death penalty news

October 7, 2004


NORTH CAROLINA:

Ruling delays execution

Lethal injection challenge proceeds

The state's planned execution early Friday of convicted murderer Sammy 
Perkins was still on hold late Wednesday after a federal appeals court 
declined to lift a trial judge's freeze order.

The U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Va., rejected the 
state's request to let the execution go forward despite Perkins' claim that 
lethal drugs the state uses could torture him.

The state then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to lift a stay Chief U.S. 
District Court Judge Terrence Boyle issued Friday. The high court's 
decision wasn't known Wednesday evening.

Boyle issued the stay after Perkins' attorneys said he should be allowed to 
pursue a lawsuit challenging the legality of the state's lethal injection 
method.

Attorney General Roy Cooper's office declined to comment on the court 
action or the case.

Ken Rose, director of the N.C. Center for Death Penalty Litigation, said 
Perkins' case raises serious issues that affect other inmates slated for 
execution.

"The 4th Circuit in essence is acknowledging that questions remain," he 
said. "I cannot understand why the Attorney General's Office wants to rush 
it. Why push it? Why experiment with it?"

Also Wednesday, a state court judge denied Perkins' request for a new 
trial, The Associated Press reported. Perkins, 51, was sentenced to death 
in 1993 for the rape and murder of a 7-year-old Pitt County girl, Lashenna 
"Jo Jo" Moore, who was the granddaughter of his girlfriend.

Pitt County Superior Court Judge Wilton Duke rejected the claim that 
Perkins was convicted on illegal hearsay evidence. Duke said a U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling that limits the use of evidence not directly from a witness 
didn't apply because the ruling came down after Perkins' state trial.

Duke also admonished the defense, noting the Supreme Court case was decided 
nearly seven months ago, yet Perkins waited until three days before his 
scheduled execution to file the appeal.

Shortly after Duke ruled, the defense appealed to the state Supreme Court, 
which quickly denied a request for a hearing and a separate stay of execution.

Perkins now awaits word on whether the U.S. Supreme Court will lift Judge 
Boyle's stay and let the execution proceed at 2 a.m. Friday. He was moved 
Wednesday afternoon from death row to the isolated area near the death 
chamber at Central Prison in Raleigh.

(source: newsobserver.com)


============


USA:

High court reconsidering execution of minors

Case of Roper v. Simmons

During the second week of October, the United States Supreme Court will 
hear argument in Roper v. Simmons. The case calls upon the Court to 
consider once again the question whether the Constitution permits the 
government to execute offenders who committed their crimes while under the 
age of eighteen.

In 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court answered the question yes, even 
though it had held a year earlier, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, that the Eighth 
Amendment barred the execution of convicts who were fifteen years of age or 
younger at the time of their crimes.

The distinction between fifteen and sixteen, said the Court, was based upon 
the respective presence or absence of a national consensus.

The issue of executing minors raises important questions about what we 
believe makes a person deserving of the ultimate sanction.
The Missouri court's bold decision

Roper is an unusual case in the boldness of the ruling that preceded its 
presentation before the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court of 
Missouri granted the petition of Christopher Simmons for relief from his 
upcoming execution, in spite of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
specifically rejected the very grounds on which the Missouri court based 
its decision: the fact that the petitioner was under eighteen at the time 
of his offense.

A state supreme court, of course, does not have the power to overrule a 
U.S. Supreme Court decision on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution. 
According to the Missouri Justices in the majority, however, the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments has changed since 
1989, when Stanford was decided, and this change has rendered (previously 
legal) juvenile executions unconstitutional.

The Missouri court reasoned that the nation's views underlying the earlier 
Supreme Court decision have evolved, and so, therefore, has the 
constitutional status of such sentences.
Comparison of minors and mentally retarded

In determining that there is now a national consensus against the execution 
of minors, the Missouri Supreme Court considered, among other things, the 
2002 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Atkins v. Virginia, prohibiting the 
execution of the mentally retarded.

Years before it decided Atkins, the Court previously affirmed the execution 
of the retarded - in Penry v. Lynaugh. Coincidentally, Penry came down the 
same year in which the Court affirmed the execution of sixteen and 
seventeen year olds.

A comparison between execution of young people and of the mentally retarded 
may thus shed some light on the question currently before the Supreme Court.

Let us consider first the public emotional impact of executing a mentally 
retarded person, and how it might differ from that of executing a juvenile 
offender like Christopher Simmons.

When a mentally retarded person is executed, the person dying in the 
electric chair or the gas chamber or the lethal injection gurney is - by 
definition - mentally retarded at the time of his execution.

The developmentally disabled, in other words, do not grow out of their 
impaired mental status.

The convicted youthful offender who is sentenced to die, by contrast, will 
ordinarily no longer be a minor by the time his sentence is carried out. A 
person who is sixteen or seventeen years old will -- in another year or two 
-- no longer be under the age of eighteen. And the process of death penalty 
appeals often takes longer than two years.

As a result, the American public will not usually have to face the 
spectacle of a "child" dying a scheduled death at the hands of the state in 
the way that it faces the spectacle of a "mental child" being executed in 
the analogous context of the mentally retarded.

To the extent that the national consensus responds to the sympathy factor 
at the moment of execution, the youthful offender thus has one strike 
against him.

On the other hand, the fact that a younger person, unlike a mentally 
retarded person, will tend to change a great deal over time, may, in 
another regard, prove helpful to youthful offenders like Christopher Roper.

A mentally retarded person who faces the death penalty several years after 
his crime will probably seem like the same person who committed the earlier 
murder for which he is being punished.

The youthful offender, on the other hand, will often look and sound like an 
entirely new person by the time of his execution.

Because the public may feel the understandable desire to punish the same 
person who committed a murder, his evolution over time can greatly help the 
cause of the youthful offender.
Blameworthiness and execution of minors

As I have noted, an offender's status (or relative status) at the time of 
his execution may affect the nation's emotional response. Yet the legal 
arguments that appeal to judges generally concern the offender's age or 
mental status at the time he committed his offense.

The reason that age, in particular, matters to the law, is that full 
criminal blameworthiness under the law is understood to require a minimum 
level of maturity.

Until a person has reached a given age, she may not be fully capable of 
appreciating the depth of harm that she inflicts on others when she commits 
a murder. Also, a young person's self-control may not be as developed prior 
to adulthood. In the absence of a completely functional capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of crime and to control destructive impulses, 
some argue, it is unfair to punish an offender with the most severe 
punishment available under the law.

The notion that youthfulness is associated with an underdeveloped 
conscience - an inability to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of crimes - 
and reduced willpower has proven consistent with ongoing scientific study. 
As people age out of childhood, they apparently become better able both to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of, and to control, their murderous impulses.

The death penalty is supposed to punish the most blameworthy actors for 
their crimes. If criminals under a particular age are less blameworthy than 
other criminals, in terms of their mental and emotional capacities, it 
might seem to follow that we should spare such criminals the harshest sentence.
Underinclusiveness

Looking critically at this argument, however, we should note that the age 
cutoff is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive in addressing whatever 
incapacities accompany youth.

Consider its under-inclusiveness first.

If we ought to avoid executing people who lack the abilities fully to 
appreciate the evil of their crimes and to control their impulses, then we 
should exempt many more people from the death penalty than just the young. 
Indeed, any person who suffers from a mental disorder that affects his 
self-control and his ability to empathize should be similarly exempt.

This lack of fit between incapacity and exemption, moreover, is hardly a 
trivial one. Some would argue that almost all murderers on death row show 
characteristics that make them more like teen-agers than like adults, in 
both their ability to experience the weight of their crimes and their 
capacity to control themselves. Indeed, it is these weaknesses that may 
largely define much of the criminal population.

The under-inclusiveness problem, then, is that many (perhaps most) 
individuals on death row should qualify for exemption by the same reasoning 
as the young offender.
Maturity and overinclusiveness

In addition, there also turns out to be an over-inclusiveness problem in 
exempting all minors from the death penalty. The problem is this: At 
whatever age we choose, whether it is eighteen, seventeen, sixteen, or 
fifteen, there will be people in that age group who do in fact have the 
same ability as or a greater capacity than their elders to understand and 
stop themselves from committing crimes.

We know of young people carrying out heroic deeds in times of war, for 
example. Such heroes are evidently able to understand fully and put into 
practice the difference between right and wrong.

It would therefore seem that some murderers - those, for example, who 
believe in the righteousness of their cause - could be fully responsible at 
a very young age. They should therefore be ineligible, as a matter of 
logic, for the exemption that they would receive under Missouri's approach 
to the Eighth Amendment.
Taking other factors into account

I have been assuming consensus on the view that those who lack the capacity 
fully to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions and to control their 
destructive impulses are less deserving of the ultimate sanction. But that 
assumption may, in fact, be in error.

Some people take the position that the harshness of a punishment should 
correspond to an individual criminal's character, as revealed by the 
circumstances surrounding his crime. On this view, for example, a young 
person who commits a childish prank should perhaps not be punished very 
harshly, because the prank does not reveal anything significant about the 
prankster (other than that he is a normal child).

A murder, however, of the sort that would expose a person to the death 
penalty (that is, a murder committed in the presence of aggravating 
circumstances) might be thought to reveal a very evil character in the 
person committing the crime. Being evil, moreover, may be entirely 
consistent with being incapable of empathy and poor at impulse control - 
the marks, some would say, of a psychopath or a recidivist criminal.

If a teenager (of whatever the magic age) is capable of deliberately 
inflicting grave harm on another person, some people might be more rather 
than less inclined to judge such a person "rotten to the core."

"He was already committing murders at the tender age of sixteen," they 
could say.

Rather than mitigating an offense, then, youth might actually serve as a 
signal that we are in the presence of a truly bad person. Another way of 
saying this is that many people do not expect the murderous teenager to 
"outgrow" his affinity for violence, even if, theoretically, his ability to 
do so matures. A wicked child may thus be beyond redemption.

The national debate and evolving consensus over executing young people is 
not subject to easy resolution. For those of us who reject capital 
punishment, it follows necessarily that the young (at any age) may not be 
subject to the ultimate sanction. But for those who accept the death 
penalty, it might not be quite so obvious that only legal adults should be 
subject to it. The answer may ultimately depend on whether we really 
believe that those teen-agers who murder other human beings are likely to 
become better as they get older.

[Sherry F. Colb, a FindLaw columnist, is Professor and Judge Frederick B. 
Lacey Scholar at Rutgers Law School-Newark. Her earlier columns may be 
found in the archive of her work on this site.]

(source: CNN)


===============


VIRGINIA:

Jury, Men eligible for execution

Jurors decided Wednesday that two men convicted in an Albemarle County 
ambush killing carried out the slaying in such a heinous and cruel fashion 
that they should be considered for execution.

The decision means the jury will return to U.S. District Court in 
Charlottesville today to hear evidence on whether to recommend the death 
penalty for Shawn A. Breeden and Michael A. Carpenter.

The men were convicted Tuesday of participating in a drug conspiracy; 
crossing state lines with the intent to commit robbery in furtherance of 
the conspiracy; and crossing state lines with the intent to kill, injure, 
harass or intimidate the victim.

The use of firearms in each of the crimes caused the government to seek 
capital punishment. Jurors agreed that the government met its burden of 
proving at least one aggravating factor required by federal law in death 
penalty cases: that Breeden and Carpenter each committed the offenses "in 
an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner in that it involved torture 
or serious physical abuse to the victim."

Police found Kevin Lee Hester's dead and bloody body in the parking lot of 
the Meadows apartments on Mountainwood Road on Aug. 8, 2002. The 
30-year-old had been shot in the leg and head and stabbed in the chest.

"Shawn Breeden just didn't kill Kevin Hester. He butchered him. He 
massacred him," Assistant U.S. Attorney Timothy J. Heaphy told jurors.

Breeden, who lived in Washington during the summer of 2002, targeted Hester 
for robbery after losing his girlfriend's car payment money in a dice game. 
Hester had been Breeden's friend and drug connection in Charlottesville. 
Prosecutors said Breeden enlisted the help of Carpenter and two other men 
in the robbery.

Denise Y. Lunsford, an attorney representing Breeden, called the crime a 
robbery gone bad and said a killing was never planned.

"There is no evidence that there was substantial planning by Mr. Breeden to 
kill this man," Lunsford said.

Carpenter's lawyer, J. Lloyd Snook III, told jurors that while he did not 
want to minimize the importance of Hester's death, the crime did not rise 
to the level of an "extraordinary killing" that would warrant execution.

"This case may involve a lot of bad things but it does not involve 
torture," Snook said.

When Hester met Breeden at the apartments, Carpenter emerged from a wooded 
area with a shotgun and shot Hester in the leg. Afterward, Breeden stabbed 
Hester, and a third man, Robbie Outterbridge, fired two shots from a 9 mm 
pistol at Hester's head. One round hit the ground, while the other pierced 
the victim's skin but did not penetrate his skull.

A medical examiner testified that both the shotgun wound to the leg, which 
broke bones and tore through critical arteries, and the stab wounds, which 
pierced Hester's heart and lung, would have been fatal.

Outterbridge and Kevin T. Cassell, who drove the getaway car, pleaded 
guilty to the same six charges and took the stand last week in hopes of 
reduced prison terms.

(source: Daily Progress)


====================


SOUTH DAKOTA:

Supreme Court upholds conviction and death penalty

The South Dakota Supreme Court has once again upheld Donald Moeller's 
convictions and death sentence for the 1990 killing and rape of a 
9-year-old Sioux Falls girl.

The high court ruled unanimously Thursday that Moeller got a fair trial and 
that his lawyers did an effective job of representing him.

Moeller, 52, has been sentenced to die by lethal injection for the May 8, 
1990, slaying of Becky O'Connell of Sioux Falls. He also was given a 
25-year sentence for raping the child.

"We're delighted," South Dakota Attorney General Larry Long said of 
Thursday's decision.

Moeller was convicted by a Yankton County jury on Sept. 1, 1992, for 
first-degree murder and rape. But the state Supreme Court reversed the 
convictions in May 1996, ruling that improper evidence was used at the trial.

A second trial was held in Rapid City, and Moeller was convicted again in 1997.

The Supreme Court upheld those convictions and Moeller's death sentence in 
a direct appeal nearly four years ago.

Moeller then returned to court to argue his convictions should be set aside 
because his constitutional rights were violated by the introduction of some 
evidence, instructions to the jury and the process used to sentence him to 
death.

Moeller is unlikely to be executed for a number of years because of further 
appeals in federal court.

"We're not looking for an execution anytime soon," Long said.

(source: AP)


==================


PENNSYLVANIA:

Death penalty sought in Beaver County killing

Beaver County prosecutors say they will seek the death penalty against a 
Pittsburgh man they say was paid to kill someone.

Claron Hanner is accused of killing Frank Helisek Junior of New Brighton on 
January 19th.Beaver County District Attorney Dale Fouse isn't saying who 
paid Hanner. At the time of the shooting, Helisek's son was in jail and 
expected to testify for prosecutors in a drug case.Police say they 
connected Hanner to the slaying through a cell phone that was dropped at 
the scene.

(source: AP)

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