Title: RE: Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment (was Re: First Monday August 2000)

I'll add two words to the list: "support" (as opposed to "provide"), and "accountability." I prefer to say that a digital signature is a tool that "supports accountability."  I suppose that "supports non-repudiation" would be fine as well.  My concern is when the phrase "provides non-repudiation" is used it implies that complete non-repudiation can be provided technically (which I don't believe is the case). 

Mike J. 

 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Jablon [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2000 10:29 AM
> To: Arnold G. Reinhold
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment (was Re: First
> Monday August 2000)
>
>
> "Anti-repudiation" sounds good to me.
>
> ... even if does remind me of "antidisestablishmentarianism".
> Come to think of it, now even that term sounds appropriate here -- as
> our belief in the value of methods that deter key "dis-establishment".
> Pretty scary.
>
> -- dpj
>
> At 09:08 AM 10/11/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
> >My concern is that the vast majority of informed lay people,
> lawyers,
> >judges, legislators, etc. will hear "non-repudiation" and hear
> >"absolute proof."  If you doubt this, read the breathless articles
> >written recently about the new U.S. Electronic Signatures Act.
> >
> >I don't think technologists should be free to use evocative
> terms and
> >then define away their common sense meaning in the fine print.
> >Certainly a valid public key signature is strong evidence and
> >services like that described in the draft can be useful. I simply
> >object to calling them "non-repudiation services." I would
> not object
> >to "anti-repudiation services,"  "counter-repudiation services"  or
> >"repudiation-resistant technology." Would the banking
> industry employ
> >terms like "forgery-proof checks," "impregnable vaults" or
> >"pick-proof locks" to describe conventional security measures that
> >were known to be fallible?
>
>

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