-Caveat Lector- From http://www.orlingrabbe.com/lfctimes/mathilde_terrorwar.htm
}}}>Begin Princess Mathilde and the War on Terror by Pierre Lemieux It must have occurred to any objective student of politics that 9/11 and the “war on terror” provided the state with convenient excuses to promote legislation it had already been considering. This leads us to a more general question: How and why are statist decisions — decisions whose main effect is to increase state power — made? There is no state office called “Coordination Bureau for Increasing State Power,” and most statocrats (i.e., politicians and bureaucrats) will deny, perhaps sincerely, that they aim at anything else than public welfare. Is it possible that the state reaches statist decisions without anybody within its apparatus consciously promoting them? The question is less pressing in an autocratic state. Princess Mathilde Bonaparte favored Napoleon because, as she explained, “without that man I should be selling oranges on the wharf in Marseilles.”[1] (She was nicknamed “the nicest cleavage in Europe,” which may be another reason why she got away from the wharf.) Princess Mathilde approved state power because it brought her money. In a democratic state, although politicians and bureaucrats are not exactly unpaid volunteers, it is not so clear why they would contribute to increased state power. We can model the state in two ways. One is to view it as a small society where politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists, and — from time to time — voters interact, and where “public policy” or “legislation” is the result of their interaction. Much of the Public Choice literature in economics views the state as such a small collectivity. The other way to model the state is as a single actor who has preferences and aims at satisfying them. For e xample, Anthony de Jasay’s model is of that sort.[2] The more people are involved in the state, the less realistic is the single-actor model, but it might still be analytically useful to consider that the state acts as if it had preferences and aimed at maximizing “its” utility (or satisfaction). In the single-actor model, it is easy to see why the state would enjoy excuses to increase its power, for power is necessary to reach its objectives, whatever they are (with the only exception of individual liberty, of co urse). Yet, we need to understand how increased state power is consistent with the everyday decisions of politicians and bureaucrats. Why do statocrats’ decisions favor state power, even if this is not their conscious aim ? Firearms vs. Nasalprints The reason is that state intervention necessarily favors some groups at the expense of others, that policy-makers have to overrule some of their subjects’ preferences, and that they will naturally favor the clienteles who support their interventions. This creates an environment where only the “right” issues are raised. Consider the example of voting institutions, i.e., the rules and procedures whereby citizens cast their votes for politicians. Put yourself in the shoes of a statocrat, and consider two extreme alternatives. At one extrem e, you could require that every individual arriving at the polling station be frisked for firearms. If he is found without one, he is not allowed to vote, for he lacks the spirit of a free man. And if he is not responsibl e enough to carry a gun, he is certainly not reliable enough to choose political rulers. At the other extreme, the procedure could require that every voter produce a biometric ID card, and bow down before the polling offi cer to have his nasalprint taken. The typical statocrat will not even think of the first procedure, because it would chase away many “good” citizens, i.e., voters who vote the “right” way. He is more likely to entertain the second procedure, for there is nothing inconsistent in a father knowing the particulars of his children — actually, a good father will want to —, and because the only people who might thus be discouraged from voting are those who mistrust the state and , therefore, are bad citizens. Indeed, actual voting procedures in democratic states have become much closer to the second extreme than to the first, and no statocrat questions them. Statocrats are selected to serve those clienteles who support them, and to think of issues only in terms palatable to these favored groups. Consider another example, more hypothetical and even less politically correct, of how statocrats will naturally increase state power while favoring some clienteles over others. A statocrat is likely not to have a high opi nion of revolutions and rebellions against the state. There are exceptions, like Thomas Jefferson, who liked “a little rebellion now and then.”[3] “God forbid we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion,” he wrote , and “what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. ... The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.”[4] In general, though, we would expect politicians and bureaucrats to entertain a high opinion of the state that recognizes so well their value and competence, and to be st rongly opposed to violence against it. The statocrats will thus naturally favor peaceful subjects and quiet clienteles. They will see no use in wrath, for it can be directed only against peaceful citizens, or against their nice government. True, it can also be aimed at common criminals, but even this is not necessary as the rule of law proposes non-violent alternatives. Protection against criminals is the domain of the state, and any act of self-defense is an admission of fail ure. Between two possible supporting clienteles, each one being sufficient to maintain the politicians in power and the bureaucrats well-fed, the more quiet one will be preferred. The state will privilege apple-pie citize ns over rednecks. Much political correctness may perhaps be explained by the state favoring dependent or otherwise quiet clienteles: the handicapped, city intellectuals, old people, and women. The State and Women Talking about women — and here, we reach the crux of our politically incorrect hypothesis —, one might wonder why the state has been so generous towards them since the late 19th century. Of course, it is difficult to argu e — and no libertarian would argue — against what was, at first, a process of recognizing to women the same contractual and property rights as men. It may also be difficult to argue against women’s right to vote, if only because of its symbolic character. Yet, we might wonder how it got placed on the state agenda, and why it preceded the great expansion of the state in the 20th century. Moreover, why did the state give back more than it h ad taken? It not only granted women the right to vote, but also a host of privileges, subsidies and protections, from the support of “welfare mothers” to maternity leaves, affirmative action, etc. Could it be that women w ere perceived as choice clienteles because they were, culturally or perhaps sociobiologically, more quiet and patient, and less prone to resist the fatherly figure of the state? Anecdotic evidence seems consistent with the conjecture that the state favors women because (in general) women love it more. One piece of harder evidence is the support that, starting in the late 19th century, women and s uffragette organizations lent to temperance and prohibition movements.[5] I suspect that other pieces of hard evidence could be found. At any rate, this non-PC hypothesis is but one illustration of my point. My point is that statocrats have to favor some segments of the population at the expense of others, and operate in an environment that naturally favors the clienteles who support them. In such an environment, only certain questions are raised; others just don’t reach the level of consciousness. In this way, the “right” decisions, i.e., decisions that increase state power, are made without anybody being necessarily conscious of the biases involved. The “war on terror” is an even bigger bonanza, as important clienteles cry openly for more state power. How could the state deceive them? References Princess Mathilde’s picture is reproduced from http://napoleontrois.free.fr/mathilde.htm [1] Anthony de Jasay, Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 143. [2] Anthony de Jasay, The State (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998; original edition: 1985). [3] Thomas Jefferson, letter to Abigail Adams, February 22, 1787; reproduced in Thomas Jefferson, Writings (The Library of America, 1984), p. 889-890. [4] Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Smith, November 13, 1787; reproduced ibid., p. 911. [5] See Mark Thorton, The Economics of Prohibition (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1991), pp. 48-49. Pierre Lemieux is visiting professor of economics at the Université du Québec à Hull (Canada), and research fellow at The Independent Institute (Oakland, CA). E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] -30- from The Laissez Faire City Times, Vol 6, No 6, February 11, 2002 End<{{{ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Forwarded as information only; no endorsement to be presumed + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without charge or profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this type of information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + "Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not believe simply because it has been handed down for many generations. Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumored by many. Do not believe in anything simply because it is written in Holy Scriptures. 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