On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 11:10:29PM +0100, Guido Witmond wrote:
> DANE can only specify *intent*. Intent of the domain owner what they
> choose for their certificate source.
The intent of the holder of the current zone signing key.
> Without *verification* that intent is worthless.
The intent is conveniently verified by an RRSIG generated by the
zone signing public key.
Arguing against the DANE security model has no bearing on the acronyms.
> IMHO, the naming should reflect the source of the certificate:
> 0: Global trusted CA;
Except that the record value is not a global trusted CA. Rather
its value is a CA constraint on the chain from some trusted CA
requiring the presence of some intermediate at or below such a CA.
The record should be named after what is specifies, which is a CA
required in your chain, not a trusted root. This was my objection
to the change from PKIX-CA to PKIX-TA. The change from PKIX-CA to
PKIX-TA is still wrong (even if I am willing to let it slide), as
it will perpetuate confusion by many people who don't understand
usage 0 or usage 2, but think they do.
> 1: End certificate in a chain from a Global trusted CA;
Sure. But I don't see an ancronym here...
> 2: My own CA; ( from the perspective of the domain owner)
Your own trust-anchor.
> 3: My own Certificate; (same perspective)
Still no actual acronym.
--
Viktor.
_______________________________________________
dane mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
