| http://www.softwar.net/ocmc.html (4) The factor of deterrence. Based on strategic considerations, the CMC has decided to disclose, when appropriate, some information on strategic weaponry so that the U.S. will exercise some caution in decision-making and be aware that it would have to pay a price if it decided to intervene in a military conflict. The purpose is to prevent the U.S. from being deeply involved even if a war becomes unavoidable so that the losses on both sides of the Taiwan straits will be minimized throughout the war. The main point is deterrence, which is the test for a peaceful solution. The test is within the strategic scope of taking initiative and promoting good timing. Based on the international situation as well as realities on both sides of the Straits, Li Denghui obviously misjudged the situation when he threw out the "two-country theory" shortly before the end of his office in an attempt to destroy the well-established exchange channels and internationalize Taiwan issue. Ostensibly, he underestimated our determination and capability; in reality, he was blackmailing with foreign forces behind him in total disregard of the safety of the Taiwan people. In substance, his behavior constituted a sharp contrast to our concern for the safety and best interests of the Taiwan people while seeking reunification. To stay well-informed, be ready to take initiative, and grasp the best opportunity within our predetermined limits represent in a nutshell our high sense of responsibility for the Chinese nation. 3. Enhancing the Awareness Within Our Armed Forces of the Increased Possibility for A Military Solution and Certainty of Winning the War Should It Break Out The Sino-US relations are currently at a low ebb. However, in terms of mutual efforts to improve the bilateral relations, it should be pointed out that the US government is relatively more active. The U.S. believes that it has responsibilities for all the affairs in the world, but such a philosophy must find expressions in international cooperations, particularly among big countries. China is a big country and therefore the US government could never afford to neglect the existence of China in handling international affairs ever since the establishment of diplomatic relationships between the two countries. Such a trend has been strengthened after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in confrontation under the surface of detente. However, in carrying out exchanges with the U.S., we have followed the principle of mutual benefit and equality and aimed at maintenance of regional stability, which reflects normal bilateral relations. The Chinese government has its own principles in handling domestic and international affairs and will never be at the beckon and call of another country. Because of such an attitude, when disagreements arose between the two countries, some US politicians would nail China down to the position of the former Soviet Union through exaggeration and turn China into a potential opponent of the U.S.. Pointing fingers at China based on the US social system and human rights standards is but an excuse, and the substance is to implement the hegemonism which would never prevail. In containing China, the U.S. has only one tangible means, which is Taiwan issue. In fact, both Jiang Jingguo and Li Denghui were presented with a historical opportunity to make contributions to the reunification of the motherland and could have become a hero in the Chinese history, because only by peaceful reunification can the strength of our nation remain intact: externally, to avoid fighting a war against the U.S. while internally, to grasp the opportunity to develop and achieve prosperity. Jiang Jingguo belonged to the second generation of the Nationalist-Communist dispute and was seriously constrained by his family background. Therefore, apart from sticking to the one-China concept, he failed to make due contributions to the reunification, which is historically regrettable. Although Li Denghui did not carry a similar historical burden, he was filled with animosity towards the Chinese nation, which gave rise to the instability in the relations between both sides of the Taiwan Straits and ultimately led to the current situation under which a military solution has to be considered. Li's behavior obviously caters to the taste of some anti-China US politicians, but when military actions become a must, neither Li Denghui nor those short-sighted anti-China US politicians will be able to control the outcome. Based on the long-term interests and current strength of our country and our armed forces, the question that we have to consider is not Taiwan's capability to defend itself or what kind of war will be fought if the U.S. intervenes, but our tactics and timing, with regard to which we provide you with the following points of reference. (1) The impact on economic development. Taking into account of possible intervention by the U.S. and based on the development strategy of our country, it is better to fight now than future --- the earlier, the better. The reason being that, if worst comes to worst, we will gain control of Taiwan before full deployment of the US troops. In this case, the only thing the U.S. can do is fighting a war with the purpose of retaliation, which will be similar to the Gulf War against Iraq or the recent bombing of Yugoslavia as far as its operational objective is considered, namely, to first attack from the sky and the sea our coastal military targets, and then attack our vital civil facilities so as to force us to accept its terms like Iraq and Yugoslavia. This is of course wishful thinking. However, before completely destroying the attacking enemy forces from the sea and their auxiliary bases which together constitute a threat to us, even if we successfully carry out interception and control the sky, our military and civil facilities will still incur some damages. The damages will be more extensive if the war cannot be ended within a short period of time and the U.S. launch the second and third strategic strikes, which will take a toll on the economic development of our country. If the above scenario cannot be avoided, an early war will delay the success of our reform whereas a later war will jeopardize the full achievement of the reform. (2) The balance of strategic weaponry. From the perspective of winning a large-scale modern war with defense as the main purpose but involving local offensives, an early war has another advantage over a later war, namely, not counting the risk of a nuclear war, our conventional forces compare favorably with those of the U.S.. From a purely technical point of view, the US armed forces indeed have no match in the world, which characteristic constitutes the fundamental strength and framework of the U.S. in fighting a war. However, what we are talking about above is the whole US military organization with its formal forces at the core, and the gigantic power also includes its advanced and powerful weaponry as well as its capability for nuclear strikes. Based on its structure, in times of strategic necessity, one third of its joint combat forces can be assembled and deployed for overseas operations within a short period of time, but this capability is limited to strategic flexibility. It may constitute a great deterrence to small military powers such as Iraq and Yugoslavia, but has no tactical advantage whatsoever in fighting against us, because we are close to home while they will be exhausted by the arduous expedition. When both sides rely mainly on missile strikes based on electronic confrontation, we evidently enjoy superiority in terms of the number of short-range and middle-range missiles. So far the strategic superiority of the US joint forces has not been tested in a war against a big country. In contrast, using the Vietnamese War as an example, our forces do have the experience of fighting the US forces under modern warfare conditions. In that war, the Chinese forces were mainly responsible for air defense and accumulated a whole set of experience in this regard. Things have changed significantly since then, but the most telling changes should have occurred to our forces in terms of personnel qualifications and weaponry, which are well-tuned to meet the requirements of modern warfare. In terms of air defense, it is impossible for the US air force to enjoy the kind of dominance which they maintained in Iraq or Yugoslavia. Considering the morale of our forces and the nature of the war, and also considering the fact that the performance of the missiles on both sides is basically at the same level as well as the fact that both our defense and offense, which are the two major types of operation that can be imagined, will be carried out from our territory, the strategic superiority which can be claimed by the U.S. is close to zero. It does not even enjoy a sure advantage in terms of the foreseeable scale of war and the hi-tech content which can be applied to combat. It can be safely expected that once the U.S. launches an attack, the front line of the US forces and their supporting bases will be exposed within the range of our effective strikes. After the first strategic strike, the US forces will be faced with weaponry and Logistic problems, providing us with opportunities for major offensives and win large battles. (3) Reaction to and preparation for escalation of war. Basically, we do not foresee a nuclear war between China and the U.S., for two basic facts will prevent it. First, it is against the US interests to fight a nuclear war against China simply for Li Denghui and his followers. On this point the anti-China US politicians will have to respect public opinion within the U.S.. Our principle is "willing to sustain major losses of our armed forces to defend even just one square inch of land." If the US forces lose thousands or hundreds of men under our powerful strikes, the anti-war sentiment within the their country will force the US government to take the same path as they did in Viet Nam. Unlike Iraq and Yugoslavia, China is not only a big country, but also possesses a nuclear arsenal that has long since been incorporated into state warfare system and played a real role in our national defense. During last crisis across the Taiwan Straits, the U.S. tried to blackmail us with their aircraft carrier(s), but when their spy satellites confirmed that our four nuclear submarines which used to be stationed at Lushun Harbor had disappeared, those politicians addicted to the Taiwan card could not imagine how worried their military commanders were. In comparison with the US nuclear arsenal, our disadvantage is mainly numeric, while in real wars the qualitative gap will be reflected only as different requirements of strategic theory. In terms of deterrence, there is not any difference in practical value. So far we have built up the capability for the second and the third nuclear strikes and are fairly confident in fighting a nuclear war. The PCC has decided to pass through formal channels this message to the top leaders of the U.S.. This is one of the concrete measures that we will take to prevent the escalation of war in the spirit of being responsible. However, conceptually we are fully prepared for a prolonged warfare. Judging by each's domestic situation, it is the U.S. that will not be able to keep up for long. Historically, China has experience prolonged warfare against foreign invasion, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has the ability to safeguard the peaceful production activities by the people of all nationalities in China during the war. We do not want to fight a prolonged war, but this is because our country's basic principle is preserving peace and developing economy, not because we are afraid. Prolonged warfare will work to our advantage and enable us to defeat the enemy, which will be one of our strategic options to win the war under extreme circumstances. (4) The basic principle of military operation against Taiwan. Our operational planning has been receiving extensive attention, not just from the U.S.; some friendly countries have also inquired about our intentions on various occasions. Foreign news media have published speculations on this topic, too. Since these speculations were based on research done by experts and specialized institutions, they did score some points. However, strategic perspectives can only be valuable when matched with battle operations and tactics. The key factor that has caused the West's lack of understanding of the capability of our armed forces to fight a modern war is bias and prejudice. The quality and level of their studies have not changed much since the early 1980s. For instance, some US studies questioned the capability of our armed forces to resolve Taiwan issue. The method employed in such studies is typical of studies on positional warfare under modern conditions. Since Li Denghui came to power, Taiwan's military equipment has been updated, basically completing the generation change of the combat arms. However, how much this has enhanced the combat power of the Taiwan forces is yet to be seen, because the Taiwan forces do not have any combat experience and will not be able to stand the test of a large-scale war, which is a fatal weakness. For many years, Taiwan's defense system and war planning have not gone beyond the operational procedures of so-called "air superiority, sea superiority, and resistance to landing" and therefore will not be able to react accurately to the basic warfare model of instant, large-scale, and fully-extended operations. In particular, geographically Taiwan occupies only a small area. Although the quality of its equipment is not too bad, its quantity is limited. It is obvious that after the first fatal strike, the Taiwan forces have no way to organize effective resistance. Under such circumstances, we will be able to control Taiwan before the US intervention and then concentrate our forces to fight the U.S.. Based on this scenario, it is impossible for the U.S. to force us to fight on two fronts when it tries to protect Taiwan. 4. To Fully Understand the PCC's Preparation for Resolution of Taiwan Issue Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, and to resolve Taiwan issue and achieve reunification of the motherland is purely a concern of the Chinese government and the Chinese people. On this issue we will not take orders from anyone, nor do we allow anyone to point their fingers at us. Li Denghui's reliance on foreign forces shows that he does not understand the determination and capability of the Chinese government and the PLA in resolving Taiwan issue; it also shows that he does not care about the best interests of the Taiwan people. Before we take necessary reactions to Li and his followers motherland-splitting conduct, he will continue to create an atmosphere for splitting in answer to the call of a handful of anti-China US politicians and in an attempt to manipulate political trends in Taiwan, further poisoning the relationships between the two sides across the Straits. This will surely cause concern and discontent of neighboring countries and regions and objectively benefit us by working against the public opinion. First of all, to effectively reduce the rampant arrogance of Li Denghui and Taiwan's splitting forces represented by him and to adapt our armed forces to cross-the-Straits operations, the CMC has decided, in accordance with the directions of the PCC, to carry out, based on combat phases, a series of large-scale of military exercises in both southeast coastal and inland regions from now on through early September. In comparison with the exercises in 1996, the PCC has not only made specific requirements as to the scale and the degree of combat likeness, but also clearly identified the target of these exercises, namely Taiwan's splitting forces represented by Li Denghui. These exercises will serve both as a warning to the Taiwan authorities and as a notice to the world of our current policy towards Taiwan. The timing for these exercises has been decided on by the PCC in consideration of the overall Taiwan policy, taking into account both internal and external as well as military and political factors. These exercises constitute a specific step and an important part of the current campaign waged by the Chinese people against the splitting under the leadership of our Party and government. Internationally, President Jiang Zemin will go to Biskek in late September to attend the five-country summit meeting, including China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, and Tajikstan. The meeting will sum up and expand cooperations in the field of security and reach agreements on reduction of armed forces stationed along the borders and establishment of military trust. During the meeting, President Jiang Zemin will hold bilateral talks with President Yeltsin on political and military exchange and cooperation in face of challenges posed by new interventions out of hegemonism in international affairs. The above efforts will not only eliminate security concerns in the rear by reducing the traditional pressure along our northeast and northwest borders, and increase the proportion of forces which can be moved to the southeast coastal regions, but also serve to ensure our exchanges with the outside world by land routes during the war. This is an important strategic decision to maintain social stability and normal exchanges with other countries in case we are forced to fight a full-scale war against the U.S.. Such a decision represents a concrete expression of the PCC's determination to resolve Taiwan issue. Apart from the above summit meeting, President Jiang Zemin will also make state visits to Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand in early September. He will meet with Clinton in mid-September to officially inform the U.S. of Chinese government's position on Taiwan issue. To complement the above visits, other Party and state leaders will also meet, either at home or abroad, leaders of a number of countries to manifest the Chinese government's determination to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity and reunify the nation. These final efforts will promote the understanding of our position among countries throughout the world. Domestically, our Party and government have intensified the effort to clean out corruption, taking organizational and administrative measures to preserve the outstanding tradition of the Party, to strengthen the relationships between Party cadres and ordinary people, and to alleviate popular discontent. At the ideological front, we grasped the opportunity and outlawed "Falun Gong," rooting out the biggest tightly-organized counterrevolutionary religious group with a platform and plans since the founding of our country and eliminating unstable factors in domestic politics. This measure has not only safeguarded the predominant position of materialism in the field of ideology, but also provided practical support for our armed forces to prepare for the war. It must be pointed out that when we were dealing with "Falun Gong," we had to bear on one hand pressure from the so-called human-rights-ism, on the other hand, the Sino-US relations were at a low ebb because of conflict in Yugoslavia; moreover, Li Denghui threw out his "two-country theory" and caused Taiwan issue to take an abrupt turn. Given all these factors, we had to consider carefully the timing and the strategy. In fact, the determination with which our Party and state did away with "Falun Gong" reflected the overall evaluation of all the above factors. To outlaw "Falun Gong" was a pre-emptive measure aimed at the ultimate resolution of Taiwan issue, not only eliminating domestic trouble, but paving the way for the reunification as well. Negative international reaction has proven to be limited, and the protest from the U.S. was particularly pale and powerless, fully demonstrating that our Party has the ability and courage to gain advantage in complicated domestic and international struggles. Between now and the end of the year, we will celebrate two grand occasions: the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and resumption of sovereignty over Macao. To properly handle these two big events will have great impact on the resolution of Taiwan issue. The National Day celebrations should focus on the splendid achievements of the 50 years. According to the directions of the PCC, the PLA shall play the predominant role in the celebrations and the development of our armed forces shall be a reflection of accomplishments in all walks of life, which shall be displayed through a large-scale review of armed forces to our people of all nationalities and the people around the world. At the review, a number of advanced equipment and strategic weapons will be revealed to the outside world. Internally, this will enhance the morale of our people of all nationalities and inspire patriotism; externally, this will make clear to the world that we do have the capability to defend our country and promote reunification. Such a move constitutes an important link in our overall strategy on Taiwan. On December 20, with the resolution of Macao issue, the humiliation that the Chinese people have been subjected to for more than a century will be washed away and a new chapter of the ultimate reunification of the motherland will begin. The smooth transition of Macao shows that we have surmounted yet another hurdle along the path of reunification and Taiwan issue has entered a substantive phase. This is also a premeditated decision made by the PCC. Although Li Denghui's splitting tricks have increased the possibility of a military solution and forced us to advance our timetable, they did not have any effect on our overall plan as far as priority is concerned. Our principle is seeking a peaceful solution and not resorting to military actions until the last moment. When this principle has been trampled upon and military actions become the only means to achieve reunification, we will not hesitate to carry out the historic mission that embodies the wishes of several generations. We will accomplish with our own hands the eternal cause of the reunification of the motherland. For our Party and government as well as the people of China, including the people of Taiwan, Taiwan issue is the last issue before the achievement of the complete reunification of the motherland. Peaceful and gradual reunification are not only in the best interests of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, but also in the long-term interests of the Chinese nation. This reasonable solution was first proposed by our Party based on the changes in domestic and international situations. At present, the foundation of a peaceful dialogue between two sides has been destroyed and the possibility for military actions has been greatly increased. Even so, we still strive to bring about a peaceful solution, which option shall remain valid until the last moment. Every commander and soldier in our armed forces shall keep in mind the expectations of our Party and our people, attach great importance to political orientation, science, and skills that will stand the tests, strive to acquire modern military expertise under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory, unwaveringly follow the leadership of the PCC with Comrade Jiang Zemin as its core, play the all-conquering role of the Great Wall of iron and steel, and make new contributions to our national defense and reunification of the motherland under the new historical conditions. General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army August 1, 1999 |
