On Mon, 9 Dec 2002, Tyler Durden wrote:
> Well, this is for me not an easy issue. Amerika has always had a hard-on for
> fascism (as long as it was in the service of "freedom"), and as a result the
> pendulum seems to swing pretty wildly at times.
It's not America, it's people.
Some have compared the concept of 'paper protection' of rights as
worthless, yet the countries who do have such protection are the ones
where the centralization of power in an elite is the most hindered.
> Crypto is for me primarily a way to send information to somebody else
> without worrying if a third party hears it. This may be financial data, it
> may be personal information.
They can't understand it, they can certainly capture the transmission
which maps directly to 'hearing', and they can certainly learn the
'language' (ie crack the crypto) if given enough time and effort.
> In a state where crypto (and hence my right to communicate discretely) is
> resisted, it then transforms into a means of resistance and possible
> preservation of residual freedoms.
No, it actually acts as evidence of your intent. Using crypto in Russia,
China, or France for example will not protect you, it will single you out
of the crowd.
The only place crypto will work is where there is no real consequence for
using it with regards to the law. It's an empty promise of protection.
> and only for reasons that have undeniable need (WW2 is an example, as was
> the Chinese Communist reaction to the Nationalist's non-response to Japanese
> Genocide in China).
The term you're looking for is 'self-defence'.
> In this sense, then, strong Crypto, Ubiquitous WiFi/Broadband, P2P, Blacknet
> and so on are for me tools with which to head off scenarios where violence
> might otherwise be the only reasonable recourse.
Gibberish, the use of any of these -requires- the consent of the powers
that be by -not- regulating them. Take WiFi for example, if it were not
sanctioned by the FCC then it wouldn't exist, and if you built such
devices you would in fact be saying 'Here I am, come get me', not to
mention that in such a situation the ability of others to use it (you're
using it is worthless if 'they' don't use it also) is severely
constrained. This leads to the classic OTP key sharing problem of a
'secure channel'.
> close, though.) What I DO hope is that via the proliferation of such (and
> other) technologies, the very notions of "limiting speech" (whether by "good
> guys" or "bad guys"), surveillance of on-line activites, and so on, become
> anachronistic, perhaps even non-concepts.
The only way this stuff will work is to become so common that people can't
think of their lives without it, that it is used so deeply day to day that
it becomes a necessity. That will -require- some sort of willingness on
the part of the governing bodies to allow it. The only way that will
happen is to apply the technology in a broad swath of applications
-before- the regulatory agencies really understand the consequences.
--
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We don't see things as they are, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
we see them as we are. www.ssz.com
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Anais Nin www.open-forge.org
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