death penalty news

March 2, 2005


USA:

Juvenile death penalty abolished

In a seminal 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court strikes down capital 
punishment for those who commit crimes under age 18.

The US Supreme Court has struck down the juvenile death penalty, embracing 
a constitutional challenge that the nation's evolving standards of decency 
have rendered the practice cruel and unusual.

In a landmark decision announced Tuesday, the justices ruled 5 to 4 that 
state laws authorizing capital punishment for 16- and 17-year-olds who 
commit murder violate the Eighth Amendment and are henceforth 
unconstitutional. The action reverses the death sentences of 72 convicted 
murderers who committed their crimes as juveniles.

Juvenile justice advocates hail the ruling as a major advance for American 
society. "This is a great day," says Marsha Levick of the Juvenile Law 
Center in Philadelphia.

"It confirms that America's standards of decency have indeed evolved and 
that children are different," says Stephen Harper, a professor of juvenile 
justice at the University of Miami.

The high court said a national consensus had emerged in opposition to the 
execution of juveniles. Dissenting justices said the fact that 20 states 
authorize the death penalty for juveniles is proof that no such consensus 
has emerged.

The ruling in a case called Roper v. Simmons means the death penalty still 
applies to anyone age 18 and older. But juries can no longer be asked to 
assess whether defendants who committed their crimes between ages 16 and 18 
were mature and culpable enough at the time of the crime to warrant 
society's harshest punishment. Instead, teens who commit even the most 
heinous crimes will face a maximum punishment of life in prison.

"The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and 
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death 
penalty despite insufficient culpability," writes Justice Anthony Kennedy 
for the majority.

"The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes 
between childhood and adulthood," Justice Kennedy says. "It is, we 
conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest."

Kennedy was joined in the majority opinion by Justices John Paul Stevens, 
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer.
The rationale

The majority justices extended to the juvenile death penalty the same 
analysis used in a 2002 landmark ruling invalidating the death penalty for 
persons with mental retardation. The justices said youth, like a mental 
disability, can so reduce a criminal's blameworthiness or culpability as to 
require a constitutional bar against capital punishment.

"An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded 
nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based 
on youth as a matter of course," Kennedy writes, "even where the juvenile 
offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity 
should require a sentence less severe than death."

In a dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor criticizes the majority for 
usurping the role of state lawmakers and jurors in deciding the issue.

"The rule decreed by the court rests, ultimately, on its independent moral 
judgment that death is a disproportionately severe punishment for any 
17-year-old offender," Justice O'Connor writes. "I do not subscribe to this 
judgment. Adolescents as a class are undoubtedly less mature, and therefore 
less culpable for their misconduct, than adults," she says. "But the court 
has adduced no evidence impeaching the seemingly reasonable conclusion 
reached by many state legislatures: that at least some 17-year-old 
murderers are sufficiently mature to deserve the death penalty."

The decision stems from a Missouri murder case involving a teen sentenced 
to death for tying up a woman while burglarizing her home. He then dumped 
her - still bound and alive - into a river. Christopher Simmons was 17 at 
the time of the crime.

While planning the burglary and murder, Mr. Simmons told his friends that 
even if he was caught, nothing would happen to him because he was a juvenile.

The Missouri Supreme Court struck down Simmons's death sentence, citing a 
2002 decision by the US Supreme Court barring execution of the mentally 
retarded. The Missouri high court applied the ruling in the context of a 
juvenile death-penalty case, even though the US Supreme Court itself had 
not yet extended its 2002 ruling to juveniles.

In taking up the Missouri case, the Supreme Court agreed to explore two 
questions. First, can a lower court like the Missouri Supreme Court extend 
US Supreme Court precedents into new areas prior to the high court itself 
doing so?
Key question

Second, the justices agreed to examine whether a national consensus has 
emerged that the juvenile death penalty is a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment.

Kennedy did not address the Missouri Supreme Court's actions in his 
opinion. In a dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia raised the issue, saying the 
Missouri high court had engaged in a "flagrant disregard" of Supreme Court 
precedent by applying the court's analysis in the 2002 case to the juvenile 
death-penalty case before the high court itself had done so.

"Allowing lower courts to reinterpret the Eighth Amendment whenever they 
decide enough time has passed for a new snapshot leaves this court's 
decisions without any force," Justice Scalia writes.

He also criticized the majority opinion for including references to 
international opposition to the juvenile death penalty.

"Only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile 
offenders since 1990," Kennedy writes. "Since then each of these countries 
has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public 
disavowal of the practice."

Anticipating criticism, Kennedy adds, "The opinion of the world community, 
while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant 
confirmation for our own conclusions."

Scalia was undeterred in his dissent. "To invoke alien law when it agrees 
with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned 
decisionmaking, but sophistry," he says.

(source: Christian Science Monitor)

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