On May 30, 2013, at 3:37 AM, Jakob Schlyter <[email protected]> wrote: > On 30 maj 2013, at 04:24, Rick Andrews <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Is there another list that's right for discussing the merits and demerits of >> the different DANE options? I work for a CA, so of course I believe that the >> current PKI is *not* irreparably broken, nor do I agree that modes 2 and 3 >> are "substantially more robust". Because I believe your voice is respected >> in this forum, I wanted to speak up to make it clear that this opinion is >> not shared by all. > > Unless the chairs do not object, I believe this mailing list is a good place > to discuss this matters.
The chairs do not object. Obviously though, as always, standard mailing list etiquette is expected -- if this turns into ad hominem attack (or simply ads :-) ) we'll stomp on it…. > > IMHO, classic PKI augmented by DANE would be a very strong package. However, > I would argue that without the extra identity proofing and other controls set > by by Extended Validation (EV), DANE has equally security properties to a > plain Domain Validation (DV) certificate. <no hats> Well, yes and no… It all (to me at least) depends on what all the attacker has managed to compromise. If (one day, fingers crossed) end hosts are all doing DNSSEC then an attacker who gets a mi-sissued cert shouldn't be able to actually use it, unless they have also compromised the DNS. As an example, the Diginotar incident. If a site has a DV (or whatever other cert) and were using DANE, the attacker (who we assume has on the wire MITM capabilities) would not be able to actually *use* the cert. If the compromise happens because you lost control of your DNS infrastructure (including your registrar account, etc) then yeah, no huge difference… > > For a foreseeable future, we definitely need to combine DANE with classic PKI > in order for the general Internet user to be able to validate certificates. Agreed. > For limited deployments, or applications where classic PKI has not yet gained > significant traction (such as TLS for SMTP), a pure DANE solution makes sense > (unless EV is required). Also agreed. </no hats> > > jakob > > _______________________________________________ > dane mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane > -- "Have you got any previous convictions?" "Well, I dunno... I suppose I used to believe very firmly that a penny saved is a penny earned--" -- Terry Pratchett _______________________________________________ dane mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
