratio of consumer
debt to disposable income. At first glance the
ratio doesn't look that bad compared to the
past, going back several decades. The problem
is that so much former consumer debt has
been refinanced with home equity loans that
there is a big iceberg below the surface. The
appearance is that the ratio of unsecured debt
to disposable income is not so high, but if we
regard the formerly unsecured debt that has
been secured on paper by equity loans secured
by the last theoretical value of overvalued real
estate, then a portion of the secured debt is
not really secured, and adding it back into
the ration of unsecured debt to disposable
income is scary. Looking at it from the other
end, the ratio of total household debt to
disposable income is 95%, which means that
unemployment or deflation of real estate
will bring on a damburst surge of house
liquidations and devaluation due to that
supply exceeding demand. ...
