In message <[email protected]>, Peter Palfrader writes : > On Mon, 24 Mar 2014, Mark Andrews wrote: > > > If you don't trust a algorithm you should not be using it. Period. > > This fall back to this untrusted/broken algorithm is bad engingeering > > and bad security practice. > > > > If the site you want to email only has broken TLSA records, get > > them on the phone to fix the problem. > > Assume we may have reason to believe that SHA1 is within reach of well > funded adversaries, and assume it had a code-point in DANE. > > Site A only publishes SHA1 entries. Would rather do unauthenticated TLS > than trust SHA1?
You left out - report and refuse to send until fixed. > Site B publishes both SHA2-512 and SHA1 entries. Would you still want > to trust SHA1? Once you decide SHA1 is not acceptable you ignore the records with SHA1 hashes. Publishing new hashes is trivial and will remain trivial. Once a algorithm has reached the state where you don't trust it for a purpose you don't use it for thar purpose. Mark -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: [email protected] _______________________________________________ dane mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
