--- Begin Message ---
-Caveat Lector-
-----Original Message-----
From: Bob Gonsalves [mailto:pinknoiz@;pinknoiz.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 6:54 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Brazil and CIA
[Expect to see similar activities in Brazil in the wake of leftist
Lula's election to the presidency this year]
http://www.pir.org/brazil.html
CounterSpy, April - May 1979, pp. 4-23.
Brazil and CIA
by Peter Gribbin
In the rush to consolidate its role as the new leader of the
so-called Free World, the U.S. government saw as a major task the
containment of countries which, during the Second World War, had
begun to pursue an independent course of development. If and when
change was to occur, it was to be of a made-to-order variety,
directed from Washington. To this end, the establishment of powerful,
centralized police forces in Asia, Africa, and especially Latin
America became a top priority.
The person the Eisenhower administration charged with organizing a
task force on police training was Byron Engle.1 He was chosen because
of his experiences training Japanese police after WW II and setting
up a police advisory board in Turkey. Funding for the new police
program supposedly came from the State Department, even though Engle
had been with the CIA since 1947. This prompted FBI head J. Edgar
Hoover to complain that the police program was just one more CIA
cover.2
When the Kennedy administration moved into Washington, Engle's
program took on new life. The cabinet-level Counter-Intelligence
(C-I) Group was headed by Maxwell Taylor, a former general who was
later named U.S Ambassador to South Vietnam. The C-I Group along with
the CIA was responsible for creating the Special Forces (Green
Berets); new training in counter-insurgency at military schools from
the National War College on down; and new courses at the Foreign
Service Institute, all designed to make members of the State
Department, the CIA and the military branches knowledgeable in
counter-insurgency techniques. In addition, a special Committee on
Police and Police Training was set up under the direction of U.
Alexis Johnson, who has worked hand-in-glove with the CIA throughout
his career. Johnson later became deputy ambassador to South Vietnam,
but in his present capacity he appointed Engle as head of the new,
expanded police program. After all, hadn't Engle once trained 100,000
Japanese police in only two months?3
In the Fall of 1961, just as Joao Goulart was taking over the
presidency, the United States began an expanded influx of CIA agents
and AID officials into Brazil. AID Public Safety advisers like Dan
Mitrione were responsible for "improving" the Brazilian police
forces. Engle sent CIA officer Lauren J. (Jack) Goin to Brazil under
the cover of "adviser in scientific investigations." Before coming to
Brazil, Goin had set up the first police advisory team in Indonesia
which was instrumental in the CIA-backed coup which culminated in the
documented killing of over three-hundred thousand Indonesians. He had
also served with Engle when the first police advisory team was
created in Turkey.4
Economic Background
The Goulart regime of 1961-1964 represented the "fundamental
contradiction between a government's responsibility to the citizens
who elected it, and the obedience to the demands of foreign creditors
expressed in the IMF stabilization program."5 A government which
refuses to make any gesture toward meeting their conditions
frequently finds its international credit for imports cut off which,
in turn, increases the likelihood of a CIA-induced, right-wing coup.
A country in the throes of a balance of payments crisis is usually
unable to obtain needed credit unless "significant policy changes are
made."6 For example, new loans may be obtained only through a change
away from nationalist economic policies toward measures favoring
foreign investment. As is being increasingly borne out by other Third
World countries, Brazil's democratic system at the start of the 1960s
proved unequal to the difficult challenge posed by the foreign
exchange constraint. Since Goulart was elected by a "populist"
coalition of voters spanning class lines, the party system itself
discouraged strategies that might put any significant group at a
disadvantage.In this atmosphere, the coup of '64 became a sine qua
non for new U.S. credit.
Previously, in 1958, President Juscelino Kubitschek had been forced
to come to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund on
certain stabilization measures in order to secure a $300 million
loan.7 (His predecessor, Getulio Vargas, had committed suicide in
1954. Behind him he left a document in which he blamed outside forces
for helping to create the circumstances that drove him to take his
life: "The foreign companies made profits of up to five hundred
percent. They demonstrably deprived the state of more than a hundred
million dollars by false evaluations of import goods.8) But the
president of the Bank of Brazil refused to go along with the
government's proposedcredit squeeze which would have caused a
depression in the private sector. After floundering around for the
greater part of 1958, instituting half-way measures unacceptable to
the IMF, Kubitschek broke off negotiations and gave up hope for the
American loan. He managed to obtain the needed foreign credit by
means of a short-term, high-cost loan from private sources abroad.
But his successor, Janio Quadros, inherited a full-scale debt
repayment crisis that could no longer be postponed.
Quadros immediately came to terms with the IMF and his foreign
creditors. He abolished the "exchange auctions" which the Brazilian
government, by auctioning off its foreign exchange reserves to the
highest bidder/importer, had previously used as a source of revenue.9
Certain exchange controls (subsidies) were established for
"necessary" imports, effecting a devaluation of the Brazilian
cruzeiro by fifty percent. The IMF was still not satisfied, however,
and by July of 1961 it succeeded in forcing Quadros to abolish all
exchange controls and to peg all exchange transactions at the (free)
world market rate.10
By meeting the IMF's demands, Quadros was able to negotiate new
credits and reschedule payments due with his U.S. and European
creditors. Inflation still raged, however, and when Quadros limited
credit (like Kubitschek before him) he came up against strong
political counterpressures. Hoping to win popular support and a new
mandate to lead the country, Quadros resigned after only eight months
in office.
Although some sources saw his resignation as being forced upon him by
the CIA, Quadros had, in fact, been the U.S. government's last hope
for bringing their brand of stability to Brazil within a democratic
framework. In the New York Times of August 26, 1961, the mood of the
State Department was described as "one of fear that the departure of
President Quadros from Brazil's political scene, if it is not
reversed, would plunge the country into serious political
difficulties threatening its stability and interfering with the
financial and economic stabilization program."
Quadros' successor, Joao Goulart, whose political strength rested on
the close ties he had fostered with the unions while Minister of
Labor under Vargas, was to the left of the Brazilian political
spectrum. The real threat -- to industrialists, the army and foreign
investors -- was the likelihood that under Goulart organized labor
would become the dominant political force in Brazil.11 If Quadros
could not carry through his stabilization program, there seemed even
less to hope for, in that respect, from Goulart.
During Goulart's presidency, the contradictions inherent in Brazil's
post-war development reached the breaking point. Goulart had
inherited the accumulated problems of fifteen years of inflation and
foreign borrowing which none of his predecessors had successfully
tackled. Brazil's last effort at economic stabilization within a
democratic framework was made in 1963. The Three-Year plan, drawn up
by Minister of Finance, Santiago Dantas, and Minister for Economic
Planning, Celso Furtado, was made with one eye on the Brazilian
electorate and the other on the IMF.12
On the one hand, this plan promised to carry out tax and agrarian
reforms while resuming a high rate of growth. Simultaneously,
however, it sought to curb inflation which was a precondition for
receiving new credits and/or deferral of payments due. In 1963, this
crushing debt repayment burden threatened to eat up 45 percent of
Brazil's export earnings.13 When the plan was presented to the IMF,
the latter wanted more stringent conditions. These were: devaluation
of the cruzeiro; exchange reform which meant abolishing subsidies on
the import of wheat and petroleum; and, restrictions on the budget
deficit (which translated into a cutback in government services) and
on wage increases. These restrictions were designed to contract the
money supply and depress the costs of goods and labor. Cheaper goods
and labor (at the expense of the workers) would make Brazilian
products more competitive on the world market. But the contradictory
elements of the Three-Year Plan soon exploded.
Brazil was able to head off imminent disaster when the Agency for
International Development (AID) agreed to release $400 million on the
condition that the government stick to its austerity program.14 The
government's program was doomed to failure, however, because of a
proposed 70 percent wage increase to government employees -- the
military among them -- whose support was necessary if Goulart was to
stay in power. Caught between a rock and a hard place, Goulart gave
in to the wage increase and held off on the proposed stabilization.
The U.S. immediately suspended its aid disbursements.
Goulart further exacerbated American hostility towards him when he
signed the Profit Remittance Law.15 This law, which infuriated
foreign investors, provided that profit remittances could be
calculated only on the amount of capital originally brought into the
country, and not on the (much larger) unremitted past profits which
had been reinvested in Brazil. U.S. distaste for Goulart was
expressed in the cutting-off of aid to his government while at the
same time giving aid to certain conservative state governors (Carlos
Lacerda in Guanabara and Adhemar de Barros in Sao Paulo) with whom it
thought it could do business.
The final act of Goulart's futile attempt to placate both foreign and
domestic interests was played out in the first quarter of 1964. Early
in the year, Goulart held discussions on yet another exchange reform
and rescheduling of Brazil's foreign debt with a three-man team from
the IMF. But this attempt to come to terms with his creditors fell
through when, in a gesture towards the Left, he announced the
expropriation and redistribution of privately owned land and the
nationalization of private oil refineries. Unfortunately, these moves
did more to mobilize the Right than they did to gain support from the
Left. On April 1, 1964, the military quickly deposed Goulart and
installed its own caretaker government.
The subsequent fifteen years have shown that with the overthrow of
Joao Goulart, democracy in Brazil came to a screeching halt. After a
shaky twenty years, basic political rights were abandoned. Provisions
of the First Institutional Act drawn up after the coup created a
cassacao, or political death for ten years. These emergency powers
soon gave way to a Second Institutional Act. The Fifth Institutional
Act shut down Congress, suspended habeas corpus for political
activity, and gave full autocratic power to the president.16 Labor
laws enacted after the coup rescinded virtually all job-related
rights: the right to strike, to negotiate directly with the employers
instead of the state, and to establish trade union representation
within factories.17 The destruction of democracy in Brazil was
evidence of the impossibility of serving two masters. Goulart was
never able to reconcile the legitimate demands of domestic pressure
groups with the external economic constraints of Brazil's creditors.
As a final ironic twist, Goulart's refusal to succumb to foreign
pressures only served to irritate undemocratic forces inside Brazil
to the point where they saw it in their interest to get rid of
democracy and Goulart in one fell swoop.
Imperialism's Internal Allies: Brazil's National Enemies
In the fall of 1961, just as Joao Goulart was assuming the
presidency, the United States began to make contact with his
right-wing opposition. At the same time, the CIA began a multifaceted
penetration of Brazilian society designed to influence that country's
internal politics. Lincoln Gordon, U.S. ambassador to Brazil, was
appointed the same day that Goulart's predecessor, Janio Quadros
resigned. Soon after his arrival in October, Gordon met with a
right-wing admiral named Silvio Heck. Heck informed Gordon of a poll
of the armed services which revealed that over two-thirds of the
enlisted men opposed Goulart. Heck also hoped that when it came time
to oust Goulart "the U.S would take an understanding view."18
Although Gordon later determined that Heck's figures were
exaggerated, he never once warned Goulart or his advisers of this
conspiracy.
The CIA, for its part, took more than a passive interest in helping
right-wing military forces come to power in Brazil. The overthrow of
Goulart and the destruction of democracy in Brazil was effected
through the manipulation of diverse social groups. Police, the
military, political parties, labor unions, student federations and
housewives associations were all exploited in the interest of
stirring up opposition to Goulart. Yet, while Washington's original
intent may have been to replace Goulart with the strongman General
Castello Branco, the guaranty of the coup's longterm success demanded
an increase in U.S. material and training for the Brazilian security
forces which continues to this day.
The military coup took as its first president Humberto Castello
Branco, a man who had a long and close relationship with the United
States military. During the Allied invasion of Italy in 1945, a
number of prominent Brazilian officers participating in the campaign
became exposed to American military ideas and tactics.19 Castello
Branco's roommate in Italy was a CIA-coup engineer, then-Lieutenant
Colonel Vernon (Dick) Walters. In 1964, Walters was the U.S.
embassy's military attaché, and the man most closely connected with
Brazil's military leadership.
Since the end of World War II, Washington had used its role as
policeman of the so-called Free World to justify expanding its
influence in the Brazilian forces. Military planning between the two
countries was coordinated by a Joint Brazil United States Military
Commission (JBUSMC). In 1949, the Pentagon helped Brazil set up and
staff the Escola Superior de Guerra (Advanced War College), a carbon
copy of the U.S. National War College.20
The Advanced War College is responsible for national security
studies, development of military strategy, and ideas on nation
building -- the last being taken from the Pentagon and the U.S.
Army's experience in reconstructing postwar Japan.21 To this day, the
college has graduated over three thousand civilians and military
managers indoctrinated in a right-wing military ideology and the
belief that only the armed forces can lead Brazil to its proper
destiny as the great power of Latin America.22
Another Brazilian army general who was instrumental in the coup was
Golbery do Couto e Silva. Like Castello Branco, Couto e Silva was a
member of Brazil's military elite who became enamored of U.S.
military thinking while a member of the Allied expeditionary force in
Italy in 1945.23 The Brazilian army's "intellectual gray eminence,"
Couto e Silva was particularly influential in the formation of the
Advanced War College, popularly known as the "Brazilian Sorbonne." At
one point the head of Dow Chemical's Brazilian section, Couto e Silva
became head of Brazil's first national intelligence service, the SNI,
after the coup in 1964.24
In the early 60s, the now-retired General Couto e Silva became the
chief of staff at the Institute for Social Research Studies (IPES, in
Portuguese). The leading inspiration at IPES was Glycon de Paiva,25 a
mining engineer from the state of Minas Gerais. To avoid detection,
IPES posed as an educational organization that donated money to
reduce illiteracy among poor children. IPES' real work, however, was
organizing opposition to Goulart and maintaining dossiers on anyone
de Paiva considered an enemy.
Making the rounds of Brazil's major industrialists, de Paiva was able
to appeal to their interests by translating his visceral hatred of
communism into a simple message they could understand: Goulart wants
to take away from you that which is yours. In this way, de Paiva was
able to drum up close to $20,000 a month in donations.26
One immediate target of IPES' anti-Goulart campaign were housewives,
whom de Paiva recognized as being receptive to warnings about the
threat that communism posed to the Brazilian family, and to the
values of society in general. He set up women's societies in all the
major cities. In Rio de Janeiro it was called the Women's Campaign
for Democracy (CAMDE).27 During the week of the coup in March 1964,
IPES organized a huge march against Goulart. In Sao Paulo 10,000
people joined a March of the Family with God for Freedom. Sao Paulo
women presented a manifesto on behalf of Christian democracy, while
at the same time the Archbishop of Sao Paulo forbade his bishops from
participating in the march because he said it had been funded by the
U.S. advertising agency, McCann Erickson.28
De Paiva's major concern, however, was the threat posed by Goulart's
openness towards the Left. In this respect, Couto e Silva's role in
keeping files at IPES was twofold. On the one hand, he put paid
agents in the Brazilian military to make sure that key men throughout
the services remained loyal to the Brazilian "nation" and not to
Goulart. At the same time, IPES placed paid informers in factories,
schools, and government offices to report on supporters of Goulart.
Petrobras, the state-owned oil company, received special attention as
de Paiva was convinced that Goulart had many supporters there. Before
Couto e Silva was finished, IPES had files on 400,000 "enemies" of
Brazil.29
Another part of the CIA's effort to create anti-Goulart sentiment in
Brazil was the rigging of elections. Working through a front group
called the Instituto Brasileiro de Acao Democratica (IBAD), the CIA
channeled money into local political campaigns. IBAD, in turn, passed
the money through its two branches, Democratic Popular Action (ADEP)
and Sales Promotion, Inc.30 In the 1962 elections, IBAD not only
funded more than one thousand candidates but recruited them so that
their first allegiance would be with IBAD and the CIA. At every
level, from state deputies up to governorships, the CIA stacked the
ballots in favor of its candidates.
In February, 1964, the CIA was nearly "burned" by a parliamentary
investigation into its violation of election laws in 1962.31 The CIA
had spent close to $20 million, but a scandal was averted by three
developments: five of the nine members of the investigating committee
had themselves received CIA funds; three of banks involved -- First
National City Bank, the Bank of Chicago, and the Royal Bank of Canada
-- refused to reveal the foreign sources of the money deposited in
the IBAD and the ADEP accounts; and lastly, Goulart, still hoping to
appease Washington, saw to it that the final report was laundered.
The CIA also manipulated certain members of the student movement. The
benefits of having assets in the universities, however, were not
realized until after the overthrow of Goulart. Though largely
ineffectual before the coup, the Grupo de Acao Patriotica (GAP) was
later used to spy on members of the national student union (UNE). GAP
was founded by Aristoteles Luis Drummond whose hero was the
right-wing Admiral Silvio Heck.32 During a radio talk show he did in
Rio de Janeiro, Drummond expounded on GAP's determined defense of
liberty and property, which he claimed only the military could
safeguard. Not surprisingly, the interview was rebroadcast by the
Voice of America. Later on, the CIA supplied Drummond with 50,000
books and Cold War pamphlets on the communist menace and, more to the
point, diatribes against the UNE. Still, GAP's following was small
and whenever Drummond put up posters saying "GAP with Heck," he made
sure it was in the dead of the night.
In the four years following the coup, however, Drummond and GAP came
to play a key role in the new junta. For example, during a student
demonstration in May of '68, protesting the discriminating cost of
education, a military jeep was overturned and set on fire. The next
morning, Drummond was asked to speak about the incident with
President Costa e Silva. Boarding a military aircraft, Drummond was
flown to Brasilia where he spent an hour with the president
identifying leaders of the demonstration and assuring Costa e Silva
that they were communists who did not represent the majority of
students.33
Police Operations
As opposition to the military junta increased, control of the state
apparatus became synonymous with increased surveillance, arrests, and
torture of those engaging in political activity. In response, Couto e
Silva, the chief of staff at IPES, took his hundreds of thousands of
files to Brasilia to set up the first national intelligence service,
the SNI.34 As with the creation of DINA in Chile, Brazil's SNI was
set up immediately after a CIA-backed military coup. Inevitably, the
SNI turned to its more powerful counterpart in the North. In police
barracks all over Brazil it was common knowledge that many officers
took money from, and reported directly to, the CIA stations. In
return, the CIA and the SNI began to push the police for results.
Hard-pressed for incriminating evidence on subversives, the police
concluded that nothing made a detainee more willing to talk than a
little torture. Besides, working closely with the CIA opened one up
to special stores of equipment. Everything from tear gas to field
telephones (used to administer electric shocks) could be delivered
immediately from the Panama branch of the CIA's Technical Services
Division (TSD). Requesting such material through normal channels
might take months.
Yet, the information on dissidents in Couto e Silva's files was
inconclusive, and the processing of prisoners was cumbersome. An
alternative resource had to be found. The sense of limitations on the
part of the Brazilian police soon gave rise to vigilante groups which
sought to appease the fears of Brazil's new leaders and their U.S.
backers. One of the men who acted on these concerns was Henning
Albert Boilesen, president of a liquid gas company. The suspicion
that Boilesen was in the pay of the CIA grew when he began soliciting
money from wealthy industrialists for a new organization called
Operacao Bandeirantes (OBAN).35 OBAN united the various military
police intelligence services into one paramilitary organization which
knew no limits.
Esquadraos da Morte (Death Squads) were not a new phenomenon in
Brazil. Before the coup they had been a source of extra income for
off-duty policemen. If a thug needed a rival eliminated, he could
arrange for a member of a Death Squad to get the job done. Despite
salary increases from the AID, six years after the coup Death Squad
executions by off-duty police personnel were still taking place. And
now, a new wrinkle had been added. The "Ten for One" dictum meant
that for every killing of a Death Squad member, ten people would die.
When a Sao Paulo police investigator was killed in 1970, nearly
twenty people were executed by the police.36
U.S. AID officials knew of and supported police participation in
Death Squads. In Uruguay, a CIA operations officer, William Cantrell,
used the cover of an AID Public Safety Advisor to help set up the
Department of Information and Intelligence (DII).37 Cantrell's
chauffeur, Nelson Bardesio was himself a member of the Death Squad in
Montevideo. Under interrogation by Tupamaros guerrillas in 1972,
Bardesio testified that the DII served as a cover for the Death
Squad. Bardesio's testimony further revealed that a Brazilian
diplomat offered to set up radio communications between Brasilia and
Montevideo. Uruguayan intelligence officials, claimed Bardesio,
received Death Squad-type training in Brazil. The living link between
the two countries' Death Squads is Sergio Fleury, a top officer of
the political police in Brazil. A leader in the elimination of the
Brazilian left, Fleury has been identified by hundreds of political
prisoners as the man who supervised their torture.38 Through his work
in the Death Squads, Fleury's infamy has spread from Sao Paulo to all
of Brazil and on to Uruguay. On at least two occasions, he met with
groups of Uruguayan police through CIA contacts.39
The systematic use of torture was also condoned if not encouraged by
U.S. AID officials. Police in Brazil once speculated on what the
Public Safety Advisor Dan Mitrione would do if he were witness to the
torturing of a prisoner. One said he would leave. Another asked,
"Where, the country?" "No," said the first, "leave the room."40 To
this day, the U.S. Public Safety Program in Brazil has assisted in
the training of over 100,000 federal and state police personnel.
Moreover, 600 high-ranking officers have received training at the
now-defunct International Police Academy (IPA) on the campus of
Georgetown University in Washington DC.41 The United States is also
responsible for the construction, equipping, and development of the
curriculum and faculty of Brazil's National Police Academy, its
National Telecommunications Center; and the National Institute of
Criminalistics and Identification.42
In the actual torturing of prisoners, the military and civilian
police worked hand in hand. It was a common practice for prisoners to
be taken from a prison run by the civilian police to one run by a
branch of the military and then back again to a facility run by the
police. CENIMAR, the navy's intelligence section, had its main prison
and torture center in the basement of the Ministry of the Navy, near
the docks of the harbor in Rio de Janeiro. U.S. Navy officers based
at the naval mission often heard screams from across the courtyard.
But none of them -- not even mission commander, Rear Admiral C. Thor
Hanson -- ever raised the matter with their hosts.43
>From the CENIMAR facility, prisoners were shipped across Guanabara
Bay by motor launch to a prison on the Isle of Flowers. Inside the
low white buildings were interrogators who specialized in torture.
The staff there was made up of members of the Department of Political
and Social Order (DOPS). The island's commander was Clemente Jose
Monteiro Filho, a graduate of the School of the Americas (commonly
referred to as the escuela de golpes, the school of coups) at Fort
Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.44 The leader of interrogation and
torture was Alfredo Poeck, a navy commander who had taken a three
month course at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg in 1961.45
A common torture routine consisted of a preliminary beating by a flat
wooden paddle with holes drilled through it called a palmatoria. This
would be followed by a more concentrated application of electric
wires to the genitals designed to elicit information from the victim.
If this method failed, the prisoner was subjected to another round
with the palmatoria -- often for six hours at a time.46 Today,
Brazil's terror technology has advanced beyond the electric prod and
the wooden paddle. Testimony from political prisoners verified by the
Brazilian College of Lawyers lists among the newest inventions a
refrigerated cubicle called a geladeira. Nude prisoners are boxed in
the geladeira for several days at a time and frequently doused with
ice-cold water. All the time, loudspeakers emit deafening sounds. One
prisoner described this as a "machine to drive people crazy."47
The graduates of CIA-connected police programs in the U.S. are an
undeniable concern to the Brazilian people. CounterSpy, speaking to
this concern, is presenting the names of these graduates during the
1961-64 periods:
Dates indicate when the person was in the U.S.
Abreu, Antonio Candido (4/15/63-7/15/63) Ferreira, Rubens Jose
(7/15/63-10/15/63)
Affonso, Leonel Archanjo (4/15/63-7/15/63) Firmo Sereno, Joao
(4/15/63-7/15/63)
Almeida, Eudes Batista (7/15/63-10/15/63) Hostin, Jose Mario
(4/15/63-7/15/63)
Almeida, Jose Tabosa (4/15/63-7/15/63) Lage, Raimundo
Valerio Dias (7/15/63-10/15/63)
Andrade, Neylor Vasconcellos (4/15/63-7/15/63) Mafra, Heitor
Martins (7/15/63-10/15/63)
Araujo, Jose Eduardo (7/15/63-10/15/63) Nascimento, Ricardo
Frazao do (4/15/63-7/15/63)
Araujo, Taltibio Delivalle y (4/15/63-7/15/63) Nogueira,
Hever da Silva (1/15/63-2/15/63)
Arnaut, Vilmar Leal (7/15/63-10/15/63) Oliveira, Alceu
Drummond (7/15/63-10/15/63)
Barbosa, Joaquim (4/15/63-7/15/63) Pereira, Paulo Fernandes
(1/15/63-4/15/63)
Boffa, Carlos Alberto (7/15/63-10/15/63) Ribeiro, Arlindo
Bento (7/15/63-10/15/63)
Brandao, Raul (4/15/63-7/15/63) Rosa, Helio Pestana
(1/15/63-4/15/63)
Costa, Jose Luiz (7/15/63-10/15/63) Saraiva, Iaci Cruz
(1/15/63-2/15/63)
Da Costa, Ismar Concalves (1/15/63-4/15/63) Silva, Paulo Souza da
(4/15/63-7/15/63)
Dantas, Walter (1/15/63-4/15/63) Silva, Wilson Gomes da
(7/15/63-10/15/63)
De Abreu, Eudes Coutinho (1/15/63-4/15/63) Silveira Filho, Paulo
Agemiro da (7/15/63-10/15/63)
De Almada, Antonio Soares (4/15/63-7/15/63) Sousa, Saulo Nunes
(4/15/63-7/15/63)
De Arruda, Firmiand Pacheco (1/15/63-4/15/63) Souza, Dilson
de Almeida (1/15/63-4/15/63)
Fernandes, Antonio (7/15/63-10/15/63) Teixeira, Dioran
(7/15/63-10/15/63)
Fernandes, Oezer Carvalho (1/15/63-2/15/63)
Labor Operations
In this final section we will examine how CIA's subversion of
Brazilian labor leaders and other trade union officials helped to
topple Goulart. As such, we are making available to the people of
Brazil the names of those persons who participated in special
training sessions in the U.S. from 1961-1964. These courses were run
by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) which,
according to Philip Agee, is a "CIA controlled labor center financed
through AID."48 Before going into the names, however, it is important
to trace the history of U.S. labor's cahoots with American foreign
policy in Latin America.
Since the middle of the 1950s, the American Federation of Labor and
the Congress of Industrial Organizations -- once they had merged to
become the AFL-CIO -- have taken on an increasingly active role in
the implementation of American foreign policy. When the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was established as an
anti-communist rival to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU),
the "Free World" acknowledged that Latin America would become the
exclusive domain of the AFL-CIO in its Cold War counter-offensive
against its perceived nemesis, Soviet Expansionism.49
ICFTU's affiliate in the Western hemisphere was the Inter-American
Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT). In both ideology and
practice, ORIT mirrored the AFL-CIO, which both funds and profits
from its little sister to the South. ORIT's "prime goal is to fight
Communism and to promote 'democratic trade-unionism.' It preaches
reform within the existing capitalist system, denying the existence
of class antagonism.... ORIT points to the U.S. as an example of the
rewards that the system can heap upon the working class and organized
labor."50 The principle sources of ORIT's funding have been the
AFL-CIO, ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund, and other U.S.
agencies. In 1961, its annual budget amounted to $125,000, excluding
the grants.51 The CIA has exercised considerable control over ORIT.
In the early 60s, Morris Paladino was ORIT's Director of Education,
Director of Organization and Assistant Secretary General. At the same
time, Paladino was also the CIA's principal agent in ORIT, working
out of the CIA's International Organizations (IO) Division in Mexico
City.52
Another creature of the AFL-CIO's work in the international arena is
the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).
Inaugurated in 1962, AIFLD's board of directors testifies to the
commonality of interests shared by the CIA and America's industrial
and labor elite. AIFLD's executive director until 1966 was Serafino
Romualdi, former Inter-American representative for the AFL-CIO. Other
board members include AFL-CIO chief George Meany; Joseph Beirne, head
of the Communication Workers of America and a collaborator in CIA
labor operations through the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers
International (PTTI); J. Peter Grace, an ex-president and present
chairman of the board of AIFLD, and head of the W.R. Grace Company
which has extensive interests in Latin America. Other business
leaders who hold or have held executive positions include Charles
Brinckerhoof, chairman of the board of the Anaconda Company; William
M. Hickey, president of the United Corporation; Robert C. Hill,
director, Merck and Company; Juan C. Trippe, chairman of the board,
Pan American World Airways; Henry S. Woodbridge, chairman of the
board, Tru-Temper Copper Corporation.53 A new member of AIFLD's board
of directors was Nelson Rockefeller who joined shortly before his
death. Aside from this illustrious crew, executives rounding out
AIFLD's leadership come from Gulf Oil International, Johnson and
Johnson International, Owens-Illinois, and members of the Institute
of International Education and the Fund for International Social and
Economic Education, both recipients of funding from CIA fronts.54
The extent to which AIFLD is under the aegis of the CIA is indicated
by the fact that Serafino Romualdi, while at AIFLD, was still an
agent of the CIA's International Organizations (IO) Division. Through
the IO Division, Romualdi and William Doherty -- former
Inter-American Representative of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone
Workers International (PTTI) and now AIFLD's Social Projects Director
-- exercised day-to-day control of AIFLD for the CIA.55
Unlike ORIT's out-front role in promoting pro-Western trade unionism,
AIFLD is dedicated to "strengthening the democratic labor sector in
terms of ... technical assistance and social projects ... primarily
in the areas of education and training, manpower studies,
cooperatives and housing."56 William Doherty is less equivocal when
he points out that AIFLD is an example of the desirability of
cooperation between employers and workers. He thus emphasizes AIFLD's
main goal: to dispel the hostility of Latin American workers toward
U.S. corporations.57
A less optimistic but more realistic appraisal of AIFLD's role is
given by Philip Agee in his book, Inside the Company. Speaking of its
creation in 1962, he states that AIFLD is "Washington's answer to the
limitations of current labor programs undertaken through AID as well
as through ORIT and CIA stations." The problem, says Agee, was "how
to accelerate expansion of labor organizing activities in Latin
America in order to deny workers to labor unions dominated by the
extreme left and to reverse communist and Castroite penetration."58
"AID programs," says Agee, "are limited because of their direct
dependence on the U.S. government.... ORIT programs are limited
because its affiliates are weak or non-existent in some countries....
The CIA station programs are limited by personnel problems, but more
so by the limits on the amount of money that can be channeled
covertly through the stations and through international organizations
like ORIT and ICFTU."59
Under the official cover of "adult education," AIFLD sets up social
projects such as workers' housing, credit unions and cooperatives.
AIFLD's major task, however, is similar to ORIT's in that it seeks to
organize anti-communist labor unions in Latin America. To this end,
AIFLD set up training institutes which would carry on the teaching of
courses presently being given by AIFLD members. And although
administrate control of the training institutes in Washington would
be by AIFLD, it was hoped that the institutes themselves would be
headed by salaried CIA agents under operational control of the local
CIA station.60
A logical outcome of AIFLD's obsession with anti-communism was the
direct participation of its trainees in the overthrow of Joao
Goulart. Even before Goulart came to power, AFL-CIO leaders were
critical of growing communist strength in both the labor movement and
in Juscelino Kubitschek's government. In 1956, Romualdi, along with
labor attaché Irving Salert and U.S. ambassador James C. Dunn,
arranged to have Brazilian labor leaders visit the U.S. AIFLD's goal
was the "development of a core of labor leaders who, by commanding
the enthusiastic support of the rank and file, could turn back
Communist attempts to capture the Brazilian labormovement."61
The 1960 elections saw Janio Quadros elected president and Goulart
vice-president. During this time, Romualdi began to court Carlos
Lacerda, the right-wing governor of Guanabara, the capital of which
is Rio de Janeiro. When Quadros attempted to halt Brazil's raging
inflation by limiting the supply of credit, pressure against him
mounted. In August of '61, after only eight months in office, Quadros
unexpectedly resigned. By doing this, he hoped to rally the nation
behind him and thus give himself new popular support. But Lacerda,
acting on the advice of Romualdi, saw to it that the expected
communist call for a general strike would be defeated. Speaking to
the opening session of the ORIT convention being held in Rio, Lacerda
said he would resign in order to lead "from the streets" the fight
against Quadros.62 During the convention, Romualdi and AFL-CIO
secretary-treasurer William F. Schnitzler pressured the labor leaders
into boycotting the proposed strike.63
When the call for a general strike was issued on August 26, the
Maritime Workers, the Central Committee of the Railway Unions and the
Trade Union Committee for the Defense of Democracy, representing over
four million workers, prevented their members from honoring the
strike, thus causing its failure.64
When news of ORIT's complicity with Lacerda's anti-government plans
became known, Quadros' Minister of Labor threatened to outlaw ORIT in
Brazil. Only Quadros' resignation kept him from issuing the decree.65
ORIT's relations with Quadros' successor were even worse. Early in
1962, an ORIT delegation headed by General Secretary Arturo Jauregui,
Mexican Senator Manuel Pavon and Romualdi went to Brasilia to confer
with Goulart. After waiting the whole day to speak with the
president, the delegation left without even having had a chance to
see Goulart. When Goulart came to New York later in the year, he
innocently asked the AIFLD director, "My dear Romualdi, when are you
coming to visit me in Brasilia?"66
Goulart's popularity steadily declined as inflation ate away the
wages of Brazilian workers. Between 1958 and 1963, the cost of living
increased by over 600 percent.67 To counter the combined criticism of
industry, commerce, the military and the Church, Goulart began to
take his case to the workers and oppressed people of Brazil's
countryside. But Romualdi and his allies had other plans.
To undermine Goulart's support in organized labor, ORIT, AIFLD, and
the American embassy worked to break up the left-dominated CGT
(General Workers Command), the nation's largest progressive labor
organization. Their efforts culminated at the Third National Labor
Congress of 1962. A U.S. labor specialist flown in especially for the
occasion plotted strategy for the "democratic" trade union leaders.
They convinced this minority bloc to pull out of the gathering, thus
undermining the CGT's efforts to unify labor.
Meanwhile, the Movimento Democratico Sindical (MDS), under its motto
"God, private property and free enterprise," received AIFLD aid and
advice in sponsoring meetings and setting up trade-union courses. In
addition, the Instituto Cultural do Trabalho (ICT) -- AIFLD's local
affiliate partially financed by U.S. business concerns -- trained
labor personnel and disseminated anti-communist propaganda. In
response to growing radical peasant movements in the rural Northeast,
AIFLD initiated a series of training and aid programs for reformist
groups and leaders.68
The close ties between AIFLD and the CIA went beyond the use of AIFLD
trainees in CIA-sponsored coups. It is the CIA's desire to continue
its penetration of labor unions as a means of silencing one of the
main foci of opposition to the U.S. presence in Latin America. In
Brazil, the CIA channeled $30,000 to the International Federation of
Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW) through its conduit the Andrew
Hamilton Foundation.69 It was AIFLD's plan to get the IFPCW to
affiliate with its anti-communist IFPCW counterpart in North America.
As a measure of the success of its payoff, sixteen major petroleum
unions in Brazil failed to unite in a National Federation of
Petroleum Workers which the CIA opposed. AIFLD was able to get these
unions to align with the conservative IFPCW by awarding financial aid
to unions taking such a course. At one point, the IFPCW
representative in Brazil, Alberto Ramos, wrote to one A. Noguria, "I
have with me 45 million cruzeiros (almost $17,000) for you to
distribute to the unions for campaigns in accordance with our plans."
An itemized payoff sheet attached to the note listed the following
recipients: $875.00 to Dr. Jorge Filho of the Ministry of Labor; a
bonus of $312.50 to a reporter for favorable newspaper coverage; and
$140.63 to two labor leaders for helping the IFPCW defeat an
opposition candidate for union office. However, because of these
revelations, the IFPCW was forced to end its Brazilian organizing
efforts.70
In the fall of '63, Romualdi and AIFLD vice-president Berent Friele
-- "an old Brazilian hand belonging to the Rockefeller entourage" --
met with one of Goulart's chief opponents, Adhemar de Barros,
governor of Sao Paulo.71 De Barros told the two men of plans already
under way to mobilize police and military contingents against
Goulart. When he complained that the U.S. Embassy was not listening,
Romualdi wrote to the embassy's labor attaché, John Fishburn. "The
Embassy's reaction," says Romualdi, "was, of course, noncommittal."72
Even before his pleas to the embassy fell on deaf ears, Romualdi had
decided that "a substantial sector of labor's rank and file were fed
up with the Goulart regime."73 Starting in 1963, AIFLD "trained in
Washington a special all-Brazilian class of thirty-three
participants."74 After travelling to Western Europe and Israel with
Romualdi, they returned to Brazil. Upon arrival, some went to the
countryside to organize and conduct seminars. Others went to Rio, Sao
Paulo and various industrial centers. Here then are the names of
those persons who participated in CIA-directed labor training courses
in the U.S. from 1961-1964:
Dates indicate when the person was in the U.S.
* designates participation in the AIFLD training session in
Washington DC in the first three months of 1963
Abate, Hugo (9/15/61-12/15/61) Luiz, Jose Martinho
(9/15/61-12/15/61)
Abbud, Jose (7/15/61-9/15/61) Machado Filho, Antonio
Rodriguez (8/15/63-10/15/63)
Abrita, Antonio (8/15/63-10/15/63) Magnani, Fabio (8/15/63-10/15/63)
Abritta, Ernane Souza (8/15/61-11/15/61) Maluf, Edmundo Amin *
(1/15/63-3/15/63)
Almeida, Gilson Dias de (6/15/63-9/15/63) Manzoni, Antenor
(7/15/63-10/15/63)
Almeida, Jose Gomes de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Marcassa, Joao *
(1/15/63-3/15/63)
Amante, Francisco Hegidio (7/15/61-9/15/61) Marinho, Dominiciano
de Sousa (6/15/62-9/15/62)
Araujo, Paulo Henrique * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Marques, Ivo Bento *
(1/15/63-3/15/63)
Barbosa, Jose Sebastiao (7/15/63-9/15/63) Mello, Jose Gabriel
de (8/15/61-10/15/61)
Barbosa, Onofre Martins (8/15/62-10/15/62) Mello Jr., Theodore
Narciso (5/15/63-7/15/63)
Bareta, Nelson (7/15/63-10/15/63) Moreira, Joao Balbino
Goncalves (6/15/62-9/15/62)
Barreto, Benjamin Bittencourt (9/15/61-12/15/61) Moreira,
Pedro Martins (8/15/61-10/15/61)
Barreto, Vincente de Paulo (5/15/63-7/15/63) Mueller,
Cezar Francisco (9/15/61-12/15/61)
Barros, Luiz Capitolino (7/15/63-10/15/63) Nascimento, Luiz
(8/15/61-3/15/62)
Bastos, Carlindo Martins (1/15/63-3/15/63) Nascimento, Zozimo
Gomes * (1/15/63-3/15/63)
Bastos, Thodiano Conceigao da Silva * (1/15/63-3/15/63)
Nascimerto, Djalma Paiva do * (1/15/63-3/15/63)
Bayer, Wilfredo Marcos (9/15/61-12/15/61) Neves, Jose Ferreira
(8/15/61-11/15/61)
Bottega, Abilio (6/15/62-9/15/62) Nina, Celso Afonso
(8/15/63-10/15/63)
Braga, Nelson (5/15/63-7/15/63) Nogueira, Paulo * (1/15/63-3/15/63)
Branco, Aparicio de Cerqueira (7/15/62-10/15/62) Oliveira,
Deodato (7/15/61-9/15/61)
Branco, Eliseu Castelo * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Oliveira, Edward
Ximenes de (8/15/61-11/15/61)
Brasiel, Wanderly Pimenta * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Oliveira,
Elieser da Silva * (1/15/63-3/15/63)
Busse, Ralf (8/15/62-10/15/62) Oliveira, Jose Luiz de
(7/15/63-10/15/63)
Carvalho, Antonio Nelson (10/15/62-12/15/62) Oliveira,
Solon de * (1/15/63-3/15/63)
Carvalho, Aureo * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Oliveira, Vbirajara Ferreira
de (7/15/63-10/15/63)
Castanheira, Bento * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Paiva, Carlos de *
(1/15/63-3/15/63)
Cerqueira, Jose de Arimateira (7/15/61-9/15/61) Paiyao,
Miguel Santos de (1/15/61-4/15/61)
Cesar, Jose Oliveira (8/15/61-11/15/61) Paula, Elison Galdino
de * (1/15/63-3/15/63)
Contesino, Erico Antonio (7/15/61-9/15/61) Pereira, Antenor
(7/15/63-10/15/63)
Correa, Jose Benedicto (7/15/63-10/15/63) Pereira, Vitalino
Alexandre (10/15/63-12/15/63)
Costa, Fortunato Batista de (6/15/63-9/15/63) Pinto,
Geraldo Servulo (10/15/62-12/15/62)
Costa, Jose Alives da (7/15/63-10/15/63) Priess, Carlos
Fernando (9/15/61-12/15/61)
Crocetti, Mario Domingos * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Provensi,
Mario Jose (8/15/61-10/15/61)
Cruz, Serafim Ferreira da (11/15/60-12/15/60) Queiroz,
Martinho Martins (7/15/61-11/15/61)
Cunha, Euclides Veriato da (7/15/63-10/15/63) Rego, Ormilo
Moraes (8/15/63-10/15/63)
Cunha, Joao Manoel (7/15/63-10/15/63) Reimer, Getulio
(8/15/62-10/15/62)
Da Silva, Pedro Guedes (7/15/60-10/15/60) Reinaldo, Bernardino
da Silva (7/15/63-10/15/63)
Dantas, Antonio Cavalcanti (6/15/63-9/15/63) Reis,
Leopoldo Miguel Dos (7/15/61-9/15/61)
De Silva, Manoel Francisco (11/15/60-12/15/60) Rezende,
Osvaldo Gomes (8/15/62-10/15/62)
Dias, Irineu Francisco (4/15/61-7/15/61); Ribeiro, Adair
(7/15/61-9/15/61)
Dimbarre, Alfredo (7/15/63-10/15/63) Rebeiro, Nelio de
Carvalho (8/15/63-10/15/63)
Diogo, Nelson (6/15/63-9/15/63) Ribeiro, Vbaldino Fontoura *
(1/15/63-3/15/63)
Faraco de Morias, Hermenegildo (8/15/61-10/15/61) Rocha,
Hildebrando Pinheiro (6/15/63-9/15/63)
Faria, Geraldo Pio de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Roque Netto,
Sebastiao Jose (8/15/61-10/15/61)
Ferreira, Alcides * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Santos, Etavaldo
Dantas dos (6/15/63-9/15/63)
Ferreira, Jose Felix (10/15/63-12/15/63) Santos, Reinaldo dos
(9/15/61-12/15/61)
Ferreira, Sonia Apparecida (5/15/63-11/15/63) Scoz, Elzide
(10/15/63-12/15/63)
Florentino, Primo Berto (10/15/63-12/15/63) Silva, Alvimar Macedo
(9/15/61-12/15/61)
Fonseca Filho, Tristao Pereira da (6/15/62-9/15/62) Silva,
Avelino da (8/15/61-10/15/61)
Fonseca, Valdenor Flores da (7/15/63-10/15/63) Silva, Edir
Inacio da (10/15/62-12/15/62)
Francisco, Alvise * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Silva, Francisco
Narciso da (9/15/61-12/15/61)
Freitas, Jose Reis (10/15/63-12/15/63) Silva, Helio Jose
Nunes da (6/15/63-9/15/63)
Gevaerd, Cezlos Jose * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Silva, Horacio
Arantes (6/15/62-9/15/62)
Gil, Waldomiro (8/15/62-10/15/62) Silva, Humberto Ferreira
(9/15/61-12/15/61)
Giro, Guilherme (6/15/62-9/15/62) Silva, Ivan (6/15/63-9/15/63)
Gomes, Silvio (10/15/62-12/15/62) Silva, Joao Baptista Raimundo
da (7/15/61-9/15/61)
Gomes, Vicente de Paula (10/15/63-12/15/63) Silva, Julio Trajano
da * (1/15/63-3/15/63)
Goncalves, Darci Manoel (6/15/63-9/15/63) Silva, Paulo da Cruz
(7/15/63-10/15/63)
Goncalves, Osmar H. (7/15/61-9/15/61) Silva, Waldomiro Luiz
da (9/15/61-12/15/61)
Guimaraes, Benedicto Luiz (8/15/61-11/15/61) Silva
Sobrinho, Jose Domingues (8/15/62-10/15/62)
Hauk, Helmuth (8/15/63-10/15/63) Silveira, Jose Bernardino da
(8/15/61-11/15/61)
Helfenstrein, Werno (8/15/61-10/15/61) Silveira Jr.,
Norberto Candido (9/15/61-12/15/61)
Leite, Antonio Pereira (7/15/63-10/15/63) Sousa Barbosa,
Onessimo de (10/15/63-12/15/63)
Leite, Floriano Gomes (8/15/61-10/15/61) Souto, Carlos
Ferreira (7/15/61-9/15/61)
Lenzi, Carlos Alberto Silveira (5/15/63-7/15/63) Souza,
Adelino Rodrigues de (6/15/62-9/15/62)
Lima, Jose Bezerra de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) Torreko da Costa,
Carlos Coqueijo (3/15/62-5/15/62)
Lima, Manoel Barbosa (6/15/62-9/15/62) Vianna, Gilberto Luiz
(7/15/63-10/15/63)
Lirani, Julio (8/15/61-10/15/61) Waidt, Nilo (8/15/61-10/15/61)
The role of AIFLD's trainees in the coup was made clear by the CIA's
William C. Doherty, AIFLD Director of Social Projects at the time. At
an AFL-CIO Labor News Conference in July 1964, Doherty noted that the
trainees "were very active in organizing workers.... As a matter of
fact, some of them were so active that they became intimately
involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution
[Washington's code-word for the coup] before it took place on April
1. What happened in Brazil ... did not just happen -- it was planned
-- and planned months in advance. Many of the trade union leaders --
some of whom were actually trained in our institute -- were involved
in the revolution [see above], and in the overthrow of the Goulart
regime."75
AIFLD had succeeded in delivering the Brazilian labor movement from
Communist leadership. Its supposed goal of creating an independent,
democratic labor movement, however, was quickly abandoned. Two and a
half years after the coup, AFL-CIO union leaders who went to Brazil
under AID's exchange program returned with a devastating indictment
of conditions for workers and unions in Brazil. In a New York Times
dispatch from Rio de Janeiro (November 23, 1966), James Jones of the
United Steel Workers of America stated that "The leaders of unions
here have the greatest fear I have ever seen in my life. They are
afraid to raise their voices on behalf of their workers for fear of
police reprisals."76
In fact, AIFLD leaders supported the authoritarian measures taken by
the military junta and provided rationales for its policies. After
one of Serafino Romualdi's principal contacts, Adhemar de Barros, was
deprived of his political rights for ten years, Romualdi stated
equivocally that "it is still too early for a final judgement on the
success or failure of the Brazilian 1964 revolution [sic!]"77 To
cement its solidarity with the new regime, William Doherty appeared
on the same platform with Brazil's president, General Castello
Branco, in April 1966 to help lay the foundation for an AIFLD housing
project in Sao Paulo. During his speech, Doherty declared that it was
"appropriate that the ceremonies were taking place on the second
anniversary of Brazil's democratic Revolution [sic]."78
Conclusion
The denial of all political rights and the suppression of working
class efforts to gain a more equitable share of Brazil's enormous
natural wealth give the lie to the country's "economic miracle" that
foreign investors proclaim.79 Whatever gains Brazil can speak of are
realized by only a small elite. Furthermore, the markets which she
can boast of are those for raw materials, agricultural products and
manufactured goods. These markets are all export-oriented and thus
depend on the fluctuating prices of the world market. When we add to
this the cheap cost of Brazilian labor, which is a prerequisite for
keeping these goods competitive, is it any wonder that Brazil's per
capita GNP is one of the lowest in Latin America?80 Clearly, the cost
of fueling Brazil's "economic miracle" is more than its people can
tolerate.
Since the military coup of 1964, there has been a decline in the real
wages of Brazilians amounting to almost 40 percent.81 Brazil's gross
foreign debt for 1978 is expected to reach a spectacular $40 billion,
with interest and amortization payments totalling $8 billion.82 The
reason for the seeming paradox between a country so rich in natural
resources yet one whose people suffer life-long misery is quite
simple, however: for capitalists, both Brazilian and foreign, the
masses are looked upon as costs, not customers: the lower their real
wages, the higher the profits from selling to the local upper class
and the international market.83
If cheap labor and an absence of political opposition have been
considered Brazil's major investment advantages since 1964, events of
recent years suggest that the attractiveness of Brazil to foreign
investors may be on the decline. In 1978, Brazilian autoworkers
paralyzed the industry with a major strike.84 In 1969, bank robberies
by revolutionary groups in Sao Paulo alone amounted to over $1.5
million.85
Brazil's rulers themselves have had to assume a "get-tough" attitude
toward the U.S. in the wake of State Department reports on human
rights violations. In order to gain credibility amongst their local
backers, the Brazilians showed how badly they were miffed: by
canceling in March, 1977 a 25-year-old military assistance treaty
between Washington and Brasilia. At the same time, Brazil turned down
a $50 million loan credit for the purchase of military supplies
because of human rights demands attached to it by the U.S.
Congress.86 In September, 1977, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry
announced the termination of a Brazilian-American military commission
and a naval commission established in 1942 to coordinate World War II
efforts. Also canceled were a 1967 pact governing the use of
armaments imported from the U.S. and a 1952 agreement for U.S.
participation in aerial mapping of Brazil.87 Of the March rejection,
chief of staff General Moacir Barcelos Potyguara stated that the
decision would cause no problems in Brazil's military preparedness.88
Unfortunately, this cavalier attitude will not effect the long-term
military relations between the two countries. The March, 1977
announcement was to take place one year later. No mention was made of
rejecting that which is already in the pipeline to Brazil. At the
least, Brazil should benefit for years to come from its friendship
with the U.S. Furthermore, U.S. opposition to Brazil's planned
purchase of West German nuclear reprocessing technology seems to have
subsided. In a recent visit to Brazil, Vice President Mondale backed
away from criticizing the country's plans to build a uranium
reprocessing plant capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.89
As for Brazil's new president, Joao Baptista Figueiredo, and what
lies in store for the Brazilian people, a few words must be said. For
the unsuspecting, last month's appointment of Figueiredo as president
appeared to usher in a new era of liberalization for that country's
political situation. Pledging to continue the reforms (which included
the closing of Congress for four months in 1977) initiated by his
predecessor, Ernesto Geisel, Figueiredo declared that it would be his
"unswerving purpose" to make Brazil a democracy. He guaranteed
freedom of expression for the "many segments of Brazilian public
opinion."90 But for those who have even the slightest familiarity
with the man who is Brazil's fifth military head of state since the
armed forces carried out a CIA-backed coup in 1964, Joao Baptista
Figueiredo is to be watched closely.
His background speaks to the intimate role the CIA has played in
making Brazil one of the most repressive and, not surprisingly, one
of the "safest" investment climates in Latin America. After the '64
coup, the CIA helped Brazil set up its first national intelligence
service, the SNI. Figueiredo became the director of its Rio office.
Later he was named head of the military police in Sao Paulo, after
which he became then-President Emilio Medici's chief of staff. Before
coming to Brasilia in 1974 to direct the SNI, Figueiredo commanded
the Third Army in Porto Alegre. Given the documented penetration and
usurpation of the SNI and the police forces by the CIA, can there
remain any doubt that with Figueiredo's ascendancy to the executive
office, Langley truly has their "man in Brazil"?
In an effort to dress up the seamy history of their new president,
the National Renewal Alliance, the Government party, hired the
largest advertising agency in Brazil to change Figueiredo's public
image. The agency, Al Cantro Machado, which works closely with the
huge New York ad agency, Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, replaced
Figueiredo's dark glasses with clear, metal-framed ones, got him to
tone down on insults such as "For me the smell of horses is better
than the smell of people," and, finally, succeeded in projecting him
as almost a populist, anti-establishment figure.
But for the people of Brazil, the media blitz around "election" time
contrasts sharply with the harsh conditions under which they have
lived since the '64 coup. With the creation of the SNI and the
imposition of successive Institutional Acts, the democratic freedoms
Brazilians once enjoyed have been destroyed. The danger of living in
South America's oldest police state, however, has not deterred them
from struggling to achieve basic human rights. As Figueiredo took
office on March 15, over 200,000 industrial workers were on strike in
Sao Paulo demanding a wage hike of 78 percent to keep pace with
Brazil's astronomical rate of inflation, up 44 percent over last
year.91
Contradicting his liberalization pledges and new image, Figueiredo,
after only a week in office sent troops into Rio de Janeiro on Friday
March 23rd. The troops seized the union headquarters and arrested
1,600 workers. Although the workers were released over the weekend,
the Ministry of Labor unilaterally called for new union elections and
issued a decree which stripped a group of union officials of their
posts. The duly-elected head of the metal, mechanical and electrical
workers' union, Luiz Inaco da Silva has been prohibited from running
for reelection or participating in union activity. Although Inaco has
denied that the strike was called to test the promised liberalization
of the Figueiredo regime, the manner in which it was dealt with makes
clear the government's intolerance of even legal opposition.
It is in the wake of this strike-breaking that Figueiredo's statement
about "fair-play" between Brazil's legislative and executive branches
must be evaluated. During his inaugural address, he stated that "The
game is just beginning and as soon as I am in office the ball will
belong to me. If the politicians play well, fine. But if they play
badly, I will put the ball under my arm and leave the field.92 If
this warning was ambiguous at the time, Figueiredo's actions of last
week [March 1979] have clarified any uncertainty that people may have
had. Under the new president, the future of Brazil's 116 million
people bodes ill. For, without the slightest hesitation, Figueiredo
has removed democracy from the realm of political possibilities in
Brazil and has tucked it away in his desk drawer where it will
continue to gather dust as it has for the past fifteen years, to be
brought out again at the next showing of Brazilian "liberalization."
CIA Officers in Brazil as of August, 1978
Burton, Stewart D. (born: 5 April 1928)
Burton has served in Brazil on three previous occasions: from
1952-1955 at the Consulate General in Sao Paulo as a Vice-Consulwith
the rank of S-11; from 1962-1964 at the Consulate in Curitiba as a
"political officer" with the rank of R-5; and from 1967-1970 at the
Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro as a "political officer"
progressing from R-4 to R-3. As of August, 1978, Burton was at the
Embassy in Brasilia under the cover of "First Secretary."
Graves, R. Martin (born: 1 July 1937)
Graves, also, has had previous experience in Brazil. In 1967 he was
stationed in Recife as an Economic Officer with the rank of R-6. From
1968 to 1969 he served at the then-Embassy in Rio de Janeiro as a
Political Officer with the rank of R-5. At the end of1969 he was
transferred to Sao Paulo where he served for three years as a
Political Officer. After a stint in Saigon and back home at the State
Department, Graves was reassigned to the Embassy in Brasilia as a
Political Officer in January, 1976. In August, 1978 he was
transferred to the Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro.
Neves, Antonio L. (born: 15 June 1931)
Neves first came to Brazil in 1962 after seven years in the
Department of Army as an "analyst." His first assignment was at the
then-Embassy in Rio de Janeiro as an Attaché with the rank of R-6. He
served for four years in Brazil, after which he was assigned to Rome,
and then the State Department in Washington. He reappeared at the
Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro in August, 1978.
Edger, David N. (born: 20 June 1945)
Edger taught public school in 1967-1968 before serving as an
"educator" in the Department of Army for five years. Upon joining the
State Department in January, 1973, he was assigned to the Embassy in
Santiago, Chile as a "political officer" with the rank of R-7. As of
August, 1978, he was working in the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia. His
position is that of Second Secretary.
Mallet, John W. (born: 10 April 1945)
Mallet's government experience consists of two years as a "program
analyst" with the Department of Army from 1972-1974. When he joined
the State Department in 1975, he was assigned to the Embassy in
Santiago as a "political officer" with the rank of R-7. As of August,
1978, he has been at the Embassy in Brasilia working under the cover
of Second Secretary.
CIA Collaborators in Brazil as of August, 1978
The following U.S. government employees have collaborated or worked
with the CIA in a functional capacity:
Arenales, Alfonso (born: 1 March 1926)
Arenales joined the State Department in 1957 where he served as an
"intelligence research analyst" for two years. He has served in Iran,
Rio de Janeiro and the Dominican Republic. It should be noted that
during Arenales' three years in the Dominican Republic (1964-67),
Lyndon Johnson and the CIA overthrew the democratically elected
president Juan Bosch; invaded the island with over 40,000 U.S.
Marines; and sent in Brazilian troops to crush the popular resistance
movement. Arenales is presently serving in the political section of
the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia as a Consul.
High, George Borman (born: 25 July 1931)
High joined the State Department in 1956 and served for two and a
half years as an "intelligence research analyst." He has served in
Angola and Lebanon (where he was an "Arab language-area trainee" at
the Foreign Service Institute field-school). Back at the State
Department, he served as the desk officer for South Africa,
Angola-Mozambique, and Madagascar, respectively. He has served in
Ecuador and Argentina, and has been detailed to the Army War College.
As of August, 1978, High was at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia, serving
as a Consul for Ministerial Affairs.
Povenmire, Dale Miller (born: 6 June 1930)
Povenmire joined the State Department in 1957 with the rank of R-8.
In 1958 he was stationed in Santiago as a "political and economic
officer." He spent the next three years at the State Department as an
"intelligence research specialist." His next assignments were in
Zanzibar and Paraguay. In 1966, Povenmire was back at the State
Department as an "international relations officer." Two years later,
he became a representative at the National Military Command Center of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. He was then assigned to
Venezuela and Portugal. As of August, 1978, he was the "labor
officer" at the Consulate General in Sao Paulo.
References
1. A.J. Langguth, Hidden Terrors, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 47.
2. Ibid., p. 49.
3. Ibid., p. 51.
4. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
5. Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World, New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1974, p. 44.
6. Ibid., p. 15.
7. Ibid., p. 149.
8. Langguth, Hidden Terrors, p. 64.
9. Payer, Debt Trap, p. 145.
10. Ibid., p. 150.
11. Langguth, p. 71.
12. Payer, p. 152.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 153.
15. Ibid., p. 153.
16. Langguth, p. 145.
17. Helen Shapiro and Steven Volk, "Global Shift: Brazil Steals the
Show," North American Congress on Latin America, Report on the
Americas, Jan.-Feb. 1979, p. 25.
18. Langguth, p. 85.
19. Penny Lernoux, "Fascism in Brazil," Inquiry, November 27, 1978, p. 13.
20. Langguth, p.95
21. Lernoux, "Fascism in Brazil," p. 13.
22. Ibid., p. 16.
23. Ibid., p. 13.
24. Ibid., p. 13.
25. Langguth, p. 85.
26. Ibid., p. 86.
27. Ibid., p. 90.
28. Ibid., p. 108.
29. Ibid., p. 87.
30. Ibid., p. 90.
31. Ibid., p. 102.
32. Ibid., p. 89.
33. Ibid., p. 154.
34. Ibid., p. 120.
35. Ibid., p. 123.
36. Michael Klare and Nancy Stein, "Police Terrorism in Latin
America," North American Congress on Latin America, Latin America and
Empire Report, Jan. 1974, p. 21.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Langguth, p. 244.
40. Ibid., p. 140.
41. Klare and Stein, "Police Terrorism," p. 21.
42. Ibid.
43. Langguth, p. 162.
44. Ibid. p. 163.
45. Ibid., p. 96.
46. Ibid., pp. 164-165.
47. Lernoux, p. 14.
48. Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, New York:
Stonehill, 1975, p. 601.
49. Hobart A. Spalding, Jr. "U.S. and Latin American Labor: The
Dynamics of Imperialist Control," in Ideology and Social Change in
Latin America, June Nash, Juan Corradi and Hobart Spalding, Jr.
editors, New York: Gordon and Breach, 1977, p. 66.
50. Ibid., p. 62.
51. Ibid., p. 63.
52. Agee, Inside the Company, p. 237.
53. Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy,
New York, Random House, 1969, p. 420.
54. Spalding, "U.S. and Latin American Labor," p. 67.
55. Agee, p. 244.
56. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on
American Republic Affairs, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, Labor
Policies and Programs, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, July 15, 1968, pp.
5-9.
57. Radosh, American Labor, p. 418.
58. Agee, p. 243.
59. Ibid., p. 244.
60. Ibid., p. 245.
61. Serafino Romualdi, Presidents and Peons: Recollections of a
Labor Ambassador in Latin America, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967,
p. 278.
62. Ibid., p. 285.
63. Ibid., p. 286.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 287.
67. Ibid., p. 288.
68. Spalding, pp. 70-71.
69. Radosh, p. 432.
70. Ernest Garvey, "Meddling in Brazil: The CIA Bungles On,"
Commonweal, February 9, 1968, pp. 553-54.
71. Romualdi, Presidents and Peons, p. 289.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. See Radosh, p. 427.
76. See George Morris, CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of
the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy, New York: International Publishers,
1967, p. 95.
77. Romualdi, p. 290.
78. Radosh, p. 427.
79. Payer, pp. 143-44.
80. Ibid., p. 144.
81. Paul M. Sweezy, "Corporations, the State and Imperialism,"
Monthly Review, November, 1978, p. 9.
82. See Shapiro and Volk, "Global Shift," p. 25.
83. Sweezy, "Corporations," p. 9.
84. Shapiro and Volk, p. 26.
85. Joao Quartim, Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil, New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1971, p. 169.
86. New York Times, 11 March 1977, p. A-1.
87. Washington Star, 20 September 1977, p. A-1.
88. New York Times, 11 March 1977, p. A-1.
89. Washington Post, 23 March 1979, p. A-20.
90. New York Times, 16 March 1979, p. A-3.
91. Washington Post, 27 March 1979, p. A-10.
92. New York Times, 16 March 1979, p. A-3.
>From Inside the Company: CIA Diary by Philip Agee (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 361-62:
Montevideo, 1 April 1964
It's all over for Goulart in Brazil much faster and easier than most
expected.... U.S. recognition of the new military government is
practically immediate, not very discreet but indicative, I suppose,
of the euphoria in Washington now that two and a half years of
operations to prevent Brazil's slide to the left under Goulart have
suddenly bloomed.
Our campaign against him took much the same line as the ones against
communist infiltration in the Velasco and Arosemena governments two
and three years ago in Ecuador. According to Holman [Ned Holman, CIA
Chief of Station in Montevideo], the Rio station and its larger bases
were financing the mass urban demonstrations against the Goulart
government, proving the old themes of God, country, family and
liberty to be effective as ever. Goulart's fall is without doubt
largely due to the careful planning and consistent propaganda
campaigns dating at least back to the 1962 election operation.
Foreign Service List
April 1964 (Revised as of March 20, 1964)
United States of America, Department of State
[Excerpt of only the section for Brazil]
Preface
The Foreign Service List, issued quarterly by the Department of
State, is compiled primarily for use by the Department of State, the
Foreign Service, and other United States Government Agencies to
provide information on the assignments of Foreign Service personnel
and other United States personnel assigned overseas. The information
it contains has also been found useful by American business firms,
various groups and individuals, and foreign governments.
The List includes: chiefs of mission; Foreign Service officers;
Foreign Service Reserve officers; Foreign Service Staff officers of
class six and above; Foreign Service Staff officers of class seven
and eight with the title "vice consul" when assigned to a post having
a complement of one, two or three officers; and consular agents.
Special sections are also included on officers of the Agency for
International Development, the Peace Corps, the United States
Information Agency, the Foreign Agricultural Service of the United
States Department of Agriculture, the Departments of Army, Navy, and
Air Force, and United States Missions to International Organizations.
Personnel are listed in this publication at their respective posts,
with their titles, category, and class. The date of assignment listed
for ambassadors and ministers is the date of attestation and/or
recess appointment; for all other officers at the post, the effective
date of transfer is listed except in cases where a commission is
involved for a consul general, consul, or vice consul. This
information is taken from personnel action forms.
The listing of personnel at Embassy and Legation posts is by section
and is alphabetical within the section with the exception of the
chief of mission, the deputy chief of mission, and the section chief
who are listed first under each section. At all other posts the
listing is alphabetical except for the principal officer who appears
first under each post.
A section is also included giving data on the opening and closing of
posts; posts changed in rank and status; and other pertinent data.
Only that information received prior to the revision date of the
publication is included. Therefore, the List does not necessarily
reflect the current diplomatic or consular status of every individual
listed. Users in the United States may ascertain the current status
of any officer of the United States assigned to a Foreign Service
post by communicating with the Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520. Users overseas may secure the same information by
communicating with the American Embassy or Legation in that country.
This List is compiled by the Division of Publishing Services, Office
of Operations, and necessary corrections should be reported to that
Division.
Brazil
Rio de Janeiro (E)
EXECUTIVE SECTION
Gordon, Lincoln, A., E. and P. 9-18-61
Mein, John G., min-couns.; cons.gen. (O-1) 1-20-63
Avallone, Mildred A., sec. asst. (S-4) 5-31-59
POLITICAL SECTION
Keppel, John, couns. pol. aff.; cons. (O-2) 3-3-63
Arenales, Alfonso, 3d sec.; pol. off. (O-7) 9-17-61
Baker, Herbert W., 1st sec.; labor att. (O-3) 10-27-63
Brady, Thomas A., att.; pol. off. (R-4) 7-23-61
Cann, Ruth E., pol. asst. (S-5) 10-29-61
Carson, Charles C., 1st sec.; pol. off. (O-3) 5-27-62
Clearman, Albert M., pol. asst. (S-4) 3-11-63
Dyer, Donald R., geog. spec. (R-5) 2-4-62
Fishburn, John T., 1st sec.; labor att. (O-2) 9-8-57
Gahagen, Robert D., att.; pol. off. (R-3) 4-28-63
Gardiner, L. Keith, pol. off. (R-7) 11-2-62
Gresham, Vernet L., 1st sec.; pol. off. (R-2) 3-17-63
Hathaway, Gardner H., att.; pol. off. (R-5) 9-20-62
Hibbs, Russell S., att.; pol. off. (R-6) 7-8-62
Kilday, Lowell C., 2d sec.; pol. off. (O-5) 2-16-64
Lawrence, John O., att.; pol. off. (R-4) 6-4-62
Neves, Antonio L., att. (R-6) 7-16-62
Penn, Lawrence A., pol. off. (R-8) 11-1-63
Shapiro, Harold, 1st sec.; asst. labor att. (R-3) 12-17-61
Simonpietri, Andre C., sci. att. (R-1) 6-4-62
Smith, Robert B., pol. asst. (S-6) 2-3-63
Smith, William. L., att.; pol. off. (R-5) 6-23-63
Yelton, David L., pol. asst. (S-4) 3-11-63
ECONOMIC SECTION
Kubish, Jack B., min-couns. ec. aff. (O-1) 1-19-64
Elwood, Robert B., couns. ec. off.; cons. gen. (O-1) 10-13-63
Bash, Edward J., cml. att. (O-3) 6-12-60
Crane, Ray H., 2d sec.; t.c.o. (O-5) 9-15-63
Goldstein, Bernice A., 2d sec.; cml. off. (O-4) 9-18-60
Grover, Charles W., 2d sec.; ec. off. (O-4) 4-28-63
Haydel, Belmont F., Jr., att.; cml. off. (R-6) 10-27-63
Krizay, John, 2d sec.; fin. off. (O-4) 6-12-60
Ransome, Alfred L., att.; minls. off. (R-3) 9-9-61
CONSULAR SECTION
Davis, Roy T., Jr., 1st. sec.; cons. gen.; cons. off. (O-2) 8-18-63
Hunter, Grace M., sec. (S-6) 9-6-59
Kemp, Katherine L., 2d sec.; cons.; visa off. (O-5) 3-17-63
Ryan, Robert J., Jr., 3d sec.; v.c.; cons. off. (O-7) 3-1-64
Werner, Norman M., 2d sec.; cons.; cons. off. (O-5) 2-3-63
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
Loupe, Sylvain R., couns. for adm.; cons. (O-2) 5-31-59
Abell, Helen T. asst. d.o. (S-3) 3-19-61
Abidian, John V., att. (R-4) 5-27-62
Becker, Gilbert D., Jr., coms. spec. (S-6) 8-23-63
Bush, John M., coms. spec. (S-5) 9-20-63
Colletti, John T., att.; off. (R-5) 7-8-62
Finne, Florence H., 1st sec.; pers. off. (O-3) 8-19-62
Gordhamer, John W., 2d sec.; bud-mgnt. off.(O-4) 3-20-60
Gyenes, Alfred, coms. spec. (S-5) 6-18-63
Lang, Archie S., 2d sec.; g.s.o. (O-4) 2-3-63
Pitman, Chalmer E., coms rec. supvr. (S-4) 3-17-63
Roehner, Gwen M., nurse (S-5) 8-4-63
Warner, Ronald J., asst. att.; adm. spec. (S-5) 6-14-63
Wright, Ida M., coms. supvr. (S-5) 11-11-62
__________
Bouton, Norman M., 3d sec.; v.c.; FSO gen. (O-7) 7-8-62
Friedman, Townsend B., Jr., 3d sec.; v.c,; FSO gen. (O-8) 12-23-62
Jennings, Mary C., att.; social welfare off. (R-4) 2-20-63
Johnson, Peter B., 3d sec.; v.c.; FSO gen. (O-7) 1-19-64
Rauscher, Dorothy J., supvr. instr. (R-4) 6-14-59
Zweifel, David E., 3d sec.; v.c.; FSO gen. (O-7) 10-14-62
(AA, NA & Air A)
Walters, Col. Vernon A., army att. 9-20-62
Ireland, Capt. James M., n.a./n.a.a 1-14-60
Kalb, Col. Robert D., air att. 1-4-60
Connelly, Maj. Frank P., Jr., asst. army att. 1-13-61
Dillon, Lt. (jg) Francis P., a.n.a./ a.n.a.a 10-30-62
Barbee, Maj. Bud, asst. air att. 8-26-63
Kahl, Capt. Raymond W., Jr., asst. air att. 6-12-61
(FAS)
Milam, Ford M., agri. att. 6-15-59
Kinzhuber, Rado J., att. 4-17-62
Mears, Leon G., asst. att. 11-23-63
(AID)
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
Kubish, Jack B., dir., pers. rank min. (O-1)
Howe, James W., dep. dir. (R-1)
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Guerin, Faustin A., exec. off. (R-2)
Macdonald, Frank J., asst. exec. off. (R-4)
OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER
Olnick, Norman, controller (R-2)
PROGRAM OFFICE
Lion, Donor, asst. dir. plan. eval. (R-1)
Scherbak, Boris, spec. asst. prog. coord. (R-2)
Minges, Robert J., prog. off. (R-3)
MISSION AND TECHNICAL STAFF
Albers, Joseph E., health prog. asst. (R-7)
Anthony, George, electronic engr. (R-4)
Armstrong, Helen E., sec. (S-6)
Asay, Merril B., agri. educ. ad. (R-4)
Asper, James E., tech. aids coord. (R-3)
Baca, Ray R., pub. safety ad. (R-5)
Barber, Fred W., ext. ad. (R-4)
Beal, Donald E., aud. (R-5)
Bennett, Helen, rec. supvr. (S-6)
Bjorklund, Helen A., home ec. ad. (R-5)
Bodenlos, Alfred J., geol. (FC-4)
Boke, Adele T., asst. prog. off. (R-3)
Bower, Cecil L., highway engr. (FC-3)
Brailsford, Lawrence J., prog. anal. (R-6)
Brooks, Leonard D., agri. mktg. proc. ad. (R-4)
Campbell, Donald F., tech. ad. geol. (FC-5)
Carriker, Francis L., supply ad. (R-3)
Carter, Martha E., pers. off. (R-4)
Cashin, William E., pub. safety ad. (R-3)
Clark, Robert J., pub. safety ad. (R-5)
Clay, Robert J., labor tech. off. (R-3)
Clements, Leon J., pub. safety ad. (R-5)
Coonrod, L. George, agri. mktg. proc. ad. (R-4)
Curry, Charles D., agri. credit coop. ad. (R-3)
Decker, Howard S., trade-ind. educ. ad. (R-4)
Diggs, Ernest D., g.s.o. (R-5)
Edwards, Virginia L., sec. (S-6)
Ferri, Bernard, malaria spec. (R-4)
Franco, Daniel, aud. (R-5)
Gibson, John W., trng. ad. (R-4)
Gill, Charles J., supply ad. (R-4)
Glissendorf, Owen F., ext. ad. (R-5)
Gracey, Harry F., ind. develop. ad. (R-2)
Grazier, James A., coms. media ad. (R-4)
Grodsky, Morris, pub. safety ad. (R-4)
Herz, Norman, geol. (FC-5)
Hobbes, John C., agri. prog. asst. (R-4)
Hodges, Lewis H., trade-ind. educ. ad. (R-4)
Hood, Eugene, trade-ind. educ. ad. (R-5)
Horn, Francis H., supvr. electronics engr. (FC-3)
Hudson, LeVerne D., san. engr. (R-4)
Hughes, Paul W., geol. (R-4)
Huls, Ralph M., bus. mgr. (R-4)
Jessup, Frank A., chief pub. safety ad. (R-3)
Jones, Kenneth H., mech. engr. (R-5)
Keen, Harry C., pub. adm. ad. (R-3)
Kirwan, Robin M., agri. mktg. proc. ad. (R-4)
Knowlan, Charles J., Jr., asst. controller (R-4)
LaFalce, Carmelo P., pub. safety prog. asst. (R-6)
Landes, Jacobs H., epidemiologist (FC-4)
Lewis, James N., pub. safety ad. (R-3)
Lewis, Richard W., Jr., geol. (FC-6)
Little, Martin E., dep. chief educ. ad. (R-3)
Loomis, Richard P., malaria ad. (R-4)
Lopez, Francis X., cartog. (FC-6)
Losee, Garrie J., pub. adm. statist. (FC-5)
Marvin, Kenneth R., ext. ad. (R-4)
Miller, Ralph E., agri. credit ad. (R-4)
Mitchell, Tom, aud. (R-5)
Nelson, Charles E., legal ad. (R-3)
Newberg, Richard R., food-agri. off. (R-2)
Nichols, Elwood S., supply ad. (R-3)
Oley, William H., aud. (R-5)
Parker, Edlow G., pub. adm. ad. (R-3)
Paxson, William B., asst. prog. off. (R-4)
Peabody, John D., asst. prog. off. (R-7)
Pease, George, pub. adm. ad. (R-3)
Pereles, Richard M., capital projs. off. (R-3)
Pollard, Albert W., soils ad. (land class). (R-3)
Prouty, Gordon K., reports off. (R-4)
Ream, Howard W., agri. ad. (R-3)
Regnier, Arthur V., Jr., malaria ad. (FC-4)
Reinhold, Robert W., pub. adm. ad. (R-3)
Rocker, Sidney, pub. safety ad. (R-4)
Ross, Mildred, elem. educ. ad. (R-5)
Savage, Harold L., health educ. ad. (R-5)
Schatz, Robert J., san. engr. (R-3)
Schoff, Stuart L., geol. (FC-4)
Schroeder, Clayton L., agri. ad. (R-3)
Schwartz, Arnold J., ind. develop. ad. (R-3)
Shirley, Charles E., gen. engr. (R-2)
Skirvin, Kenneth W., coms. media ad. (R-4)
Smith, Phillip D., agri. coop. ad. (R-5)
Stack, Thomas P., pub. safety ad. (R-3)
Tate, Lawrence J., coms. media off. (R-2)
Theodorides, Angelos, prop. ec. (R-3)
Troyer, Max L., geol. (FC-5)
Wagner, Edmund G., san. engr. (R-2)
Warrens, Robert H., dep. food-agri. off. (R-3)
Wenburg, Wayne Q.O., soils ad. (R-4)
Weyland, Walter, dep. chief pub. safety (R-4)
Wight, Leon, aud. (R-6)
Wisdom, Robert W., asst. foods prog. off. (R-4)
Wolf, Leonard G., tech. coop. ad. (R-1)
(PC)
Coleman, George M., Jr., dep. PC rep. (R-3)
Brown, William N., assoc. PC rep. (R-4)
Castellino, Ronald A., PC phys. (R-5)
Estrin, Alexander I., assoc. PC rep. (R-6)
Fanning, Leo C., assoc. PC rep. (R-4)
Hartfield, Ann C., assoc. PC rep. (R-7)
Lopes, Phillip M., assoc. PC rep. (R-8)
Marasciulo, Joan M., assoc. PC rep. (R-5)
Miller, Louis L., assoc. PC rep. (R-5)
Rosenfeld, Howard L., PC phys. (R-5)
Watson, Jean A., sec. (S-6)
(USIA)
Oram, Frank H., Jr., couns. pub. aff. (cR-1)
Boerner, Alfred V., couns. pub. aff. (cR-1)
Ware, Hoyt N., dep. pub. aff. off.; att. (cR-2)
Bishop, Bruce A., asst. info. off.; asst. att. (R-5)
Boehrer, George C.A., cult. aff. off.; att. (R-3)
Borup, Edgar S., asst. cult. aff. off.; att. (cR-4)
Bristow, William D., info. off.; att. (cR-4)
Cooper, George W., press off.; att. (R-4)
Estes, Lawrence D., asst. book off. (cR-7)
Fielden, Bert S., exec. off.; att. (R-3)
French, Graham K., asst. cult. aff. off. (R-5)
Hanson, Helen S., asst. cult. aff. off. (cR-6)
Harrigan, John J., pub. aff. trainee (cR-8)
James, Alan E., Sr., book off. (R-3)
Kent, Robert J., radio off. (R-4)
Kopp, Alice E., asst. cult. aff. off. (R-6)
Lane, Jonathan, prog. resch. off. (R-5)
McArdle, Francis J., prog. off.; att. (R-3)
Mertz, Charles T., motion picture off. (S-1)
Morad, James L., asst. cult. aff. off. (cR-6)
Nieberg, Patrick E., info. off.; att. (R-3)
Snow, Robert S., pub. aff. trainee (cR-7)
Stirling, Robert B., asst. press off. (R-5)
Vince, John J., TV prod. off. (S-2)
Zubrinsky, Aida, exec. sec. (S-6)
Brasilia Office
Dean, Robert W., couns.; pol. off. (O-2) 7-21-63
Beal, Williams, 1st sec.; cons.; ec. off. (O-3) 3-17-63
Bentley, Robert B., 3d sec.; v.c.; FSO gen. (O-8) 3-17-63
Desmond, Timothy J., att.; pol. off. (R-5) 4-15-62
Gershenson, Robert S., 2d sec.; cons.; adm. off. (O-5) 12-10-61
Hammond, Charles L., bldg-maint. engr. (S-4) 11-7-62
Keyser, C. Dirck, 2d sec.; cons.; pol. off. (O-4) 10-14-62
McCulley, Ralph M., gen. sers. asst. (S-6) 7-9-61
McLean, J. Phillip, 3d sec.; v.c.; FSO gen. (O-8) 8-5-62
Weiner, Harry, 2d sec.; cons.; pol. off. (O-5) 12-24-61
(AID)
Prior, J. Russell, pub. safety ad. (R-3)
Stigberg, Roy E., pub. safety ad. (R-5)
Weatherwax, Robert J., pub. safety ad. (R-4)
(USIA)
Shetterly, Howard E., br. pub. aff. off.; att. (R-4)
Bailey, Dale S., cult. aff. off. (R-5)
Ryan, Harry B., info. off. (cR-6)
Belem, Para (C)
Bloom, Hyman, cons. (O-5) 11-25-62
Ebert, Louis V. III, v.c. (R-6) 8-19-62
Eisner, Adolph H., v.c. (O-7) 8-4-63
(USIA)
Rotundo, Vincent, br. pub. aff. off.; v.c. (cR-4)
Manaus, Amazonas (CA)
Bowmer, Noel S., cons. agt. 5-4-58
Sao Luiz, Maranhao (CA)
Moses, Thomas, cons. agt. 7-17-48
Belo Horizonte (C)
Okun, Herbert S., cons. (O-4) 12-22-63
da Silveira, Edmund A., cons. (O-4) 6-26-60
Laser, Lawrence C., v.c. (R-6) 4-1-62
Scarfo, Richard D., v.c. (O-7) 10-13-63
(AID)
Laurie, Annie, elem. educ. ad. (R-4)
Mitrione, Dan A., pub. safety ad. (R-5)
Perry, Lenelle, elem. educ. ad. (R-5)
Whittle, Boyd T., livestock ad. (R-4)
(PC)
Martinez, Quino E., assoc. PC rep. (R-4)
(USIA)
Halle, Elinor J., br. pub. aff. off.; v.c. (cR-3)
Curitiba, Parana (C)
Feldman, Arthur W., cons. (O-5) 4-15-62
Burton, Stewart D., v.c. (R-5) 3-18-62
Gilbertson, Gerald D., v.c. (O-7) 10-14-62
(AID)
Gerbracht, Carlton J., trade-ind. educ. ad. (R-3)
Mertz, Walter W., trade-ind. educ. ad. (R-5)
Oeffinger, Ralph H., trade-ind. educ. ad. (R-5)
Paine, Harry W., trade-ind. educ. ad. (R-4)
Pillifant, Thomas H., area pub. safety ad. (R-4)
(USIA)
Brettell, John A., br. pub. aff. off.; v.c. (R-6)
Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (C)
Duffield, Thomas J., cons. (O-3) 11-11-62
Bumpus, James N., v.c. (O-8) 7-29-62
Graham, William I., adm. asst. (S-5) 9-4-60
Laybourne, Wesley L., v.c. (R-6) 4-15-62
McLain, W. Douglas, Jr., v.c. (O-6) 7-8-62
Whistler, Leonard, pol. off. (R-7) 12-8-63
(AID)
Bowen, Richard L., geol. (FC-6)
Langley, Glenn S., soils ad. (R-5)
Olson, William H., ext. ad. (R-4)
Robinson, James, livestock ad. (R-4)
(USIA)
Fawcett, Jack B., br. pub. aff. off.; v.c. (cR-4)
Barnhart, David H., br. pub. off. off. (cR-4)
Recife, Pernambuco (CG)
Rowell, Edward J., cons. gen.; pers. rank min. (O-1) 4-14-63
Godfrey, Richard A., cons. (O-3) 9-15-63
Cariddi, Charles A., v.c. (O-6) 7-22-62
Creane, Stephen F., pol. off. (R-6) 2-2-64
de Vos, Peter Jon, v.c. (O-7) 10-28-62
Exton, Fred, Jr., cons. (O-5) 11-10-63
Frizzell, Arthur P., cons. (R-4) 1-31-62
Granzow, Elizabeth, nurse (S-5) 8-18-63
Hinchcliff, Harold, Jr., gen. clk. (S-6) 2-18-62
MacDougall, Hugh C., v.c. (O-6) 12-22-63
Mestres, Lee G., v.c. (R-8) 10-27-63
O'Donnell, Thomas J., FSO gen. (O-7) 12-17-61
(AID)
Luzzatto, Bruno B., assoc. dir. (R-1)
Dieffenderfer, John C., assoc. dir. (R-1)
Byrnes, Arthur F., dep. assoc. dir. (R-2)
Bair, William D., asst. food-for-peace off. (R-5)
Bell, Forrest G., agron. ad. (R-3)
Beran, Donald L., coms. develop. ad. (R-3)
Chamberlain, Robert L., asst. prog. off. (R-6)
Cullivan, Donald E., asst. community water supply ad. (R-5)
Cornell, Ezra B., highway engr. (R-4)
Culverwell, Donald H., ind. develop. ad. (R-3)
Dill, Alvin C., Jr., electronic engr. (R-3)
Dunlop, John H., asst. foods prog. off. (R-4)
Finberg, Donald R., asst. prog. off. (R-3)
Finks, Clark E., prog. anal. (R-7)
Hagen, Stanley C., educ. ad. (R-4)
Hansell, J. Wesley, food agri. off. (R-3)
Hargreaves, George H., water resources ad. (R-3)
Hawbaker, George D., ind. develop. ad. (R-4)
Haynes, James L., agron. ad. (R-3)
Houska, James E., trng. off. (R-4)
Hunt, Lester M., Jr., g.s.o. (R-6)
Huseby, A.W., elec. engr. (R-2)
lmmerdauer, Bernard, ec. ad. (R-5)
Javrotsky, Igor, dep. prog. off. (R-5)
Johnson, Charles J., surface water hydrol. (R-5)
Keithahn, Luella M., elem. ed. ad. (R-4)
Laflin, W. Alan, develop. off. (R-2)
Langley, Edgar N., ext. ad. (R-4)
Leiby, George M., chief pub. health ad. (R-2)
Letts, Thomas C., elem. ed. ad. (R-3)
Logan, John A., geol. (R-4)
Maher, James O., food prog. off. (R-4)
McCormick, Chester, elem. ed. ad. (R-3)
McElfresh, Francis H., hwy. engr. (FC-4)
McElroy, Barbara C., bud-acctg. off. (R-6)
Miller, Martin B., hsg. ad. (R-4)
Morales-Perez, Herson E., health educ. ad. (R-4)
Morrison, Henry B., livestock ad. (R-3)
Murray, Virginia M., prog. asst. (R-6)
Nowak, Stanley S., asst. controller (R-4)
Paschal, James L., agri. econ. (R-4)
Perina, George J., asst. exec. off. (R-4)
Peterson, Robert R., dep. food prog. off. (R-3)
Reed, Lowell H., field support off. (R-7)
Santos, Reinaldo C.. exec. off. (R-3)
Schlomann, Ernst A., coms. media ad. (R-3)
Schwab, Philip R., educ. ad. (R-3)
Sinclair, William R., geol. (R-7)
Snell, Leonard H., surface water hydrol. (FC-4)
Sparks, Jack L., agri. engr. (R-4)
Stillman, George, coms. media ad. (R-4)
Van Winkle, Richard D., pub. safety ad. (R-5)
Weeber, Richard P., gen. engr. (R-2)
Wiggin, Charles B., prog. off. (R-2)
Wilder, Wilma M., pers. asst. (R-6)
Wiler, Laurence F. san. engr. (R-4)
Willette, Francis A., asst. prog. off. (R-6)
(PC)
Tesh, Robert B., PC phys. (R-5)
(USIA)
McGillivray, James H., reg. pub. aff. off.; cons. (cR-2)
Challinor, John R., cult. aff. off. (cR-5)
Gaddie, George L., mobile unit off. (cR-5)
Tucker, Creed D., info. off.; v.c. (R-5)
Villarreal, G. Claude, pub. aff. ad.; v.c. (cR-4)
Williams, Stanley E., br. pub. aff. off. (Fortaleza) (R-5)
Salvador, Bahia (C)
Midkiff, Harold M., cons. (O-3) 9-30-62
Hennessy, John W., v.c. (R-6) 7-21-63
Matthews, Wade H.B., v.c. (O-6) 4-29-62
Service, Robert E., v.c. (O-7) 3-1-64
(USIA)
McCloskey, Richard G., br. pub. off. off.; cons. (cR-3)
Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo (CG)
Bond, Niles W., cons. gen.; pers. rank min. (O-1) 1-19-64
Lyon, Scott C., cons. (O-2) 2-18-62
Achen, Lewis P., pol. off. (R-5) 12-23-63
Barnes, Kyle D., cons. (O-5) 5-29-60
Biggane, Helen, cons. (O-4) 1-19-64
Desmond, Richard C., cons. (O-3) 3-4-62
Ginnold, Richard E., v.c. (O-7) 9-30-63
Graham, John R., adm. asst. (S-6) 4-28-63
Guaderrama, Ernest S., cons. (O-4) 5-14-61
Heflin, Martin G., v.c. (O-7) 9-30-62
Hessler, Evelyn R., cons. (O-5) 7-7-63
Jelinek, Herman J., cons. (R-3) 12-12-60
Kanes, Donald K., pol. off. (R-7) 2-28-64
Kenney, John J., v.c. (S-6) 4-28-63
Liebof, Jack, cons. (O-5) 7-23-61
Nemchik, Theresa M., sec. (S-5) 1-6-63
Proper, Datus C., v.c. (O-6) 6-25-61
Reynolds, Robert, cons. (R-4) 7-8-62
Saudade, Gil M., cons.; pol. off. (R-5) 10-13-63
Smyth, Calvin M., cons.; pol. off. (R-5) 1-29-63
(FAS)
Thorburn, Winston G., agri. off. 6-26-61
(AID)
Costello, Peter F., pub. safety ad. (R-4)
Faulds, Vincent R., trade-ind. educ. ad. (R-4)
Hill, Glen A., pub. safety ad. (FC-4)
Tolbert, Gene E., geol. (FC-5)
(USIA)
Dickens, Fred W., br. pub. aff. off.; cons. (cR-3)
Cohen, Alvin H., cult. aff. off. (cR-4)
Mason, John A., Jr., info. off.; cons. (cR-4)
Morrison, Dale A., pub. aff. trainee (cR-7)
Shelby, Barbara M., asst. cult. aff. off. (cR-6)
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