"I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't help."
Well, what if there were 3 passwords:
1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually be smart enough to look beyond this...that's why they have guns)
2)One for real data...this is what you're hiding
3) One for plausible real data, BUT when this one's used, it also destroys the real data as it opens the plausible real data.
Of course, some really really smart MwG (or the cool suits standing behind them) will be able to detect that data is being destroyed, but statistically speaking that will be much rarer.
-TD
From: "Major Variola (ret)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 11:53:07 -0700
At 05:56 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: >On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >> At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: >> > >> >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you prove >> >somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel? >> >> Torture, of the sender, receiver, or their families, has worked pretty >> well. >> If you're good you don't even leave marks. > >However, it's not entirely reliable. At some point, the suspect tells you >what you want to hear, whether or not it is the truth, just so you leave >him alone. It can even happen that the suspect convinces himself that what >he really did what he was supposed to do.
Interrogators check out each confession. First ones won't work, bogus keys. Just noise. Second confession reveals pork recipes hidden in landscape pictures. Beneath that layer of filesystem is stego'd some porn. Beneath that, homosexual porn. But your interrogators want the address book stego'd beneath that. They know that these are stego distraction levels, uninteresting to them. You'll give it to them eventually. If you give them a believable but fake one, it will damage innocents or true members of your association.
>This brings another ofren underestimated problem into the area of >cryptosystem design, the "rubberhose resistance".
My comments were written with that in mind. I'm familiar with filesystems (etc) with layers of deniable stego.
I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't help.
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