-- On 23 May 2002 at 21:58, Adam Back wrote: > This won't achieve the desired effect because it will just > destroy the S/MIME trust mechanism. S/MIME is based on the > assumption that all CAs are trustworthy. Anyone can forge any > identity for clients with that key installed. S/MIME isn't > really compatible with the web of trust because because of the > two tier trust system -- all CAs are assumed trustworthy and all > users are not able to sign anything.
Or to say the same thing in slightly different words, all CAs are perfectly and equally trustworthy, and all users are untrustworthy. This system is inherently authoritarian. Because that authority must be restricted for it to be useful, it is inherently a pain in the ass to administer, with inherently high administrative costs. Like socialism, S/MIME results in bureacracy, delay, expense, and inefficiency. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG USL5cv1ggEyWtLV5o70QlHagEAxDOVzR+aGoGJyG 4r/H3bXgCwZ3aRF4U6H7Adat9jD9PjCxb1FPSgQpk