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Did Clinton Blow His Chance to Get Bin Laden?
Thursday, December 06, 2001
BILL O'REILLY, HOST: Now for the Top Story tonight. There's been a persistent criticism that the Clinton administration could have captured Usama bin Laden but blew it. In July of 2000, American activist Mansoor Ijaz says he brought information to Mr. Clinton that could have led to bin Laden's apprehension. Mr. Ijaz joins us now.
Let's walk through this for people who don't know you. You say you
met with President Clinton how many times in seven years?
MANSOOR IJAZ, COUNTERTERRORISM EXPERT: Probably 30, 35 times,
something like that.
O'REILLY: Face to face.
IJAZ: Yes.
O'REILLY: And the reason he decided to see you?
IJAZ: Well, there was no question I was a big contributor to the
Democratic Party. I embraced his concept of trying to expand into the
Muslim-American, Arab-American communities. I'm a person of a Pakistani
origin. We were trying to develop a voice, a political voice, in this
country...
O'REILLY: All right, how much money...
IJAZ: ... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)...
O'REILLY: ... did you donate to the Democrats?
IJAZ: Out of my own pocket, probably about $300 or $400,000.
And I raised another half a million or so for...
O'REILLY: All right, so about...
IJAZ: ... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)...
O'REILLY: ... a million dollars because of you went to the
Democrats. So Clinton saw you 30 times in seven years.
IJAZ: yes.
O'REILLY: You were interested in Usama bin Laden why?
IJAZ: It wasn't Usama bin Laden per se, it was the concept and the
problem associated with Islamic radicalism and the rise of radicalism throughout
the Islamic world. And the primary area that I was concerned about
initially was Pakistan, because the corrupt practices of the governments there,
successive governments there, had caused a lot of oppression in the lower layers
of the society. And these people, when they give up, they decide, All
right, the hell with it, then we're going to go and blow something up.
O'REILLY: All right. So you had a big view, worldview, that you
wanted President Clinton to consider.
IJAZ: That's correct.
O'REILLY: But you did bring up bin Laden, correct?
IJAZ: Absolutely, no question about it.
O'REILLY: And what specifically did you tell him could happen?
IJAZ: I told both him and his national security team that there was a
much better way to deal with the countries that were harboring what we called
terrorists at that time, that maybe those countries had come to the conclusion
that it wasn't so good for them either to have Islamic radicalism spin out of
control.
They were fundamentalists. They didn't want the fanatical part of
Islam to crop up in their midst.
So when I went to the Sudan, it was because, at that time, we had pushed
bin Laden out. We, the United States, had told the Sudan, We don't want
you to extradite him to Saudi Arabia, we don't want you to do anything else with
him, just let him go. Wherever he goes, it's not our problem.
O'REILLY: All right. So we did push him out of the Sudan...
IJAZ: That's right.
O'REILLY: ... the Sudan sent him out to Afghanistan.
IJAZ: Then I come to Sandy Berger in August of 1996 and I say that
Dr. Thurabi (ph), who was the religious ideological leader of the Sudan, is
prepared to do business with us. He's prepared to help us understand
what's going on in these radical frameworks.
And the answer was nothing.
O'REILLY: Nothing.
IJAZ: No response. Susan Rice...
O'REILLY: All right, now, they...
IJAZ: ... Susan Rice sat in on that meeting, she was...
O'REILLY: Right. And she says...
IJAZ: ... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)...
O'REILLY: ... Well, we had, or we didn't need you, Mr. Ijaz, we
didn't need you, because we already had people over in the Sudan gathering
intelligence information about Usama bin Laden.
IJAZ: And that's a flat lie. That's all I can tell you.
O'REILLY: How do you know?
IJAZ: I know because I went and I sat there with the ambassador in
Khartoum, who could only go there one day a week, who could only -- one day a
month, excuse me, and was there for such short periods of time that the only
thing he was doing when he was going there was signing the embassy slips to make
sure that all the work got done. Tim Carney himself...
O'REILLY: But wait a minute. The ambassador to -- the American
ambassador to the Sudan could only go where one day a week?
IJAZ: Into Khartoum, into his office.
O'REILLY: He could only do his job one day a week.
IJAZ: He was living -- exactly.
O'REILLY: He was exiled.
IJAZ: He was living in Nairobi at that time...
O'REILLY: I see.
IJAZ: ... and apparently, because of some threat to his life, which
even he did not believe was real.
O'REILLY: All right. Say I believe you. Bin Laden's out
of there, he's out of the Sudan, OK?
IJAZ: Right.
O'REILLY: So what good is the Sudan do to the United States now?
IJAZ: Everything that we needed to know about the terrorist
frameworks, the networks...
O'REILLY: Al Qaeda.
IJAZ: ... who the people were -- Not just al-Qaeda. At
that time, al-Qaeda was not the problem that it is today. At that time we
were more worried about Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad.
O'REILLY: OK.
IJAZ: And the problem that we had with Hezbollah and Hamas was that
they were teaching bin Laden's people from Afghanistan, these Afghan Arabs that
were coming back and forth, they were teaching them exactly how to make
explosive devices.
O'REILLY: All right. So you say to Clinton and Berger, who's
national security adviser...
IJAZ: Right.
O'REILLY: ... Look, the Sudanese are going to play ball with
us. They're going to give us all this information about these radical
Islamic groups.
IJAZ: Correct.
O'REILLY: And Berger and Clinton say what?
IJAZ: Zero.
O'REILLY: What do you mean, zero?
IJAZ: They didn't, they didn't respond at all.
O'REILLY: They looked at their shoes?
IJAZ: And, and, and the sad thing is that we -- first it was an
intelligence to intelligence offer. Then I said, Maybe that won't work,
because they're -- the spooks don't want to talk to each other.
O'REILLY: But why would the Sudanese...
IJAZ: So we (UNINTELLIGIBLE)...
O'REILLY: ... help us? They didn't even like us.
IJAZ: It's not a matter of them liking us or us liking them.
They had the same problem that we did. The Islamic radical movement that
they had given rise to was starting to spin out of control.
O'REILLY: So they wanted them to be crushed.
IJAZ: They wanted those guys to be put in their place...
O'REILLY: All right. Now, you know...
IJAZ: ... (UNINTELLIGIBLE)...
O'REILLY: ... that Rice and Berger and all these people are saying
you're a liar.
IJAZ: Well, they can say whatever they want to. I've got the
facts.
O'REILLY: All right. You, well...
IJAZ: I can prove what I'm saying without any hesitation whatsoever.
O'REILLY: How?
IJAZ: I've got the documentation. I have the memoranda that I
sent to Berger myself, in which I said, "Sandy, is there not a better way for us
to deal with these people? Here is what I recommend we do, let's test
them," and then he would come back to me obliquely, through another NSC
official, and say, "Try it, but don't use my name."
O'REILLY: OK. Now...
IJAZ: This was purposeful obfuscation.
O'REILLY: ... say, say we all believe you, and...
IJAZ: You don't have to believe me. The letter...
O'REILLY: All right, all right, all right.
IJAZ: ... the letter from Bashir...
O'REILLY: Listen, I'm -- I'm...
IJAZ: ... is clear.
O'REILLY: ... I'm here just to ask questions.
IJAZ: Fair enough.
O'REILLY: Why wouldn't Berger and Clinton want intelligence
information about Islamic radicals when they already had bombed our embassies,
and this was before the "Cole," but, you know, it was three months before, and
why wouldn't they want? Doesn't make sense.
IJAZ: Look, you're talking about July 2000. This problem
started in 1996.
O'REILLY: I understand that. But they knew it was going to be a
problem. Why wouldn't they want the information?
IJAZ: I'm only one person that can give you a judgment on that.
The American people have to make their own judgment.
O'REILLY: All right, give me your opinion.
IJAZ: My judgment is that they did not have ever any intention to
engage anyone in the Islamic world in a significant way.
O'REILLY: Why?
IJAZ: It would -- it -- something was going on inside that White
House, and these are the questions that the American people (UNINTELLIGIBLE) to
ask.
O'REILLY: So you don't know. You don't know.
IJAZ: No, no, I'm not done yet.
Now, having said that, it was a convenient target to put the weakest
Islamic countries, Sudan and Afghanistan, on the radar map as easy targets.
O'REILLY: Yes, but still, I don't know...
IJAZ: So, so, so, so the question, the question that the American
people have to ask these men is, Did you purposefully give rise to bin Laden as
a devil that you would then go out and take shots at?
O'REILLY: That doesn't make any sense. I think it was more fear
of disrupting the economy or something like that.
Well, Mr. Ijaz, you've given us all a lot to think about, and we will
pursue the story. Thanks for coming in.
IJAZ: Thank you for having me.
Archibald Bard
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