As several have pointed out, a single system these days is replaceable readily. OTOH if anyone were to decide that I were Disloyal they would get 4 or 5 depending on the day in question. Additionally, in my freelance days they would have gotten data from a client or two.
If we assume that only encrypted data is the "problem" (grounds for extended seizure), then only Bad Data should be encrypted and it should be stored separately from other data stores. A Usually Off Snap server on the network and secreted in a wall, or some such, would work, especially with wireless. Off site, over-the-wire would also work, but, in either case, there would need to be no Residual Indicators when not in use. Let us remember that the Committee for State Security so recently and its little brethren are not reluctant to use extra-legal means when they have determined your guilt and need to build a winnable case. Which leads me to the real point of my initial post: When the case looks unWinnable (or insufficiently winnable) there is no reluctance to go to early penalty phase - arrest at 5:01 Friday for a holiday weekend, gather up all the hardware and leave you with no means of support, along with other methods as applicable to the situation. PHM Steve Schear wrote: > > At 01:46 PM 2/4/2002 -0800, you wrote: > >There is a significant difference between smart and > >honest. This method allows for blackmail to release > >the encryption keys -- "We can't allow this to be > >released until you prove that it is not Bad data, so > >cough up the Keys to the Kingdom or we keep the > >hardware." -- this method is especially helpful when > >you don't have a good enough case for the punishment > >to be "sufficient" and you need the extra fine of > >harware and loss of income. > > As hardware has gotten pretty cheap, unless you've got a substantial system > (probably not a home variety), seizure should be inconvenient and angering > but not devastating to many. Loss of data or availability is something > else. Anyone who has a significant investment in their data or is using > their gear to earn their living, especially to deliver a service, needs to > treat their system as any business should treat a mission critical > asset. Off-site data backups (especially offshore) and off-site or > emergency hardware support contracts are a plus. I wonder if thin PCs > (those without disks) combined with encrypted off site data have a role to > play in protection against prosecutions and seizure interruptions? > > steve -- Paul H. Merrill, MCNE, MCSE+I, CISSP [EMAIL PROTECTED] [demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/x-pkcs7-signature which had a name of smime.p7s]
