Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries
http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf Our results show that Tor users are FAR MORE SUSCEPTIBLE to compromise than indicated by prior work. QUITE SIMPLE AND EFFICIENT TECHNIQUES CAN CORRELATE TRAFFIC at these separate locations by taking advantage of identifying traf- fic patterns [29]. As a result, the user and his destination may be identified, completely subverting the protocol’s security goals. Given the SEVERITY OF THE TRAFFIC CORRELATION PROBLEM and its se- curity implications, we develop an analysis framework for evaluat- ing the security of various user behaviors on the live OUR ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT 80% OF ALL TYPES OF USERS MAY BE DE- ANONYMIZED BY A RELATIVELY MODERATE TOR-RELAY ADVERSARY WITHIN SIX MONTHS. OUR RESULTS ALSO SHOW THAT AGAINST A SINGLE AS ADVERSARY ROUGHLY 100% OF USERS IN SOME COMMON LOCATIONS ARE DEANONYMIZED WITHIN THREE MONTHS (95% IN THREE MONTHS FOR A SINGLE IXP) signed paul FUCKING syverson Now, all the RETARDS who parrot that 'tor stinks' perhaps should try to update their mental databases.
