-Caveat Lector-

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61143-2002Aug25.html

We the People, We the Warriors
By Talbot Brewer
The Washington Post

August 26, 2002

One common philosophical argument for democracy is that democratic regimes
are particularly unlikely to start wars. When the power to declare war is
closely tethered to the preferences of those who would bear the costs of
fighting, it stands to reason that this power will be used sparingly. Thus,
many political philosophers have followed Kant in supposing that the
universal embrace of democracy offers the best hope of world peace.

Our nation now finds itself on the verge of initiating war against another
sovereign nation. We have not been attacked by Iraq, and we have thus far
failed to produce convincing evidence that Iraq has aided, or plans to aid,
those who have attacked us. If we go to war, we will be the initiators of
aggression.

It would be a mistake, however, to take this as fresh cause for doubt about
the link between democracy and peace. We ought instead to view this imminent
possibility as an occasion for raising hard questions about whether, in the
critical matter of waging war, we still function as a genuine democracy.

It was widely viewed as a victory for the peace movement when the draft was
abolished and military service became voluntary. Unfortunately this
arrangement does not really serve the cause of peace but rather lowers the
threshold of war by creating a decisive cleavage between the social classes
that wield political power and those that supply the country its soldiers.
Too many of our political leaders are now in a position to choose war with
little fear that it will endanger their friends or loved ones. This is
dangerous for the same reason it would be dangerous to entrust the power to
determine tax policies to a class of citizens who have been granted blanket
immunity from taxes. It breeds political irresponsibility.

No doubt many of our political leaders do feel a certain generalized concern
for the lives of their fellow Americans, including those in the military.
Still, even this potential call to moral seriousness is dampened by the
otherwise happy fact that our technological and military mastery permits us
to fight and win wars with remarkably few casualties.

Nor are we prone to give sufficient thought to the foreigners whose futures
we put at risk when we make use of our impressive capacities for destroying
nations and our very modest capacities for rebuilding them. Today we wage
war at an anesthetizing distance, with precise munitions that make killing
an abstract activity, registered largely in terms of hit and miss rates. We
rarely are recalled to moral reality by the last look in the eyes of those
our errant bombs maim or shred, or by the anguish and indelible anger of the
sons and daughters they leave behind, or by the political chaos that we
ourselves all too often leave behind when our troops and journalists decamp.

These are familiar and deeply troubling sources of moral levity in the
public war deliberations of the world's dominant military power. There is,
however, another, less familiar yet possibly more troubling source of such
levity. It is the relative passivity with which most Americans now
experience the mobilization for war. This process has become highly
undemocratic. Large groups of ''we the people" now are insulated not only
from the physical risks of injury or death in war but also from the moral
risks that attend any active role in the initiation of war.

What are the moral risks of war? Consider, to begin with, that one cannot
responsibly choose to start a war without supposing oneself to have the
capacity to discern those rare historical moments when war has a realistic
chance of doing more good than harm. Overestimating one's capacity to shape
the course of history raises the risk of becoming responsible for the
creation of a damnable mess.

Consider, too, that one cannot responsibly choose the path of war without
being certain that one's enthusiasm for fighting is not rooted at least
partly in such dark psychological sources as an overgeneralized thirst for
revenge or intoxication with the capacity to humble one's enemies. To
overestimate the purity of one's war motives is to risk becoming responsible
for evil, entered into -- as evil ordinarily is -- with every belief in
one's good intentions.

Today both sorts of moral risks are in play. We are contemplating a fresh
military adventure at a time when our attempts at statecraft in Afghanistan
show signs of crumbling into anarchic violence. If we depose Saddam Hussein
and his tyrannical regime, it is by no means clear that we can establish a
stable successor. Meanwhile, we run the danger of provoking Hussein to use
weapons he might otherwise not dare to use.

There is also good reason for scrutiny of our desire for combat. We are
hurt, angry and still grieving over the meaningless loss of thousands of
American lives in the attacks of Sept. 11. Desire for revenge is general in
our land and often overgeneralized in its target. We hear this in George
Bush's loose talk of an ''axis" of evil formed somehow by countries that
have almost no dealings with one another. We see it in our readiness to tar
Iraq with the same brush used to discredit the Taliban.

The cause of peace is threatened as much by specialization in the
distribution of the moral risks of war as by specialization in its risks to
life and limb. Both sorts of specializations can lull citizens into passive
fascination with impressive shows of power staged by a military that is, in
theory, supposed to do the public's will. In a properly constituted
democracy, decisions of war and peace must emerge from the conscientious
deliberation of the public's true representatives, and their deliberations
must shape and be shaped by the equally conscientious if less organized
deliberations of an engaged citizenry.

While today's Congress hardly answers to this ideal account, it remains the
center of the nation's public political deliberation.

It is, then, a blessing that Article I, Section 8, of our Constitution
clearly vests the power to declare war in Congress. Yet we have fallen from
this democratic element of our own Constitution to the point at which the
public expresses little or no outrage when the president speaks and acts as
though he has the unilateral prerogative to initiate a war in nonemergency
conditions.

The first fateful bomb might fall on Baghdad before Congress even begins its
formal discussion of the wisdom of the war. Even if debate does take place,
it likely will be a mere fifth wheel to the seemingly self-sufficient
decision-making already underway behind closed doors in the White House.
Under these circumstances, both Congress and the public it represents are
reduced to the role of spectators.

It may be objected that presidential decisions about war and peace are in
good democratic order, because presidents generally are concerned about
maintaining their popularity and can do so only if their decisions reflect
public preferences. One superficial problem with this objection is that it
applies only to those reasonably popular first-term presidents who have a
realistic hope of reelection. But the more fundamental problem is that it
overlooks the vast difference between what a person is capable of applauding
and what a person is capable of making the deliberate and considered
decision to do.

If war policy is chosen behind closed doors and then conveyed to the people
in conjunction with a skillful caricature of the predetermined enemy
(supported, perhaps, by intelligence whose precise nature cannot be
revealed), the public can be made to prefer an array of unsavory wars that
it would never choose in the light of open deliberation. To think that
democracy boils down to making sure one's decisions can be made popular in
retrospect is to reduce the ideal of democracy to competency in marketing.

It is true that we cannot make decisions about war and peace more
democratically without also making them more slowly and openly. It is also
true that openness and deliberateness can be costly. Yet these costs are
part of the price of self-rule, the essence of the political freedom we
Americans have historically cherished.

We must assume these costs, along with the burdens of the citizen-soldier,
not only to realize our own aspiration to self-rule but also to give the
world the best available guarantee that we will use our vast military power
as responsibly as is humanly possible.

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