IT is tempting to believe the new orthodoxy that America's war of
pre-emption against Iraq is the precursor to even more US-led wars – yet
this view is almost surely wrong.
Far from Iraq being the precedent that launches a new US global strategy
this war will represent the best and last demonstration of the
pre-emptive faith that has guided America's neo-conservatives.
The truth about pre-emption is that such a doctrine has severe limits –
strategic, economic and political. America's neo-conservatives, in denial
about the costs of pre-emption, are about to be hit by their full force.
The costs for the US in a relatively swift victory in Iraq will be
immense (let alone a slow victory) and the purging of the Iraqi neurosis
from the American mind will mean an end to foreign invasions rather than
a start to them.
Just examine the "axis of evil" realities. The US can invade
Iraq and succeed for three reasons – because Iraq is now a depleted and
weak state; because its regime is discredited worldwide as evil; and
because there are no regional or global powers to dissuade the US by
making its actions prohibitive. Each condition is critical for
pre-emption.
Only one of these conditions applies to North Korea. Yes, it is evil. But
it is a strong military state able to render incalculable damage to South
Korea if attacked. It is surrounded by major powers – Russia, Japan and
China. China is the key player in any settlement with Pyongyang. It would
not tolerate US pre-emption and such a move would force a US-China
crisis. After all, China has previously gone to war against US
penetration into North Korea.
Two of these conditions are not applicable to Iran. Compared with Iraq,
it is strong (65 million people as opposed to 23 million and a GDP of
$US113 billion compared with Iraq's $US25 billion).
Australian National University professor Amin Saikal says: "Iran
compared with Iraq is socially homogeneous with a more resilient
nationalism. It has a degree of Islamic democracy and a broader political
system than any in the Arab world. If the US resorted to surgical strikes
Iran could retaliate by de-stabilising the American position in both Iraq
and Afghanistan." Steven R. Weisman of The New York Times
reported on March 23 that Secretary of State Colin Powell, when asked
whether the Iraq war reflected a broader doctrine of pre-emptive attacks
on enemies, replied: "No, no, no." Powell's view will prevail
(this time).
The US is discovering in Iraq the difficulties of military pre-emption
but Iraq is a picnic compared with any adventure in Iran or North Korea.
Bush knows this. His 2003 State of the Union address said "different
threats require different strategies." Bush is about to document the
cost of the Iraq war. But as Yale's Professor William Nordhaus argues,
the President has failed to prepare his country for this burden which
includes post-war occupation. If the US declines to pay then it
"would leave a mountain of rubble and mobs of angry people in Iraq
and the region". Nordhaus offers a range of estimates over a decade
from $US99 billion ($165.7 billion) to $US1924 billion. It seems the US
will have years to reflect upon its misjudgment of the cost-benefit
equation in Iraq.
The true cost of Iraq, however, will defy arithmetic. The US will
discover after Saddam Hussein is gone that the world remains a
dangerously unsafe place with new risks replacing the old risks that it
paid so much to solve.
It will also prove a truth – a truth documented in the latest issue of
The National Interest by Columbia University's Jack Snyder, who
surveys imperial temptations and concludes that "a general strategy
of preventative war is likely to bring about precisely the outcome that
Bush and Condoleezza Rice wish to avert". The reason is because weak
states on the hit list will develop new lethal capacities to save
themselves. What else would they do?
In summary, a theory of pre-emption at state-to-state level will not
endure because its political gains cannot outweigh its costs and a
democratic society such as the US will adjust accordingly.
In the interim there are belated signs that the Howard Government now
accepts the risks of pre-emption. This shift follows Defence Minister
Robert Hill's embrace of the idea last November and John Howard's
infamous late 2002 application of pre-emption to the region.
The facts, however, are that the Howard cabinet has not endorsed the
doctrine of pre-emption as such; in their statements on Australia's war
decision neither Howard nor Alexander Downer supported this principle;
and the Government justifies the Iraq war in its own right not as part of
any broader pre-emptive game plan.
Indeed, Howard's remarks last weekend warned against any pre-emptive
theory and Downer assured the house this week that Australia had no
"plans to mount military action against Cuba, Sudan, North Korea or
whoever". Downer's public line is to cast doubt on whether such a
doctrine exists at all.
But it does. Bush's historic West Point speech last June made explicit
his support for pre-emption. His new National Security Strategy of
September 2002 made this position formal: "Deterrence based only
upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against rogue
states . . . to forestall or prevent hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively."
It is equally a fact that cabinet endorsed the recent strategic review
from Hill that envisaged Australia's military forces fighting in further
coalitions-of-willing led by the US. Australia's recent more sceptical
line on pre-emption is long overdue. It puts Australia at odds with the
neo-conservative mentality that dominates much of the Bush
administration. This is a good place to be because the neo-conservatives
are about to have an experience they love – they are going to be mugged
by reality.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,6187398%255E12250,00.html
