On Thu, 16 Nov 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Bram Cohen writes: > > In the vast majority of cases, preventing man in the middle attacks is a > > waste of time. > > In the sense that, in the vast majority of communications, there is no > man in the middle attack being mounted? Yes. > Couldn't the same thing be said of cryptography, since in the vast > majority of cases there is no eavesdropping? Yes, but it's a less vast majority than the ones for which man in the middle is happening. > The point in both cases is that if you construct a protocol which has > weaknesses, eventually people may begin to exploit them. And if you build a protocol which is a pain to use, noone will use it. -Bram Cohen
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