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WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War! Terror war entering most difficult phase Success in next theaters of operation likely harder to define ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Editor's note: In partnership with Stratfor, the global intelligence company, WorldNetDaily publishes daily updates on international affairs provided by the respected private research and analysis firm. Look for fresh updates each afternoon, Monday through Friday. In addition, WorldNetDaily invites you to consider STRATFOR membership, entitling you to a wealth of international intelligence reports usually available only to top executives, scholars, academic institutions and press agencies. © 2001 WorldNetDaily.com As the United States turns its attention away from Afghanistan and toward other potential al-Qaida bases, the war on terrorism will enter its most difficult phase. The fog of war will obscure goals and cause confusion over how each side is progressing. Both the United States and al-Qaida will use that ambiguity for their own ends while attempting to peer through the haze at the other, but the need to deal in a probabilistic universe will undoubtedly strain the anti-terrorism coalition. The current phase of the war in Afghanistan is drawing to a close, and with it the first phase of the war against al-Qaida. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has been driven from the cities and from power, but it has not been annihilated. Al-Qaida's operations have been dramatically contained, in the sense that it is inconceivable that al-Qaida command and control functions can still be carried out from inside Afghanistan. A great deal of personnel and infrastructure have been lost. However, it is not yet clear that the command capabilities of al-Qaida have been destroyed. Indeed, it is not clear whether those capabilities remain in Afghanistan or have migrated to another country. If they have been annihilated in Afghanistan, there is reasonable concern that al-Qaida can generate a new command and control structure from senior and mid-level operatives who were not located in Afghanistan when the war began. The ambiguity of the outcome was built into U.S. strategy. The United States depended on Afghan forces to drive the Taliban from power, but it also understood that did not necessarily mean the end of the Taliban. The complex system of shifting alliances that is Afghanistan means that the Taliban regime, its successor organizations or its individual members will be of value to one warlord or another. Moreover, since the Taliban also has roots in Pakistan, elements could survive there. In any case, the United States was interested in the Taliban only to the extent to which it enabled al-Qaida's international operations. Beyond that, Washington is content to leave the Taliban question to the Afghans and Pakistanis. Ambiguity about the future of al-Qaida's leaders is also built into the strategy. The death or capture of Osama bin Laden is of tremendous psychological importance but relatively little military importance. What is important militarily is that global pressure on al-Qaida becomes so intense that the group begins to fragment and collapse. Preventing the migration of the command cell out of Afghanistan is a highly desirable outcome, but it is not necessarily a war-ender. Moreover, U.S. planners understood fully that the destruction of command functions in Afghanistan was going to prove difficult. Senior al-Qaida officials have had ample time to move across the border into Pakistan and either go underground there or migrate to other locations. The United States has very few troops in Afghanistan and is highly dependent on Afghan factions for ground operations. It was always understood that both the quality and reliability of these forces were questionable. Their interest in al-Qaida was not nearly as intense as that of the United States. Thus, U.S. war planners understood the Afghan operation was a necessary first step in the war against al-Qaida, but that nothing achieved in Afghanistan would, by itself, be definitive. All U.S. officials from the president down made this point during the height of Afghan operations and have continued to do so since the fall of Kandahar. The war is not only far from over, it is now entering a more difficult phase. In Afghanistan, war goals had a geographic focus and were relatively clear. There was also some sense of how each side was doing. But the level of clarity is now about to degrade. This is partly due to the fog of war. But it also will be due partly to the war-fighting strategies of each side. For example, in the American theater of operations, the United States is pursuing a strategy of deep ambiguity. U.S. intelligence does not have a clear idea of the precise structure of al-Qaida operations in the United States or Europe; it has therefore pursued a strategy of confusing the enemy. Its broad sweeps and arrests have been designed to net al-Qaida operatives simply by the laws of probability. By shrouding the operations in secrecy, al-Qaida cannot be certain who has been taken into custody and, when they do know that an operative has been arrested, they cannot know whether the operative has talked. Not knowing forces al-Qaida to assume the worst and to abort missions because the group cannot know the degree to which its plans have been compromised. A similar level of ambiguity is present on the side of al-Qaida. Indeed, ambiguity has always been an operational principle, but it can now be raised to new heights. For example, at this moment, bin Laden could be hiding in Tora Bora. He could also have been dead for weeks, killed in a bombing raid. He could have crossed the border into Pakistan and be hidden there. Or he could have left the region entirely and be in any of a dozen countries. What is true for bin Laden is truer by orders of magnitude for other members of the command cell, some of whose identities or even existence might not be known to U.S. intelligence. It is obviously crucial to al-Qaida to maintain this uncertainty principle. Bin Laden's fate must be kept uncertain. Even more important, the fate and even existence of other commanders must also be shrouded in mystery. What this means is that as the United States emerges from Afghanistan, neither side definitively knows the operational status of the other. Al-Qaida members cannot be certain what U.S. intelligence knows about them. U.S. intelligence officials cannot be certain that what they think they know is both true and exhaustive. This means it is increasingly difficult for al-Qaida to mount operations without fear of compromise. It is also difficult for the United States to rule out any capabilities on al-Qaida's part or to feel confident of understanding the group's intentions. Driven by uncertainty, the United States must now follow a strategy of capabilities and probabilities. Washington knows al-Qaida is capable of either relocating or regenerating a command organization. It also understands that this command cell would require certain conditions in which to operate securely. The Afghan model is one in which al-Qaida can dominate a friendly or weak central government and use territory secured by that government for training, planning and command operations. Countries with Afghan-like conditions are relatively few. Therefore, if the United States assumes al-Qaida is capable of operating after Afghanistan, it must work in a probabilistic universe and deal with the most likely follow-on targets. Probability forces two operations. First, it is probable that al-Qaida command organizations beneath the very senior level are located in Europe, which provides cover and excellent transportation into the United States. A cell in Hamburg clearly supported and controlled the Sept. 11 task force. That means an intense intelligence, security and police effort must be undertaken in Europe. That is already under way and, in some ways, has been more important than the Afghan theater. The mission of that operation is not only to disrupt European operations of al-Qaida but also to prevent the emergence of a new command center from the European infrastructure and its movement to a new, secure country. Second, the probability of any given country becoming host to al-Qaida training, planning and command operations must be evaluated. Such countries are finite in number, but on the other hand, no single country is a certain destination. Therefore, a great deal of very public attention is being paid to the arrival of U.S. military officers in Somalia, where al-Qaida already has some operatives and where conditions for establishing command facilities are good. For its part, al-Qaida must evaluate each country in terms of the probability of U.S. military and intelligence actions intended to deprive it of a base of operations. This highly indeterminate maneuvering does not take place in a vacuum. Physically, it must take place in certain countries. Al-Qaida must operate somewhere. At the same time, the United States must operate its intelligence forces and mount military operations. This poses a tremendous challenge to the United States. As of now at least, surgical attacks -- covert or overt -- are not possible. The intelligence picture is too murky and too dynamic. More important, even as the intelligence picture clarifies itself, the United States' ability to provide that intelligence to third-party countries in which it is operating will remain severely limited. So will its ability to justify overt attacks on potential al-Qaida host countries to coalition partners. The problem is not just the sensitivity of the information and its sources, although this is no trivial matter. There are two additional problems. First, clarity is transitory. What is true may only be true for a short period of time, with little forewarning. Intelligence-sharing in these circumstances is almost impossible. Second, the degree of clarity required by other countries to support U.S. operations, or -- more difficult -- to permit those operations on their soil, just isn't there. There is a high degree of uncertainty, intuition and risk-taking in all operations against al-Qaida. Most operations will be a combination of information, intuition and guessing at odds. This cannot build confidence within coalitions. Indeed, it must inevitably strain coalitions and even break them. This is not only true for foreign coalition partners but also for the political coalition in the United States. The unpublicized arrests that the Bush administration regards as critical to deterring al-Qaida in the United States require an extremely high degree of trust in U.S. security forces, as well as a willingness to tolerate inevitable errors. The broad coalition supporting Bush has been strained over this issue. Over time, similar strains will develop among European countries and particularly in Islamic countries cooperating with the United States. The war began with the United States trying to forge a war-fighting coalition. That coalition gelled in the emotional aftermath of Sept. 11 and has held together fairly well through the Afghan operation. But the clarity of the mission in Afghanistan helped sustain the coalition. Follow-on operations, the part of the war where clarity is most difficult to achieve, will generate the greatest stress on the coalition. Extended operations in this uncertain environment require a degree of trust in the United States' good intentions and competence. It is not enough that governments accept U.S. intentions; it is also necessary that public support for these operations be sustained. It is not only a matter of clarity. Fog will create errors. Some of the errors will be the natural by-product of war, and some will be the result of negligence -- another by-product of war. Maintaining the belief in good U.S. intentions in the wake of certain developments -- say, the accidental killing of a suspected al-Qaida member who turned out to be an innocent bystander -- will be extremely difficult. Washington will also have a hard time justifying to allies operations in a country like Somalia if it acts to prevent al-Qaida from establishing a presence -- rather than because al-Qaida's presence is already known -- or if it acts on the basis of partial data and intuition. Thus, the Afghan theater gives way to a climate of inherent uncertainty on all sides. Al-Qaida is desperately trying to peer through the haze to understand how much the United States knows. The United States is trying to deny the group this information while trying to peer through the haze at al-Qaida. Each side will confuse itself and the other. Keeping a coalition together in this environment will be much more difficult than anything encountered in Afghanistan. The Bush administration has repeatedly made the point that the war is not only far from over but also that the hardest parts are yet to come. We agree. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? Write at [EMAIL PROTECTED] for a menu of our lists! Write to same address to be off lists! <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/";>www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! 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