On Thu, Jun 02, 2005 at 11:05:30AM +0200, DiSToAGe wrote: > I have read infos that say that audio and video drivers will be in the > trusted chain. If your hardware system is used by an os (i.e. win) on > which you can't create drivers, and only industry signed drivers can be > used you can't bypass this by hacking drivers ...
The code running in the trusted sandbox isn't magic, so if it's complex enough there will be vulnerabilities (not a problem in theory, but in practice). > My though is the hardware drm can be reverse engineered ? If you use My thought is, can cryptosystems be broken? Not by 31337 h4x0rs, obviously. > cert on your DRM you must put cert and private keys on your DRM chip ... Not you -- somebody else. Generated on board, probably, or generated externally, and loaded into the hardware. > So you have somewhere memory (rom or else) where you have this private So far, so good. > and cert datas. So with good tools you can read what are the bits in > this DRM. So you can make a "soft drm" that use all the instructions of If you mean by good tools 100 k$ worth of hardware (and a skilled operator) to read out the state of bits on die, after etching away the enclosing, you're correct. Why do you think a system designed to contain and keep a secret will contain a convenient backdoor? > the reverse engineered hard drm, you but the reverse engineered private > key, certs on your soft drm. All this goes on a "emulated" drm part on > your os emulator. So booting the os believe that it is hard, because all > instructions are the same, certs is the same, and private key can be > used by your soft drm to en/crypt drm files ...??? We see that with time > almost all can be reverse engineered, can it be the same with hard drm > systems ?? -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
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