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===== Thursday, Sept. 6, 2001 Tri-State News Murder suspect seeks insanity verdict Man charged with stabbing his girlfriend expected to take stand today, lawyer says By BETH GORCZYCA - The Herald-Dispatch [EMAIL PROTECTED] HUNTINGTON -- A Huntington man accused of murdering his live-in girlfriend is expected to testify today in his own defense. Willard David Hutchinson, 31, has been on trial since Tuesday for allegedly stabbing 45-year-old Linda Rigney three times in the chest and once in the arm with a dagger on Feb. 9. He is also accused of maliciously wounding Rigney’s daughter Jessica Ford by stabbing her in the arm. Hutchinson’s attorney John Laishley said Wednesday he expected his client to take the stand as soon as the trial resumed this morning in Judge Dan O’Hanlon’s courtroom. Hutchinson is expected to be the last witness of the trial. If found guilty of murder, Hutchinson could be sentenced to life in prison with or without mercy. The penalty for malicious wounding is two to 10 years in prison. During the trial Wednesday, Laishley and fellow attorney Ryan Turner introduced testimony to build their defense that Hutchinson is not guilty by reason of insanity. "You heard Jessica say that (Hutchinson) lives in his own little world. You heard Chris say he is crazy," Laishley said, referring to testimony given Tuesday by Rigney’s children -- Jessica Ford and Christopher Ford. "Here is this man who suffers from mental disease. He suffers from paranoid schizophrenia." Laishley called Hutchinson’s mother Barbara Hutchinson to the stand to discuss Hutchinson’s behavior over the years. She said Hutchinson talked to himself, believed he was building a time machine in his attic and thought people were talking about him and thinking bad things about him. "He was so scared that someone was going to set him up that he would go to places with security cameras so that he could prove where he was at" if he was ever arrested, Barbara Hutchinson testified. Turner then asked Barbara Hutchinson who Carl Sagan was. "A famous astronomer," she replied. "Who does your son think he is?" Turner asked. "An alien," Barbara Hutchinson answered. "Does he think people are out to get him," Turner asked. "It’s getting worse," she replied. Laishley called forensic psychiatrist Dr. Deleno Webb III to testify about Hutchinson’s mental condition now and at the time of the incident. Webb said after talking with Hutchinson for about 30 to 45 minutes, he believed the man to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, delusions and antisocial personality disorder. Webb also said he thought Hutchinson had a problem with alcohol and marijuana abuse. "You never know if you are dealing with a full deck or partial deck with him," Webb testified after discussing some examples of Hutchinson’s odd behavior. "You never know?" asked Laishley. "Not unless you are there with him all the time," Webb answered. But Webb was also quick to point out that people with paranoid schizophrenia, delusions and/or alcoholism don’t necessarily commit crimes. In fact, there is absolutely no connection between paranoid schizophrenia and criminal behavior, he said. "Irrationality doesn’t mean he doesn’t know right from wrong," Webb told Laishley. "He may think he can fly faster than light, but he can also walk to the store put money on the counter and buy a beer. He’s got some nutty beliefs but that doesn’t mean he doesn’t know what’s going on around him." Webb told the jury that when he interviewed Hutchinson before the trial he found the defendant competent to stand trial. And based on the interview and police reports he read, Webb said he believed Hutchinson was competent the night Linda Rigney died. Also Wednesday, David Wayne Miller, a DNA expert with the West Virginia State Police, testified that blood found on Hutchinson’s chest and cheeks belonged to Rigney. He also testified that Rigney’s blood was found on the crystal-handled dagger prosecutors believe to be the murder weapon, as well as some carpet and furniture in the bedroom and a stair. In addition, Zia Sabet, the state’s deputy chief medical examiner, testified that Linda Rigney received three stab wounds to the chest and a defensive wound to the arm. Of those wounds, Sabet testified that two of them could have been fatal -- either a 11/2-inch deep wound that punctured her lung or a 5-inch deep wound that cut her aorta. Sabet said the dagger could have inflicted the four wounds on Rigney, but hesitated to say that it was THE murder weapon. "I’d say it is consistent with the wounds, but I’m not 100 percent sure it is the weapon that killed her," he said. ===== Story last updated at 10:18 p.m. on Saturday, May 5, 2001 Ax murder suspect to stand trial this week By Stephen Gurr [EMAIL PROTECTED] Defense attorneys are going with a seldom-used tactic in the murder trial of a woman accused of killing her husband with an ax: they're letting a judge decide whether she is guilty or insane. This Wednesday, Superior Court Judge Joseph Gaines is expected to hear testimony from mental health experts in the bench trial of Diluvina Claudia Garcia Brooks, a 28-year-old Athens woman charged with murder in the February 1999 ax killing of Patrick Brooks. Her attorneys from the University of Georgia Legal Aid and Defender Clinic, seeking a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, don't dispute the key facts of the case. Should they prevail, Brooks would likely be institutionalized indefinitely in a state mental hospital. A guilty verdict could draw an automatic life sentence in a state women's prison. Rarely does a person pleading not guilty to murder waive the right to a trial by jury, but Brooks' lawyers feel the evidence is strongly in their favor. Under Georgia law, a defendant can be found not guilty of a crime if the person couldn't tell right from wrong at the time of the crime and suffered from ''a delusional compulsion ... which overmastered (the) will to resist committing the crime.'' Testimony from a preliminary hearing indicates that may have been the case. The first officer on the scene at the Brooks' Rustwood Drive duplex said she ranted of being ''on a mission'' and was covered in blood when he arrived. Athens-Clarke police officer Michael McCauley, who lived next door, testified Brooks wouldn't stop swinging an ax at her husband's head when McCauley entered the home. Later, in the back of a patrol car, the Honduran immigrant mumbled in Spanish and English, ''No, no, he's not dead yet,'' according to officer Ako Cromwell. Prosecutors have not said publicly whether they will put up a significant challenge to the defense contention of insanity. Without a jury to select and a limited amount of testimony, the trial should last no more than two days. This article published in the Athens Banner-Herald on Sunday, May 6, 2001. ====== Frank Spisak's neighbours knew him as 'Frankie Ann Spisak.' He was a frizzy-haired transvestite who was looking forward to having a sex-change operation. They didn't know about Spisak's other side, a side that eventually took over his personality. Spisak eventually decided he no longer wanted to be a woman, but instead he wanted to be Hitler. He stopped wearing frocks and make-up, and changed to silly suits, slicked back hair and a toothbrush moustache. I'm not sure which gathered the most amount of laughs, but either way Spisak was serious about this new style. In February 1982, Spisak launched his first "seek and destroy mission" in which he was attempting to "clean up the city". He walked onto the Cleveland State University and shot a black minister, Rev. Horace Rickerson, in a men's room. The Reverend died. Four months later he shot another black, John Hardaway, 55, only wounding this one. During August Spisak struck three times. The first was Timothy Sheehan, 50, also at Cleveland State University. Sheehan was caucasian but Spisak suspected that he may have been Jewish. He then gunned down 17-year-old Brian Warford, another black, at a bus stop near the campus. His next attack failed, narrowly missing another CSU employee.Spisak was arrested in September for firing his gun out of his apartment window, but was released on bail. Police then received an anonymous phone call telling them to check the gun, a .22-caliber pistol. The gun was linked to the Warford murder and Spisak admitted to the others. At the trial Spisak pled insanity, saying that the one-man war was launched under direct orders from God, his "immediate superior." He also blamed his transvestite period on the Jews saying that they "seized control of my mind when I wasn't looking". No one fell for this crap and Spisak was sentenced to death on August 10, 1983. "Even though this court may pronounce me guilty a thousand times, the higher court of our great Aryan warrior God pronounces me innocent. Heil Hitler!" Or so Spisak thought after the trial. ===== Carbondale woman found guilty in murder trial Corinne Mannino Daily Egyptian Reporter A Carbondale woman accused of first degree murder refused a last chance plea bargain against her counsel's recommendation, and was found guilty Friday for the Oct. 18 shooting death of her daughter. Jurors deliberated for 45 minutes before returning a verdict against 30-year-old Apollonia Thomas. They concluded that mental illness had not affected her behavior at the time of the shooting. Attorneys would not disclose the terms of the plea bargain. Thomas was charged with first degree murder after shooting 5-year-old Victoria Thomas in the right temple while preparing her for a shower Oct. 18. Police responded to a call from Thomas' brother in Georgia at about 12:25 p.m. saying Thomas had called their mother and told her she had shot Victoria. Thomas held police at bay outside her West Sunset Drive apartment for about an hour with threats of suicide before placing her gun on a sofa. Police then entered Thomas' apartment with a key from the apartment manager. Victoria was pronounced dead shortly after arrival at Memorial Hospital of Carbondale. Jackson County State's Attorney Mike Wepsiec said he expected the guilty verdict, but he did not expect it to be returned so quickly. After testimony by two psychologists Thursday, Jackson County Circuit Judge David W. Watt Jr. eliminated the possibility for jurors to decide Thomas was not guilty by reason of insanity. Watt ruled that Thomas was not legally insane the day she shot her daughter with a .357-caliber Magnum revolver. Thomas testified that after seeing a monster when she looked in the mirror, she heard voices and was commanded by the devil to kill Victoria that morning. She also testified she had planned for several months to kill Victoria, set their apartment on fire and then kill herself. She said she was not convinced the first shot killed Victoria and was unable to shoot her again. While testifying for the defense, both psychologists said Thomas answered questions and acted in a way that suggested she was pretending to be mentally ill. Jurors could have found Thomas not guilty, guilty, or guilty but mentally ill after closing statements Friday. In order to be found mentally ill, Thomas had to prove that she had a substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior that impaired her judgment. "This wasn't a trial, it was a lynch mob," said Larry Haney, Victoria's baby-sitter of five years. Haney said there was no doubt that Thomas was mentally ill, and no one knew more about her problems than he did. "When you have a broken arm, you can show the X-rays. When it's a mind, you can't tell," Haney said. He said it was the beatings that Thomas received throughout her life that caused her to kill her daughter, and Thomas was just trying to protect her daughter by sending her to heaven. Wepsiec said there was no argument whether or not Thomas committed the crime because she admitted guilt several times under questioning and throughout the investigation. Wepsiec had to prove Thomas intended to kill Victoria, she knew the act would kill Victoria or that she knew there would be a strong possibility the act would kill her daughter. "When you put a gun to the head of a child, there is only one intent," Wepsiec said. Sentencing is expected July 30. Thomas faces a minimum of 20 years and a maximum of 60 years in prison. ===== THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Merrimack No. 96-763 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. ROBERT BLAIR June 29, 1999 Philip T. McLaughlin, attorney general (John C. Kissinger, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Donald E. Bisson, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, by brief and orally, for the defendant. THAYER, J. The defendant appeals two first degree murder convictions, RSA 630:1-a (1996), after a jury trial in Superior Court (McGuire, J). We affirm. The defendant testified to the following. In August 1994, the defendant and his family were on vacation in Concord. While in his motel room, the defendant decided to return there one day with his wife and son and kill them. On March 11, 1996, the defendant, his wife, and his son returned to Concord. They rented the same room at the motel as the defendant had planned. On the afternoon of March 24, the defendant left the motel room and walked to a local store to purchase a hammer. After returning, he hid the hammer under his bed. He testified that he was certain no one would discover the hammer because he "knew it was going to be used before the maids ever c[a]me in the room again." That evening, the defendant told his wife that he was thinking about killing their son. In fact, he showed his wife the hammer that he intended to use. The defendant testified that his wife became angry. The defendant assured his wife that he would not kill their son, and was confident she believed him. The defendant left the room, threw the hammer outside in the trash, and returned to the motel room. Then he and his family fell asleep. According to the defendant, during his sleep he experienced a trance "where God revealed to [him] that [he] would be cast into the lake of fire if [he] backed . . . away from it." He further testified that he "heard . . . the voice of [an] angel commanding [him]." While his wife and son slept, the defendant awoke and left the room to retrieve the hammer from the trash. He returned to the room and bludgeoned his sleeping wife and son. Both died as a result. Shortly thereafter, the defendant left the motel and went to a nearby store where he asked to speak to the manager. When the manager appeared, the defendant confessed to the killings. The manager called the police. When the police arrived, the defendant told them that he killed his wife and son with a hammer, whereupon he was arrested and charged with two counts of first degree murder. He filed an insanity defense and waived the guilt phase of his trial. At the beginning of jury selection, the judge instructed the jury that "this is not a capital murder case. That is, the defendant cannot receive the death penalty." The judge explained that "given the charges in this case, it would be natural for [jurors] to wonder about [the death penalty]." According to the judge, "it's only fair to the jurors to inform them that they will not have to be making such decisions in this case." The judge further advised the jury that it is not their job to be concerned with the sentence that the defendant receives because "[t]he duty of determining and imposing sentence is for the judge and not for the jury." During trial, the defendant testified in his own defense. The defendant testified that "in my opinion, I'm sane. I acted under the command of God. I do not suffer delusions or hallucinations . . . . I was very rational . . . I understood what I did." The jury found the defendant sane and thereby guilty on both counts of first degree murder. The defendant was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without eligibility for parole. On appeal three issues are preserved for our review. See Daboul v. Town of Hampton, 124 N.H. 307, 309, 471 A.2d 1148, 1149 (1983) (issues not briefed are waived). First, whether the trial court erred by advising the jury at the outset of trial that it would not be deciding a death penalty case. Second, whether the trial judge erroneously limited the defendant's closing argument. Third, whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence. We address each issue in turn. The defendant argues that the trial court erred when it informed the venire panel at the outset that the defendant was not subject to the death penalty. He contends that such comment minimized the impact a guilty verdict would have. As a result, the defendant argues, the judge's comment created a "preponderantly prejudicial" effect. The general rule is that the jury should not be informed of the penalty that a defendant may receive if convicted, when, as here, the jury will play no role in sentencing. See State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 526, 567 A.2d 544, 547 (1989); Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994). The prohibition on discussing penalties applies equally to defense counsel, see Brown, 132 N.H. at 526, 567 A.2d at 547, and to the prosecution, see State v. Beede, 128 N.H. 713, 715-16, 519 A.2d 260, 262 (1986). We see no reason why this rule should not extend to the trial judge. "When an improper comment or other trial error does bring the extent of a potential criminal penalty to a jury's attention," and where the comment did not result from willful misconduct, a mistrial is warranted only if the improper statement is "both preponderantly and irremediably prejudicial." Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the defendant does not assert that the comment resulted from willful misconduct. We hold that the court's statement in this case was not preponderantly and irremediably prejudicial. Any prejudice created by the trial court's comment was cured by the trial court's instructions to the jury to not concern itself with the defendant's punishment and to follow the court's instruction. "The court's instruction, when read as a whole, unquestionably instructed the jury as to its duty and province." United States v. Steel, 759 F.2d 706, 711 (9th Cir. 1985). Between the time of the court's comment and the beginning of deliberations, the selected jurors were admonished several times not to consider the potential penalty in their deliberation process, including prior to opening statement and several times during the court's final charge. Any potential harm that could have arisen from the court's comment was cured by the judge's instructions, which the jurors can be presumed to have followed. See Shannon, 512 U.S. at 585; State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980). In addition, the defendant himself commented on his potential sentence during cross-examination. Specifically, the defendant stated that "[a]s I explained to this jury, the alternative in this case, to sanity, if you do see me as insane, is not a question of will I be locked up. It will be a question of where I'm locked up. I'll be locked up the rest of my life . . . ." This statement impermissibly allowed the jury to hear the defendant's possible punishment and could have prejudiced the State. See Brown, 132 N.H. at 526, 567 A.2d at 547. Moreover, the defendant misstated the law because a finding of insanity would not necessarily lead to a lifetime of confinement. See RSA 651:8-b, :9-a (1996). We therefore conclude, under the facts of this case, that the defendant failed to show that the trial court's reference was both preponderantly and irremediably prejudicial. Cf. Brown, 132 N.H. at 526, 567 A.2d at 547; accord, e.g., Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1481-82 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1122 (1995); Steel, 759 F.2d at 711; State v. Hernandez, 846 P.2d 312, 328 (N.M. 1993). The defendant argues that the court's error of commenting that the case did not involve the death penalty was compounded when it informed the jury prior to deliberations of the possible consequence of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. We disagree. We have previously stated that a jury charged with ascertaining a defendant's sanity should be instructed about consequences of a "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict because such consequences are not commonly known. See Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 125, 384 A.2d 124, 130 (1978). ===== MARtin F. ABErnathy --- [[EMAIL PROTECTED]] <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/";>www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! 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