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Vanity Fair, April 2002.
 
Mary Brenner article on Jan Avery of Enron, page 205
 
"In Houston, Avery went to Broadband Services, and during her interview there she was asked to take a look at the projected trading models.  It would be her job to help determine the pricing for the Broadband swaps - trades that would later provide the basis of Bill Lerach's invective in court, when he would compare them to Michael Milken's fraudulent operations.....
 
Avery studied the models and told the head of the division, "There is no way that these can work."  She then walked away from the job and was moved to the international group, where she worked on a deal to create a trading hub for liquid gas in Malaysia.  Skilling's purge had now infected the entire company, and there were waves of firings.  While in Kuala Lumpur to negotiate with the local oil-and-gas company, Avery learned of the "ethnic cleansing" being used to close down her division.  "Don't worry, they are keeping the best people and re-deploying them," she was told.
 
She was next assigned to Enron Energy Services (E.E.S.), the playground of Lou Pai, who had set up a division to trade energy in California.  The move meant changing buildings and giving up her large office for a trading desk.  E.E.S. sold "bundled energy" to customers such as Starwood Hotels, J. C. Penney, QUAKER OATS, and Owens-Illinois, the glass company.  The "bundle" was a promise of future service -- meaning air-conditioning replaced, lightbulbs changed, wiring fixed.  In her first weeks, Avery approached a commodity analyst who was proposing a price that would absolutely guarantee a loss to Enron.  "We can't do this," Avery told him.  "How can you be selling something that is a negative?"  The commodity analyst replied belligerently, "Just do it.  We sell negatives all the time."
 
($101 billion comes in as revenue in 2000, and in order to reduce it to a near-normal expected thin profit margin characteristic of a trading company, negative deals are done and treated as "cost of goods sold" ...)
 
------------------------- BAXTER
 
p. 180
 
The Enron Wars
 
If there was one thing Jan Avery knew when she joined Enron in 1993, it was numbers.  But nothing added up.  New evidence reveals that the seeds of Ken  Lay's pattern of hiding loses went back even further -- all the way to 1987.
 
By Marie Brenner.
 
... shortly before his death, Baxter told colleagues that he had become a pivotal figure in the scandal, and that he stood between Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling (former C.E.O.'s of Enron) going to jail.  Avery was apprehensive as well ...
 
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p. 196, caption under picture of Michael Milken:
 
"convicted junk-bond tycoon Michael Milken, left, who helped Lay finance the Enron merger."
 
 
"As the Enron tentacles spread, it became increasingly difficult for Fastow and Skilling to disguise their ambitions.  The deal structures became more and more byzantine.  At the broadband division, which trafficked in the fiber-optic cable used in high-speed Internet connections, trades called "Barney deals" - meaning "I love you, you love me" - were constructed.  Enron would sometimes swap control of its fiber lines with those of another company, only to undo the transaction a few days later, so as to create the appearance of volume.  Other maneuvers pushed hundreds of millions of dollars of trading equity around in a circle, a practice employed by such companies as Qwest, Cisco, and Global Crossing, which was headed by Gary Winnick, who had trained at Drexel Burnham. 
 
p. 195
 
.... The aura of fraud permeated Enron from its inception in 1985, when the legacy and corporate style of Michael Milken were imprinted on Lay and his company.  It was Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham that helped raise the $2.3 billion needed for the InterNorth-Houston Natural Gas merger.  A little-known fact is that Enron stock was one ingredient of the scandal that brought down Michael Milken and Dennis Levine.  Tipped off by a banker at Lazard Freres, Levine and his group of insider traders profiteered on the merger, as James B. Stewart has reported in "Den of Thieves."  They later went to prison.
 
When Lay became allied with Milken in 1985, the junk-bond king's reputation as the genius of inventive financial structures was at its peak.  Not long before Drexel Burnham chief executive Frederick Joseph denounced the press for its "outrageous" allegations linking Milken to insider trading and the unsavory affairs of arbitrageur Ivan Boesky, Lay arrived in Beverly Hills in search of the financing he needed  to realize his dream.  The steady drumbeat of allegations in 1986 concerning Milken's honesty would have alarmed a more prudent C.E.O.  In a 1987 interview, Milken went as far as to defend his business practices by boasting that he was helping Enron increase the size of its debt offering by an additional $225 million.  Lay never cut his ties with Milken, and would later talk about him as a visionary who had been unfairly prosecuted.  After Milken got out of jail, Lay invited him to speak at an Enron conference, despite a vocal protest from lawyers inside the company.  "Ken always thought Mike was an out-of-the-box thinker who deserved sympathy," an Enron executive said.
 
In one magazine spread, Lay was portrayed as the wizard of energy, his body a glowing electric-power line.  As for the Kool-Aid, it was the elixir of money."
 
 
 
----------------------------- daisey and closed loop imagry presented by Bill LeRach is noted in the article -------------------------------------
 
Mary Brenner's article references the April 1987 Board minutes of Enron.  The members of the board knew about millions missing and voted to keep the employees on board:
 
p. 198
 
On January 23, 1987, (Herb) Perry (former Enron auditor) says, his boss, David Woytek, the vice president of audit, got a call from a security officer at Apple Bank on 42nd Street in New York.  "Hey, something interesting happend.  You should know about it.  There are unusual cash transactions from the Isle of Guernsey coming into my bank from Enron in $100,000 increments!" the officer said.  The approvals of the transactions, he went on, were not coming from authorized corporate treasurers but from two executives in Valhalla, New York, named Louis Borget and Thomas Mastroeini.  "Broget and Mastroeini appear to be writing checks to themselves." the bank officer said.
 
Woyteck called Rich Kinder and then spoke to an aide of Enron's John Harding.  The news of the suspected fraud rocked the audit staff.  Enron Oil appeared to be a great source of profit for Enron, and Harding had personally appeared before the board, one auditor told me, describing in detail the connections to the Saudi royals and Kuwait that had enabled his executives to make such vast trading profits.  All the midwesterners at Enron, including Ken Lay, understood pipelines and their rich, dependable cash flow, but Harding's description of the potential bonanza to be made in trading money thrilled them..."Lay told us 'Just go up there and get the money back,'" Perry said.  By then the audit department had gotten statements from Apple Bank and suspected that Borget and Mastroeini were keeping double books.  Perry, who went with Woytek to Valhalla, was sternly warned "Whatever you do, do not upset Borget.'"
 
(story continues two days later) 'I can't believe you are going to ask us to do this,' Kinder told Woytek, 'Get out of the building and come back to Houston.You are off the case.'" The reason?  "They were all scared," one auditor told me, "that the traders would get upset and they would lose the income." 
 
Perry remembers Kinder saying, "We are turning the investigation over to Arthur Andersen." ... I asked the auditor to read me the minutes from the April 29, 1987 meeting.  "Dr. Jaedicke called upon management for a matter that involved Enron Oil Corporation that was investigated by the company and subsequently investigated by Arthur Andersen ... After a full discussion, management ("This was Ken Lay,' the auditor said) recommeneded the person involved be kept on the payroll but relieved of financial responsibility, and a new chief financial officer of Enron Oil Corp. be appointed.  The committee agreed with reservations ... For the Enron auditors, the April board meeting was prophetic.  "It was obvious to us and to Arthur Andersen that (Borget and Mastroeini) had opened fraudulent bank accounts, and we felt that they were going to continue to manipulate transactions," one auditor told me.  "Lay read the report and he read his budget, and estimated how much they made and if they were fired what he could lose ... My conclusion was that this is a guy who puts earnings before scruples, rather than reacting to the dishonesty right in front of him."
 
...
 
Lay's designated watchdog was delayed in getting to Valhalla in 1987, and soon Borget and Mastroeini had spun out of control.  They bet long on oil as the prices dropped and shorted when the prices rose.  Borget called Houston and said, "There is going to be a huge loss.  About a billion dollars."
 
(goes on to explain that the transactions were unwound through negotiations such that the loss was reduced to $185 million.  Later we may hear war stories of strong arm tactics used to threaten counter-parties).
 
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NOTE:  In testimony before the Senate, no year was used and the dialogue blended in.  I was left with the distinct impression that the $1 billion "loss" occurred in 1993 and that is the same year the MIPS was created.  As it turns out, the $1 billion loss occurred in 1987 and the MIPS was created in 1993, however it cannot be confirmed that it was created to offset a $1 billion write-down or adjustment.  By coincidence, Jan Avery was hired in 1993 to "take care of a $142 million loss" and there were no records.  Her impression at the time Mary Brenner wrote the article was that it might related back to the matter that occurred in 1987.  Jan Avery had only one piece of the puzzle.  The losses in 1993 may have been greater with other units combined, such that the MIPS was a vehicle to provide $1.2 billion in liquidity to Enron while offsetting losses ... we will have to see what discovery brings.
 
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When Skilling or Fastow would order bizarre and questionable off-the-books deals, Jeff McMahon then as Treasurer would follow up with staff and frequently say "We all have to drink the Kool-Aid."  While the interpretations given by people suggest this was a sugar-coated phrase .... it could also be intrepreted to mean "we must all commit suicide together" if McMahon intended this to be a reference to Jonestown.  Recall that Jeff McMahon is serving as President of Enron.
 
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