On Tue, 7 Aug 2001, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> > > 2. Operator probably trustworthy
> >
> > Impossible, and unnecessary. Don't assume any remops are trustworthy.
>
> Actually it is absolutely necessary. If all operators are willing to
> collude, then your precious anonymity is completely lost. A simple
> tracing methodology can establish this. The first remailer operator
> tracks the
> exact outgoing message to the next collusion, the second tracks to the
> third, etc until the message escapes, then the colluding operators track
> back through
> the list of remailers, linking based on the intermediate value being
> sent,
> until it reaches operator 1 who knows the sending address. This assumes
> a best case of the sender determining the path taken through encryption.
> Worst case the first operator can reveal the information to everyone.
> Joe
Run your own remailer. Chain through it at some point. As long as you
trust yourself, there is no threat.
Who of the current remops do you trust? Why?
-MW-