April 19


TEXAS:

Prosecutors to ask jurors to keep Garza on death row


Prosecutors began reconstructing the 1998 killing of a retired preacher
for a jury who will determine if the man convicted for his murder will
remain on death row.

A jury convicted and sentenced Joe Franco Garza of Lubbock six years ago
on one count of capital murder for strangling and robbing 71-year-old
Silbiano Rangel in 1998.

Garza, now 34, wrapped a sock around the man's neck and choked him to
death, before stealing Rangel's truck, wallet and ring reportedly for beer
money, according to court records.

Members of Rangel's family gathered in the courtroom as attorneys began to
argue the case.

"I never expected to be here again," Silbiano Rangel Jr. said as he took
the stand to testify about his father.

His father was devoted to his faith and family, he said. Rangel founded a
baptist church in Littlefield and loved to work with his children and fish
with his grandchildren.

Rangel never returned home after giving Garza a ride to a liquor store in
December 1998.

His body was later discovered face down in the 7300 block of King Avenue.
A sock was knotted around his neck.

Witnesses testified that Garza began drinking early on the day of the
killing; he then left with Rangel and returned home in the victim's truck.

Garza and his girlfriend  a 13-year-old who was pregnant with his child
then fled to Dallas and returned after ditching the pickup, according to
the testimony.

Rosemary Dominguez, Garza's cousin, testified that she witnessed the
strangulation but did not report it to police.

"Joe said he was going to put it on me and my son," she said "I was scared
and confused."

Garza's attorney did question Dominguez's credibility and her involvement,
citing two statements given to police which an investigator testified
contained false information.

Dominguez also said she helped Garza put Rangel's body into the backseat
of the truck.

The jury will not be asked to dispute Garza's guilt. They will only
consider his sentence.

A federal judge in August found that information omitted in Garza's first
trial may have led a jury to sentence him to life.

U.S. District Judge Sam Cummings ordered that a Lubbock County District
Court retry the punishment phase of Garza's trial and include information
about his criminal record as a juvenile.

The only punishments in Texas for a capital offense are a life sentence or
the death penalty.

The trial is expected to last through the week.

(source: Lubbock Avalanche-Journal)

*******************

Johnson's execution date could soon be set


Michael Dewayne Johnson is in line to become the 2nd murderer convicted in
Waco to be executed this year.

The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans has denied a motion
from Johnson asking that the court reconsider its ruling from last month
that rejected the death row inmates latest appeal.

That means that Johnson is eligible to have an execution date set, which
54th State District Judge George Allen likely will do next week.

Prosecutor Crawford Long said the attorney generals office, which handles
federal appeals filed by death row inmates, has suggested that Johnsons
execution date be set for early fall.

Johnson, formerly of Balch Springs, was sentenced to death after a 1996
trial in Waco in the September 1995 shooting death of Jeff Wetterman
during a robbery at the Wetterman family convenience store in Lorena.

Waco attorney Greg White, who is handling Johnsons appeals, said he now
will ask the U.S. Supreme Court to review Johnsons case.

Allen also has set an Aug. 30 execution date for Billie Wayne Coble, whose
motion for rehearing was rejected last month by the 5th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals.

Coble has been on death row since his conviction in Waco in April 1990 in
the shooting deaths of his estranged wifes parents, Robert and Zelda
Vicha, and her brother, Waco police Sgt. Bobby Vicha.

(source: Waco Tribune-Herald)






MISSOURI:

Defense seeks to depose doctor involved in executions


Attorneys for a death row inmate want to depose a doctor and nurse so they
can argue that a drug combination used to kill condemned prisoners is
unconstitutionally cruel.

But the state has blocked the move, in part out of concern that the
medical personnel would be harassed. The defense said it had agreed to
shield their identity.

The defense team is not seeking a reprieve of the death penalty for
convicted killer Michael Taylor of Kansas City. Attorney Donald Verrilli
Jr. of Washington, D.C., told a federal appeals court panel in St. Louis
that the 3-drug cocktail used in Missouri and around the country can
result in a "horrible, excruciating death" if the anesthesia doesnt take
effect or wears off.

Similar arguments are being made in death penalty cases around the
country. But the defense in this case offered an alternative: a single
dose of barbiturate, said to be constitutionally permissible and to attain
the same result.

Verrilli asked the 3-judge panel to send the case back to U.S. District
Court in Kansas City to be heard by the original judge assigned to the
case.

In January, a hearing to weigh the cruel-punishment argument was
transferred from Judge Scott O. Wright to Judge Fernando Gaitan because
Gaitans schedule could accommodate it more quickly. At the close of the
hastily convened, 2-day hearing, Gaitan ruled that Missouris execution
protocol was constitutionally permissible.

Taylors defense team said it needed the testimony of the doctor and nurse
involved in state executions to argue the case. The defense also wants to
present a witness who couldnt make Gaitans hearing.

Taylor had been scheduled to be executed Feb. 1 in the 1989 kidnapping,
rape and murder of 15-year-old Ann Harrison of Kansas City.

(source: Associated Press)






USA:

Whose Truth Is It, Anyway?


Imagine a situation where prosecutors have spent years investigating their
case -- they have their theory, and the trial is underway. A defense
witness exists who is available to testify and would completely undercut
the prosecution's theory. But he is too afraid to testify because the
prosecutors might retaliate by bringing charges against him. No problem --
just get the witness to use immunity so he can tell the truth at trial,
right? Wrong.

Unfortunately, the same prosecutor who holds the sword of Damocles over
the witness's head has the sole power to grant immunity for that witness.
And, not surprisingly, that prosecutor often does not want to help the
defendant.

This scenario replays itself in courtrooms all over America -- and there
is no reason for it. Judges who routinely make decisions on matters, both
large and small, are certainly equipped to decide what witnesses should
testify at trial to ensure due process and a fair trial. The law needs to
be changed.

Most criminal defense attorneys needing witnesses who are reluctant to
testify begin case preparation pessimistically because decades of case law
state that the power to grant immunity rests almost exclusively with
prosecutors. [FOOTNOTE 1] The time for reconsideration and reform has
come. If we cringe to think that a prosecutor could use a physically
coerced confession and we agree that illegally seized evidence is not
admissible, then why accept a system where exculpatory evidence of a
defendant's innocence can be (and often is) kept out at trial at the sole
discretion of an adversary party claiming to represent the government's
interests in a fair trial?

Trials, particularly criminal ones where a person's liberty is at stake,
are supposed to be forums for seeking the truth. However, given the
government's immunity power under the current statutes, prosecutors often
"encourage" potential defense witnesses not to testify by declaring that
their investigation is ongoing and that the witnesses may someday be
charged. This has the potential for enormous abuse as, in many cases, that
"future" prosecution never occurs, and all that has resulted was that a
key defense witness has been kept off the stand.

The issue of defense witness immunity has risen to the forefront in
several recent high-profile white-collar cases. It is a principle issue on
appeal in the case of Bernard Ebbers, the former WorldCom president and
CEO convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy charges and sentenced to
25 years imprisonment.

In another recent 4-month federal jury trial, a Mississippi plaintiffs
attorney (whom Chadbourne & Parke represented) was accused of corruptly
influencing judges who presided over his cases. He sought to call 2
attorneys in his law firm who tried the cases in question to show their
merits. Right up until the moment the defense case began, the prosecutors
kept waffling about the status of these attorneys (targets or not) and
whether they would be given immunity, which never occurred. Under the
circumstances, the attorneys refused to testify. The real shame was that
the court's inherent and nondelegable power to ensure due process was
usurped by the prosecutors' actions (which, luckily for this defendant,
did not result in conviction).

In another case, this one pending in Virginia, two pro-Israel foreign
policy lobbyists stand accused of the illegal disclosure of classified
defense information. The defendants (one of whom Chadbourne & Parke
represents) has tried to secure the trial testimony of various government
officials and private citizens in the foreign policy arena. Some of these
potential witnesses have provided favorable statements in the media about
the defendants' innocence. Yet, as trial approaches, all have raised the
concern of prosecutorial retaliation and believe that, without a grant of
immunity, they do not want to testify where prosecutors are threatening to
make legitimate lobbying into a crime. Even individuals whose actions are
more than 20 years old are wary because of prosecutors' statements to them
about "ongoing conspiracies."

In a system that is supposed to be fair and concerned about truth, why
should it be the prosecutor rather than the court who gets to shape what
truth is told? And despite this clearly inequitable system, there is
little a federal judge can do about a prosecutor's prerogative to deny a
defense witness immunity. Judges traditionally tend to give wide latitude
to this area of prosecutorial discretion, except where the prosecutorial
misconduct is readily apparent and outrageously egregious.

Several circuits hold that federal district court judges have no power to
challenge a prosecution's decision to deny a defense witness immunity.
[FOOTNOTE 2] Other circuits, like the 2nd and D.C. Circuits, have held
that federal courts can review a prosecutor's decision not to grant a
defense witness immunity -- but only where there is clear prosecutorial
misconduct (e.g., hiding exculpatory evidence from the court or engaging
in blatant witness intimidation) and such testimony is material,
exculpatory, noncumulative and available from no other source. Even under
these circumstances, however, the court's ability to remedy this conduct
is limited and the bar for the defense to prove such misconduct is set
very high. [FOOTNOTE 3]

The best remedy is to amend the federal statutory law of immunity to
accommodate the search for truth and justice. The provisions of 18 U.S.C.
6000 et seq. can easily be changed to allow a defendant to make a
pre-trial application to a court (or during trial for good cause shown)
requesting immunity for a witness. The request, just like requests for
severance in order to secure the testimony of a co-defendant, [FOOTNOTE 4]
would have to be specific, state what the testimony would be and state why
their interests of justice outweigh allowing the testimony to be stifled.
This balancing is no more difficult than literally hundreds of
considerations trial judges weigh every day.

Judicial grants of defense witness immunity serve to facilitate the
truth-seeking process that is the bedrock for our rule of law. It should
be the courts -- not the prosecutors -- who should have the ultimate
authority in deciding what constitutes fair play and whether a defense
witness should be given immunity. Otherwise, whose truth is it, anyway?

Abbe Lowell heads and Obiamaka Okwumabua is a senior associate in
Chadbourne & Parke's special litigation and investigation practice group.

Law.com's ongoing IN FOCUS article series highlights opinion and analysis
from our site's contributors and writers across the ALM network of
publications.

::::FOOTNOTES::::

FN1 The decision to grant a witness immunity lies solely within the
executive branch, i.e., it rests with the prosecutor. See 18 U.S.C.  6002
-2003 (2005); see also United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 232 (1st
Cir. 1997).

FN2 See Castro, 129 F.3d at 232 (finding courts lack inherent authority to
grant immunity); United States v. Lahue, 261 F.3d 993, 1014 (10th Cir.
2001) (same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 995 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.
1993) (same); United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1483 (7th Cir.
1993) (same).

FN3 See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331 (D.C. 1996) (en banc)
(requiring prosecution to choose between immunizing critical defense
witnesses or to face dismissal of the indictment in case where court finds
prosecutorial distortion of fact-finding process); United States v.
Chitty, 760 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding due process requires granting
of defense witness immunity to safeguard defendant's right to essential
exculpatory testimony); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615
F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding judicial immunity for defense witness
only where the witness is available, testimony is clearly exculpatory and
essential, and the government does not have a strong countervailing
interest against granting immunity); United States v. De Palma, 476 F.
Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (vacating conviction finding prosecution's
reliance on immunized testimony in its case-in-chief while denying
immunity to defense witnesses denied defendant fair trial).

FN4 See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (holding that Rule 14
severance rests solely with the district court judge); United States v.
Rucker, 915 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1990) (granting severance upon
finding that co-defendant was the government's "best witness against the
other co-defendants"); United States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.
Mass. 2004) (holding severance necessary in case where co-defendant's
counsel acting as second prosecutor against defendant).

(source: Law.com)

********************

Study Fuels a Growing Debate Over Police Lineups


The police lineup is a time-honored staple of crime solving, not to
mention of countless cop movies and television shows like "Law and Order."
Each year, experts estimate, 77,000 people nationwide are put on trial
because witnesses picked them out of one.

In recent years many states and cities have moved to overhaul lineups, as
DNA evidence has exposed nearly 200 wrongful convictions, 3/4 of them
resulting primarily from bad eyewitness identification.

In the new method, the police show witnesses one person at a time, instead
of several at once, and the lineup is overseen by someone not connected to
the case, to avoid anything that could steer the witness to the suspect
the police believe is guilty.

But now, the long-awaited results of an experiment in Illinois have raised
serious questions about the changes. The study, the first to do a
real-life comparison of the old and new methods, found that the new
lineups made witnesses less likely to choose anyone. When they did pick a
suspect, they were more likely to choose an innocent person.

Witnesses in traditional lineups, by contrast, were more likely to
identify a suspect and less likely to choose a face put in the lineup as
filler.

Advocates of the new method said the Illinois study, conducted by the
Chicago Police Department, was flawed, because officers supervised the
traditional lineups and could have swayed witnesses.

But the results have empowered many critics who had worried that states
and cities were caving in to advocacy groups in adopting the new lineups
without solid evidence that they improved on the old ones.

"There are people who'd say it's better to let 10 guilty persons free to
protect against one innocent person being wrongfully convicted," said Roy
S. Malpass, a professor at the University of Texas at El Paso and an
analyst for the Illinois study, who served on a research group on
eyewitness identification for the National Institute of Justice in 1999.

"I'm fine with that when we're dealing with juvenile shoplifters," Dr.
Malpass said. "I'm not fine with that for terrorists. We haven't figured
out the risk there."

The new lineups lack some of the drama of the old. In some places,
witnesses view lineups on laptop computers to make them completely "blind"
to influence from someone administering the process.

Psychologists who favor these so-called sequential double-blind lineups
say that showing witnesses people one at a time makes lineups more
difficult for the witness, and therefore better. Witnesses have to compare
the person in front of them against their memory of the crime, rather than
simply against the other faces in the lineup.

"It turns a lineup into a much more objective, science-based procedure,"
said Gary L. Wells, a professor of psychology at Iowa State University and
a prominent proponent of blind sequential lineups. "The double-blind is a
staple of science; it makes as much sense to do it in a lineup as it does
in an experiment or drug trial."

In classroom studies by Dr. Wells and others, the sequential method was
found to reduce the number of times witnesses chose an innocent person,
without reducing the number of times they chose the right one.

The movement to change lineups took off in the 1990's after a growing
number of DNA exonerations. New Jersey was the first state to adopt the
sequential method, in 2001. The Wisconsin Legislature recently recommended
the same approach, as did commissions in North Carolina, Virginia and,
last week, California. Boston and Hennepin County, which includes
Minneapolis, use sequential lineups, and Washington, D.C., is studying
them in one district.

Still, lineup methods remain an open debate: law enforcement officials in
California and New York have resisted changes, arguing that the evidence
in favor of the sequential approach is not firm.

A guide for prosecutors produced in 1999 by the National Institute of
Justice study group said "there is not a consensus" and declined to
recommend sequential lineups as a "preferred" method.

But before the Illinois study, released last month, no one had compared
the 2 methods in the field.

The experiment was part of an overhaul package recommended in 2002 by the
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, set up by former Gov. George
Ryan of Illinois after DNA evidence exonerated several death row inmates.
It tested the 2 methods for a year in 3 dissimilar cities; half the
lineups were conducted sequentially and half were done simultaneously.

"Surprisingly," the study said, the sequential lineups proved less
reliable than the simultaneous ones.

Out of 700 lineups, witnesses in those using the simultaneous method chose
the correct suspect 60 percent of the time, compared with 45 percent of
the time for the sequential lineups. Witnesses in the sequential lineups
were more likely to pick the wrong person - someone brought in as filler -
choosing incorrectly 9 % of the time, versus just 3 % in the simultaneous
lineups.

And witnesses declined to make a pick in 47 % of the sequential lineups,
compared with 38 % of the simultaneous ones. (Percentages were rounded.)

"If you are going to take officers outside their comfort zone, you have to
be able to sell them on the reasons you are doing it," said Sheri
Mecklenburg, general counsel to the superintendent of the Chicago Police
Department and director of the experiment. "Based on this study, I think
we'd have a difficult time having them believe this is a way to get more
reliable eyewitness identifications."

Prosecutors elsewhere say the results make them less inclined to move to
sequential lineups.

"This is very powerful because it's real," said Patricia Bailey, an
assistant district attorney in Manhattan who has considered lineup changes
for New York City. "This isn't a classroom study where people are watching
a 30-second video of a crime that happened to someone else."

Paul A. Logli, president of the National District Attorneys Association,
said that his group would discuss lineups at its convention this fall, but
that many prosecutors were doubters.

"I think many prosecutors think doing it sequentially runs contrary to
human nature," Mr. Logli said. "Human nature tells me that having the
ability to compare is more helpful than destructive. Doing it sequentially
is almost like this is a trick question."

Dr. Wells of Iowa State said the Illinois study had not validly compared
the two lineup methods because simultaneous lineups had not been done
"blind."

But Dr. Malpass of the University of Texas and Ms. Mecklenberg said the
point was to study the new method against the status quo.

The new study will be the focus of a conference Friday at the Loyola
University Chicago School of Law. Thomas P. Sullivan, a former United
States attorney in Chicago and the co-chairman of the governor's
commission that recommended the study, said that already, the results had
"changed the debate."

"It has put a cloud over the sequential system," Mr. Sullivan said. "I
think it will retard the system throughout the country until this gets
sorted out."

But others say changes to lineups should focus on other elements that
studies have shown produce more reliable picks: reducing pressure on
witnesses by advising them that they do not have to pick someone; making
sure that "fillers" strongly resemble the suspect; and recording what the
witness says upon choosing a suspect, so juries can hear how certain they
were about a pick.

"I don't understand why the rest of these reforms shouldn't be adopted
immediately," said Barry C. Scheck, a co-director of the Innocence
Project, a legal clinic that uses DNA evidence to try to overturn wrongful
convictions. "The controversy over sequential blind has obscured the fact
that all the other reforms are not in dispute."

Ms. Mecklenburg, in Chicago, said, "There are no sides in this debate."

"We all want the same thing," she said. "Whether you are a prosecutor or
police or defense counsel, we all want reliable eyewitness
identifications."

(source: The New York Times)

*****************

Cruel punishment


I don't know about others, but I think killing any human being is wrong.
People who support the death penalty believe it is the right thing to do.
However, most people who support the death penalty only give one reason as
to why it is worthwhile: They believe if a criminal kills someone, then
that criminal should also be killed.

Those who are against the death penalty believe it is the ultimate cruel,
inhumane and degrading punishment. They also think it violates the right
to life. Yes, even though criminals take the life away from innocent
victims, the state should not kill them. 2 wrongs do not make a right.

The death penalty is the wrong way to go.

CHRISTINA FOGGIE, Age 14, Harrington Middle School, Mount Laurel

(source: Letter to the Editor, Courier Post ( New Jersey)

************************

High Court Debates Defendants' Right to Counsel of Choice


It is not often that the movie "My Cousin Vinny" -- or any movie, for that
matter -- is invoked during a Supreme Court argument.

But on Tuesday, the 1992 movie about a personal injury lawyer from
Brooklyn who represents a relative in a murder trial in Alabama seemed
right on point.

The question before the Court: How important is the right of paying
defendants to be represented by the lawyer of their choice?

Quite important, bordering on fundamental, seemed to be the answer of most
justices, ranging from Antonin Scalia to David Souter. In a lively,
hourlong argument in the case United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, justices
took a rare excursion into examining the merits and foibles of the legal
profession.

A majority appeared to agree that even if a defendant picks a lawyer who
is an inexperienced relative -- as in the movie -- or a lawyer determined
to make an outlandish argument, that is the defendant's constitutionally
protected right. In the movie, by the way, Vinny warms to the task and
ultimately gets his cousin and his cousin's friend off the hook.

In the case before the Court, a Missouri federal trial judge barred the
first-choice California lawyer of drug-conspiracy defendant Cuauhtomec
Gonzalez-Lopez, leaving him with a St. Louis lawyer who had never argued a
criminal case, and lost. The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals tossed out
Gonzalez-Lopez's conviction, ruling that the judge's improper exclusion of
the first lawyer amounted to a structural defect that warranted automatic
reversal of the conviction.

Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben argued that reversal should not
be so automatic, urging that some kind of inquiry be required to determine
if the rejection of a 1st-choice lawyer prejudices the outcome of a case,
especially when the replacement lawyer is competent.

That kind of inquiry misses the point, Scalia bellowed. "I don't want a
competent lawyer; I want a lawyer who will get me off," he said. "I want
the lawyer who will invent the Twinkie defense."

"Twinkie defense" is the derisive shorthand phrase referring to the
defense argument developed in the 1970s that a diet high in sugar can lead
to diminished capacity and less culpability for crime.

Scalia hastened to add that he thought the Twinkie defense was crazy but
that a client ought to have the right to pick a lawyer who will try crazy
strategies that might just work.

Souter saw an even bigger issue at stake in the case: the "autonomy
interest" of the client. Tied up in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
Souter suggested, was the ability of the defendant to direct his or her
defense.

Justice John Paul Stevens also said the "autonomy interest is powerful,"
describing the defendant's experience of going on trial as "very
traumatic."

Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. appeared to dismiss that argument, however,
suggesting that whatever right exists to counsel of choice, it is not a
defendant's right to the "expression of autonomy." Roberts also warned
that if a right to counsel of choice is given too much weight, there will
be nothing to stop it from being applied in cases of appointed counsel for
indigents, as well.

Jeffrey Fisher, the lawyer for defendant Gonzalez-Lopez, generally
received easier questions than Dreeben, and he scored points when he said
that automatic reversal is the proper remedy when "the government
affirmatively interferes" with a defendant's choice of counsel. It happens
rarely, Fisher said, but when it has, all the appeals courts that have
ruled on the issue have adopted an automatic-reversal rule.

Justice Samuel Alito Jr. offered the hypothetical of a defendant who wants
a relative, a real estate lawyer, to defend him, but when that lawyer is
barred by the judge, the replacement lawyer is someone with a national
reputation in criminal work who still loses nonetheless. Would that
defendant be able to win reversal?

Fisher said yes, at which point Scalia gleefully said, "A real case of 'My
Uncle Vinny'!" slightly mislabeling the movie. But Fisher picked up the
point, asserting the "autonomy interest" a defendant should enjoy.

Fisher ran into some trouble when Roberts asked whether the rule he was
asserting would also apply to a defendant's appeal. If the Supreme Court
itself, for example, refused to admit a lawyer of choice pro hac vice,
would that be a Sixth Amendment violation?

Fisher, a lawyer with Davis Wright Tremaine, was caught off-guard but
said, "Yes, this is a right that would go forward on appeal." Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg asked incredulously whether that means the Supreme Court
would have to repeat oral arguments in cases where a party's preferred
lawyer was not accepted.

Scalia tossed Fisher a lifeline, noting that the right of counsel has
different dimensions in the appeals context. Fisher told the justices, "I
haven't thought through" the appeals issue, and his momentary misstep
seemed to have been fixed.

(source: Legal Times)

*********************

More executions are halted----Cruel punishment of lethal injection


A STRING of recent court rulings could stop the use of lethal injection by
the U.S. death penalty machine. The rulings come in the wake of evidence
suggesting that prisoners executed by lethal injection--a supposedly
"painless" method--may, in fact, have endured agonizing deaths

In North Carolina last week, U.S. District Judge Malcolm Howard told
prison officials that they would need a medical professional during the
execution of Willie Brown--slated for April 21--to make sure that Brown is
sedated enough before paralytic and heart-stopping drugs are injected into
his body. But the American Medical Association's code of ethics prohibits
doctors taking an active role in executions, so it may be hard for North
Carolina to find a willing accomplice.

In February, a California judge ruled that a licensed anesthesiologist
would have to oversee the execution of Michael Morales, or that the state
would have to change the drugs used to kill prisoners. When doctors
refused to participate, Morales' execution--and all executions in the
state--were halted indefinitely.

Several years ago, an appeals court halted executions in New Jersey
pending an explanation from corrections officials about the state's lethal
injection procedures. The New Jersey legislature adopted a 1-year
moratorium on executions this January.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently stopped an execution in Florida to hear
arguments that lethal injection, as currently practiced, constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.

Three drugs are used in the lethal injection procedure. The 1st chemical,
sodium thiopental, is a barbiturate used to sedate an inmate.

The 2nd drug, pancuronium, paralyzes the body. The 3rd, potassium
chloride, stops the heart.

Lethal injection is the preferred method of execution in 35 states, and
pro-death penalty forces have always maintained that the procedure is
humane--similar to being "put to sleep."

Leaving aside the torment that prisoners go through while waiting to be
killed, and the fear and pain they undergo as intravenous lines are
inserted, death penalty opponents point out that if sodium thiopental is
improperly administered, it leaves the prisoner conscious throughout the
execution, suffocating and in excruciating pain caused by the drugs, but
unable to cry out because of drug-induced paralysis.

A Florida study has shown low levels of anesthetic in the bloodstreams of
executed inmates--suggesting that they were, in effect, tortured to death.
Likewise, in North Carolina, Judge Howard based his decision on the fact
that post-mortem levels of sodium thiopental in the bodies of four North
Carolina inmates executed over the past 6 months suggest they might have
been conscious as they were killed.

Witnesses at lethal injections have frequently reported seeing prisoners
in pain. In the North Carolina case, Judge Howard also noted that three
lawyers who had witnessed executions in the state had seen condemned men
writhing and gagging during their executions.

"Instead of the quiet death I expected," one of the lawyers, Cynthia
Adcock, said in a sworn statement about her client Willie Fisher, who was
executed in 2001, "Willie began convulsing. The convulsing was so extreme
that Willie's cousin jumped up screaming."

The evidence is clear: There's no such thing as a "humane" execution.

(source: Socialist Worker)






TENNESSEE----impending execution

Corrections Taking Media Applications For Witnessing Execution


The Tennessee Department of Correction is accepting applications from
recognized news organizations to serve as witnesses for the scheduled
execution of death row inmate Sedley Alley.

7 media witnesses and two alternates will be selected by the Department of
Correction during an open drawing to be held at Riverbend Maximum Security
Institution located at 7475 Cockrill Bend Boulevard, Nashville.

The drawing will take place next Tuesday at 10 a.m. CDT.

The drawing will be conducted in accordance with the Rules of the
Tennessee Department of Correction Adult Services Division, Chapter
0420-3-4, under the authority of TCA 40-23-116.

Only one application will be permitted from each news organization.

Sedley Alley was convicted of the 1985 murder of Suzanne Collins in Shelby
County. The execution is currently scheduled for May 17.

(source: The Chattanoogan)




Reply via email to