AARG!Anonymous wrote: > If only there were a technology in which clients could verify and yes, > even trust, each other remotely. Some way in which a digital certificate > on a program could actually be verified, perhaps by some kind of remote, > trusted hardware device. This way you could know that a remote system was > actually running a well-behaved client before admitting it to the net. > This would protect Gnutella from not only the kind of opportunistic > misbehavior seen today, but the future floods, attacks and DOSing which > will be launched in earnest once the content companies get serious about > taking this network down.
Before claiming that the TCPA, which is from a deployment standpoint vaporware, could help with gnutella's scaling problems, you should probably learn something about what gnutella's problems are first. The truth is that gnutella's problems are mostly that it's a screamer protocol, and limiting which clients could connect would do nothing to fix that. Limiting which clients could connect to the gnutella network would, however, do a decent job of forcing to pay people for one of the commercial clients. In this way it's very typical of how TCPA works - a non-solution to a problem, but one which could potentially make money, and has the support of gullible dupes who know nothing about the technical issues involved. > Be sure and send a note to the Gnutella people reminding them of all > you're doing for them, okay, Lucky? Your personal vendetta against Lucky is very childish. -Bram Cohen "Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent" -- John Maynard Keynes