On 09/04/2016 12:07 AM, Georgi Guninski wrote: > I think tor should not be used for anything of importance.
Play isn't "important" ;) > What if tor allows code execution by design and it is heavily > obfuscated? OK, so then segregate tor process in separate gateway VM. That does increase cost substantially, because you need physical server for each node. But it's for sure workable. > On Sat, Sep 03, 2016 at 07:56:33PM -0600, Mirimir wrote: >> So let's say that a bunch of us have Tor onion servers. They're linked >> to each other via OnionCat with ip4ip6 tunnels. With IPv4 routing so >> each can hit the others. And with iptables rules (IPv4 and IPv6) to drop >> packets to/from everyone else running OnionCat. Maybe even >> HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient/HidServAuth to lock down access. >> >> What might we do with that? We might create an overlay Internet, I >> suppose. Given how long OnionCat has been around, there are probably a >> few of those. I doubt that OnionScan[0,1] would see the connections, >> given that there are no hyperlinks, and better, no unauthorized access. >> >> But more specifically, what? BitTorrent, for sure ;) LizardFS works, so >> we could have private and shared cloud storage, backed by globally >> redundant, erasure-coded storage. >> >> What about VPN services? Say, with two VPS linked via OnionCat. You hit >> VPN server as an onion service, and exit through one of many redundant >> VPS. We already have <https://i2vpn.eu/>. So maybe chain that with VPNs >> via onion services. What do y'all think? >> >> And what about Freenet or I2P on an OnionCat network? Or one of the P2P >> messaging apps? Or even old-school Mixmaster? >> >> Back to basics, would any of that help against global adversaries? It's >> very hard to evade observation of network edges. You can have lots of >> chaff, but then that itself can be a signature. >> >> [0] https://github.com/s-rah/onionscan >> [1] >> https://motherboard.vice.com/read/these-maps-show-what-the-dark-web-looks-like >