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By James Turk 
The Freemarket Gold & Money Report

The long-awaited ruling from Judge Lindsay 
has arrived. All claims against the Bank for 
International Settlements and the other 
defendants in Reg Howe's lawsuit have been 
dismissed. 

When I received this news, my initial 
reactions were dismay and disappointment, but 
I was also surprised. The wrongdoing by the 
Defendants appears so clear-cut, and the 
evidence that has emerged to date so 
compelling, I wondered how this case could 
possibly be dismissed? But then I thought 
more deeply about this dismissal and my own 
understanding of the law. 

If there is one thing I have learned in my 
30-plus years of business experience, there 
are right and wrong, and then there is the 
law as it is written and interpreted in 
America today. After all, if President 
Clinton could claim innocence because of 
"what the definition of 'is' is," who knows 
what could be possible in a complex case like 
Reg's? 

As I started to read the judge's ruling, my 
question was quickly answered. To put it in 
non-legal terms because I am not an attorney, 
the answer is that the defendants may be 
guilty, but in the eyes of the court, the law 
is the law. Or in other words, Reg Howe may 
be right, but the judge denied him the 
opportunity to pursue these claims. The 
reason? 

Reg, in the opinion of the judge, does not 
have "standing." In other words, the case may 
have merit, and Reg may have convinced the 
judge of wrongdoing by the defendants. 
Indeed, given that the judge did not say that 
the factual allegations are insufficient to 
bring a price-fixing case, one can reasonably 
conclude that the judge believes Reg's case 
has merit. But regrettably, Reg was unable to 
persuade the judge that within the scope of 
the law that he has "standing." In essence, 
the judge said that Reg is the wrong person 
to bring this case to trial. 

The ruling from the judge began forthrightly 
and candidly: "This case involves allegations 
of 'an unholy alliance of high public 
officials' and 'large bullion banks' to 
manipulate the price of gold. The plaintiff, 
Reginald H. Howe, asserts that various 
combinations of the defendants committed two 
interrelated sets of wrongful acts: first, 
that all of the defendants conspired to 
depress the price of gold; and second, that a 
subset of the defendants conspired to set an 
unfairly low price in the mandatory 
redemption of shares of the Bank for 
International Settlements." 

The judge then describes the aforementioned 
"wrongful acts" as "factual allegations." 
Having completed only the first paragraph of 
a 38-page ruling, I could sense that I had an 
interesting read ahead of me. And in fact my 
interest perked up considerably in the next 
section, entitled "background." 

The judge began this section by stating: "The 
facts set forth below are those alleged in 
the complaint as well as uncontested matters 
of public record, which have been adverted to 
by the parties in their papers. Alternative 
Energy Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1 st Cir. 2001) (noting 
that a district court properly may consider 
matters of public record in deciding 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss). I must accept as true 
the allegations in the complaint and construe 
in the plaintiff's favor all reasonable 
inferences from those allegations." Then 
through another three pages he lays out in 
detail key facts that Reg presented in his 
complaint. 

As I read the ruling it became clear that the 
judge was not dismissing the case because the 
allegations were unfounded. Nor was the judge 
saying that the factual allegations made by 
Reg were insufficient. To the contrary. The 
judge said nothing negative about the 
allegations put forth by Reg. For that reason 
one can reasonably conclude that there is 
merit to Reg's argument that the defendants 
committed "wrongful acts," and, perhaps more 
importantly to the future of this case, that 
the allegations presented by Reg are 
sufficient for this case to allege price 
fixing by the defendants. 

Thus, I didn't have to wait long to answer my 
question about how this case could possibly 
be dismissed. It was not because the 
defendants didn't manipulate the price of 
gold. Rather, the case was dismissed for a 
reason that I consider to be a technical 
matter. The judge said Reg did not have 
standing. 

To explain this point, the judge states: 
"There are many participants in the gold and 
gold derivatives markets who could allege a 
more direct injury than does the plaintiff. 
For example, there are many gold mining 
companies and private investors in gold (not 
to mention those central banks with gold 
reserves) that the plaintiff does not allege 
to be involved in the conspiracy. All of 
these persons or entities would be more 
directly injured than the plaintiff by a 
scheme of the kind he alleges." 

In judge-speak, there are "more appropriate 
plaintiffs" than Reg. And as if his point is 
not sufficiently obvious, he says further: 
"…it seems clear that there is sufficient 
incentive for any of the many gold mining 
companies or private investors in gold or 
gold derivatives to bring suit." 

Will the gold industry please stand up? In 
this remarkable statement the judge is giving 
us here an open invitation for a gold mining 
company to take over Reg's complaint and his 
allegations of price fixing. 

Is there a gold mining company out there to 
which Reg can pass the baton? 

So the gist of the ruling came quickly, but 
I'm glad that I continued reading the judge's 
memorandum. There were some surprises, 
unbelievable even to my jaded eyes. 

For example, one surprise involved the 
judge's statement as follows: "Thus when 
there is no evidence that Congress intended 
to subject federal government agencies, 
officials, and instrumentalities to the 
antitrust laws -- indeed, when all evidence 
points in the opposite direction -- it is 
inappropriate for a court to infer such an 
intent." 

The ghastly conclusion reached by the judge 
of this reading of the law is: "For all the 
reasons set forth above, I conclude that 
Greenspan, McDonough, and the Secretary of 
the Treasury in their official capacities are 
not 'persons' within the meaning of the 
antitrust laws. They enjoy the protection of 
sovereign immunity." In other words, they are 
above the law. You can sue them only if they 
first allow you to sue them. Now where did 
the Founding Fathers put that clause in the 
Constitution? 

The judge observes: "All of the relevant case 
law, as discussed above, indicates that 
government officials are not subject to the 
Sherman Act, and both the Federal Reserve and 
the ESF have statutory authority to trade in 
gold."

And therefore to manipulate its price? 
Interestingly, the judge never addresses that 
thorny issue.

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